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ABSTRACT 
Kennedy Agade Mkutu 
Title: Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms in North Rift, North East 
Africa. 
Key words: Pastoralists, conflict, governance, small arms, security, disarmament, 
vigilante, gender, public health, Kenya, Uganda. 
3 0-40 million people in and areas depend entirely on animals for their livelihood. Of 
these 50-60% are found in Africa with largest number found in the North Eastern 
region. Pastoralism depends largely on the availability and access to water and 
pasture. However, pastoralism is under threat. This is due to a range of factors 
including weak governance; inadequate land and resource management policies; 
political and economic marginalization of pastoral groups. These have been initiated 
by the colonial regimes and continued by postcolonial governments. Increasingly 
cattle raids have resulted in insecurity fuelled by the proliferation of small arms and 
light weapons in pastoral communities. 
The thesis identifies several factors contributing to pastoral conflicts in North Rift, 
Northeast Africa (Karamoja, West Pokot, Baragoi, and Do! Dol Mukogodo) These 
include communal resource conflict at the local, district, national and regional levels. -- 
The increase in drought has drastically reduced the amount of water and pasture 	, 
available, thus escalating the vicious circle of cattle raids and counter raids. The 	C 
drought has provoked greater need for movement and made clashes more likely. The 
situation is made worse by the weak governance or no governance in some areas. 
Official government structures or institutions of justice are conspicuous by their 
absence. The deficit has been substituted by a proliferation of vigilante groups of 
armed youth created either by the government or ad-hoc by the community. In recent 	- 	z 
years the areas have seen the emergence of local businessmen and warlords, whose ; . 	 C., 
economic activities span cattle raiding, small arms sales, drugs and who are at the 	- 
centre of incipient regional criminal networks linked to national networks. 
Small arms are not the cause of the pastoral conflict; they have simply intensified the 
conflict. Since 2001 until now small arms have drastically dropped in cost. But the 
ammunition prices have tripled due to their scarcity. Small arms in the pastoral areas 
have since the 1980s   negatively impacted the communities. Small arms injuries can 
be counted like the incidence of any disease, and from the figures it is clear that a 
public health crisis is mounting as the violence continues. The 5000 victims of gun 
wounds over 18 months in Nakapiripirit area alone should be viewed as a major 
problem. 
No common policy on intervention by the states ia, available. Attempts at 
interventions have been poorly coordinated and executed, too often taking a narrow 
definition of security that has focused on more or less coercive disarmament without 
focusing sufficiently on providing viable economic alternatives to those whose 
livelihoods have become dependent on the gun. Finally, traditional structures of 
authority within communities have been gravely weakened, as have some of the 
cultural restraints upon violence that operated in the past. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This research study examines the relationships between ethnic conflict, governance, small 
arms proliferation and violence as they relate to pastoralists in the Horn of Africa. An 
estimated five million small arms are alleged to be circulating in Nairobi city alone 2, and 
the number in the pastoral communities in northeast Africa and the entire Horn region is 
unknown. In 2001, the Washington File on Africa noted: "illegal arms in Kenya had 
reached crisis proportions." 3 Although small arms have proliferated in the Horn for 
decades, attention to the problems associated with their illegal transfers and misuse is 
fairly recent4 . Current interest coincides with civilians' decisions to arm themselves and 
with their use of small arms in livestock rustling and criminal activities. Such arms are 
usually acquired illegally. Therefore the stockpiles, transfers, and use of illicit small arms 
comprise a serious security and development challenge to countries in the Horn of Africa. 
The problem is especially acute in Kenya and Uganda within pastoralist communities and 
between the pastoralists and other communities, and this study addresses the problem. 
Arms transfers and the conflicts they feed are having a devastating impact on sub 
Saharan Africa. Mkutu (2001) demonstrates that they have significantly prolonged and 
intensified instability, violence and insecurity of livelihood. Since 1989, Africa has 
experienced more armed conflicts than any other continent5 . By the 1990s wars in Africa 
2  Daily Nation, 18 December 2000 "5,000 Guns Unlicensed in Nairobi" 
Http://usinfor.state.gov . July 10, 2001:4 
It was only 15 March, 2000, that the issue of small arms was placed on the security agenda of the 
countries of the region. The meeting brought together ten countries from the Horn and the Great Lakes 
region, which are adjacent, and overlap. The meeting led to the signing of the Nairobi Declaration that lays 
the basis for devising a regional approach to the management and control of small arms. 
See Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 1997:339 
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had increasingly taken on a regional character, especially in the Greater Horn of Africa. 6 
A second type of armed conflict is the small communal conflicts, which are rarely 
reported, but have the potential to evolve into greater civil wars. This study will 
concentrate on pastoralism conflict and small arms in North East Africa, which fall into 
the second category, but which are more devastating overall than the large-scale wars. 
This chapter gives a brief overview of the research area, describes the genesis of the 
research, describes study methodology and how access to data was gained, identifies 
ethical issues and limitations, and briefly outlines the content of the thesis. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The small arms 7 issue has emerged as the latest problem to be tackled by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), funding agencies and governments in order to 
improve human security and development in northeast Africa. Why? The proliferation of 
small arms and light weapons is associated with the escalation and intensification Of 
conflicts, crime and violence in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa 8 . The area 
has been ravaged by conflict and cattle rustling within and between border communities, 
with violent use of small arms. Conflicts over diminishing resources continue to 
characterize the socio-economic and political life in the region and in sub-Saharan Africa 
6  Covers the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa, which include Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Sudan and Eritrea. 
These include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and 
light machine guns. Light weapons also consist of heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barr-el and 
mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of 
anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, and mortars of less than I OOmm.caliber. Ammunition and explosives 
also fall under stnall arms and light weapons and consist of cartridges for small arms; shells and missiles 
for light weapons, anti-personnel and anti-tank grenades; land mines; mobile containers with missiles or 
shells for single action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems; and explosives. See UN A/52/29S 27 August, 
1997. This thesis uses the term 'small arms', 'light weapons', and 'firearms', interchangeably as the over-
lap is great. 	 - 
8  There are currently 3 ongoing conflicts in the Horn of Africa (Southern Sudan, Uganda north, Ethiopia 
and Eritrea), in addition to one collapsed state (Somalia), and much pastoral conflict and banditry with the 
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as a whole. Many of those affected are non-combatants: women, the elderly and 
children, as well as the young men who are forced to become warriors. The conflicts 
among the pastoralists have not spared the peacekeepers, relief workers and 
entrepreneurs; who more and more become victims. 
Towards the beginning of the 20th  centuly, pastoralists faced major challenges 9 and 
threats emanating from political marginalization, drought, and competition for grazing 
land, diseases and stock theft.' ° In addition, inept aid and development policies continue 
to affect them. Between 1990s and now, next to political conflict, insecurity from small 
arms proliferation has become the main problem affecting pastoralist communities and 
urban areas in Kenya 1 ' and Uganda. In the Rift Valley of Kenya, where nomadic and 
semi- nomadic pastoral and agro-pastoral communities occupy two thirds of the country's 
landmass, cattle rustling has increased ten fold in the last decade as small arms and light 
weapons have flooded into the region.' 2 The problem, however, cuts across regional 
boundaries and has engulfed Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Somalia and Ethiopia. 
The epicentre is in the upper Rift Valley where the Pokot, Marakwet, Samburu, Turkana, 
Oromo, Karimojong, Be, and Toposa share borders and keep livestock (cattle, camels and 
donkeys) as the main economic activity. Some of the communities, such as the Turkana, 
Karamojong, Samburu and Pokot, depend almost entirely on livestock for their 
livelihood. Civil unrest in the region is high, as seen by widespread cattle rustling across 
national boundaries. 
use of small arms in Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, and Kenya. 
Pastoralism is.a subsistence system that relies on domesticated animal production for meat, milk , hides 
and blood etc or tending herds of largc animals native to parts of Asia, Europe, Africa and the Middle East. 
Pastoralism is the core activity in and and semi and areas and relies mainly on pasture and water with some 
little agriculture combined in some areas. It is a nomadic way of lifestyle. 
10  Mkutu 2001; Kashay et al., 1998 
1  See for example Kenya Times 21 April 2004. Nairobi alone has nearly 5,000 small arms circulating. 
12  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 200 1-2004:35. 
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Livestock raids in the last two decades have been well organized and sophisticated. 
Historically, raids came once a year; the raided group knew the raiders were coming, and 
no one used AK47s. A man in traditional war costume would alert the other clan. 
Raiders would round up the cows, but herders were never killed. Women and the 
disabled were not killed, or if they were, such actions were thought to bring bad luck to 
the killers' families. The technology was primitive: spears, stones, arrows, and 
occasionally an old 303 rifle. 
The problem of cattle rustling and small arms became so serious in 1999, that the former 
President of Kenya directed the police to shoot cattle rustlers on sight and ordered 
punishment for whole communities abetting the practice. Raiding has come dramatically 
to national and regional awareness by raids that have repeatedly closed road contact 
within large areas of the North Rift. The lethality of the raiding can be illustrated by a 
raid in April, 2000, where a gang of 500 armed bandits with AK47s, G3s and Mark 4 
rifles, invaded Baragoi, Samburu District of Kenya, stole 5,000 cattle, camels and 
donkeys; and left five Kenya government officers hurt and thirty people and 100 animals 
dead 13 . Proliferation of small arms is associated not only with escalating cattle raids, but 
also with greater banditry and insecurity on roads and killings in villages. It has also 
made the control of livestock diseases a more difficult task. (OAU/IBAR, Report, 2001). 
The need for research and cooperation to find practical and mutually beneficial sOlutions 
cannot be over-emphasized. The first meeting of African experts in 2000 stressed the 
need for data collection and policy oriented research to guide efforts to control the illicit 
small arms trade (OAU, 2000:22). The regional foreign ministers then met in March 2000 
signing the "Nairobi Declaration" 4 and later its "coordinated agenda for action" 15 that 
13  Daily Nation 18 April 2000. 
Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the 
Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, March 2000. http://www.ploughshares. 
caJCONTENTIBUILD%20PEACEINairobiDeclarOO.html 
15  "Coordinated Agenda for Action on the Problem of the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
5 
placed the issue of insecurity and the spread of small arms on the security agenda of 
nations in the greater Horn of Africa (GHA) region. The destructive and debilitating 
impact of the availability and use of small arms and light weapons is now a serious 
concern for different countries and regions worldwide. The U.S. Embassy in Kenya noted 
that small arms proliferation has reached a crisis in Kenya. (Washington File for Africa, 
2001). The UN (2001) Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons 
in All its Aspects underscored the importance of small arms in exacerbating and 
prolonging conflicts around the world. That conference is one of the latest high-level 
attempts to curtail the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. It aimed to agree on 
a set of measures to curb the illegal trade, circulation and re-circulation of small arms and 
light weapons 16 . 
The conference created a valuable document that proposed global, regional and national 
actions to reduce the dangers of the diffusion of small arms' 7. Its most useful 
recommendation was for well-organized government regulation of small arms exports, 
not to obstruct them, but to guarantee their legality. It has made sure that small arms 
issues get attention by African Union, East African Cooperation and the IGAD. 
The scope and magnitude of conflict in Africa has increased in the last two decades. 
Nowhere is this pattern more clearly demonstrated than in the fragile, and peripheries of 
the Horn of Africa. For the past thirty years, the Horn has been in a state of turmoil, 
devastated by drought and famine and torn by civil war and at least three regional 
conflicts, bringing death to millions. The proliferation of light weapons, financed by 
cash, diamonds, or other commodities, did not cause Africa's wars, but it has prolonged 
them and made them more lethal. 
in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa November 2000. 
16  The United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light WeapGns in All its Aspects, 
9-20, 2001. UN Headquarters, New York. http://www.clw.org/atop/salw/un_conference.html 
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Two types of armed conflicts are now rampant in the Greater Horn 18 of Africa. One is the 
large-scale conflict such as the wars in Democratic Republic of Congo, in Northern 
Uganda and currently in Southern Sudan and the Darfur area. These wars are widely 
covered by the press. The second type of conflict is intra and interethnic conflict among 
pastoralists, which are not often reported. Little is known about them though it is 
assumed that there is a causal relationship between small arms availability and the 
intensification of the level of violence. As noted by Osterle and Bollig (2003:13); 
Guns have been discussed as a new means of production, highlighting potential 
gains from raiding.... However, there has been little proof that guns are, in effect, 
consistently used in an economic way so as to accumulate scarce resources. 
Additionally, a detailed quantification of losses and damages is rarely presented. 
The spread and use of small arms in interethnic and intra-pastoral conflicts has 
exacerbated the nature of these small-scale resource conflicts. To date there have been 
only a few attempts by the governments of Kenya and Uganda to address the issue of 
small arms in pastoral communities. That is what this research is intended to study. 
Small arms and light weapons as tools of combat were increasingly in the limelight in the 
1990s. According to Kiare (2000), small arms are not just small, they are a distinct class. 
Their portability allows them to be carried by an individual or even a child. Their use 
requires minimal training. Most are easily concealed in the clothing or hand luggage of 
an individual. The problem of small arms is basically one of excessive accumulation and 
widespread abuse. Their easy access undermines both traditional and modern institutions 
of human security, conflict mediation and democratic governance. 19 They play an 
important role in creating and sustaining a culture of violence, which undermines human 
development and finally they contribute to criminal violence. A study such as this one 
' 7 lbid. 
Ibid. Footnote 3. 
19  Mkutu 2001. 
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should help fill a pressing need. 
1.2.1 Distinctiveness and Rationale for Choice of Study Areas. 
The North Rift is a geographical area, which was part of the former eastern province of 
Uganda before the 1884-5 Berlin Conference, which created the current international 
borders. The Uganda border then extended south and east to what is now Naivasha, 
Kenya, and the current Northeastern province of Kenya was part of Jada land province. 20 
Thus the area displays complex issues of two different states with distinctive colonial 
histories and border politics. Another complexity is the issue of multiple conflicts waged 
simultaneously at different levels (regional, national, district, inter-ethnic and local). The 
conflicts are varied in nature, including environmental and resource based conflicts, 21 
communal armed conflicts and political insurgencies. Different ethnic groups live in the 
area but share identical problems (See Figure 1.1) 
Figure 1.1 The People of the Karamojong Cluster 
Tribe Name Area occupied Country 
Turkana Turkana N.W. Kenya 
*Samburu Samburu/Kenya Kenya 
*Laikipia Laikipia/Kenya Kenya 
Pian Karamoja N.E. Uganda 
*Upe Pokotl Pokot Kenya Uganda/Kenya Uganda-Kenya border 
Tepes "people of mountain" Karamoja N.E. Uganda 
Bokora Karamoja N.E. Uganda 
Matheniko Karamoja N.E. Uganda 
Jie Karamoja/south Sudan N.E. Uganda/Sudan 
Dodoth Karamoja N.E. Uganda 
Toposa Sudan Sudan 
Nyangatom Sudan/Ethiopia Sudan/Ethiopia 
Teso Uganda/Kenya Uganda/Kenya 
*Didinga Sudan south Sudan 
*Mei.111e22 Sudan Ethiopia 
*Sebei Karamoja N.E Uganda/Kenya borders 
slndicates those who are not related linguistically related to the Karimoja cluster. They are howevei related to the Kalejin, who 
inhabit parts of Kenya's Rift Valley, Uganda, and Southern Sudan. The Karamoja cluster groups have different dialects 23 . 
20  See for example Ojany and Ogendo 1973:6 "The East African Protectorate before 1902" 
21  Water, land, pasture and control of minerals 
22  Merille are found between the River Omo in Ethiopia and Lake Turkana in Kenya 
23  For more on Karamoja cluster see Pa.zzaglia 1982. "Karimojong" are the people, "Karamoja" the region. 
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The people of the north Rift fall into two categories, the highland Nilotes or Kalenjin, 
who include Pokot, Sebei, Marakwet, Elgeyo, Tugen, Nandi and Kipsigisi and the Plain 
Nilotes, which here are composed of the Masai, Samburu and Karim oj ong-Teso. They 
have similar cultural and physical characteristics, though are linguistically different. 24 
Crops will not grow in these and and semi-arid areas, so people are forced to be nomadic 
pastoralists. All the tribes of the cluster own and value cattle; when drought, famine and 
disease reduce the herds, the people must get more through raiding. They intermarry, raid 
each other, and forge war alliances with and against each other. The areas straddle 
communities on both borders that are related but separated by the border. 25 The Turkana 
and Jie are related but separated by the border between Kenya and Uganda. In addition, 
the areas are characterized by weak state structures and by customary traditional elders 
who remain very powerful. In Kenya the areas have chiefs appointed by the state, but in 
Uganda the customary governance system still dominates. The communities themselves, 
using vigilantes and local militias protect the people in most of these areas. 
The problem of underdevelopment and purposeful abandonment by the government dates 
to the colonial regime, which preferred private to communal land ownership. Efforts were 
made by external forces to organize the pastoralists for ranching and to sedentarize them 
in an attempt to gain political control and to tax them. 
People's means of livelihood in North Rift is quite different from those in the south 
where modernization has been attempted. Access roads to the cities and major towns are 
rudimentary, and there are no railways. Other amenities like water, electricity and health 
care are extremely limited or absent. This condition hampers access to basic services such 
as health care, formal education, security and markets. It hinders efficiency and options, 
both for input resources and output products. Therefore, trade ability and income 
24  Karimojong cluster consists of seven tribes. 
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generation capacity in all the areas under study are severely restricted. Much of the 
existing social services in the North Rift has been provided by churches and missionaries; 
related to this is the fact that the majority of the people in the North Rift are not Muslims 
but nominal Christians or traditionalists. In northeastern areas by contrast the government 
provides services or they do not exist. Also the area is predominantly Muslim. As relates 
to land claims few claims exist in northeastern Kenya.26 
The marginalization, brutalisation and dehumanisation of the districts by the colonial 
state have been sustained by the postcolonial regimes. In other areas in Kenya and 
Uganda, this is less of a problem. Policies that began in the colonial and immediate post-
colonial periods have trigged many current contradictions and conflict between local 
people and the states. The area under study is still a subject of conflicting territorial 
claims based on policies from the colonial period. The conflicts, therefore, are partially 
linked to state formation. 
The areas studied are similar in ecology and harsh climatic conditions, and they are 
remote from the two countries' capital cities (Nairobi and Kampala). They are termed 
'hardship' areas by all civil servants sent to them. The areas were also chosen to allow 
representation of different communities, to portray different degrees of insecurity and 
intensity of conflict that exist in the North Rift; and to compare areas that have been 
targets of government interventions with those that have not. The uniqueness and its 
variety noted above and given that little work has been done in the area is the main 
rationale for the choice. 
Finally, the areas were selected because those most affectd by small arms conflict lie 
along the national borders in northeast Africa, and they also border under-developed 
25  For example, the Pokot extend from Baringo in Kenya to eastern Uganda. 
26  See for example, "Memorandum: The Pokot Land Claims in Trans Nzoia District (1895-2002)" 
Presented to the constitution of Kenya Review Presidential Commission of Enquiry into the Land Law 
Systems in Kenya and to His Excellency, The President of the Republic of Kenya, Daniel T. Arap Moi 18 
April 2002. 
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regions of neighbouring countries. Cross border conflict is complex because it is local, 
national, regional, international and global in nature. It becomes a national issue when it 
is manifested in intra-community raids, when the pastoralists cross borders to other 
neighbouring districts, or when the raids impinge on the security of the entire state of 
Kenya or Uganda. Such conflict takes an international dimension when the pastoralists 
raid people across the national boundary, e.g. Pokot against Karamoja or vice versa. It 
then takes a regional dimension when the Pokot attack the Karimojong and/or when the 
Turkana of Kenya ally with Karamoja to attack Sudanese Toposa and vice versa. Lastly 
the pastoral conflict takes a global dimension because small arms and light weapons are 
not manufactured in the areas but must be imported from abroad. The arms challenge is 
not just an African problem per se. Rather, it is a global challenge because of the 
intriguing nature of the arms flow into and within the Horn of Africa. No developed 
industry for small arms and ammunition 27 is located in any of the pastoral districts on the 
border. 
Relevance of the Research 
The work is relevant for policy communities as well as for the academics concerned with 
the interrelationships between conflict, governance and the availability of small arms in 
developing countries especially in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes. This work 
examines the problem of arms proliferation among pastoral people in unprecedented 
detail, and it shows that some widely held assumptions about the problem are misleading. 
The work takes an interdisciplinary perspective and looks beyond public-arena 
pronouncements. The dissertation also provides a detailed case study of small arms flows 
and their availability to violence, in the context of overlapping complex conflicts, and of 
the ways in which different governance strategies affect them. The study also examines 
the public health and economic impacts of small arms. In addition the work has generated 
an extensive literature review on arms and conflict in northeast Africa, and it contributes 
27  Though ammunition industries do not exist in pastoral areas, all three East African countries (Kenya, 
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to the understanding of crime as it relates to small arms. It also provides information, 
which should be useful to scholars in security studies and conflict resolution and to those 
who are interested in further investigating the areas of pastoralism conflict, small arms, 
governance and development. 
1.3 Genesis of the Research. 
My primary education was in Sameta high school, which is located on the border 
between the Kisii and the Masai in Kenya. The Masai are pastoralists, while the Kisii are 
mixed farmers. 28 From time to time, the Masai raid cattle from the Kisii, and the Kisii 
mount revenge raids to repossess their cattle and to punish the Masai. Sometimes, the 
interethnic fighting would affect the school. However, the fights between the Kisii and 
the Masai in 1980-1983 did not involve small arms; spears, arrows and sticks were the 
weapons of choice. 
In 1983-84, I was admitted to a boarding school on the Kenya-Tanzania border, where 
the Kuria occupy both sides of the border. The Kuria are mixed farmers who also herd 
cattle. They raided cattle across the borders of Migori and Tarime in Tanzania's 
Transmara districts. The Kuria had access to firearms, which were easily obtained from 
Uganda. The principal source of weapons was the instability in Uganda and Tanzania in 
1983-85 (Egesa and Mkutu, 2000) .29  The Tanzanian Kuria managed to get arms to their 
kinsmen on the Kenyan side. Among the cattle raiders were 11-14 year old boys from my 
school. This gave me an opportunity to begin to comprehend the problem through 
interaction with schoolmates. Once or twice bandits invaded the school. In December 
1983, 1 sat for advanced level exams and left Kuria. 
Uganda and Tanzania) have ammunition-manufacturing industries. 
28  They grow wheat, tea, and corn but also keep some cattle. 
In 1987, I went to study in United States. On return to Kenya in 1996, 1 found myself 
lecturing policy makers and state governors in Kenya, 3° of whom some worked in 
peripheral areas, which are mainly occupied by pastoralists. There livestock theft was 
prevalent. 
In November 1997, my first assignment as a lecturer was to supervise governors in two 
pastoral areas of Kenya, Marigat (Baringo District) and Maralal and Baragoi division 
(Samburu District). The governors were studying public administration. To get to 
Samburu from Marigat, one had to use back roads via Lake Bogoria and pass through 
Pokot and Tugen country. For miles, there was no life, except from time to time. On 
occasion young Pokot herding boys (pastoralists) would spring from the bush armed with 
bow and arrows. 31 This stimulated me to try and understand and help to solve the 
problems faced by the pastoralists and from 1998, I ensured that any work I supervised 
among policy makers was in pastoral areas and concerned cattle rustling. This enabled 
me to write one of the first works on cattle rustling and small arms in Samburu, which 
was presented at the Conference for Improving Human Security in East Africa, in 
Arusha, Tanzania. The study was later serialized in the local newspapers in Nairobi 32 . 1 
then decided the best way to help the world understand the security dilemma in pastoral 
areas of East Africa was to undertake further research in the area. Since joining the 
University of Bradford in 2001 1 have published some preliminary findings. Pastoralism 
and Conflict in the Horn of Africa (2001)Nairobi, London. APFO/Saferworld, University 
of Bradford and Pastoral conflict and small arms: The Kenya-Uganda border region 
(2003)London. Saferworld. I have also contributed in writing the report "Breaking the 
cycle of violence: building capacity for development in Karamoja, Uganda, SNV-
Uganda/Paxi Christi 
29  The fighters from Tanzania who liberated Uganda were mainly Kuria from Tanzania. 
30  District officers and top security officers and civil servants 
311 had watched the movie Gods Must be Crazy, but could not imagine such areas existed in Kenya. 
32  See People Daily 20 August, 2000. 
31  See appendix for other conferences and workshops attended and participated in. 2001-2004 
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The understanding of pastoralism conflict and small arms, and of their dynamics and 
complexity, are vital to peace, security, stability and development in Northeast Africa. It 
is because of the neglect of the small arms presence amongst the pastoralists that this 
research has been undertaken. 
1.4 Study Methodology 
A case study approach employing both qualitative and quantitative methods of data 
collection and analysis is employed. The study questions, hypotheses and objectives are 
found at the end of the literature review in chapter 2. The methods chosen were those 
able to answer "why" and "how" questions. These methods are suitable when studying a 
phenomenon such as small arms, where the purpose is to understand the dynamics. 
Qualitative research is context sensitive and embeds everything in its social, historical 
and temporal contexts. To overcome bias, triangulation was used to compare data relating 
to the same phenomenon but deriving from different phases of the fieldwork and 
accounts of different participants (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995; 230). Triangulation 
is the use of two or more approaches in the study of the same object. 34 Put simply, 
triangulation between methods compares at least two research 'solutions' to a singie 
problem in an effort to validate the outcome of one approach in terms of the outcome of 
another. Thus, it is a means of monitoring research findings. (McFee, 1992:2 19) 
Triangulation allows mutual validation, reduces inappropriate certainty, and can assess 
the plausibility of threats to validity. Additionally, it assists in cross checking findings 
from both quantitative and qualitative research. Patton (1990:26) also notes that it is a 
powerful solution to the problem of intrinsic bias that comes from single data sources or 
methods. However, 
The major problem with triangulation as a test of validity is that, by 
34  See Denzin, 1970: 301; Robinson, 1993: 404; Patton, 1990:187; McFee, 1992; Hammersley and 
Atkinson, I 995:230-231. 
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counterpoising different contexts, it ignores the context-bound and skilful 
character of social interaction. (Silverman, 1993:158) 
Attempts are made to counteract this and are later discussed. 
The dissertation is based on primary data collected between August 2000 to November 
2004, and also secondary data from historical sources. The nature and complexity of the 
problem predetermines that several data gathering techniques be employed. Their various 
merits are discussed in the relevant sections below. The main instruments used to collect 
data included an individual questionnaire, key interview guides, focus group discussions, 
and participant observation. Other approaches are employed, such as archive data, 
medical data and police data. The data collected from the different areas is woven into 
eight chapters. Data analysis from the different methods is done with triangulation, so 
when the entire work is put together, it gives the richness of the data but with checks on 
bias. 
1.4.1 Archival Data 
Archival data was obtained from published and unpublished sources including the 
Internet, books, journals, published and unpublished articles, official government reports, 
OAU documents, official statistics, parliamentary reports, and newspapers. These 
materials were predominantly useful in the theoretical chapter (2). The Kenya National 
Archives provided information on the background of the problem and thesocial structure 
of the communities. They also provided data on colonial policies toward cattle raids and 
attempts at management. The Kenya National Archives carry important documents and 
records dating to colonial times. 
1.4.2 Participant Observation 
Observing pastoralists was used while carrying out other study methods. Observation was 
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used in most of the areas visited to verify certain claims, particularly as to injuries, stolen 
cattle, the security situation, the military's presence and other measures to curb 
insecurity. I was able to attend some of the security meetings, conferences, workshops 
and peace meetings in the region 35, at some of which the warriors attended with their 
arms. While driving on the roads I could observe young boys carrying arms, even while 
grazing their herds. For example, I visited an area where I saw some lovely camels. When 
I inquired where the camels came from, I was told, "They were raided in Turkana in 
1984." Additionally, I had the opportunity to herd with the warriors, enabling me to carry 
their AK47s and to just talk to them. 
Participant observation is especially useful in the study of small arms because it is 
difficult to collect such data without knowing the community and talking to its members. 
While I lived in the community, I could easily collect data as well as be a part of the local 
activities. I also obtained a rounded and well-founded picture of the community. As for 
disadvantages, the process was slow and intensive. It is difficult to cross check some 
subjective information and replication would be unlikely. Participant observation is vital 
in pastoral conflict research as it forces the researcher to step into potentially alienating 
situations (Cohen, 2000), and has the advantage of allowing the researcher to experience 
daily life first hand, clears the path to understanding, and acts as a point of reference for 
local practices that might otherwise remain obscure or strange to the passive observer 
(Jorgensen 1989:9; Dewalt and Wayland 1998). 
1.4.3 In-depth Interviews 
One hundred and eighty semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants 
thought to be more knowledgeable about, and more involved in pastoral conflict and the 
diffusion of small arms than others. They covered historical and current insights about 
35  See Appendix 
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local conflicts, especially as small arms entered the North Rift and neighbouring areas, 
the security situation, knowledge of arms movements, governance and security, impacts 
of conflict, peace building and development initiatives. 
Interviews were conducted based on a general schedule so as to achieve comparability 
and a more balanced view of issues discussed. The questions were broad to encourage 
contributions, and elicit detailed descriptions, direct quotations of perceptions and 
accounts of experiences. Efforts were made in each case to identify a cross section of 
participants, to ensure that a representative picture emerged in the discussions. 
Categories of Interviews in Kenya and Uganda 
Key informants interviewed included government officials such as district officers, 
district commissioners in Kenya and their equivalents in Uganda, resident district 
commissioners, chief administrative officers, local council leaders, security personnel, 
local council members (at district, sub-country and other levels), elders, religious leaders, 
doctors, nurses, women, karachunas (warriors), ex-raiders, and warlords, and workers in 
Non-governmental organizations. 36 Early researchers who worked in the region were also 
approached37. Other people interviewed included members of parliament and local 
councils, local defence unit and militia members, Kenya police reservists, businessmen, 
and cattle traders. 
36  In Karamoja, NGOs visited included; Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Project (KISP), Karamoja 
Agro-development Programme (KADEP), Karamoja Project Implementation Unit (KPIU), Matheniko 
Development Forum, (MADFO), Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN), Karamoja Association for Peace 
Environmental Project (KAPEPS), Karamoja Data Centre KDC), Moroto/Nakapiripirit Religious Leaders' 
Initiative for Peace (MONLIP, Pokot-Karamoja-Turkana-Sthmy Peace Building Project (POKATUSA), 
Teso Initiative for Peace (TIP), and Medicine San Francise (MSF). In Kenya, NGO personnel were 
interviewed included: National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), Semi-arid Rural Development 
Program (SARDEP), Intermediate Technology Development Gnup (ITDG), Organization For Survival of 
the Lilaikipiak Group Initiatives (OSILIGI), and African Peace Forum (APFO). 
This included writing Prof. Gulliver (who did his work in the area in 1948); Prof. Ton Dietz from 
Belgium researched Pokot). Prof. Bollig (Germany) did his work among Pokot. Ben Knighton, (Oxford) 
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Individual oral testimonies were obtained in Uganda in Nakapelimoru, Kanwat, 
Pangyangara, Lokitelaebu, Kachire, Kotido District (Jie), Nakiloro, Rupa, Loputuk, 
Lotirir, Nadeket, Musasi, Moroto district (Matheniko), Inn (Bokora), Namalu, Amudat, 
Karita, Nakapiripirit district (Pian and Upe Pokot) and Kampala. In Kenya, testimonies 
were obtained in Kapenguria, Kachiliba, Alale (West Pokot), Maralal, Baragoi, Bendera, 
South Horr, (Samburu), Dol Do!, Nanyuki in Laikipia district (Masai) and Nairobi. 38 
1.4.4 Questionnaire 
A structured open questionnaire was administered between 2001 and 2003 to 
administrative officers attending the six months course at the Kenya Iistitute of 
Administration. 39 The administrative officers are a special informant group because in 
Kenya, they are the custodians of pub!ic safety, especially in conflict prone or border 
areas. Sometimes, as a result, they become victims of violence, crime and the small arms 
scourge. Due to their experience in national and regional issues in the field, they have 
certain information not available in print. They chair local security committees, and the 
police are directly under their jurisdiction. 
The study aim was to question them about the dynamics of small arms trafficking, cattle 
rustling, governance, disarmament, arming of pastoralist home-guards, the advantages 
and disadvantages of home-guards, their attitudes, their personal experiences and their 
position. The purpose was to learn why they are not able to address the problems as 
governors with the state machinery. Accessing these administrative officers was not a 
problem for me: I am currently a senior lecturer at the Kenya Institute of Administration 
(KIA) in Nairobi, J(iya, where these officers come for training. KIA was established in 
1961 to take ovrbe running of the public service from the colonial civil servants who 
and prof. John Laniphear who did his work among the Turkana and Jie. 
38  See annex for the lists of those i*ervi)ewed in each country. 
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were to depart following independence.40 
A colleague was requested to administer the questionnaire in my absence, and after 
completion the questionnaires were returned to him. Those not willing to complete them 
were excluded, as were those who had not served in the field. 41 In total, 142 
administrative officers completed the instrument. The officers based in headquarters or 
with ministries like finance, home affairs, transport, the judiciary and foreign affairs, did 
not need to respond. The questionnaires not returned were mainly from people assigned 
to these ministries. 
The questionnaire had the advantage of being inexpensive and quick. It was intended for 
the respondents to complete themselves. Questionnaires provide people with a medium 
for the anonymous expression of beliefs (May, 2001:97), and open-ended questions are 
useful for testing hypotheses about ideas or awareness (Oppenheim, 2001:115). 
1.4.5 POlice Occurrence Book Records 
The police occurrence books in police stations, especially in Kenya, provide raw data on 
crime incidents reported at a given police station or post in Kenya. I was able to obtain 
crime data on cattle rustling, arms used, arms recovered, deaths, injuries, and livestock 
stolen or recovered, as well as the general misuse of arms and its human and economic 
impact. This is material that has not been made available to earlier researchers because 
government officials usually treat security issues with secrecy. 
Police data has limitations. Taking the figures at face value ignores the dynsmics 
underlying their collation. Only a quarter of all offences recorded are detected by the 
39 KIA is the senior institution for training upper level policy makers in Kenya. 
40  See http://unpanl .un.orglintradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRADIUNPANOO8  176.pdf 
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police, meaning that the public voluntarily reports the remaining three-quarters. 
However, reporting a crime does not ensure it will be recorded. Police officers may 
consider no crime was committed or decide to take 'no further action', in which case it 
will not be entered in the police occurrence book. Recording practices also vary, so the 
same act may be recorded differently in different areas. Additionally, pastoral areas are 
generally inaccessible; hence the police data presented below are indicative rather than 
definitive. The areas chosen are also districts/divisions not provinces; figures for the 
whole province will be significantly higher. Police data also suffers from lack of logical 
investigation to a conclusion; political interests may influence this. However, with all 
these limitations police data plays a crucial role in intelligence and statistical analysis for 
decision-making. Because of the police system's vast network, data from the police are 
likely to cover nearly all forms of crime. Also the police data are detailed at the national, 
provincial, district, and probably even to the local village level. It may give the nature of 
crimes committed and those involved, which makes it very valuable. 
Information in daily papers is actually gleaned from police records, as journalists do not 
access these and areas. Such records also help identify particular types of guns and their 
possible sources, e.g. illicit/licit. Gainitig access to the data is near to impossible, since 
police are extremely wary of how it will be used. Hence they sometimes may be accused 
unjustly of secrecy and corruption. 
Nevertheless for Kenya I managed to get the police data through the extensive networks I 
have in the different districts. Because that information was not available in Uganda, a 
comparison between the two countries could not be done; hence each country is treated as 
a unique case. 
41  Some of the district officers are based at the headquarters. 
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1.4.6 Medical Data 
Several hospitals were visited within the study areas, including Moroto District Hospital, 
Matany Mission Hospital, Tokea Dispensary and Amudat Mission Hospital, all in 
Uganda. Kenyan hospitals visited included Kapenguria District Hospital, Amukuriate 
Mission Hospital, and Baragoi Health Dispensary. 
The hospitals were visited since they are the first recipients of most victims of small arms 
or domestic violence. In these institutions, I was allowed access to the records. I 
examined hospital records on gunshot wounds, noting numbers of those who died and 
those who lived, records on any trauma, by sex, age, date, etc. Some of the data was 
available for the past ten years, but in other clinics and hospitals records were not 
available for that long. Such information often is not available because of the sensitivity 
of patient information in health and social care. Therefore, names and addresses were 
removed to reduce the chances of anyone identif'ing a record, and only summaries were 
obtained, rather than detailed records. 
The data was analysed for trends in demographic information, such as villages of origin, 
age and sex of victims, comparison of numbers of gunshot wounds with other types of 
trauma. From these data, as well as from discussions with the staff at each clinic, 
inferences were made about the magnitude of the problem of violence in the North Rift. 
1.4.7 Focus Group Discussions 
Where security allowed, focus groups discussions were conducted with community 
leaders of the areas, including women, youth (warriors), chiefs, local defence units, and 
Kenya police reservists, to elicit information through interaction with the communities. 42 
42  This was very significant given the low literacy rate in pastoral areas. Language was not a problem 
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Focus group discussion involves bringing together a group of individuals to discuss an issue 
and eliciting a wide range of opinions on that issue. 
In total 23 focus groups were held in the entire region 43 16 in Uganda and 7 in Kenya. 
The number of participants ranged from 8-12 and each session lasted for 2-4 hours. 
Among the pastoral groups were elders7' kraal leaders, warriors/morans (vigilante), 
women and young girls, chiefs and their assistants and Kenya Police Reservists, home 
guards, and local leaders. 46 Due to insecurity in the North Rift, I used assistant enumerators 
from the areas that were chosen for their knowledge of the area and their ability to 
translate.47 
These were organized in Namalu, Nakiloro, Rupa, Lopotuku, Musasia, Nabilatuku, Kanwat, 
Nakapelimoru, Pangyangara, Losilang, Lochilabeau and Amudat in Uganda through the 
churches (Lutheran World Federation/Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Development, Karamoja 
Project Implementation Unit, Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Project). In Kenya 
discussions were conducted in Alale, Baragoi, Bendera, Maralal, Dol Dol, South Horr and 
Nanyuki. 
Groups were arranged through the provincial administrators and a network of friends in the 
areas. Groups were separated by gender to differentiate the perspectives held on small arms. 
The purpose of the focus group discussions was to obtait in-depth information on the 
insecurity problems caused by small arms. Their data is used extensively to understand the 
conflict dynamics and the systematic interplay between culture and conflict. The focus 
except in Namalu where most people did not speak Swahili. Here I used an interpreter but also tape 
recorded the interviews then gave a native speakçr to translate to compare notes with my translator. 
43  See Appendix for the places focus groups held 
44  An elder among pastoralists is defined as a male person who is passed the moran age-set 
' A moran or (Masai) warrior or karachunas- warrior (Karamoja) is a male of the watrior age-grade. He is 
not married and forms the core defence of the commirnity. 
46  Distributed among civic leaders, paramount chiefs, church leaders. 
47  The researcher is functional in the common languages of the areas. 
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groups also served to validate interview data. Focus group discussions allowed deeper 
understanding of the small arms problem and helped answer the question why the 
problem persists despite intervention by different non-governmental organizations and 
the states. Focus groups allow people to identify more problems and to give thoughtful 
responses to what the research is trying to address. The groups allowed people to state 
how life has been transformed with the introduction of small arms. They also allowed 
people to ventilate their concerns as well as to talk to people from other villages, and they 
helped understand respondents' knowledge, attitudes and behaviours, towards the small 
arms conflict, as described in their own terms. They also allowed flexibility in the way a 
topic was approached. The disadvantage is that some opinions were more extreme and 
some were less verbalized than others because of the group effect. 
Interview phases 
The field research was carried out in Kenya and Uganda in four phases. Interviews in 
Kenya were conducted May-June, 2001, and July-September, 2002, and those in Uganda 
were done June-July, 2001, January-February and May, November 2003 and finally 
September-October 2004. 
In Kenya interviews were carried out in three locations: West Pokot, Baragoi - Samburu 
and Dol Dol, Laikipia. In Uganda, Karamoja (Nakapiripit, Moroto and Kotido) were 
selected. Interviews were face to face in oj'fres and in the field, and group discussjos 
were held under trees, ip open market plates, in the fields or in churches. Officers of 
NGQs and goverpme, fl pjq were interviewed in their offices, except in Kenya where 
some District Conirnissjers were interviewed at the Kenya Institute of Administration. 
This was qoneçse is difficult to get access to them in their offices. Local leaders 
were inrviewe4 in tJiir own homes as some were too elderly to mobilise. 
For the focus group discussions in Kenya, the researcher first reported to the District 
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Commissioner's office, which would give permission to go to the villages. Then contact 
was made with the chiefs or local leaders to help set up the focus groups. For the 
discussion groups in Uganda, either the local church or a local network arranged them. At 
the Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Project, elders were instrumental. At least one 
accompanied the researcher wherever he went, as they had to give their approval for any 
interviews. 
Apart from the elders, sometimes the author would randomly interview any adult in the 
village. Efforts were made to ensure that the interviews were gender balanced. Interviews 
with community leaders ranged from 1 hour to 3 hours. The interviews were either taped 
or videoed to ensure accurate recall. Additionally written notes were prepared 
immediately after each interview. 48 . 
Interview Guidelines. 
There were three types of interview questions. The first were general questions, and they 
did not follow any particular order. A checklist of questions ensured that all the issues 
were covered. The second types of questions were those designed foT  the focus group 
discussion. Finally there was the questionnaire that was given to district oflicers. Each 
respondent was given a standardized questionnaire, which required one to answer in 
specific categories. 49 In addition to the 9uestionnaire, some of the district officers and 
district commissioners wre also askecj questions on human security, crime, illegal 
weapons and developet. 
1.5 Limitatu 	i4 ghallenges 
Any study on smalj arms is difficult, and this study is no exception. These research 
48  All field notes, tapes, questionnaires, videos are available. 
49  See Appendix for the questionnaire. 
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methodologies are therefore limited by four problems that must be adjusted to while 
doing work in pastoral areas in North Rift. 
The first is the genuine fear and risk to life due to high insecurity. The fieldwork 
unfortunately ran during a time when insecurity was extreme in pastoral areas. In 
Karamoja there were not only fights between government troops and warriors over 
surrender of guns, but thuggery, hostilities and banditry on the roads was high. This 
sometimes hindered and prevented access to people crucial to the study. When raids 
were in progress, no research was possible. To visit kraals, I moved around with elders 
and warriors. Insecurity on the roads meant that I travelled either during the night, when 
bandits are unlikely to attack, or travelled by air. Flying is expensive, and the only flights 
that operate in the areas are missionary aviation flights, only two to three times a week. 
Secondly, there are no roads in some areas, which make it impossible to access them 
except on foot. I have waded through rivers, which were once roads, for 16 miles, during 
the rainy season in Karamoja! Thirdly, the mobility of the pastoralists makes it 
logistically difficult to follow large samples. Fourthly, the study touches on security 
issues, which in the Horn of Africa are the concern of national governments. Hence 
anything to do with small arms tends to be seen as too confidential and a prerogative of 
the state only. 
Despite these limitations, the study was able to reach useful and valid conclusions on the 
relationship between illicit smlJ arms proliferation, pastoral conflict, and governance in 
Northeast Africa. Biases were overcome as ipuch as possible by the methods mentioned. 
Moreover, the researcher's extensive fieldwork experience, his status as a lecturer in the 
area, and his acquaintances with local leaders, district officers, district commissioners, 
leaders of non-governmental organizations and community based organizations and 
security agencies, all helped in getting access to the needed information. 
1.6 Study Areas and Their Locations 
The whole region under study is in northeast Africa, and the specific areas chosen are: 
Karamoja in northern Uganda, and in Kenya West Pokot District, Laikipia, (Mukogodo, 
Dol Dol) and Samburu (Baragoi division) in northwest Kenya. My research extends 
beyond these boundaries though, as the pastoral conflict with small arms involves other 
neighbouring groups such as the Jie, Dodoth, Tepei, Teso, Sebei of Uganda and the 
Toposa and Donyiro of Sudan50. The entire area is commonly referred to as the 
Karamoja cluster, which consists of seven ethnic groups in total. Thomas (1965:9) notes 
of the cluster: 
Even today there is raiding, the Karimojong and Dodoth against the Jie and 
Turkana, or any one of these people against some of the other less closely related 
pastoral tribes unfortunate enough to live within reasonable distance (see map of 
1-Tom 1.2). 
° See for example Daily Nation 23 April 2004"Cattle raids hold sway in Turkana" 
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1.2 	Map of the Horn of Africa 
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So, it can be seen that information about the pastoralists' conflict and small arms in 
neighbouring districts as well as communities in the adjacent countries has been used. 
The aim is ;ç inderstand how small arns impact on different communities in different 
locations and at different levels51 . Data from the different areas is wpven together to 
produce the dissertation. 
1.6.1 Dol Dol, Laikipia 
Laikipia is one of the 17 districts in the Rift Valley Province of Kenya. The district lies 
51  Regional, national, district, interethnic and local. 
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east of the Great Rift Valley and borders Samburu District to the north, Isiolo District to 
the northeast, Meru district to the southeast, Nyeri district to the south, Nyandarua and 
Nakuru Districts to the southwest and Koibatek and Baringo to the west. Laikipia district 
is predominantly a plateau, bounded by the Great Rift Valley to the west and the 
Aberdares and Mt. Kenya massifs to the south. To the northwest, this plateau descends to 
the floor of the Rift Valley, while in the north and east it merges into areas that extend to 
the north. 
The rainfall patterns in the district differ but typically average between 400 and 750mm 
per annum. Mukogodo division, which is the focus of this case is occupied by the Masai 
community (1,100sq.km) of Laikipia District. 52 Mukogodo experiences the lowest 
rainfall, averaging less than 400mm. per year. The low rainfall increases the vulnerability 
to drought during the dry season. 
Laikipia is a multi-ethnic tribal district with recent immigrants from among the Kikuyu, 
Samburu, Masai, Kalenjin, Boran, Turkana and Europeans (Mkutu, 2001). The Samburu, 
Kalenjin, Boran and Turkana occupy the semi-arid part of the district. The Kikuyu and 
the Meru occupy the urban and arable parts of district, while the Europeans are mainly 
ranchers and occupy 70% of the total land. 
The total district population according to recent census figures is 332,000 (Housing and 
Population Census 1999) of which the Masai comprise only 10% (33,000 persons). They 
occupy only 10% of the land despite the historical reality that this was their ancestral land 
before the treaties of dispossession forced upon them by British colonial rule in Kenya in 
1904 and 1911. Over the last ten years the population of Laikipia district has increased 
4.5% per annum (Laikipia District Development Plan, 1997-2001). Between 1967 and 
52  Approximate 10,000 sq.km in the Rift valley province of Kenya 
53  See Kenya National Archive, Kenya Land Commission Report 1933-34:186-203. See 
Http://www.cs.org/newdirection/voices/kenya.htm;  New Scientist 12 August, 2000 "Inventing Africa" 
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1979 the same area experienced annual population growth rates of 7.3%, 5.6% and 5.3% 
(1969 and 1979 population censuses). Between 1979 and 1989, Laikipia experienced 
annual population growth of 5.0%, 5.7% and 6.6% (ibid.). 
The residents of Laikipia acquired arms only recently, and their acquisition of arms was 
related to conflict over access to water. Pastoralists, who are well armed, occupy all the 
lands bordering Laikipia. Mukogodo in Do! Dol division of Laikipia was chosen to study 
the small arms impact on resource-based conflicts in a multi-ethnic area. Lastly 
Mukogodo experiences human conflict with wildlife, and the presence of wildlife also 
attracts armed poachers to the area, though the human-wildlife conflict is not examined in 
this thesis. 
1.3 	Map of Laikipia District 
Source: Laikipia District Development Plan 2001 
1.6.2 Baragoi, Samburu 
Samburu District is the triangular shaped district that lies at the southern end of Lake 
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Turkana within Rift Valley province in Kenya. Samburu is one of the 24 districts of 
Kenya that are 80-100% and or semi-arid. The district borders Baringo District to the 
west and Laikipia District to the north. It covers 21,126 sq. km . and is administratively 
divided into six divisions namely, Leroki, Baragoi, Wamba Waso, Nyiro and Karisia. 54 
There are two main rivers, Ewaso Ngiro (perennial) and Siya Barselei-Miligis (seasonal). 
There are three main urban settlements, Maralal, Wamba and Baragoi, separated by 
between 120 and180 km. Due to the primitive roads, it takes 4-5 hours for motorists to 
travel these distances. Most of the population in the district lives widely dispersed in 
small or nomadic communities across vast stretches of remote land. Samburu has 84% of 
its population living below the national poverty line. 55 It is one of the districts that are 
politically, economically and socially marginalized. 
The Samburu are Plain Nilotes, closely related to the Masai and the Njemps of Rift 
Valley. Samburu has a population of 156,12656  and it is home to Samburu, Turkana, and 
Rendile and Somali people. The study concentrates on Baragoi, which has a population 
of 19,884 with 10,010 being female (Ibid.) and an area of 4,078.1 sq. km . The small 
gender discrepancy rises from the district's rural nature, and from it having suffered from 
stock raids from Turkan. In all of Kenya, Turkana was among the earliest pastoral areas 
to be arme0 57 . 
The Samburu customary governance systen is still intact (see preljrninary PhD results 
2001, 2003; Masinde et al., 2004), so it was wçrth rçsearching .how the study problem 
was handled in that context. Moreover, Samburu was picked to illustrate how arms 
escalate conflict in previously peaceful areas. Unlike Pokot and northeast Uganda, the 
14  Samburu District Development Plan 2002-2008:4. 
Ibidi: 8 with 131,196 persons living under absolute poverty. : See also Were and Ssennyonga, 1986, 
Lesorogol, 1998,2003; Masinde et al. 2004. 
56  1999 Housing and Population Census, Samburu Development District Plan 2002-2008 
57  See Berber, 1968; Lamphear, 1976; Gulliver, 1966, 1972. 
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arms infiltration in Samburu is a very recent problem. Insecurity is perceived to have 
started in 1996, a year prior to the 1997 general elections. Violence has intensified, with 
cattle rustling and rOad banditry being the major manifestations. In addition, Samburu 
has been disarmed twice; therefore, it provides a good case to examine Kenya's policy of 
disarmament in pastoral areas and its attempts to manage the conflict. 
Lastly, Samburu is chosen due to its location away from major towns. The study 
concentrates on Baragoi division, which is the epicentre of the intertribal violence that 
pits the Samburu against the Turkana. Baragoi is one of the historical seats of the 
Samburu and straddles the ethnic fault lines that divide the traditional grazing grounds of 
these two ethnic groups. 
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1.4 	Map of Samburu District 
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1.6.3 West Pokot and the Kenya-Uganda Border Area 
West Pokot is a unique case. It is situated along Kenya's western border with Uganda. It 
is one of the 17 districts of the Rift Valley, and it borders Turkana to the north, the 
Karamoja of Uganda to the west, the Tugen and Marakwet to the east and northeast, and 
Transzoia District to the south, which is cosmopolitan. The Pokot and all their neighbours 
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except to the South are pastoralists. They are divided into two with the smaller group 
living in Uganda (Upe Pokot) and the major groups living in Kenya. However, they 
normally move freely across the borderline. They belong to the Kalenjin group of tribes. 
The other name for the Pokot people is the Suk. 
The population of West Pokot is 337,87058  with males being 166,139 and females 
171,731. The district includes a sizeable area that was added to Kenyan territory in 
1966. However, it was not until 1972 that the presence of the Kenya government was felt 
in the area which, until then, continued to identify with Uganda; hence the name 'Kenya 
mpya' (new Kenya). West Pokot lacks infrastructure59 and security and is adjacent to the 
porous 933 km international border with Uganda, which extends from Busia (Kenya) to 
Turkana. Through the border flow a great number of small arms from Turkana, Uganda 
and even from as far as southern Sudan. One of the reasons West Pokot was chosen to 
study was to understand better the transnational movement of small arms and light 
weapons into Kenya from Uganda and Sudan. 
Cattle rustling in Pokot is often inter-ethnic between Pokot and Turkana, Pokot and 
Marakwet, Pokot and Karamoja in Kenya, as well as frequent violent raids across the 
border between the Pokot and Karamoja in Uganda. There also is raiding between Pokot 
and Sebei, Karimojong and Toposa in Sudan. 60  Of all the pastoral areas in northeast 
Africa, West Pokot is perhaps the most important for this study, due to its high insecurity 
and the volatile relationship, which has existed for years between the Pokot on the one 
hand, and the Karamoja and Turkana on the other. In the northern border area, among 
the semi-arid areas in Kenya, West Pokot has the second highest number of arms in 
58  Housing and census population, 1999: West Pokot District Development Plan 2002-8:8. People under 
absolute poverty line are 108,160. 
59 As argued by in West Pokot District Plan (1979-1983:90) by Kenya standards, West Pokot is one of the 
most under- developed districts in the republic, having been a closed district during the colonial era. Except 
for Kapenguria Division, a large proportion of the economy remains significantly traditional. 
60  'Kenya Mpya' means the new Kenya 
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circulation per capita. 
West Pokot is significant also because the problem of insecurity and the infiltration of 
small arms into the district go back to before 1979, when the Kenya government first 
took official notice of the problem. 6 ' However, the Kenya Government decided, 
"Rustling areas must be avoided."62 Five different times (or more) the Kenya government 
have attempted to disarm the Pokot. The people have experienced massive security 
operations in the district involving the use of the army, the Kenya air force and the 
combined police forces in attempts to disarm the Pokot by force. 
West Pokot is divided into 10 divisions; this study mainly examines Kachiliba and Alale 
divisions, which have suffered greatly from the small arms problem. They are also the 
largest divisions and close to the international border (see West Pokot map below). 
61  West Pokot District Devetopmen Plan 1974-1979 
62  West Pokot District Plan 1979-1983:90 
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1.5 Map of West Pokot administrative Divisions and Boundary changes 1910 to 
now. 
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1.6.4 Karamoja Northern Uganda 
Karamoja region is located in northeast Uganda. Internationally, it borders Sudan in the 
North, and Kenya in the East while the local neighbouring districts include Kitgum, Lira, 
Soroti, and Kumi in the West and Mbale and Kapchorwa in the South. The region 
occupies a total area of 27,200 square kin, approximately equal in size to the country of 
Belgium. it has a semi-arid savannah, bush and mountainous area inhabited in the south 
by the Matheniko, the Bokora and the Pian. All are Karimojong, having close ties with 
one another. There are also the Jie, who are closely related with the Turkana in Kenya, 
and in the Southeast, there are the Suk (Pokot) who also have cousins in Kenya (West 
Pokot). Both these groups have poor relations with the Karimojong. Administratively, 
Karamoja is divided into three districts: Moroto, Kotido and Nakapiripirit. 
The census figure for Karamoja in 1959 was 171,945, but more recent censuses show the 
population at 350,000 in 1980, and 370,423 people in 1991.63  However, these counts 
were not accurate because most people in Karamoja were not enumerated within their 
localities, being mobile in order to seek pasture and water. Most recent figures give the 
total population of Karamoja to be approximately 954,773 (UBOS, 2003). The highest 
population growth rate was supposedly registered in Kotido district whose population 
grew from 196,000 in 1991 to 605,322 in 2002. Kotido district is divided into 3 counties 
(Dodoth, Jie, and Labwor) and 20 sub-counties. These figures suggest that between 1991 
and 2003 the population has increased by over 570,000, an increase of nearly two 
hundred percent in twelve years. The 200 percent increase between 1991-2002 is 
questionable because of the researchers knowledge about the harsh environmental and 
many deaths due to the conflicts and child mortality rate, and also the fact that boundaries 
have remained the same. inaccuracies in either the 1991 or the 2003 figures could have 
63  Statistics Department, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 1996. 
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been brought about by the following factors. 
Pastoral mobility across local and international borders 
Difficulty in access to the areas due to lack of infrastructure and insecurity 
(noted previously is that census was not done in 1991 due to insecurity). 
High illiteracy of the people 
Disarmament threats from 2000-2004 may have led to emigration to Kenya, or 
other Ugandan districts. 
Popuhtion could have been increased to enable the districts to access more 
funds from the central government. 
These figures therefore deserve further investigation before being taken as true, since 
they might have led to over or under estimation of the population. 
1.6 	Map of the people of Karamoja 
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Source: Novelli 1988:12 
Northeastern Uganda, Karamoja is an area where the relationship between animals and 
human beings has been largely determined by the limitations of terrain and climate. It is a 
dry area where livestock production provides the best form of land use, as noted by 
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Novelli (1999:267): 
The Karimojong are pastoralists by necessity and by vocation. Due to irregularity 
and scarcity of the rain, their natural habitat simply does not guarantee a regular 
and sufficient yield of agriculture produce in order to assure their continued 
survival. The peripheral areas surrounding their territory do contain some good 
agricultural land; however, the close proximity of very hostile neighbouring tribes 
prevents settlement due to the constant danger of attack. 
In the drier or semi and areas, livestock are the only major form of production possible to 
sustain daily life. Hence animals are prized not only as an economic asset which 
guarantees their survival in a very harsh environment, but also the cattle have intrinsic 
value as the means on which the entire fabric of Karimojong society depends. 
Dyson-Hudson (1966:101-102) summarizes the position of cattle in Karimojong society 
as follows: 
When born, a child's most distinctive name is drawn from cattle, he founds and 
feeds a family of his own with cattle. His adult life centres on defending the cattle 
he has, and fighting to acquire more. When he dies he is wrapped in cattle hide 
and laid in a grave beneath his cattle corral. In short, to Karimojong, as 
individuals and as society, nothing  is more important than cattle. For them, 
herding is more than a mode of livelihood; it is a way of life. 
Like other pastoralists in East Africa, the Karjmojong Oplieve they have the right to own 
all cattle in the world, and cattle are their means of surviv1. According to Dyson-Hudson 
(1966), Karamoja society is dominated by three things: Age-set structural relatior!s, cattle 
ownership, and territory acquisition for grazing. The people occupy an area that is harsh 
in terms of diseases, and that severely limits their relations to natural resources and 
makes existence in the area marginal. Diseases endemic to the area include redwater 
fever, east coast fever, rinder pest, tsetse fly, and pleuropneumonia. 
Karamoja comprises an area of approximately 320 km. from north to south and 160 km. 
from east to west. Most of the region is composed of large highland plain at an average 
1200 m. altitude, from which a number of mountain masses raise, the most well known 
being Mt. Moroto with an elevation of 3,084 m. above sea level. In the districts of 
Nakapiripirit, Moroto and Kotido a few counties that are accessible were studied. 
This cruel ecology in which they live is like that of their counterparts in Kenya. Karamoja 
is more interesting, however, because of the pressure created by weak governance, 
inadequate security, and a rebel group that wants to topple the central government in 
Uganda. The rebels are currently fighting nearby and are a source of arms. They also 
recruit Karamoja warriors to join their conflict. Additionally southern Sudan's civil war 
is currently a major source of arms to Karamoja, which is one of the reasons it was 
chosen for study. 
Traditionally, the Karimojong do not recognize any external government. From colonial 
times till now the Karimojong have not recognized the central government, and the 
central government did not acknowledge the fact that the Karimojong continued to 
mainly recognize their own goverflment of elders. 
Although this study focused solely on Iaragoi, Samburu, Mukogodo, Lailcipia,  Kachiliba 
and Alale in West Pokot in Kenya, and on Moroto, Kotido and Nakapiripirit in Uganda, 
the issue of pastoral conflict and small arms involyes others. Occasionally, the wars 
involve the Jie in Uganda and Sudan. The Dodoth, Tepei, Teso, Sebei and Toposa people 
are also included in this work. 
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1.7 Thesis Outline and Summary 
The thesis is organized into 8 chapters: 
Chapter two examines three literatures: Pastoralism, governance debates, and debates 
and theories around the subjects of weapons and war, and weapons and society. Its 
purpose is to develop a foundation for the entire thesis and to establish where pastoralists 
fit into the overall picture of arms and the demand for arms. The chapter raises key issues 
in a general way. 
Chapter three examines customary pastoral conflict and how pastoralism operates in the 
North Rift as a viable mode of life and livelihood, followed by the changes and 
challenges of the current era. It examines the historical and cultural background of the 
pastoral communities, patterns of conflict that have emerged in the North Rift, ranging 
from conflicts at the local level within and between pastoral communities, to the regional 
dimension of such conflict. The chapter describes the deepening political and economic 
marginalization of those communities since Kenya and Uganda attained independence in 
the early 1960s and addresses how and why conflict has become an endemic feature of 
life in the pastoral areas. The final part focuses in more depth on several new factors 
connected to conflict in the pastoral areas that have hitherto not received much 
consideration: racketeering, changing power relations between elders and youth, bride 
wealth and gender issues within pastoral communities. 
Chapter four scrutinizes governance and the provision of security and safety to 
pastoralist communities in the North Rift during the colonial period, 1920-1960. It links 
issues of arms proliferation and expansion with general issues of 'security' and frames a 
discussion of this in terms of the political systems through which 'security' is or is not or 
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only partially guaranteed/maintained. it analyses the colonial recovery record of rustled 
cattle in both countries as an indicator of security. The chapter then looks at governance 
and post-colonial stock theft recovery in both countries. It looks at the origins and 
metamorphosis of vigilantes, militias, local defence units and home guards, and police 
reservists in both countries, tracing developments to the current volatile insecurity in the 
region. It ends by suggesting implications of using vigilante groups for security. 
Chapter five examines how the influx of small arms and light weapons began in the 
region, with the story of Turkana and its links with Arab ivory traders and the Abyssinian 
conflict. There is then a large section on the cold war, the second stage in arms 
proliferation, and then the role played by arms in the localised postcolonial regional 
conflicts, which have diffused arms into pastoral areas. It then reveals sources, flows and 
costs. It examines different areas to show how the arms move from conflict areas to 
peaceful ones, which then become conflict areas. The chapter also shows the movement 
of arms from the borders to interior areas. It ends by providing the approximate prices of 
small arms and ammunition, which indicate to some extent, the demand and supply 
dynamics. 
Chapter six explores the direct and indirect impacts of small arms proliferation. The 
chapter first examines the impact on health in Uganda then Kenya. Secondly it provides 
the smail arms impact on livestock and lives using the police evidence on raids. Thirdly 
the chapter then gives indirect impacts, on families, livelihoods and development 
activities. The chapter argues that the proliferation of small arms in the North Rift has 
had a grave impact on the individual communities in terms of deaths, injuries, economy, 
infrastructure and agriculture and also at the domestic level. 
Chapter seven first examinestie evolution of the two governments' various strategies 
for addressing armed violence invilving pastoralists. It then reviews current efforts by 
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the Kenya and Uganda governments, which have ranged from branding of livestock to 
voluntary and forced disarmament. The chapter also explores the challenges of 
disarmament in both countries. The main focus is on the Pokot and Samburu in Kenya 
and the Karimojong in Uganda. It also describes attempts at co-operation between the 
two states and examines attempts at protocols and agreements to enhance security in the 
area. It argues that a militaristic approach has never been, and will never be effective. 
Chapter eight presents the multiple and complex linkages of small arms, governance and 
pastoralism and then offers concluding remarks. The chapter also suggests responses to 
the small arms problem where good governance at the local level has seen armed crime 
decrease. It ends with some suggestions for future research. 
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Figure 1.2 Timetine on Events in Kenya and Uganda 1960 to 2004 
Kenya Local to North Rift Uganda Local to Karimoja 
1960 Formation of KANU and 
KADU  
1961 Kenyatta 	released 	from 
prison  
1962 Uganda gets Independence  
1963 Independence under Kenyatta 
and KADU dissolved  
1964 Shifta war- Somali campaign  Karamoja Act  
1965 To claim N.E. Province of  
1966 Obote suspends the constitution 
and declares himself president 
Kabak over thrown and driven 
Shifia war ends 
into exile- kingdoms abolished. 
1967 
1968  
1969  
1970 Kenya Mpya, Alale returned 
to Kenya  
1971 Army chief General Idi Amin 
takes power in military coup  
1972  
1973  
1974  
1975  
1976  Amin become OAU chair  
1977  
1978 Kenyatta 	dies 	and 	Moi Amin 	Launches 	operation 
becomes president Magurugur 	on 	Uganda- 
Tanzania border. 
Tanzania —Uganda war breaks 
out 
1979 Tanzania/Uganda war continues. 
Idi 	Amin 	defeated 	and 
successive changes of powers: 
in Oct 1979 Yusuf Lute become 
president under 	UNLF, 	June 
replace by Godfrey Binaisa.  
1980 Wagalla and Malaka Man May Obote 	returns to power Obote II twice attempts to disarm 
massacres with UPC. Karimojong 
NRA established to fight Obote 
1981  
1982 Attempted coup by Air Force  
1983  
1984 
by Kenya security forces 
Military operations in Pokot  
1985 Obote 	II 	government 
overthrown 	by 	Gen 	Olara- 
Okello 	July- 	Government 
headed by Tito Okelo 
Nairobi 	peace 	process 	for 
1986  
Uganda fails in Kenya  
 January NRA comes to power, 
many rebellions break out 
Massive 	increase 	in 	raids 	in 
Karamoja, with large scale arms 1987 1 Constitutional changes giving 
more power to Moi  UPDMJA in Acholi trafficking in the region. 
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1988  
1989  
1990  
1991 
First 	national 	multiparty 
Rift Valley Land Clashes  
1992 
elections 1992  
1993 Karimoja 	pacification 	committee 
formed 
1994  
1995  First presidential election under 
NRM 
Vigilante programme starts 
1996  Security 	operations to disarm 
the Pokot 1997 Land Clashes at coast Debate on disarmament 
Multiparty election preceded Magoro Agreement 1998 
by violence 
Moi wins  
1998  Uganda deploys army to DRC 
1999 
Masai 	pastoralist 	invade 
 Major Drought in Laikipia  
2000 LDUs created by government 
ranchers/farms  Kumi Declaration Mar 2000 
2001 Constitutional debates Voluntary disarmament 
Dec 2001 
2002 Multiparty elections Forceful Disarmament 
KANU defeated by NARCK Feb 2002 to now 
under Kibaki 
Constitutional debates  
 Drought in Karamoja 2003 
2004 Masai 	1904 	agreement Major Drought in pastoral areas 
expires in Kenya 
Masai 	pastoralists 	invade 
ranches again.  
Figure 1.3 Currency exchange rates 2001-2004 
2001 2002 2003 2004 
Uganda  
$toUgShs 1,760 1,838 1,960 1,750 
£toUgShs 2,522 2,840 3,377 3,157 
Kenya  
$toKShs. 79 79 76 82 
£toKShs 100-112 114 121-130 145148 
Sources: Central Banks of Kenya and Uganda 
Language was not a problem for the researcher except in Namalu and some parts of Jie, 
where most people did not speak Swahili. Here an interpreter was used, including in 
Focus groups with elderly people who did not understand Swahili well. But also most 
interviews and FGD were tape-recorded. The interviewers were then given a native 
speaker to translate to compare notes with my translators. I translated most of the other 
data and I take responsibility for any translation mistakes. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework 
Pastoralism, Governance, Weapons: Debates and Theories. 
And ye shall hear wars and rumours of wars; for all these things must come to pass" 
2.1 Introduction 
This literature review looks at the key arguments and issues surrounding pastoral conflict 
and weapons. The first section takes a look at the way of life of pastoralists, the pressures 
facing them, survival strategies, and potential causes of conflict. The impact of 
governance and modernisation on pastoralists is then explored, with reference 
particularly to security and conflict. The current knowledge regarding the demand and 
supply of arms into pastoral areas is also given. The need or desire to accumulate arms is 
then explored in a section on weapons, violence and society, which identifies some new 
factors that have been a magnet for arms proliferation. This section also asks the question 
"Does the acquisition of arms lead to violence?" to provide possible insight into the 
pastoral conflict. The debate is then expanded to the level of weapons and war, outlining 
the schools of thought on the cause and effect relationship. The section on weapons and 
war looks for explanation of pastoral conflict in the North Rift. 
2.2 Pastoralism 
This literature review considers what is entailed by Pastoralism as a viable mode of 
livelihood and the pressures and changes facing pastoralists, in particular those in the 
North Rift region (the Samburu, Laikipia, and West Pokot in Kenya, and the Karamoja in 
Uganda). The impact of the creation of states and the extension of capitalist relations of 
production are examined and why all these might lead to conflict. The questions guiding 
the section include: 
Matthew 24:6 The Bible 
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What pressures are faced by pastoralists, which may lead to conflict? 
How and why do pastoralists acquire arms? 
Why are pastoralists seen as a threat to governance and what is the impact of 
sedentarisation? 
What is the effect of weak/failing states on pastoralists' security? 
The following section defines Pastoralism noting the difference between that and settled 
agriculture. It reviews the global distribution of pastoralists. The remainder raises key 
questions in a general way, examining the impact of centralising and extension of 
capitalistic relations of production on Pastoralism. It extends by examining impact of the 
new kinds of weapons and the demand and supply of small arms. 
There has been increased interest in African Pastoralism, with regard to droughts, range-
management, failure of development intervention, early warning systems, drought coping 
mechanisms and response to socio-economic activities 2 . However few studies have 
delved in to new problems facing the pastoralists in the end of the second millennium, 
pirticularly the change effect and impact of small arms, for which there is little empirical 
research. 
2.2.1 Definitions and Geographical Distribution 
The pastoral lifestyle is nomadic, and pastoralists subsist mainly or largely through 
'stock' keeping" or it is a mode of livelihoodlrelations to land and stock mobility (Van 
Zwanenberg and King, 1975:8 1). The species of animals vary with the region of the 
world. 
All aspects of pastoralists' social and economic life are ordered in relation to their stock 
and their natural environment. It is mainly a mode of production adapted to harsh and 
2 	Dalby et a!, 1977;Galaty and Douglas, 1990; Konczaki, 1978; Swift 1977: Niamir-FuIler, 1994: 
Behnke, 1994; Cappock, 1994; Helland, 2000; Sandford, 1983; Lane, 1997. 
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environments, in these societies livestock (cattle in Kenya's north Rift Valley) hold the 
'central value' of a whole culture. Cattle are the basis of association in a complex of 
social, political and religious institutions (Konczaki, 1978; Short, 1974). Pastoralism as a 
mode of livelihood "puts into profitable use the scantily and sparsely distributed 
resources of the marginal lands without doing damage to the ecology" 3 . 
Livestock held by pastoralists represent livelihood, income and employment; 
employment in the sense that labour for herding is secured by recruitment through family 
and kinship ties, through reciprocal exchanges, and through contractual agreements. In 
high-risk remote areas, males tend to do most of the herding, with sons and poor male 
relations recruited as labour assistance 4 . Pastoralism across the world is characterised by 
a variety of ecological, cultural and economic conditions. African Pastoralism is 
characterised by extensive cattle husbandry and mobility, as they have to continuously 
search for pasture and water. This takes place in dry marginal areas where no other 
alternative exists, though they may produce some crop species in wet seasons. 
In Africa and the Middle East, nomadic Pastoralism tends to characterise distinct ethnic 
groups, who are organised along tribal lines. However, in India pastoralists are not 
ethnically different from the sedentary population, but there are certain castes whose 
traditional occupation is regarded as Pastoralism. 
The table below shows where the world's main pastoral populations are found, the 
primary stock they keep and their habitat. 
Odegi-Odegi-Odegi-Awoundo 1990:8 
See Brownman, 1993, Odegi-Odegi-Awoundo- Odegi, 1990: Awogbade, 1979 
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Figure 2.1: Geographical distribution some of the worlds main Pastoral Groups 
Geographical Ethnic Groups Primary stock Habitant type 
region  
Mideast/E. Turkoman, Baluch, Sheep, goats Hilly, semi-arid 
Mediterranean- Pathan, Bassri and camels 
oldest pastoral 
zone 
North Africa and Bedouin, Bedu Sheep, goats, Hilly, semi-arid, 
Arabia  camels very and 
East Africa & Masai, Turkana, Cattle, goats, Dry Savannah 
Sahel Pokot, Karimojong, camels, sheep, Arid and semi 
Marakwet, Tugen, donkeys arid. 
Nuer, Somalis, 
Borana,  
West Africa Fulani Cattle, goats, Open savannah 
Tuareg camels, sheep  
Southern Africa Himba (Naimbia) Cattle, goats, Arid (Kalahari) 
Khoisan sheep 
(Namibia/Botswana)  
Central Asia Mongols, Kazaks, Horses, sheep, Rich grassland, 
Steppes Gujarat camels severe winter (hay 
for fodder) 
Tibetan Plateau Ethnic Tibetans Yaks, horses Arid, low 
temperatures, 
high attitude 
N.Eurasian Sami (lapps) Tungus, Reindeer Taiga (Tundra & 
herders 	I Chukchi Boreal forest) 
Source: MKutu LOU I, also http:I/wwwtaoorgfDUUJthP/0U5/Y2647E/y2647eo0.html. 
It is difficult to determine how many pastoralists exist in Africa or worldwide. Some 
authors have argued that pastoralists have been declining in number (Tapper 1974; FAO, 
1978:35), while others like Sandford (1983) strongly believe that their numbers may be 
increasing. He notes that reduction in mobility is different from reduction in numbers of 
pastoralists. Pastoral production in eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa is under a 
critical situation in that it is now unable to support the basic needs of pastoralists. Cattle 
are diminishing, not for climatological reasons alone, but due to increased raiding and 
lack of security and good policy making. Where authors have argued a population 
decrease, this could also be due to raiding violence. 
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2.2.2 Pressures and Coping Mechanisms 
Drought, epidemics and other calamities are common features among pastoralist 
communities. However pastoralists have developed coping mechanisms within 
themselves and with neighbouring communities to make Pastoralism the only viable 
livelihood in and and semi and areas. As Aronson points out, 
Through their history.... Pastoralists have engaged in a multiplicity of economic 
activities, making use of a wide diversity of resources within their reach and often 
modify their animal production to the demands of other pursuits. ... they trade, 
they handcraft, they smuggle, they transport, they used to raid and make war on 
their own account or for others, they managed the labour of others working for 
them 5 . 
2.2.3 Pressure Due to Climatic Variability. 
Arid and semi-arid areas cover half of the world's land area amounting to about 50 
million square kilometres 6 . The harsh characteristics of the physical environment are a 
significant part of the pastoralist way of life. Climatic change and environmental 
degradation lead to increased pressure on available land water and pasture resources, 
which in turn leads to competition and conflict. 
There have been nearly six major drought episodes on the African continent in the last 
three decades 7 . Among the Tuareg and Fulani in West Africa 2 famines have taken place 
since 19608.  Drought and famine has been a feature of life in Ethiopia throughout history, 
in more recent times 1972/1973 and 1984/5 were the worst. The latter was exacerbated 
by civil war between the Ethiopian government and Eritrea and Tigray. The Sahel 
Aronson, 1980:173-184 
6  See JLRI, 1999:1; Livingstone 1984:2 
In 1965/66, 1972-1974, 1981/1984, 1986/1987, 1991/1992, and 1994/1995 and for the Horn 1999/2001. 
See ASARECA/ILRJ, 2000; see Mkutu 2001. This year 2004 pastoralists in the Horn and specifically 
Kenya and Uganda are experiencing droughts. 
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droughts of 1960s   and 1980s   have been described many times and are a subject of many 
publications. Bovin (1992:37) notes that for the Sahel, drought has been a major pressure, 
affecting the entire population. 
The 1981-84 drought was the worst ever recorded for the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) 
countries and the 1991/1992 was the worst for Southern African Development 
Community countries (ASARECAIILRI, 1998). In Kenya, huge losses of livestock 
occurred in the first three months of 2001 following the serious long dry spell of 
1999-2001g. This year (2004) the drought in northwestern Kenya has claimed the lives of 
many Turkana and Pokot people'°. 
Elsewhere in the world pastoralists also experience harsh climatic conditions. Mongolia's 
economy is largely pastoral, and climatology is key to adapting to the harsh climate. The 
Rural Institutions and Participating Service of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO, 2001) argues that Central Asian pastoral production systems are important for 
their economies but currently face high levels of variability and risk from environmental, 
as well as socio-economic and institutional pressures. The most obvious pressure for 
Pastoralism comes from periodic snow disasters 11 , which cause high animal and human 
mortality. This is demonstrated in that the particularly severe blizzards of 1999-2000 and 
2000-200 1 caused losses of 2.4 million animals. Over 2, 370 herding households lost all 
of their livestock in the winter of 1999/2000. Snow (zud) disasters are almost as bad for 
Mongolia as droughts are for other pastoralist peoples. Humphrey (1978) remarks that 
from the 1950s,   Mongolian authorities have worked to provide shelters and fodder for the 
herds in the winter blizzards, creating winter campsites with a source of water and 
shelter. 
8 In 1968-1973 and 1982-1984. See CaIdwell, 1975; Picardi, 1974: Suliman, 1994 
9 Mkutu 2001 
° See East African Standard 16 June 2004 "Coast appeals for additional food" 
Zud is ranked as the greatest risk by most herders in central Asia. Zud is defined as snow cover of more 
than 25 cm, a sudden, prolonged snowstorm, 2-3cm. of frozen snow cover or prolonged extreme spells of 
cold. 
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In western Rajasthan, India, from 1980-1989, the state experienced nine years of below 
average rainfall particularly affecting the western districts 12 . Recent migration in India, 
however, is a development caused by reduced availability of grazing in the immediate 
vicinity of villages, such as Rajasthan's Pali district. Kavoori (1992) observes that the 
pastoralists are migrating due to "pull factors" such as the opening of grazing 
opportunities on the stubble of newly irrigated fields in neighbouring states, especially 
Haryan. New "non-traditional" pastoralists are also taking up migratory sheep 
Pastoralism, especially members of the Rajput, the traditional land-owning caste (ibid.). 
The recurrence of drought and famine in recent decades has lent support to the idea that 
Pastoralism is on the verge of extinction' 3 . Following a drought, herds can take up to ten 
years to recover, and the greater the herd recovery time, the less able are the herders to 
cope. Yet pastoralists have managed to survive in the face of natural and man-made 
disasters, despite the gloomy predictions (Hogg, 1992:135). 
2.2.4 Human Population Pressure 
Marcel (1999:186) and Bollig (2003) attributes the cause of changes noted in pastoral 
regions above to population increase and stratification of livestock ownership in Africa. 
Blanth (2001) like Marcel notes the significant increase in resource conflict in semi-arid 
areas in Africa is due in part to human population increase. Boyazoglu and Flamant 
(1993:379) observed the pressures due to population pressure in the Eastern 
Mediterranean semi and areas and argue that in Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, 
the result of the population bomb is an increase in small ruminant numbers linked to the 
preference for mutton leading to the expansion of animal forage production in and and 
semi and areas. 
Brownman (1993:333) also observed the pressure from population increase in the Andes, 
while Barth, (1 964a) noted the problem among the Bassri pastoralists of Iran. Pitaliya 
12 	western districts were Banner, Jodhpur and Jaisalmer. Statistics from Government of Rajasthan 1989The 
13 Baker, 1967; Carr, 1977; Morton, 1988, 1993 
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(1993) observes Rajasthan experienced a 28.5% rate of population growth with the 
Western districts equalling or surpassing this figure. 
There is considerable evidence to show that population pressure cuts across all pastoral 
areas around the world. This puts pressure on grazing lands, not only for food but also 
for firewood, causing land degradation. Population pressure also implies decline in 
community resources, which sometimes leads to violent conflicts. In other parts of the 
pastoral world it leads to changing production from larger animals to smaller animals. 
2.2.5 Internal Relationships 
Attack as Coping Mechanism 
Internal conflicts within pastoral communities used to be rare, with a preference for 
raiding cattle from outside the community. Many pastoralist peoples believe that the cow 
was created only for the pastoralists and those related to them, such that other ethnic 
groups must have stolen them. Therefore, it is a birthright for a pastoralist to repossess 
(steal) them back (Nyaba and Otim, 2001). Strong traditional mechanisms such as 
laipai' 4 (compensation) existed to protect against a member of the same community 
killing another during these attacks. This consisted of the sacrifice of animals, a heavy 
penalty to pay for the deceased, ensuring that law and order was maintained. 
Segmental Social Structure 
The age set system is another social framework common amongst pastoralists, giving rise 
to "stratified relations between seniors and juniors and egalitarian relations among peers" 
(Kurimoto, 1998:48). Kurimoto compares the age set-system to the "institution of modern 
nation state" (ibid.). It functions as a military and political organization, which the elders 
used to control the excess of young. Circumcision, marriage, pastoral duties and 
14  Laipai is the term used for compensation in Pokot. 
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punishment were coordinated with peers and managed through the system. Among the 
Masai, if a member of the age set committed a crime the entire age set could be 
punished.' 5 The social organization of Pastoralism worked to preserve order and minimise 
internal conflicts. 
Recruitment into the age-set system seems to have been an aspect of Pastoralism all over 
the world. Awogbade (1983; Bernus, 1982) observed it among the Fulani in Nigeria and 
also the Turaeg in Mali, while in the Northeast Africa, Quam, (1996) and others' 6 . Negi 
observed the system amongst the Gujars in the Himalayas' 7 . 
Pastoral social institutions focus on inheritance (kinship/descent systems, usually 
patrilineal' 8 in nature). In times of crisis communities have traditionally come together to 
support their weakest and most vulnerable members. A well-established culture of wealth 
redistribution ensured that the needy were helped and the community survived. This 
characterizes pastoral society all over the world. 
Nearly all pastoralists around the world export their products abroad, though the 
pastoralists themselves do not assume the role of direct exporters; instead they act 
through middlemen. The sale of their cattle is the main source of income used to purchase 
goods like grains from other groups. The Fulani sold cattle to other communities' 9, as did 
the Kamba and Masai of Kenya. Tignor states "Although British officials frequently 
condemned Masai and Kamba pastoralists for their unwillingness to exploit their 
livestock as economic assets, in fact both peoples commercialized their stock-rearing 
economies successfully and rapidly." 2° 
15 See Mkutu and Marani op cit 
16 Berber, 1968; Pazaglia, 1982; Thomas 1965; Spencer, 1973: Simonse and Kurimoto, 1998; Lamphear, 
1998 
17 R.S.Negi, http://www.ignca.nic.inlcd_08004.htm. 
pastoral communities are patrilineal, implying property and status are inherited through their fathers 
line and belongçI to the father's line. 
' 9 Frantz, 1978; Swift,1979 
20 Tignor 1976:323-329 
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The practice of bride wealth is another symbiotic relationship. In the Himalayas the bride 
price is 5 to 6 buffaloes21 . There, if a young Gujar man cannot pay, he may serve in a 
family in which there is a marriageable daughter. He signs a contract to serve the family 
for one or two years, and at the end of the period, if found suitable, he may be married to 
the daughter. However this option does not exist on the cross border of Kenya and 
Uganda, and the high bride price with the destruction of the symbiotic relationship 
between wealthy and poor pastoralists, is leading to conflict and inequality in pastoral 
society. 
Customary Governance Institutions (CG1) 
Elders dominate traditional pastoral societies. Most pastoralists have a distinctive 
clan-based governance system derived from a progressive age-set system. Elders decided 
pastoral matters, marriage, property distribution, social commitments, and the selection of 
grazing, leaders, defence matters and disputes. In Ethiopia among the Boran, the village 
council and Gadaa have far reaching political, social and economic functions22 . Among 
the Masai, Nandi, Turkana, Marakwet and Pokot of Kenya, traditional institutions were 
and are still very important. Indigenous pre-colonial African institutions were generally 
democratic with strong in-built systems of accountability and popular participation 23 . 
In Mongolia, the formal authority to allocate pasture rested in the customary traditional 
institutions. When the herding collectives in Mongolia were dismantled in 1992, the 
formal regulatory institutions for allocating pasture had vanished, and other customary 
institutions that used to be effective had been weakened. Though Mongolian pastoralists 
2!  For a majority of pastoralists, ranging from India to West Africa and from Southern Africa to North 
Africa and Arabia, exchange of bride wealth is normal. Generally bride wealth is quite high. For example, 
among the Gujar of Kashmir it used to be as high as Rs. 10,000; but among the Gujar of the lower 
Himalayas and the Siwaliks it may now go up to Rs. 30,000 or Rs. 40,000. see Negj. 
http://www.ignca.nic.in/cdO8OO4.hm.  
22  Tache and Irwin, 2003:15:Boku 2000:112 
23  See Quam, 1996, Hadley, 1997, Stenning 1959, Spencer, 1975, 1973; Awogbade. 1979; Shoup, 
1993 :Mkutu and Marani, op cit, Mkutu 2001 op cit., Niamir-FulIer 1999: Mkangi, 1997: Masinde et al, 
2004: Lamphear, 1998, Ogot and Keiran, 1969. 
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have indeed been assisted by the state, new institutions are unable to completely fill the 
void, affecting their freedoms. 
As a result of modernisation and some of the pressures mentioned there is a weakening of 
social organization across pastoral areas and power struggles between the seniors and 
juniors. This has ensured that the social security that once existed in pastoral areas is 
declining. The erosion of the traditional governance institutions among pastoralist 
communities has reduced effective control of conflict. In some places eldership can now 
be attained by wealth, and armed youth are adding new pressures, which the elders have 
not confronted before. 
While governments have exerted control over some aspects of life, they have remained 
weak in pastoral areas. 24 In the past the presence of customary traditional governance 
institutions has compensated for weak state governance by regulating behavior, adjusting 
disputes and generally keeping people organized among all pastoral communities. 
Traditional structures are still vital for understanding pastoralists and such structures can 
be revitalized and used to resolve pastoral problems. 
Labour as a Form of Internal Relationship 25 
Odegi-Awoundo (1990:33-34) notes about the Turkana of Kenya "traditionally, 
Pastoralism was a full- time occupation for all 26 ." Swift (1977) remarks that among the 
Kel Adrar Tuareg of northeast Mali, . . . children as young as 5-9 years supervise goats. 
Among The Fulbe of West Africa, "oltaining employment as herdsmen assisted the Fulbe 
to slowy build their own cattle herds (Bassett, 1994). The employment of pastoralists as 
watclrnen in East Africa and western Africa is widely reported. Among the Andes 
Mountain pastoralists, labour is secured as with other pastoralists around the world, by 
24 Lesorogol, 1998:Mkutu 2001, 2003 op cit. Mkangi, 1997: Knighton, 2003: ASARECA, 2003; Masinde et 
al, 2004. 
25  Labour among the pastoralists relates to the core tasks of livelihood. Livelihood is the way people 
acquire their means of survival. In this case herding is a form of livelihood. 
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recruitment through family and kinship ties, reciprocal exchanges, and contractual 
agreements. 
According to Cossins (1983), pastoralists seek to optimize not profits but the human 
support capacity of the area upon which they depend, through the production of milk and 
sometimes with blood that they consume without killing the animal. Jannke (1982) 
observed that if countries like Mauritania and Somalia were to reorganize their land use 
on the basis of modem ranching, the numbers employed would be no more than one 
fiftieth of the present numbers supported. Unemployment is now one of the biggest 
pressures in pastoral areas due to the decline of the pastoralist economy. 
Relationship Between Pastoralists and Other Communities 
Some have argued there is a continual feud between pastoralists and agriculturalists 27 . 
However, despite the contrasts, pastoralists have always cooperated in trade, as a form of 
interaction with other communities. Pastoral communities around the world exchanged 
their products and divided themselves into agricultural and pastoral groups as the most 
efficient way to utilize resources and support themselves. In times of scarcity, pastoralists 
have developed survival strategies by sharing resources between ethnic groups and across 
international borders. 28  These relationships enable pastoral groups to gain access to 
seasonally available resources. 
The linkage between Masai and non-Masai is well documented. 29 The Masai traded with 
other ethnic groups and fought for themselves but were also allied to other communities. 
They also controlled caravan trade routes creating a toll system for travelling traders. 
They had close relationships with the Kikuyu, often built on inter-marriage and trade, 
which benefited both sides30. Odhaimbo et al (1969:44) note "Raids and intermarriage 
26  See Sperling 1984 for Labour and Samburu 
27  Sutton, 1968 
28 	Muhereza 1997b:5 Turkana move westwards towards Karamoja border to gain access to water in the 
Kidepo valley. The Kenya Pokot move towards Kapachorwa border with Kenyan West Pokot and Trans-
Nzoia districts. To the North, the Toposa (Sudan) move southwards into Kidepo valley nationally park. 
29 5pencer 1973; Berntsen, 1979; Galaty, 1981; Spear and WaIler, 1993, Mwanki, 1980: WaIler, 1976:507. 
30  For example Mungeam, 1966:111-113 notes they were too powerful a body to be ignored. 
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took place between the people of Nilotic strain and the conquered hill men. The 
marriages assisted to reduce tension and conflicts." James (2002:139) argues that among 
the Gumuz of Wellega Blue Nile "intermarriage relationships brought promise of peace 
and security." 
In other parts of Northeast Africa, trade flourished between the pastoralists and their 
immediate neighbours. The pastoralist's role in the trans-Saharan trade is a theme that has 
been well explored by several authors. Managed by the Fulani and Tuareg pastoralists, it 
created the basis for the economic interdependence between pastoralist and other groups. 
Tonah (2003:96) notes that in the 1950s and 1960s,   the relationship between the Fulbe 
and the host population in both Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana was good in that they developed 
economic exchanges whereby the Fulbe rented themselves out as herdsmen, in exchange 
for milk from the cattle they were herding. 
The Andean pastoralists also exchange or trade with their agricultural neighbours 
(Browman, 1982), while Rangnekar (1992) notes that the Gujarat and Rajasthan in India 
migrate in search of markets for animal products (gliee, wool, hair) as well as in search of 
fresh pasture for livestock. Among the Mongols, as well as other pastoralist groups in 
Asia, trade was vital for their survival. 
The Gujarat and Rajasthan have good relations with farmers along their migration routes. 
One aspect of this is that the government has established migration routes. Farmers also 
pay pastoralists for herding services, and the pastoralists rent individual trees from 
farmers to use their pods and leaves for fodder. The Gujarat and Rajasthan migration 
system is an interesting interaction between farmers and pastoralists and illustrates the 
complementarity of the two systems and communities. 
This relationship ,exjsts in some parts of the Horn of Africa, especially between Tanzania 
and Kenya, but not between Uganda and Kenya. Whether or not migration is supported 
may determine how long pastoralist communities will survive, since historically they 
58 
must move in order to trade, but also to seek good grazing pasture and water for their 
animals. 
Due to the reliance on market exchange, pastoral populations are vulnerable, because of 
considerable seasonal oscillation in the grain prices as noted in recent years in West 
Africa, North Africa and the Horn of Africa. Toulmin (1995:99) notes: 
These price movements provide an increasing tight squeeze on the ability to raise 
cash to buy the food needed by their families. Thus herders may be forced to sell 
animals far in excess of those required to bring animals numbers into balance with 
fodder availability. 
However the potential for conflict in this relationship is also apparent as the majority of 
the population might not have the capacity to rebuild their livestock resources in the short 
term and many will never totally recover. A situation of inequality and resentment is 
created between the haves and have nots due to the drought and price oscillations, which 
leads to tension. 
Relationship and Pressure from the Emerging New Bourgeoisie 
Modern times have seen the development of elite pastoralists in the roles of civil 
servants, businessmen, traders or even racketeers. Though worldwide data on wealth 
distribution among the pastoralists is lacking, in East and West Africa, North Africa and 
even Asia, civil servants and others originating from pastoral areas now reinvest their 
high salaries in the areas. In West Africa, for instance, the new local elite is finding it 
attractive to invest in cattle, which are looked after by Fulani herders. This reduces the 
herders to the status of "tenants" exacerbating the pre-existing inequality 31 . The 
emergence of poor herders working for wealthy herd owners especially in the Horn of 
Africa is now a norm 32 . 
In Mongolia the same dynamics are producing negative ecological consequences since 
wealthy herders grab better pastures and force small herders to more extensive grazing 
practices (Neupert, 1996). In Gujar Himalayas there is a shift from subsistence to 
' See Hogg, 1976, Franz, 1979; Oxby, 1985; Shorter, 1973:30-48 
32  Example see Hogg, 1976 
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commerce using modern methods of transportation and changing the mode of migration. 
This means that buffalo meat and milk products are sold in the market through 
middlemen, the bania. The Gujars rarely get a fair price and sometimes instead of cash 
are offered credit support. The result is that the Gujar is heavily dependent on the banid 3 . 
Additionally in Asia in Rajput, non-pastoralists are taking up Pastoralism, aided by their 
socially and politically superior connections, compared to the traditional pastoralists who 
are less well connected and educated. A class system is emerging which is bound to cause 
impoverishment and lead to tension and insecurity. 
2.2.6 Impact on Pastoralism of Centralising States 
The development of modern centralising states and socialist collectivisation and the 
incorporation of pastoralists has been a long process often negatively impacting on 
pastoralists. In West Africa, nomads led the 20th  century jihads; some settled as rulers of 
the conquered people, while others continued life as pastoralists, with their military 
traditions, mobility and unwillingness to obey laws created by the nation state. 
Blench (1996) notes that in West African States, though many of the settled populations 
depend on the meat and milk that pastoralists produce and profit from their opportunistic 
breaching of national borders, they condemn herders for not staying within a confined 
range. Throughout Central Asia many pastoral peoples have been split by the constitution 
of the states. 34 This section examines the creation of the states. 
Colonialism and Settler Rule 
Most pastoralists around the world had no experience with state structures until colonial 
intrusion. Geographic borders did not exist for them, until they were created somewhat 
arbitrarily. Colonial officials had very little understanding of the relationship between 
African andEuropean stock keeping. A major concern of colonial governments was to 
Negi http://ignc.nic.in/cd_08004.htm;  Kavoori, 1992. 
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keep African and European stock apart so that the former did not infect the latter with 
disease. Later colonial governments created boundaries between ethnic groups, to "keep 
law and order"; however this also led to a static division of land and water resources. 
Giles and Gefu (1990) observe that boundaries were essential because mobility rendered 
close administration impossible. However it denied pastoralist access to much of their 
former high potential grazing areas and affected the quality of their herd management 
(Jacobs, 1975:407). 
In West Africa, the Fulani and Tuareg were very powerful and headed 12th, 13th and 
14th century jihads, and assisted in the jihad in Alwasa in1804 (Hiskett, 1963). They not 
only helped to overthrow governments but also took leadership in local administration of 
Hausa land and Borno. Fulani rule in West Africa came to an end in 1903 when the 
British defeated the army of Sokoto and incorporated the Sokoto sultanate into the 
newly-proclaimed protectorate of Northern Nigeria, hence quelling their military 
strength. The large part of North West Africa, which they occupy, is now marginalized. 35 
Due to population increases the Fulani and Tuareg now find themselves extending 
through four countries from Mali to Cote d'Ivoire. The crossing of borders triggers inter-
ethnic tensions and insecurity 
Traditionally, most of land resources in pastoral areas are held under a controlled access 
system, which is communal in form. 'Communal' land tenure relates to that system of 
tenure in which the tribe or clan or a group has access to land as opposed to the 
individualization of land as advocated by state legislation. Tenure is thus a social 
institution; a relationship between individuals and groups or tribes consisting of a series 
of rights and duties with respect to the use of land36 . Modern states have attempted to 
introduce a form of private land tenure in pastoral areas. The effort was made to integrate 
pastoralists into the private property system through granting of private group title to 
limited areas. Having a group title gave security to the groups but it also circumscribed 
14  See for example Tavakolian, 1984 
35  See for example Daily Nation 3 March 2004 "Government still ignoring NEP" 
Http://www.eastandard.net'commentaries/columnlcolo04_copy (1). Html 
36  Birgegard L.E. 1993 
their ability to maintain reciprocal relations among their own communities and with 
others but also reduced their access to critical grazing and water resources outside the 
group ranches. The enforced changes in land tenure altered the way people relate to land 
and resources and has created uncertainty and tension. As a result of intensified increase 
in privatised land, pastoralist traditional grazing coping strategies have been disrupted 37 . 
"Privatization of resources can increase conflicts between wildlife and livestock and also 
increase tenure insecurity and gender discrimination." 38 
Marginalization in Education Policy 
Pastoralists in many areas of the world have very little formal education. Evidence for 
this in Kenya is demonstrated in the 1999 population and housing census. 39 Access to 
education has been by hindered local customs, traditional hostility to change, mobility 
and insufficient attention by governments to alternative models of schooling. 
Few politicians, when addressing pastoralists, mention that the pen and the book are their 
best weapons, and few again try to ascertain the causes for their resistance to education. 
Only the F.A.O (1967) seems to have specifically stressed the value of animal husbandry 
education in primary schools, particularly among pastoral societies. Low literacy levels 
are a consequence of their limited access to education, and reduce opportunities for 
influencing political decisions affecting their own lives. In Kenya people from pastoral 
tribes are underrepresented in influential government positions40 . 
Political and Economical Marginalization 
37  For the introduction of land tenure in East Africa 
38  Lane 1997, Rirgegard 1993, Rutten 1993 
Mkutu 2001:3-4 
40  See Daily Nation, IJuly 2004 "The full cabinet following the reshuffle." 
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Political, economic and social marginalization of the pastoralists is a phenomenon 
discussed by several authors 41 . Lesorogol (1998) observes that most pastoralists in Kenya 
and elsewhere live on the margins, yet in the pre-colonial period, the Masai in particular 
dominated the entire Rift Valley region of Kenya. She argues that pastoralists inhabit the 
entire border of Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Tanzania. However most 
of the boundaries in the Horn were drawn through the lowland pastoralists' habitat, and 
many pastoralist ethnic groups found themselves partitioned among several states, which 
has now limited their access to resources. 
Hogg (1997:13) notes for the case of Ethiopia: 
The general attitude of Ethiopia policy makers towards these areas has been 
ambivalent at best; they have generally been regarded as troublesome border areas 
inhabited by 'primitive nomadic tribes' who have little contribution to the 
national economy. The defining characteristic of the relationship has been 
extractive and authoritarian. It is hardly surprising that the general attitude of 
pastoralists to the centre is one of suspicion and hostility. They tend to view 
government as alien and unrepresentative of their interests and concerns. 
The once powerful Fulbe and the WoDaaBe pastoralists in Sahel are "not only facing 
change, they have become aristocrats facing death" 42. They have been subject to 
marginalization along with impoverishment and proletarization, sedentarization and 
agriculturization (ibid: 37). The situation has deteriorated due to the recurrent droughts 
where those who have lost most of their cattle are forced into jobs 'like beggars, 
cultivators, car-washers, hired labourers, house workers', water carrying etc. Due to the 
pressures exerted on the West African pastoralists, the Fulani have also been 
marginalized. 
41  Lesorgo1 1998, ASARECA: 2003;OAU/IBAR, 200 1:Muhereza, 1997: Knighton, 2003, Markakis 
1998:42; Porter, 1984; Makinda, 1992; Grebreselassie, 2001. 
42  Bovin, 1992: 37; Tonah 2003 
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The combination of inequitable policy, lack of understanding of pastoral communities, 
'favour toward settled groups' and differential provision of public goods has resulted in 
the almost complete marginalization of the pastoralists in sub-Saharan Africa. It is 
striking that most of the armed groups in Southern and Western Sudan, and the Horn of 
Africa have been formed primarily among pastoral peoples. This stems from the 
economic marginalization, their independence from administration and their tradition of 
armed resistance. Most pastoral ethnic groups have been neglected in terms of receiving 
the benefits of economic development, which has benefited a class (in the case of the 
senior civil servants from the areas) rather than an ethnic group. 
It is important to note however, in so far as their life and mode of livelihood are self-
sustaining there are only 'marginalized' when seen from an external perspective. They 
may not need or want to be included in larger entities in which their freedom and 
autonomy is restricted or they might be required to pay taxes. Socially, their culture has 
been advantageous by enabling them to continue pastoral production and to keep intact 
many of the coping strategies and social networks, which helped them to survive 
historically43 . 
2.2.7 Impact on Pastoralism of Capitalist Relations of Production. 
The brutal and inhuman manner in which states respond to pastoralists' grievances and 
the risk of losing their entire livestock population due to droughts could lead to more 
conflicts between pastoralists and their neighbours as the pastoralists invade other areas 
to survive44. This section addresses development and governance as related to pastoral 
areas in selected sections of the world. 
Development and Governance. 
Colonial policy towards pastoralist communities 
de Waal, 1990. 
44  See Daily Nation 26 August 2004 "Masai seek Sh 10 billion for all their lost land" Guardian, Lagos, 
Nigeria 25 February 2004 Http://odili.netlnew/source/2004/feb/25/42.html.  
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saw pastoralists as practising an uneconomic and irrational herding system based on 
accumulation for its own sake 45 . Polices pursued by successive post-colonial regime 
neglected pastoralists and focused on agriculture and urban dwellers. Most of those 
polices aimed at containment, pacification, sedentarisation, ranching and of late land 
tenure based on the free market, without putting in place laws to protect pastoralists 
interests. The impact of government policies on pastoralists worldwide has been well 
documented.46 In modem times, previously inaccessible pastures have been made 
available through government interventions involving technology and capital 
expenditure, usually beyond the means of the pastoralists themselves. 
Sedentarisation Policy 
Sedentarisation is the attempt by various states to settle nomads and reduce mobility. 
Sedentarisation started with the colonial regime but the policy has since been promoted 
further by the postcolonial states. The process is occurring in varying degrees in virtually 
all contemporary pastoral nomadic groups 47 . In semi and regions of Asia, Africa and the 
eastern Mediterranean sedenterisation is a major government policy (Salzaman, 1980). 
Sedentarisation was undertaken for several reasons. First was the realization that 
sub-humid zones can contribute to solving the problems of overcrowding in other parts of 
the country. Other reasons include a desire to bring the benefits of development, such as 
education and health care but also, to exert more political control and incorporate nomads 
into national culture. However, in the case of Nigeria, the purpose of sedentarisation was 
to protect pastoralists against encroachment by cultivators, by providing secured grazing 
areas (Livingstone, 1984:63), but it did not produce the intended result, as mobility is 
essential for survival of pastoralists. 
For India, Boser (1975:10) notes pressures in the increase in cultivated areas and 
decreasing pastoral lands. In Central Asia, prior to the Soviet revolution, Kazakhstan, 
Kirgizi, and a large part of Turkmenistan were predominantly nomadic and 
45 Manger, 1996:244: Oba, 1994a; Fratkin, 1998:123 
46  See Awogbade, 1983: Awad, 1959; Oxby, 1993 
47  Swidle 1980:21 
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semi-nomadic. 48 . For the economy to be re-organized sedentarization was essential and 
by 1937 all the farms were collectivised, despite protests, and Pastoralism declined. 
In Saudi Arabia's badia (rangelands) the Bedouins maintained a flourishing culture in the 
past based on nomadic Pastoralism. Yacoub (1971) notes that nomadism in the Middle 
East has been on the decline for the last 150 years, as political control has been exerted, 
pastoralists have been forced to sedentarise, and agriculturists have been allowed to 
encroach on pastoral areas. 
Sedentarisation frequently leads to competition and conflict among herders, farmers and 
ranchers, and leads to greater alienation of pastoral lands. However the creation of the 
state has impacted pastoralists differently and some have benefited. 
Ranching Policies 
Stenning (1959) defines a 'ranch' as a demarcated area expected to support commercial 
cattle to sustain a number of inhabitants exercising exclusive rights to specific forms of 
land use. Ranching was introduced based on the assumption that migratory Pastoralism is 
no longer viable, ' misunderstanding the symbiotic relationship between pastoralists and 
agricultural communities that had functioned for years. 5° Migration by pastoralists is 
vital in giving pastoralists access to diverse and unpredictable pasture resources, rather 
than relying on the hypothetical stability or uniformity of those resources. 5 Pastoralists 
have tended to rely on communal grazing rights, which are not protected by law, and they 
have lost access to water and pasture as privatisation of land tenure has proceeded. 
Tension and conflict is the predictable outcome. 
Attempts were made to transpose the Kenyan ranching system to West Africa in Upper 
Volta. The goal was to first to offer security of tenure to the livestock keepers, secondly, 
to eliminate the need for transhumance by establishing self-contained areas with 
48 Konczacki, 1978:58; Livingston, 1983. 
Giles and Gefu, 1993; Oxby, 1985; Abdalla et at; Barth, 1964 
° Dupire, 1962, Odegi-Odegi-Awoundo, 1990 
' See Lane and Moorhead, 1994; Mace, 1991; Mortimore, 1998 
sufficient pasture and water. Thirdly, it was meant to increase the degree of 
Sedentarisation among the semi-nomad Fulani. The expected result was a reduction in 
conflict between livestock keepers and cultivators by giving legal tenure, and to offer 
livestock-keepers the possibility of obtaining development loans and increased income. 
In Nigeria, as in Kenya this failed miserably 52 . Schneider (1978:42) argues "ranching 
changes the structure of land use making it more like agriculture, where, as a factor of 
production its inherent scarcity generates unequal control and social stratification." 
There are similarities between the group ranches in East Africa and West Africa and even 
the Middle East. They have led to land grabbing by elites, reducing the land available for 
migration by the pastoralists. The result has been the conflict between the ranchers and 
pastoralists, and to some extent with farmers. Ranchers require huge tracts of land, while 
serving only a small number of people. 
Free Market Economy and Privatisation of Common Lands 
Most pastoral land resources are held under a controlled access system of 'communal' 
land tenure by which the tribe or clan or a group has access to land. 
Hardin (1968) sparked the Tragedy of the Commons debate, which argued that the 
pastoralists were responsible for environmental dilapidation in Africa's dry lands. 
He suggested that pastoralists overgraze common pastures achieving a personal economic 
return at the cost of the community. He argues that donors should support private land 
management i.e. fenced ranches. A'though  his thesis is 36 years old, it still impacts 
negatively on pastoralists and is the excuse for continual land grabbing. It has justified 
policies of tenure reform; land Privatization, the registration of title deeds and formal 
land use planning (Lane, 1998:6-8). His assumptions also led to donors abandoning 
pastoralist sectors in East Africa 53 . The above viewpoint does not take into account the 
need for pastoralists to accumuite large herds as risk aversion from theft and drought, 
52  Livingstone, 1983: 87 
53  See Manger (1996:243) 
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insurance against diseases, for prestige, for providing milk and meat and as an 
investment54. Currently as noted by Birgegard, (1993) and others 55 the introduction of 
new property rights tenure does not benefit the pasoralist community. Among other 
peoples, such as the Borana clans in Southern Ethiopia (zone IV), communal grazing land 
has been turned into privatised enclosures and has accelerated alienation of land by 
Somalis returning from abroad buying large tracts of land (Tache and Irwin, 2003 : 11)56 . 
The Afar pastoralists in Ethiopia also have lived under the pressure of displacement from 
their land (Tache and Irwin 2003). The individualisation of the Borana land in Ethiopia 
and Kenya has curtailed community access to pastureland and herd mobility, (Boku, 
2003), and led to competition for resources and tenure insecurity. Similarly, the Masai of 
Kenya and Tanzania have faced land alienation for decades and the process is 
intensifying57 . 
Rutten (1999), examined Masai in Kenya's Kajiado district, the land tenure process, and 
the changing patterns of the pastoralist, which is leading to former communal and public 
and lands being privatised and the Masai being allocated individual rights. This process 
has seen the Masai once called "the most wealthy tribe in East Africa", diminish both in 
land and stock. Earlier, they were able to sustain themselves (KLC, 1933-34), but now 
their nomadic future is bleak. 
From 1990, like the Former Soviet Union, Mongolia began a process of transition 
towards a free-market economy 58 . It embarked on the introduction of land tenure from a 
collective system to a privatised system, which included rural land 59. Pomfret (2000) 
notes that collectivisation had disrupted Mongolia's pastoral economy and new industrial 
towns were created. Virgin lands programs increased the area under crops from 265,000 
hectares in 1960 to a peak of 838 000 hectares in 1989. 
54 Livingstone, 1977, and Odegi-Odegi-Awoundo, 1992 
55 See Constantantinos, 1999; Mkutu 2001 op cit; Mugerwa, 2001, Behnke, 1985 
56  See http://www.iied.org/docs/dry1ands/secur_comm4e.pdf  
' Galaty, 1994: Fratkin, 1994 
58 Bawden, 1968; Mime et al, 1991; Economist 5 June, 2004 
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?storyi&=1 487499) 
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The traditional pastoral lifestyle was resilient to economic changes (Pomfret, 2000:2). 
The introduction of the market-based system in 1991-1992, reversed a two-decade 
decline in the pastoral sector due to initial investment and the number of animals 
increased from 25.9 million in 1990 to 31.3 million in 1997. Initially the traditional 
pastoral life style was seen to provide a reliable subsistence consumption level and some 
insulation from the collapse of the economy (Pomfret, 2000:3). Many families have 
since moved back to the rural areas to keep cattle as a defensive coping mechanism to 
deal with the vicissitudes of transition from communism. One consequence of moving to 
a market economy has been an increase in herds leading to adverse environmental 
consequences due to the pressure on pastureland, especially land close to provincial 
capitals. (Ibid: 4). However, despite the environmental degradation, a key element in the 
stability of the Mongolia economy in the midst of this change has been the cultural 
homogeneity and continued orientation towards traditional Pastoralism that was shared 
by most Mongolians through the communist era. Unlike sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Mongolian Government during the liberalization process eased the pressure by regulating 
prices in order to alleviate the short-term impact to the pastoralists. With regard to access 
to pastures, customary grazing rights continue to remain in controlled-access commons 
and there are identifiable norms that regulate their use. 
In 1994, a law introducing title deeds and leases over campsites and pastures was passed 
by the Mongolian parliament. However, the government had not developed any adequate 
strategies to prepare for risk management (Asia Pacific Conference, 2001). As a result of 
increased levels of privatised land, the pastoralists' traditional grazing patterns and 
coping strategies have been disrupted. This has resulted in reduced and fragmented 
grazing areas and increased the impact of droughts and scarcity. In the case of absence of 
coherent national land policies, violence over land could increase. 
2.2.8 Impact of New Kinds of Weaponry 
59 Nepert, 1996 
Violent Conflict 
This section addresses the issue of violence by pastoralists. Pastoralists have often been 
successful conquerors. This has been especially true of Mongol horse pastoralists, the 
cattle herders of East Africa, Bedouins in North Africa, the Fulani in West Africa, the 
Tuareg in North and West Africa and Zulu in South Africa. The Mongol light cavalry 
based armies, with their powerful short bows, rapidly conquered China and Central Asia 
in the 13th century AD. During the 14th century they controlled Persia, Iraq, much of 
Russia, and the northern parts of South Asia. Many countries paid the Mongols tributes to 
avoid invasion. In east Africa, pastoralists controlled the entire Horn and Great Lakes 
region to even South Africa (Odhiambo et al. 1970). 
The pre-colonial system in the Horn of Africa was based on open access and a state of 
practically constant warfare60. Pasture and grazing rights were continuous, kept by 
military force instead of laws. Cattle raiding was carried out, to build herds lost due to 
famine and droughts. The arms used were mainly inferior arms like spears, bows and 
arrows. Modern weapon technology is a major change agent; it has intensified the 
violence, but also changed the nature of violence, leading some to conclude that 
customary governance institutions are not effective in management of violence. That 
arms do not directly cause the conflict but are instruments is debated later in the section 
on weapons and violence in society. 
Bovin (1992) studied the pure pastoralist WoDaaBe, (Fulani) in Niger and the Lake Chad 
Basin, whose history is one of escape and flight from centralized Muslim empires. The 
other group studied was the Fulbe Liptaako (Fulani) from Burkina Faso who are 
agro-pastoralist, and are hierarchical Muslims with social classes and castes. Bovin 
(1992) notes that the Fulbe of the TorroBe clan were the first to adopt Islam, They settled 
and became learned Muslims, and led the way in co-operating with the Soninke, Arabs 
and Berbers from North Africa. During the jihads, the Fulbe ToroBe used their military 
skills to become aristocrats. With the use of Islam, such powerful states in West Africa 
60  Fukul and Turton, 1997;Markakis, 1993; BoIlig, 1990;BoI Aken, 1991. 
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like Futa Jallon State (in present Guinea) was started by nine Muslim Fulbe with a jihad. 
Another empire, the Sokoto Caliphate in what is today northern Nigeria and Adamawa 
again started in 1804 with ajihad to become one of the greatest Muslim success stories in 
West African history. Usman Dan Fodio's jihad success was due to assistance from the 
pastoral nomadic Fulbe. So the pressure and changes in the West Africa pastoralists must 
be seen in this framework, which differs from Horn of Africa/Saudi Arabia and Asia, and 
in East Africa. The Fulani pastoralists have been militarised and armed since the 11 and 
12th century. 
The Horn of Africa and parts of West Africa are different to Asia, Middle East, Saudi 
Arabia, Mongolia and Asia, in the issue of the emerging threats and challenges of 
increasing violent conflicts. In recent years, peaceful pastoralists in the Horn of Africa 
have become violent. This has been due partly to governance as noted above. 
Tonah (2000) wrote on the Fulbe nomadic herdsmen and the Kassena of Ghana/Burkina 
Faso who are agro-pastoralists and neighbour each other. He notes that the relationship 
between the Fulbe and the government has been strained, because they see the 
international border as artificial. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the relationship 
between the two groups was good. However in the late 1970s stock thefts caused the 
relationship to deteriorate. The Kassena accused the Fulbe that they were colluding with 
rustlers to steal cattle belonging to local people and driving them across the borders into 
Burkina Faso. The result is the escalation of conflict along the border, and depletion of 
Kassena cattle. The pressures that have contributed to the intensification of competition 
between the two ethnic groups include land degradation and erosion due to increased 
human and livestock population; droughts; famines of the 1970s   and 1980s   and the 
appropriation of land by the government for the production of cash crops on irrigated 
fields, all noted in previous sections (Tonah, 1991:30). There is also lack of political will 
by the Ghanaian government to address the border cattle rustling. There is increasing 
possession and use of small arms by herdsmen for the security of their families and 
property, while moving through a hostile environment. The arms are further diffusing 
into the society with many farmers, who feel powerless and intimidated now carrying 
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arms, some illegal. At the centre of the Fulbe and Kassena conflict is the issue of 
protection, control and access to dwindling and deteriorating resources. 
A difference exists between the East African, Mongolian and North African pastoralist to 
the West African and North African. Religion played a major role in the violent wars 
among the West African pastoralists and they have always been armed. 
Demand for Arms 
Small Arms Survey (2001: 83) notes that 
Today, small arms traffic is drawn overwhelming to the concentration of 
insurgent fighting in sub-Saharan Africa, especially to the Great Lakes Region 
and Sierra Leone, as well as Angola and Sudan, home to more than 60 percent of 
the world's fully active non-state combatants, the Great Lakes is the most likely 
destination for most of the world's black and grey market of small arms. 
There are several facts that cause communities to demand arms. These range from corrupt 
behaviour and systematic violence by police and other government agencies, arming of 
communities by the states, lack of adequate public security, systematic brutality by police 
and other state agencies, marginalization and prejudices and stereotypes, distribution of 
arms by government to militias and other civilians. When the police are absent, slow, 
inefficient or corrupt, communities would normally demand for arms,6 ' but also it can be 
attributed to failure of effective governance structures in developing states. This work is 
interested in pastoral areas in the North Rift forms part of the Greater Horn of Africa, 
where little is known why pastoralists acquire arms, which are not part of an insurgency. 
Supply of Arms 
The pastoralists in West Africa and Horn regions and to some extent in Southern Africa 
(DRC) are now experiencing increasingly violent resource based conflicts. This is 
exacerbated by the easy availability of arms from regional conflicts in Africa and the spill 
61  See for example http://www.aug.eduJ-sbajmb/paper-smaIlarms . PDF 
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over from the cold war conflicts. Pastoralists now provide the largest market for small 
arms from local circulation and from areas in the region undergoing civil wars. 62 The 
greatest threat associated with illicit arms trade is the diversion of legal stockpiles known 
as the 'grey market' where states supply arms to non-state actors or to embargoed states. 
States have no control over where these types of arms are ultimately absorbed. It is such 
arms from states that are ending in pastoral areas. Nyaba (2001) gives the example of the 
Sudanese NIF Government (National Islamic Front) supporting and arming tribal militias 
(the Murle, Mundari, Toposa and Didinga, LRA) which led to the proliferation of arms 
among the population. The large numbers of SPLA laid off in 1993-1994 were given a 
pension, not of money but of weapons. Related, the SPLA was reported to have received 
sizeable shipments of military equipment from the National Revolutionary Movement in 
Uganda, just as the LRA was regularly supplied by the NIF Sudanese government and 
Sudanese internal security services. Though agreements between the two states have 
sought to reduce this support, it still continues. The current Darfur crisis has resulted 
from the same. Somalia, Ethiopia, DRC have all seen civil war in recent years, into which 
arms have been poured by foreign players, and are all sources of arms in the region. 
2.2.9 Conclusion 
There are immense pressures on pastoralists around the world. Middle Eastern and 
Mongolian pastoralists have experienced large scale modernisation of their political 
systems, subjecting them to greater government control, and often economic pressures, 
not forgetting the decline in their traditional values, and the impact on the environment. 
African pastoralists have seen little in the way of modernization, and find themselves 
artificially restricted in terms of mobility and out of favour with the states because of 
their "uncivilized" way of life. The social, developmental, economical and political 
marginalization, for which colonial policy is partly responsible, has them trapped. Their 
culture has made them resilient, and they continue to survive, though resource based 
conflicts have made life very difficult. The recent injection of arms into the region, which 
has intensified pastoral conflict, and the role of governance in that process, is the interest 
62  Micutu and Marani, op cit.; Nyaba and Otim, 2001, Grebreselassie, 2001. 
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with which this research is concerned. The decline of Pastoralism and the conflict it has 
engendered constitute a human problem of the first magnitude that cannot be ignored. 
The new pressure on pastoralists caused by small arms has been overlooked, under 
researched and very scanty work exists. 
2.3 Governance and Security 
2.3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the linkage between governance and security. The argument is 
that the total failure in governance in North Rift, northeastern Africa (Kenya-Uganda) is 
related to the arms demand by local communities. There is a demonstrable failure by the 
governments to guarantee security to local communities within which basic needs 
relating to growth and development can be addressed. Inadequate application and 
implementation of policies and laws and access to social institutions (general 
governance) is primarily responsible for the increase in arms acquisition to protect 
livestock and in ensuing conflicts noted above 63 . 
As noted by Lindijer (2003 :4) 
The national authorities based in Nairobi, who are mostly representatives of 
farming highland tribes, don't understand the dynamics of savannah and desert 
life. They are more adept at oppressing than governing them. 
The mistrust of government pushes individuals towards more localized loyalties and 
demand for weapons for self- protection. People resort to their customary 'traditional' 
system of governance that has been partially eroded, especially in regard to the 
administration ofjustice and peaceful conflict resolution64 . 
63  See Daily Nation 14 April 2004 on devolution promises power to the people. See also 
http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category  id25&newsid6 179 
64  See Mkutu op cit. 2001;Masinde et al 2004 
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In some places states are willing to implement but not capable, however, in some places 
the state is capable (especially in Kenya) but there is a lack of political will 65 . 
The situation has been further complicated by the state decision to provide arms to 
civilians who are not trained in their responsible use 66 . In both Kenya and Uganda 
governments have developed the Kenya Police Reservists (in Kenya) and in Uganda 
Local Defence Units (LDUs) and militias which are now operating in pastoral areas 
carrying out the everyday duties of policing. 
Vigilante groups represent communitarian thinking given that the civilian is 
viewed as able to maintain order instinctively, representing community norms that 
are internalised and undisputed67 . 
Vigilantes in the pastoral areas, and here I use the term generically and without 
implication of criticism or approval 68, are private citizens who work as volunteers. It has 
been argued by Johnston (1996), that they represent a form of "autonomous citizenship" 
that emerges when an established order is under threat. At the local level in North east 
Africa they are accepted as they address issues of security and moral order that are 
significant to the people living on the periphery reach of the formal state apparatus in 
pastoral regions. In pastoral areas, they are armed, which may lead to criminality. 
Abrahams (1987:18) notes that they operate in shadows rather than the bright lights of 
consensus and legitimate authority, and the boundary between vigilante and criminal, like 
that between heroes and bandits or patriots and traitors, is both fluid and manipulable. 
The next section outlines the concepts of governance and security. 
2.3.2 Concepts of Governance and Security 
65 0ne of the main reasons why Kenya National African Union was voted out was the overwhelming power 
of the president and decades of bad governance caused by entrenched authoritarian structures of personal 
dictatorship. See East African Standard 14 June 2004 "why they do not want the constitution they wanted" 
66  See KrlIghton (2003) also see East African Standard, 6 April 2004. See chapter 8 
67  Zedner, 2000 and Johnston, 1996: 2000:Abrahams, 1987; 1998-8-9 
term vigilante is used alternatively with militia as they are all civilians armed by the state to do 
policing work. 
75 
This section gives a standard definition of governance and security and links the two 
terms together distinguishing how they relate to each other at community and at national 
levels. It briefly outlines why governance is an issue in developing countries and then 
identifies security actors in the North Rift identifying the role of the army and police and 
how they influence conflict positively and negatively. 
Increasingly the two terms governance and security are intertwined, especially with the 
emergence of a unipolar world order since the late 1980s, and with new dimensions that 
challenge conventional understandings of national sovereignty, interests, and security. 69 
No longer does security depend on a military, which defends only borders and 
institutions. 
The impact of security on governance in general has been established, however; the link 
between governance and security is controversial. In general governance is the process by 
which government channels activities; commands flow, goals are framed, directives are 
issued, and policies are pursued and communicated. 7° The international financial 
institutions have frequently defined the term to serve their own narrow agenda. 71 . Three 
years later they used the term to refer to the practical exercise of power and authority to 
conduct public affairs. 
Though the United Nations Development Programme recently conceptualised governance 
with reference to security as a means of conflict prevention and peace building (UNDP, 
2002:85-100), it can be defined as the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, 
public and private, manage their common affairs. Governance is required where a group 
or groups of people, states or organisations gather for a certain purpose in order to 
maintain a certain order among the people, states or organisations. Thus, different 
institutions and organisations in society have their own governance. It is a continuing 
process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co- 
69  Shapiro et al, 1996; Doty 1996, Kaldor, 1999,2001. 
° Rosenau 1995; Corner 1999: 120 
exarnple, in 1989 they defined it with reference to the exercise of political power to manage a nations 
affairs (World Bank, 1989). 
operative action may be taken. It includes formal as well as informal arrangements that 
people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interests. Thus, 
governance does not necessarily mean governance by government. In any country, 
governance by government is important to sustain the country. In addition, governance is 
also required in civil societies to complement governance by government. Whilst 
government is supposed to provide national-scale economic, political and social 
frameworks civil society needs to have voices from micro-level or community based 
perspectives and also needs to function as a detector to ensure that the government 
provides the frameworks with legitimate, transparent and participatory manners. The so-
called failed states perceived in many developing countries have weaknesses of 
governance by either one or both of them 72 . In observation and research on the ground, 
the author found that civil society often suffers from bad governance, and lack of 
capacity in conflict resolution and peace building, which is also escalating conflict 
instead of mitigating it 73 . 
Governance as used in this thesis includes the ability by government to formulate, 
implement, evaluate, and monitor policies and directives and decisions without excluding 
or marginalizing any community or individual. 74 
The fundamental purpose of government is to maintain peace and security for the nation 
within the territory. To do so, the government needs to take measures for both domestic 
and international matters such as preparing laws or regulations for domestic order and 
establishing good relationships with other countries. Thus, any act by the government is 
supposed to protect all the nation and prosperity of the country. Though there may exist 
difference in precise contents of the methods of governance, the primary purpose of 
governance by government is to provide security for all nationals of the country. If 
governance does not treat all communities equally and provide security, experience has 
proved that it is a recipe for chaos and conflict. It is the alien nature of modern 
72  Example in the Horn of Africa is Somalia. 
13  Review of capacity of NGOs to deliver. Gomes and Mkutu, 2003 
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governance and its failure 75 to include the entire community that is partially responsible 
for the development of paramilitary militias by communities, leading to anarchy and 
conflict. As noted by the special envoy to the Somalia peace process recently; "bad 
governance due to flawed constitutions that deny majority of citizens political space is 
the main cause of many conflicts that have plagued many African countries since 
attaining their independence in 1950s and 60s 76. 
A permanent secretary in the Ministry of Labour in Kenya also echoed the same words 
for Kenya; "lack of good governance is the main cause of problems. Corruption, 
inefficient management of public resources, reluctance and failure to involve the poor in 
development process has contributed to the sorry state"77 . 
At a recent Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference in Nairobi, conflicts 
on the African continent were blamed on bad governance and power hungry leaders. 
Conflicts are sparked by irresponsible and provocative utterances by politicians and their 
opponents78 . 
Governance is what glues communities and individuals together. Simply put, governance 
is "how people are ruled, and how the affairs of the state are administered or regulated 
(Hanggi, 2002:6)." Accountability and transparency in the exercise of state powers are 
74 1n Kenya, the formulation of polices is not the issue, but it is the implementation of policies on the 
ground. Kenya is known for having good policies on paper but not on the ground. In the case of Uganda, 
again implementation, evaluation and monitoring are issues. 
71  By failure here is implied weak governance, whereby the government cannot guarantee security for all 
people. Cannot distribute resources without excluding and marginalizing (bad resource management). 
Cannot block or control possible threats flow from other countries (e.g. small arms, drug, refugees), 
Cannot control political corruption (function to detect corruption). Cannot give fair opportunities for all 
people (regardless of ethnic, religious or ideological differences). Cannot provide or implement enough law 
and regulations to maintain order (domestic and international). Cannot implement long-term national 
strategies (e.g. conflict management, crisis management and development). Good governance implies that 
it can guarantee security for all. Participatory, transparent, legitimate and accountable for its decisions they 
make. It is inclusive (no discrimination nor marginalization) and has fair treatment. Recognizes minority 
and diverse customary systems in all its decisions and actions. Provides a certain standard for order (laws 
and regulations). Control its border (block any possible threat from other countries). Can have long-term 
perspectives and take measures for the prosperity of the country and the nation (Prevention instead of fire 
fighting). Good governance is an abstract concept, which different fields of study define in accordance 
with their focuses. 
76  Kenya Times 18th February 2004 "Bad governance to blame for conflicts plaguing Africa". 
Http://www.kentimes.com/nwsstory/other3.html.  
77  See Kenya Times 5 March 2004. "A permanent Secretary explains the cause of economic decay" 
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fundamental principles of good governance. Others are legitimacy through democratic 
participation, respect for human rights and rule of law, and efficiency of public resources 
in delivering public service 79. These apply to paramilitary and internal security forces as 
well as intelligence services and police border guards, which share in the exercise of the 
state's coercive power (ibid: 6). 
Security, whether individual, national or international, ranks high among the problems 
facing the world. There is no universally accepted definition of security. As noted 
previously, since the genesis of the state, its security role has been to protect itself against 
internal and external threats 80 . Enforcement of law and order is the cardinal role of the 
states, thus by design the state assumes a monopoly on the use of violence. Protecting the 
state is important for individuals, since it is assumed that enforcing law and order has a 
trickle down effect to protect citizens and their possessions against damage, grievance or 
loss. The state81 has been central to analysis of international relations. For a state, survival 
is about sovereignty, and for the nationalist, it is about identity (Waever, et al, 1993, ch. 
2). 
In the Westphalian conception of international society that developed in Europe and 
spread to other parts of the world, the state was the sole repository of both the right and 
the capability to use force (Buzan et al.1998: 52). However, since the end of the cold war 
and the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the national state has become more 
vulnerable to challenges from within and without. Three major developments from the 
cold war era impact the state and change the way it operates. First is the free market 
economy82 . Second, especially in the developing world, is the growth of civil society. 
Last is the increased involvement of international financial institutions and donor 
agencies in encouraging peace building in areas of conflict83 
78  Daily Nation 8 August 2003 :6 "Commonwealth MPs discuss wars" 
79  See governance indicators D. Kaufmann A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2003) 
80 SeeBuzan 1991 
81  The state comprises the entire machinery of government, including its executive, legislative and judicial 
bodies. And the laws, procedures and norms by which they operate. 
82  Here also is globalization. 
83  International Monetary Fund, World Bank or the Bretton Wood Institutions. 
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Internal factors contributing to the failure of governance to provide security include 
porous borders, the weakness of states, armed conflicts, marginalization (see chapter 3) 
and the exclusion of citizens from the formation and implementation of policy. Booth 
(1991) notes that the individual is now a factor in security. Since the 1980s, and 
especially the 1990s, security theory has moved to focus on the individual. Hewson and 
Sinclair (1999) notes that authority tends to be relocated in multiple directions. This has 
led to a greater recognition of the link between governance and "human security" 
(Hendrickson, 1999). Thus security is now defined to include that of communities and 
individuals as well as of states. 
Governments operating in the North Rift and their security forces have been inadequate 
to the task of combating the unprecedented escalation of inter-pastoral conflict in what 
are becoming no-go zones. The response by state law enforcement bodies has been slow, 
ineffective, overly forceful, or non-existent. Often the police are complicit in violence. 
There are no effective policies to address insecurity, and the formation of vigilante 
groups and home guards (examined in this chapter) leads to additional threats to law and 
order and to the increased proliferation of small arms (chapter 5). 
2.4 Violence, Weapons and Society 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Louis (1995) notes that the linkages between small arms and light weapons, globalisation 
and socia' disintegrafion have been greatly under-researched. The lack of research is the 
more significant because small arms continue to be used in the violent civil and ethnic 
conflicts of the post-cold war era. Additionally, too little is known about the international 
trade in these weapons and the true extent of their diffusion: therefore this section 
provides an overview of the current knowledge. 
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As noted by Howe (1981:16), small arms are no longer so mild as their name suggests, 
and are likely to become even deadlier in the future. In the global terms small arms and 
light weapons have become weapons of mass destruction, taking over a thousand lives 
each day, more than half a million each year (Small Arms Survey, 2001). In fact 
according to the recent surveys, there are 639 million such weapons in circulation (SAS 
2003:57). 
Furthermore, the fact that man created arms does not mean that he can manage them 
properly. This literature review attempts to address such questions as: 
Do guns kill people or do people kill people? 
Can criminals be violent without arms? 
Can carrying weapons ever reduce crime? 
The chapter provides a debate on the role of guns as it examines banditry, warlordism and 
other societal violence. It also notes the role of the state as a source of small arms and 
violence. 
2.4.2 Debate on Guns. 
In Klein vs. Leis, 84 U.S. Judge Robert Ruelman argued, "Where carrying concealed 
weapons is allowed, crime seems to go down." The argument continues that in the past, 
children in America routinely carried rifles and ammunition through towns on their bikes, 
and school shootings were unheard of; so it is not the gun in society that makes trouble, 
but people who misuse guns. Besides the above argument against gun control in the U.S., 
the second amendment of the constitution protects an individual's right to keep and bear 
arms. This reads, "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, 
the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infrfhged" 85 It is further argued 
that laws on guns will not be tespected by people intent on committing violent crimes 
84Klein V. Leis No. A-0004340, Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio. 
5 U.s. Constitution Second Amendment, the right to bear arms by citizens. 
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because it is unlikely that persons whose morals allow them to commit murder, assault, or 
robbery would shrink at gun laws (Richman, 2001). 
According to Richman, current legal restrictions on firearms have not prevented gun 
violence, including recent horrific shootings by teenagers. With the black market in guns 
for outlaws, citizens may be rendered defenceless by law in the face of well-armed 
criminals. So goes the argument, gun control is not only futile but it often makes things 
many times worse. The corollary is that gun ownership by law-abiding people makes 
things better. 86Other groups assert the reason for the presence of the 'right to bear arms' in 
the second amendment is to provide the people the means to resist the government when 
it becomes a 'tyranny'. Additionally there should be no restriction on manufacture or sale, 
as this infringes on freedom 87 . 
Those in favour of gun control argue that more guns on the city streets can only lead to 
more violence and deaths. They contend that lack of gun control laws will transform the 
streets of America into a 'Dodge City' as previously law-abiding citizens take to settling 
arguments over fender benders and slights to their dignity with guns. Citizens' lack of 
training leads to unrealistic expectations about the usefulness of firearms, with the result 
that weapon owners take foolish risks (Snyder, 1997). The carrying of weapons by 
ordinary citizens also jeopardizes the safety of the police. Generally those who hold these 
views argue that the spate of shootings in America is due to the proliferation of small 
arms in society (Stohl, 1999). 
After the Dunblane shooting in Britain in 1996, when a middle-aged man opened fire on 
a class of primary school children, Britain decided to ban ownership of handguns. 
However, some interested groups argue that despite the ban, the crime rate involving 
86  In a lower court decision in U.S. vs. Emerson, the district court found that a federal law prohibiting an 
individual under a domestic restraining order from possessing firearms violates the second amendment46 
F.supp.2d 598 (N.D. Texas, 1999 our second amendment rights have not been eroded, but our 
understanding of them, however has. hiip://www.gunlawsuits.or/defend/second/articies/erosion.asp. 
87  Jonathan Cowan and Jim Kessler (2001) Changing the Gun Debate. Blue Print Magazine 
http://www.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfln?  kaid=1 27&subid=1 70&contentid=3 560 
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handguns has increased. 88 The Home Office acknowledge a recent rise but do not 
implicate the legislation as a cause 89 . It is argued that the contract between the public and 
their rulers is broken, and there is no political will to deal with the violation of the most 
fundamental liberty, the right of people to feel safe in their homes. Therefore it is time for 
the British government to confer a new right on the people, the right to bear arms. 
Other researchers argue possession of guns (especially by youth) is for protection. The 
same authors observe that it could be a case of "replicative externalities" model in which 
adolescents feel less safe when their classmates carry guns causing them in turn to 
acquire guns (Page and Hammermeister, 1997). These arguments appear to concentrate 
only on cause and effect but lack a philosophical standpoint, since evil does not only 
come from society, but from within an individual, who with a gun in one's hand could 
carry out any impulsive harmful intent. 
2.4.3 Banditry, Violence and Arms (Warlordism) 
Warlordism is an ugly, pejorative expression that signals brutality and the suffering of 
civil communities. A warlord is a leader of an armed band, possibly numbering up to 
several thousand fighters, who can hold a territory locally and, at the same time, act 
financially and politically in the international system without interference from the state 
in which he is based. 90  African writers, to describe locally powerful individuals, 
controlling warriors and profiting from cattle raiding and small arms conflict in the North 
Rift of East Africa, have borrowed the term "warlord" 91 . Warlords can be categorised on 
the basis of their level of domination. The highest tier is organised, characterised by 
sophisticated external relations, and controls major areas approximating to state held 
territory. The organisation is non-bureaucratic but with in-built transnational links, and 
88  See National Criminal Intelligence Service, "UK Threat Assessment on Serious and Organised Crime 
2060",www.ncis.co.uk) See also BBC 16 July 2001 "Handgun crime "un" despite ban. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi1ukl1440764.stm 
Hill, 1997; Jackson, 2002,2003; Ratner & Helman, 1992-3; Reno, 1998: see also Mackinalay, J. 
http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk/Publications/assets/PDF%2ofijesfbulletjnjssue%203  .pdf 
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personalised leadership. 92 This category of warlords mainly deals in illegal export of 
minerals and raw materials by means of exploitation of the local biosphere 93 . Tropical 
wood, gems, diamonds, ivory and minerals lead the list of products that enter the global 
market to sustain them. In Afghanistan and Colombia, drug production and trafficking 
are an important element in the survival and power maintenance of such warlords. 
The second tier of warlordism is less organised, and they dominate territory less than the 
higher tier. They do however, use the local resources and tax local communities or 
companies to survive. The best examples are the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in 
Uganda, Congolese Rally for Democracy and Mai Mai in Kivu in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 94 Revolutionary United Front95 in Sierra Leone, and the Somali 
warlords. 
The third tier, now being referred to as warlords includes businessmen, politicians, and 
traders, to strongmen with a wealth base, who employ armed men for their financial 
objectives. Sometimes they do not have political alliances, do not possess international 
clout, control no territory, but they are politically relevant because of their activities. 
' See Ocan 1992, Muhereza 1997b, Environmental Economics Association of Uganda, 2003, The 
Peacemaker 2003 June; Quam, 1996; Osamba, 2000. 
92  this category are warlords like Charles Taylor and the late Jonas Savimbi. In his early years Garang 
could be included in this group. 
93  Duffield, 1997; Keen, 1998; Reno, 1998; Rich, 1996 
94 See http://www.inshuti.org/minierea.htm 
Currently the warlords control the Colton production in the Kivu areas of Congo and run their own 
company called Sornigl. Somigi officially provided RCD with much tax revenue, which they used to buy 
arms. The Colton trade is closely intertwined with the activities of all armed groups in the area. 
95 Foday Sankob of RUF and his fighters forced the local people to si-ft through muddy pits for diamonds 
with which they bought more guns and ammunition. They became notorious for raping and chopping off 
people's hands, ears and feet in one of Africa's most brutal wars. 
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Figure 2.2 Illustration of where warlords appear in the security sector in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Various tiers of Formal sector in security Informal sector in security services (ISSS) 
security monitors services (FSSS) 
Regional Peace-keeping forces Guerrilla/Rebel alliances 
National Government Armed Rebels, militias and warriors 
Forces 
State/local Para-military and Police Militias and warlords 
Forces 
Private security companies 
Community Vigilantes Vigilantes, Home Guards and warriors 
Home Guards 
Many warlords emerged just before the end of the cold war, as local factions and leaders 
joined outstanding wars in such areas as Burma, Colombia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and 
sub-Saharan Africa to confront the changing security atmosphere. Charles Taylor, the 
former Liberian president, rose to power in 1989 when he invaded Liberia with 100 
irregular soldiers armed primarily with AK-47 assault rifles. Boutwell and Klare (2000)96 
observe that "within months" he had seized mineral and timber resources and used the 
profits to purchase more weapons, until in 1990, he toppled Samuel Doe. This is an 
illustration of the new violence where bandits and criminal gangs posing as rebels, come 
to control major territories, and sometimes they are capable of concerted military action 
against intervention forces. Easy access to small arms has assisted the process, and 
violence closely follows in the process. 
In Angola, the late Savimbi and his National Union for the Total Independence for 
Angola (UNITA) forces raised billions of dollars from diamond mining and trade. 
Opposition by the new Angolan army, supported by an array of US based private 
mercenary companies was eventually able to defeat Savimbi. In order to fight, UNITA 
(Http;//www.2.swissinfo.org/sen/Swissinfo.html) and Http//news.independent.co.uk/world/africa/story.jsp?  
Story295 199. 
96  See http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pim/pimll.htm  
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acquired arms by trading in diamonds 97 , procuring most of its weapons in 1993-94 in 
Eastern Europe (Bulgaria and Ukraine). From 1992 until his death Savimbi consistently 
controlled 70% of Angola's diamond production, generating £3.7 billion in revenue, 
enabling his followers to maintain their war effort. 98 
Bad governance and a weak state are prerequisites for warlordism to emerge and grow 
strong (Jackson, 2002, 2003). Weak governments are incapable of stopping warlords 
from consolidating and controlling large territories. Weapons have been used to protect 
their territories and to gain access to resources. In some parts of sub-Saharan Africa and 
the world" they are inheriting a power vacuum once inhabited by a state that has now 
ceased to exist, and this is the most common scenario within which warlords emerge; 
consequently warlords themselves have frequently taken over some functions of a 
'government', notably tax and infrastructure 99." In the short term, they offer stability, 
security and rewards, which cannot be ignored. 
General Crime 
Crime is defined as behaviour that is subject to legal punishment (Conklion, 1989:6). The 
four major types of violent crime are murder, rape, robbery and assault, which generally 
weaken the social fabric of any given society. This section examines general crime in 
societies around the world and links it to weapons use. 
EU member states have recently experienced an increase in organised crime and petty 
crime activities, often involving the use of arms. British Home Office figures for 2001 
state that gun crime has almost tripled in London during the past year and is on the sharp 
increase in other British citie&°°. A senior police officer warned that in parts of 
Manchester city guns were becoming 'almost a fashion accessory'°". This increase is 
creating a pressure in some groups to acquire illegal firearms to protect themselves. The 
97  Madsen, Wayne 2002. "Report Alleges US Role in Angola Arms for Oil Scandal. Issue library: Money 
and Politics. Special to Corpwatch, 17 May. 
98 ibid. 
99 Jackson 2003: 133,138 
100 See Telegraph 24 February 2002 
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diffusion of weapons to the EU is attributed to terrorist organisations, especially by those 
struggling for secession from the state, and by criminal groups involved in profitable 
illegal activities such as drug trafficking, prostitution, smuggling of illegal immigrants, 
and extortion. 
The massacre of 18 people in a school by a German teenager was the latest in a series of 
bloody gun crimes around Europe. (Hooper, 2002: 1) It came shortly after the slaughter 
of eight city council members in a Paris suburb, who were shot along with about 30 
people who were seriously injured (BBC, 2002), and the killing of 14 regional legislators 
in Switzerland in September 2001 •102 
The weaponization and increase in general armed crimes and the availability of firearms 
has been particularly conspicuous in the Netherlands, a traditional hub for illicit goods in 
transit through Western Europe. Recent high profile firearms killings reflect the climbing 
murder rates in Amsterdam, a city whose illegal trade, "has moved from sex and drugs to 
focus on firearms; everything from machine guns to anti-tanks weapons'° 3 ." The 
Amsterdam police believe that Amsterdam is already awash with weapons; the fact that 
the Dutch-based gangs are "supplying Kalashnikovs and anti-tank guns suggests a 
different scale of operation." (Ibid.) 
In Columbia weapons have been linked to increases in crime. Muggah and 
Berman 104observe that nearly all violence in Colombia, whether massacre, homicide, 
suicide, domestic violence, robbery or petty crime involves use of weapons. Columbia 
has manufactured weapons since the 1930s and now the cottage industries are on the 
increase, mainly used by gangs, urban militias and various subversive groups. 
101 See "Grange land shooting claims third victim in two weeks" 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/priniJO%2C3  85 8%2C4393275- I 03508%2C00.html 
102 See Rotella Sabastian "Rise in Weapons use Across Europe" 
http://www.dawn.com/2OO2/O4I3O/intl0.htm  
103 Financial Times (London) 8 December 2000. 
04 http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/SReports/SReportl.pdf 
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In Cambodia the porous borders have limited the information on weapons feeding the 
illicit arms trade in the region. Furthermore, the Cambodian Freedom Fighters who 
operate along the Thai-Cambodian border are believed to transport weapons. Sinthaya 
(1998) and Bainbridge (2001) both note that more than 112,000 weapons have been 
removed from circulation since the Cambodian government began a strategy of weapons 
reduction in 1998. However, that was only between 10% and 20% of the weapons 
estimated to be in civilian hands. 
Since transition from apartheid, South Africa has been steeped in violence; it has become 
a way of life and a culture that holds a dangerous attraction for today's youth. The 
political transition ushered in uncertainty and more crime. What makes crime easier is 
access to guns' 05 . Out of an estimated 14 million guns in circulation, only four million are 
registered and licensed to legal owners. Guns are used in almost 75% of violent crimes. 
About 5,000 murders are committed in Gauteng Province (Johannesburg and Pretoria) 
each year. In the entire country from January to September 2001, there were 15,000 
murders and 24,000 reported rapes'° 6 . 
The illegal drug trade is notoriously linked to violent crime and use of arms, however the 
dynamics of the relationship are poorly established.' 07 
2.4.4 Transnational Crim&°8 
The UN (2000) define transnational crime as consisting of acts of laundering the 
proceeds of crime, corruption and obstructing justice, and serious offences which have 
ramifications in more than one state and in which an organised group is involved. More 
and more the arms trafficking in the Horn of Africa is taking a regional transnational 
nature. This section examines the characteristics of transnational crimes, the organised 
criminals traffic in small arms and ammunitions, and also drugs, expensive goods, 
'° BBC 10 April 2002 
106 BBC 11 April 2002 
107 Fagan and Chin 1990 
108Transnational crime has the characteristic of being cross-border and sometimes global. 
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endangered species and forced labour and sexual exploitation of smuggled illegal 
migrants. 
Britain is witnessing the kind of cocaine-fuelled violence that burst upon American cities 
in the 1980s'°9 . The cocaine, particularly from Jamaica, now floods into Britain, while 
the availability of weapons, many from Eastern Europe, is going hand in hand with the 
drug trade. 
Transnational organised crime threatens the security and social stability of every country, 
developed or developing." 0 Increasingly the proliferation of small arms is a regional 
problem affecting the entire Greater Horn of Africa region, as 'transnational criminal 
networks' facilitate it." These networks then feed into localised interethnic conflicts, 
making them much more violent and intractable. This relationship will be fully explored 
in the thesis. 
Transnational crime shows the traits of formal organisation, division of labour, co-
ordination of activities through rules and codes, and an allocation of tasks in order to 
achieve organisational goals (Cressey, 1969). The criminal organisation tries to preserve 
itself in the face of internal and external threats, often with the use of arms. According to 
the UN (2001) "transnationalisation of criminal activity has increased substantially", and 
the general process of globalization, increased economic interdependence, and the 
increase of economic exchange "make the transfer of goods and the movement of people 
across borders easier." Carter and Drinkwater (2002), argue that in the last ten years, 
organised criminals have 'dramatically increased the scope of their activities' and pose a 
significant threat to the economies and governance of states. 
Ruggiero (2000) mentions the role of government officials in transnational crime. In 
countries like France and Britain, inspectors may turn a blind eye to quantities of arms 
' 09 Telegraph 24 February 2002 
also Findlay, 1999:127: Conklin, 1989: 46; Transnational crime was identified by the G-8 as one of 
the three challenges facing the 3rd millennium. See 
httri:I/archives.tcm.ielirishexaminerl2003/07/23/story530200809.asp 
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produced, in favour of economic benefits. Second, the illegality of arms could result from 
false claims regarding their destination (Phythian, I 997a: 43) and illegal practice may be 
adopted in the manner of payment for illegal sales and processing 2 . Ruggiero argues that 
(1 996c; 2000: 102) in some war markets where international embargoes have caused the 
expansion of the clandestine market in arms, the services offered by organised crime are 
highly valued. An example is Rwanda, where Britain, France and other European arms 
producers sold their arms through criminal networks. This greatly escalated the genocide, 
although without arms it would likely still have occurred although on a lesser scale. 
Organised transnational crime by its nature affects almost every area of the world, but 
some more than others. In the case of less advanced nations with weak structures or 
tenuous legitimacy, the power wielded by transnational crime syndicates can rival that of 
the state. 113 
2.4.5 The State as a Source of Violence' 14 
The state is an important player in the small arms debate and conflict, firstly because of 
the question of who should provide human security, and secondly because the weakening 
of states and state corruption may itself contribute to insecurity and proliferation of small 
arms. 
The state is a body, which has by definition a legitimate monopoly of the use of violence. 
It is legitimate because it represents the entire community, and when it does resort to 
" See Mkutu 2001 op. cit. 
112 Example of Nigeria in 1993. The British government, as part of measures agreed by EU, said it would 
withhold £64 million of civilian aid already agreed, but refused to halt the supply of weapons to the very 
soldiers who had staged the coup. In the light of Britain's long and close embrace of the Nigerian military 
through arms sales, military export credits and training, the move was unsurprising. Far from promoting 
good governments, Britain's arms sales have legitimised the Nigerians usurping power and violating human 
rights. Over many years, Britain's official arms sellers encouraged the squandering of hundreds of millions 
of pounds on British arnis, which Nigeria coulcj not afford, and for which the Nigerian people are still liable 
(World Development Movement, 1995: 75). 
113 Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies 2000. 
is the psychological or physical force exerted for the purpose of injuring, damaging or abusing 
people or property. (U.S. Department of Justice, 1996, D-3) 
force, it does so as the agent of the community expressing its will through 
constitutionally agreed processes. It is this monopoly, which has all too often been 
abused in civil conflicts, and in some 'peace time' contexts, the police have been 
perpetrators of violence. However, in many countries it is the failure of the police to act 
as enforcers of the law with respect to violence, which has attracted most criticism. As 
noted by Moung Khim, the first deputy of Phnom Penh municipal police, "The army 
surplus market is well known as the major weapons black market in Phnom Penh" 
(Bainbridge, 2001). Thus the lack of controls or regulations makes weaponization of 
society easy. 
The 1994 Rwanda genocide where as many as one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu 
perished, many of them women and children, is a case in point. Before the killings, the 
Hutu-dominated government had distributed automatic rifles and hand grenades to 
official militias and para-military gangs. Thus the state empowered the militias to 
terrorize its own citizens.' 15 The same mechanism has been used in the lead up to the 
violence against the Darfur people in Sudan, where thousands of women and children 
have lost lives" 6 . 
Sinthay (200 1)117,  argues that following the end of 30 years of conflict in Cambodia in 
1999, high numbers of weapons still remained in the hands of civilians and in 
government supply stocks. It is estimated that between 500,000 and one million small 
arms are in the country and are equally distributed between armed forces and civilians. 
" 5 Boutwell and Klare (2000) observe that most media accounts of the 1994 Rwanda genocide emphasized 
the use of traditional weapons- clubs, knives, machetes-by murderous gangs of extremist Hutu, but 
weapons distributed made a difference. 
116 Janjaweed militias who are mainly "Arab" supported by the Sudanese government had displaced 
thousands in Darfur. Though Sudan government denied support of the militias Human rights evidence 
show their support. See http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/19/darfur9096 txt.htm; see also Mother 
Jones.com 21 July, 2004 "Sudan Shame" 
http://www.motherjones.com/news/dailymojo/2004/07/07  821 .html 
117 See http://www.bicc.de!weapons/events/unconflworkshop_texts/workshop sinthay.htm 1 
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Virtually every household of soldiers, police officers, and civil servants has at least one 
gun" 8 
Van bye and Davis (2000: 5) argue that in the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia) the state has contributed to proliferation of arms and violence in many ways. 
Firstly, the population does not trust police since they are seen as promoters of violence 
themselves. This fuels the demand for weapons, but cultural norms also play a part. 
Secondly, the states have armed militias that are also a source of arms diffusion into the 
society. Thirdly, corruption in security has allowed unauthorised sales and thefts from 
government supplies, and covert arms transfers, especially from Russia to Armenia. 
However, very little has been done in the Caucasus about the weaponization of society, or 
about the sources of weapons in the three states. 
The Niger Delta of Nigeria is ridden with violence, with local people, not just youths, 
locked in a bloody contest with the government and the oil companies, as observed by 
Okonta (2000) and Ploughshares (2001). Weapons have diffused into the society over 
four decades of marginalization, repression and exploitation of the Niger Delta by 
multinational oil companies with assistance from the government of Nigeria. 
Marginalization and the fight for resources have prompted the youths to use criminal 
methods including kidnapping foreigners working with the oil companies, and using 
ransom money to buy arms, and they have also obtained arms by killing security and 
military officers. Oil companies like Shell continue to maintain their own private security 
outfits, and recruit local vigilantes in towns to 'protect' oil installations. This further arms 
the region, and the government responds with more troops, in an attempt to restore law 
and order. Governor Donald Duke of Cross-River State in Nigeria alleged the 
involvement of serving and retired military officers in illicit arms deals. 
Lenneco (1996) writing on the Horn of Africa, notes the existence of unofficial state 
forces that the regional governments have from time to time supported with arms (except 
118 They also note that Cambodia manufactures weapons and ammunition for both domestic and export 
markets. Cambodia has manufactured weapons since the 1930's. Cottage industries or homemade firearms 
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in Kenya). He shows how Sudan uses Arab militias to conduct frequent raids from their 
bases in Kordofan into adjacent areas of Southern Sudan for slaves and cattle. The other 
sources of weapons in Sudanese society have been the government's arming militias in 
the south and the Ugandan rebel group the Lord's Resistance Army (Nyaba, 2001) to 
fight the SPLA. The co-operation of some government officials and soldiers is an 
additional method by which weapons are transferred from the state to the insurgents' 
forces which leads to violence in the society. Since 1971 Uganda has experienced armed 
rebel groups fighting against the oppressive or ineffective regimes of Obote, Amin and 
Museveni. Outraged civilians have joined hands with rebel groups to dislodge the 
governments, and arms have been issued out by the state to "friendly" forces and civilian 
groups.' 19 
The mechanisms of gun violence in societies around the world are complex and varied, 
typically involving historical grievances, economic deprivation, bad and corrupt states 
with an underdeveloped justice system, and an absence of democratic process. Although 
small arms and light weapons are not themselves a cause of conflict, their ready 
accessibility and low cost and the ability for the states to issue them directly or indirectly 
to support communal conflicts can prolong conflict and encourage violence. The result is 
local communities buying arms to defend themselves which in turn leads to a spiralling 
demand for, and use of, such arms. 
2.4.6 Feuding 
Fpding is defined as a contention, argument or bitter quarrel between families, clans or 
two parties; a deaçlly hatred only satisfied by blood 120 . It has been reported as a prominent 
feature over family land in the North Rift as families fight for the scarce resource, but it is 
also commonplace elsewhere. 
are on the increase, and gangs, urban militias and various subversive groups mainly use them. 
119 See Muhereza 1997b, Walker 2000 
120 http://www.hyperdictionarv.com/dictionarv/feud  
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The weaponization of Cambodian society created a situation where guns are often the 
first resort in disputes over land and resources, traffic accidents, family arguments, and 
disagreements with neighbours.' 21 . Consequently in whatever sector (political, economic, 
social), any conflict assumes much higher proportions because of use of weapons or the 
threat to use them. 
Historically, feuding is common in the south of Italy. The Italian government has the 
monopoly on marketing tobacco. However mafia groups have built strong illegal 
channels in the South under its control. So feuds are between clan cartels for, first, 
control of the illegal market of tobacco; second, control of the construction business 
through building societies; and third, control of the drug markets, which unlike the first 
two, is transnational. Arms come into feuding in Italy in three ways: first to manage the 
feuds, second, to control arms sales to the different feuding parties, and last to defend the 
"families" from government, for the mafia fight with the government frequently' 22 . 
Forberg and Ulf (1999) did extensive research on small arms in Somalia, their role and 
diffusion. The bulk of the weapons in Somali society are rifles, AK 47, M14, M16 and 
SK. The weapons are mainly used in robbery, roadblocks, kidnapping and murder. 
However, the weapons play a major role in feuds and acts of revenge. In Ethiopia and 
elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa' 23 the warrior culture celebrates values such as heroism 
and strength, exalting those who win. The culture of revenge is also deeply rooted, often 
honouring retribution above reconciliation. In the event of the murder of a family 
member, someone from the murderer's family or clan must be killed before the burial 
ceremony so that the victim's family as well as the perpetrator's family will "weep 
together". Thus the spiral of violent conflict continues, and murder becomes a part of 
daily life. (Eshete and O'Reilly-Calthrop, 2000) 
121 Rousseau (1998) notes that a quarrel at a wedding party between drunkards may end up with a dozen 
killed, instead of maybe one person stabbed. He says that easy access to weapons makes the difference 
between a quarrel and a murder. 
122 Interview 18 June 2002 with native of south Italy. 
123 Thomas 1965, 1966; Lamphear 1978 
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It can be seen that weapons play a major role in feuding, appearing to fuel the fire, rather 
than initiate violence. However the murders committed in hot blood are likely to result in 
revenge murders as seen above, and therefore the arms may add to the lethality of the 
conflicts. 
2.4.7 Social Violence 
This section examines various types of violence and the linkage with weapons. The 
definition of violence is disputed. The World Health Organization defines it as the 
"intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another 
person or against a group or community, that either results in, or has high likelihood of 
resulting in, injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation." 24 No 
single factor explains why some individuals behave violently toward others or why 
violence is more prevalent in some communities than in others. Violence can be 
explained as the product of factors at several levels of influence: individual, interpersonal 
relationships, community and the larger society. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO, 2002) notes that one of the most common 
settings for violence is the home. Domestic violence is force or threat of force within 
close adult relationships in a way that causes harm or distress to victims. This may 
include actual or threatened physical or sexual assault or rape, psychological and 
emotional torture and suicide. Estimates of the extent of domestic violence vary, 
depending on the definition used. Domestic violence in Uganda was found to be high, 
according to a U.S. State Department report. It included raiders raping women during 
raids. WHO data from 1998 noted a worldwide rate of 38.4 deaths per 100,000 people 
annually was due to domestic violence. It is easy to imagine how arms in the home may 
escalate domestic violence into tragedy, but this link needs further investigation. 
114 WHO 2002 
all 
There is a great variation in rates of violent death between countries. Hong Kong city 
reported a firearm homicide rate as a proportion of all deaths, of less than 0.01 per 
100,000 in 1997. (Kostner, 2000). Cape Town, South Africa, reported a firearm homicide 
rate of 40.4 per 100,000 persons for 1999. The author suggests that in South Africa 
criminals arm themselves and their access to weapons is easier.' 25 
Handguns are the predominant weapon of choice in committing homicides and suicides. 
WHO data suggests that over 60% of urban homicides are committed with handguns and 
presumably others with knives, clubs etc. 
As noted above, violence is not distributed evenly across regions. The impact will also be 
variable in different parts of the world. In the United States, it has been calculated that for 
every person shot and killed with a firearm, three others are treated for non-fatal firearm 
injuries, but in developing countries this ratio is likely to be altered by the fact that a 
greater proportion of those injured will most probably die from inadequate access to 
healthcare. According to WHO's global burden of disease data for 1998, the rate of 
violent death in lower and middle income countries is more than double that in high 
income countries. However most studies have examined only cases among urban or city 
populations being affected' 26. This thesis examines African rural areas in the North Rift, 
which are inaccessible and have never been examined. 
2.4.8 Conclusion on the Role of Weapons in Societal Violence 
The literature suggests that guns certainly add lethality to existing conflicts, as 
demonstrated by feuds in Rwanda and Cambodia. Feuding is often resource related, and 
125 Hennop et al (2001) researched crime in South Africa. Among the types of firearm-related crime 
investigated were robbery, murder, theft of firearm, pointing a firearm, contravention of the arms and 
ammunition act, and assault. Police stations selected were mainly in urban areas to ensure that a broad 
range of crime types could be sampled. Use of guns for robbery, such as car jacking, hijacking of trucks, 
robbery of cash in transit, and bank robberies, increased from 75.8% to 78.7 % in 1998. The researchers 
found that hand guns were the preferred weapons of both victims and offenders, in defending or taking 
property 
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worsened in situations of a weak state, but arms exacerbate the conflict. Warlords use 
arms to gain control, through the use of violence, wealth is also acquired, and making 
sure the supply of arms is maintained. The supply of arms may be maintained by 
transnational networks, which then causes escalation of violent disputes. States may also 
allow the arms trade to flourish, and are increasingly supplying arms to militias which are 
frequently not used for human security. 
General crime in society has become more violent with the use of arms. Drug related 
violence is enabled by small arms, though the relationship is poorly understood. 
Domestic violence is a significant proportion of all violence, and the role of arms in the 
home is likely to be relevant here. This needs further investigation. 
2.5 Weapons as a Cause of War 
In answer to the question "do weapons cause war?" there are two major arguments. 
Arguments in support of acquiring weapons rest on the assumption that armed readiness 
is an effective deterrent to would-be aggressors, and that armament sale is one of the 
capitalist's rights under free enterprise. In this context, the purpose for the weapons is to 
keep the "peace". Human nature is such that without a strong defence, attack by others is 
possible 127 . Para bellem doctrine opines that if you want peace prepare for war. 
The other side argue that the more arms a nation accumulates the more likely it is to go to 
war.' 28 Arms aggravate regional tensions, promote instability, and increase the risk of 
open conflict (Ohlson, 1982). Pearson et at (1 992:399) assert that arms prolong, escalate, 
intensify and exacerbate war, leading to suffering and destruction of property. Werner 
(1960:314) argues that citizens are prepared by states for warfare because there are real 
conflicts between states, which may have to be solved with violence. This makes citizens 
126 Mkutu 2000; Stohl, 1999; Schmoke, 1994; Hennop et a!, 2001; Canadian Center for Justice, 1996; 
Canadian-center for Justice Statistics; Centro de Referencia Nacional Sobre Violencia, 1999; Colletta and 
Kostner,2)OO; US Department of Justice, 1997; WHO, 2000. 
127 Craft 1999 
128 	Hoffiian, 1970, Singer and Diehi 1990, Bremer 1992, Sample, 1998 
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appear bellicose, and a threat to other states. Werner argues that as technical 
developments enable (in the future) even small states to possess weapons, the chances for 
violent conflict between two states hitherto geographically, politically and in every other 
way removed from each other increases. 
Yanarella (1975) argues that with newer highly destructive weapons there no longer 
exists any efficient defence. Historical experience demonstrates that arms lead to 
catastrophe, so arms control and disarmament is vital. The counter argument to this is that 
weapons sales equalise military asymmetries between those states that have and those 
nations without and create a security environment where "deterrence can be enhanced" 
(Foster, 1978:77). 
2.5.1 Arms Transfers 
Arms transfers are an early warning indicator of impending wars, and thus serve as a 
prelude to war or states arming in preparation for war' 29 . The most prominent assertion 
based on anecdotal evidence is that there are indeed observable relationships between the 
two phenomena. Brozska and Pearson (1992,1994) and Crantz (1992) argue that the 
weapons trade exacerbates and intensifies conflicts, which are likely to lead to war and 
also increase the lethality, magnitude and duration of resulting wars. 
There are some certainties in all these theories. Arms transfers can make wars bloodier by 
increasing the lethality of the rival forces, producing political instability, facilitating the 
outbreak of violence, prolonging fighting, prompting the spread of violence into 
neighbouring countries, and raising the costs of conflict resolution efforts. This means 
increased militarization could be related to increased severity of war (SPIRI, 1971,73; 
Silslin et al 1998:394). However, removing weapons will not necessarily prevent a 
conflict or war. Without empirical evidence, one can argue that in political conflict, 
armaments only play a secondary role. 
129 Hoffinan, 1970: Laurence, 1973, Singer and Diehl 1990, 
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Most of the data used for analysis is historical and does not demonstrate that weapons 
cause war130 . Although the existence of armaments as the main cause of war is certainly 
mistaken, it could be argued that in some conflicts it is a catalytic element. Laurence, 
(1973 :240243)131  has disputed the correlations between militarization and war and argues 
that this debate hinges on the definition of arms race. The most recent study by Sample 
(1997) on arms races and war does not resolve the overall debate on the arms race-war 
relationship. (Diehi & Crescani, 1998: 11). As observed by Buzan (1987) arms racing 
connects to war through the widespread, though strongly challenged, hypothesis that the 
two phenomena are causally related. 
With the rise of modern business, the private arms industry appeared, and free-lance 
entrepreneurs engaged in the manufacture and sale of small arms without which no war 
can be fought. They argue that armaments do not make for peace, but they do make it 
possible for peaceful nations to be as efficient as war-like nations. The more a nation 
builds its military power, the less chances there are for war to occur (Wells, 1967:197). 
The issue of arms entrepreneurs or businessmen has been under-examined. 
Despite the lack of conclusion, the interest of the study is in how arms may influence, 
intensify and exacerbate conflicts and insecurities. Such study should also inform how 
the accumulations of arms complicate an already complex situation (Brozska 1994:5). 
The next task is to look at arms and escalation debate, which is the most critical 
controversy in the study of war and weapons. 
2.5.2 Richardson's Action - Reaction Model 
The father of this 44 year old debate was Lewis Richardson (1960, 1951) who, in his 
action - reaction model tried to reduce the arms race to a small number of quantifiable 
variables that could be expressed in terms of equations. He presumed that nations 
increase their armaments primarily in response to the increasing arms expenditures of an 
130 Craft, 1999; Pruitt & Snyder, 1969; Diehl,1983 ;lntrilligator and Brito, 1984, Lambelet, 1975; Wallace, 
1979,1980,1982. 
identifiable opponent. He postulated that firstly revenge or hostility, and secondly fear, 
move groups to increase armaments. For Richardson an unstable arms race between two 
nations would inevitably culminate in war. Since then, Richardson's work has been the 
most debated and extensively studied' 32 . The advantage of Richardson model is that it 
provides a systematic way of exploring relationships between discrete factors in the arms 
race dynamic (Buzan, 1987:122). However the model fails to identify real cases in the 
world to test it. Therefore, linking the model with real situations is problematic. 
Secondly, the imperfection tied to the action-reaction model is the assumption that 
reaction is not only the driving force of arms racing but it is also the deterministic 
relationship (Busch, 1970:196-7). This assumption does not fit with the superpower 
observed behaviour, which proceeds from complicated factors. Also Richardson's use of 
defence expenditure as a measure of arms racing, though obviously correct, it is widely 
thought to be too crude for applied studies 133 . Finding specific measures has proved 
extremely hard' 34 Reliable data is difficult to obtain for most countries, especially when it 
relates to defence and military expenditures and even purchases. 
Lambelet (1974) argues there have been remarkably few systematic attempts at 
integrating the analysis of arms races, on one hand, and the analysis of causes of war on 
the other hand. Lambelet examines Richardson's view that unstable arm races can only 
end in war. Unstable arms race is defined as a situation in which the military capabilities 
of the two opposing sides are unreasonably or unnecessarily large. (Lambelet, 1974:124). 
At the extreme end he examines Saalty' s (1968) view that arms races and hot wars are 
completely or at least largely independent. (Lambelet, 1971, 1973-1975). This hypothesis 
is boosted by the fact that there are some arms races that do not end in war. For Lambelet, 
unstable arms races, in the sense of high marginal propensities to react, need not lead to 
war as there is at least one natural barrier to open-ended escalation, namely economic 
resources. He further argues that failure by one side to arm sufficiently may in some 
cases lead to armed confrontation, which could have been avoided if a full-fledged arms 
'' See others who have disputed like Diehl, 1983, 1985; Weede, 1980, Bremer, 1992:318-319 
132 See Bellany, 1975; Busch, 1970; Lambelet, 1975:122-4; Luterbacher, 1975; Smoker, 1964 
113 See Bellany, 1975:120-4; Luterbacher, 1975:200; Rattinger, 1976:502. 
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race had taken place. The example of this is the Korean War, which broke out not long 
after the United States had completed a process of large-scale unilateral disarmament. It 
follows that an arms race by both sides could also lead to peace. The major shortfall with 
Lambelet is that he theorises but does not provide empirical data to test the two 
hypotheses. Like other scholars, he simply assumes it is only states that race for arms; the 
domestic arms race by individual groups within a state is not discussed or even 
mentioned. 
2.5.3 Wallace vs. Diehl debate 1979 to Date 
Wallace (1979) notes that very little data based research is available concerning the 
impacts of arms on international wars. Of the many works written virtually nothing could 
answer the central question they had addressed: does the existence of an arms race 
between two states significantly increase their probability of going to war? Wallace 
examined the two debates; that is on one hand, only strong military posture can deter an 
opponent's military adventurism, which, unchecked, would lead to armed conflict. On the 
other hand, there are those who argue that military expansion per se contributes to the 
danger of war. 
Wallace defines an arms race to involve simultaneous abnormal rates of growth in the 
military outlays of two or more nations, which mainly results from competitive pressure 
of the military rivalry itself, and not from domestic forces exogenous to this rivalry 
(Wallace, 1979:5). Using correlates of war project data, Wallace examined 99 militarised 
disputes among the major states that 23 of the 26 disputes that escalated were 
characterised by an ongoing arms race. Only 4 % of the disputes, which had an arms race 
between both countries, resulted in war. The examples were wars that happened between 
1816-1965 and only great power disputes were addressed. Wallace argued that pairs of 
nations that end up going to war are characterised by much more rapid military growth in 
the period immediately prior to the conflict than those which resolve their conflicts by 
other means. Wallace further argued that rapid competition and military growth is 
Bush, 1970:230-3, Gillespie Ct at, 1979: 261-7; Luterbacher, 1975:200-2 
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strongly associated with the escalation of military confrontation into war. When an arms 
race did precede a significant threat or act of violence, war was avoided only 3 out of 28 
times. With this result, Wallace concluded it is difficult to argue, therefore, that arms 
races play no role in the process of leading to the onset of war (Wallace, 1979: 15). 
Scholars have levelled many criticisms on Wallace's hypothesis. Diehl (1983:94) re-
tested Wallace's work (1979, 1982). He argues that despite the central nature of military 
spending in national security decision-making, empirical researchers have generally 
ignored the effect of military spending on the initiation of war. This void in academic 
literature noted by Singer (1972,1979) in 1969, remains largely unfilled today. He levels 
criticisms against Wallace (1979) in a widely quoted article, which concluded that the 
presence or absence of an arms race between two rivals correctly predicated war/no war 
outcomes in over 90% of the serious disputes studied (Diehl, 1982:94). He criticised 
Wallace on many technicalities and assumptions in his analysis of the data. He also faults 
Wallace's definition of an arms race. As concurred by Bremer (1992:319) the definition 
of an arms race determines the outcome of the debate on the arms race. An arms race is 
conventionally described as a process involving competitive interaction, manifested by a 
rapid increase in military spending and weaponry. But in Wallace's case, it is only 
determined whether or not the disputants are rapidly arming themselves even if they are 
not going to war, what is referred to as mutual military build up rather than an arms race 
(Diehl, 1982:96). 
Diehl (1982) re-tested Wallace's hypothesis, using a modified set of assumptions and 
indicators. He discovered that only one-fourth of the disputes preceded by a mutual 
military build up resulted in war, while ten of the thirteen wars occurred in the absence of 
joint arms increases by the dispute participants (Ibid: 102). Diehl found a moderate 
positive relationship between arming and war, but still has a group of 39 arms race 
disputes, which do not escalate to war. Wallace (1990), replicating Diehl's index found 
that out of 43 arms race dyads, 24 went to war, leaving 19 disputes unaccounted 
for. Wallace also fails to notice that of the 101 wars since 1889- 1996, only six were 
inter-state (Wallensteen & Sollenberg 1997). 
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2.5.4 Sample's Work on Dispute Escalation 
Sample (1997) purports to resolve the debate on the empirical literature over the effects 
of arms races on dispute escalation, which has remained inconsistent and inconclusive in 
the last two decades. She notes the three problems with Wallace (1979, 1982) studies: the 
indices, the methodology and the selection of cases. Using the arms race measures 
offered by Diehi (1985) and Horn (1987), she attempts to resolve the debate on arms and 
war. She focuses on the results obtained when one explores the relationship of two 
countries over a period of several years. The character of relations in the past between 
two countries naturally affects their behaviour in the present. If countries are engaging in 
repeated militarised disputes over a relatively short period of time, it may begin to appear 
to the decision-makers that the issues dividing them are unresolvable through normal 
political methods; the display of resolve evident in the militarization of previous disputes 
was unsuccessful in heading off future ones. She argues that disputes that are 
characterised by arms races but do not escalate are early disputes in rivalries that later 
become more volatile. (Sample, 1997:16). 
Wallace and Diehi in their work examined the correlation between arming and escalation 
by simply investigating the number of arming disputes that escalated immediately. 
Sample (1997) adds a time lag and finds that 26 out of 28 or (93%) arms racing disputes 
in Wallace's 1979 study were between countries that were at war with each other within 
five years. Out of Diehi's total of 52 disputes between arms racing countries 62% (32 of 
52) were at war within five years (including 47%) of those disputes that did not escalate 
immediately. With Horn, the numbers were even more striking. Of the 29 disputes that 
are characterised by an ongoing arms race, 25 of them (or 86%) were between countries 
that were at war within five years, (77%) of those that did not escalate immediately, did 
so within five years. She concludes that arms races appear to be more closely associated 
with dispute escalation than the narrowly focused on going debate would suggest. Sample 
thhcludes that regardless of the measure used to determine racing behaviour, and 
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regardless of the dispute set used, the proposition that arms races are positively associated 
with the escalation of disputes to war is upheld. 
She further argues that though it is impossible to resolve the debate completely whilst the 
Wallace index remains unperfected, it is clear that many of the criticisms against Wallace 
were misdirected. Her exploration of the issues using the measures offered by Diehi and 
Horn indicates that a moderate relationship between arms racing and escalation does exist 
(Sample, 1997:17). Also, her analysis indicates that disputes that occur later on in 
continuing rivalries are going to be more likely to escalate. She concludes that when two 
states engaged in ongoing arms build-ups confront each other in a militarised dispute or a 
series of militarised disputes, they are far more likely to end up at war than are disputing 
countries that are not involved in an arms race. (Sample, 1997:17). Sample resolves three 
things, first, she resolved Wallace problem of case selections, secondly, she resolves the 
methodology problem and lastly, she resolves the indices issue. 
Diehl and Crescenzi (1998:11) responding to Sample's (1997a) article argued that the 
methodological issues due to case study selection is laid to rest by Sample (1 997a), but 
the larger questions about arms races/ war remain. They argue for better theoretical 
specification of the arms race war relationship, and for empirical tests to sort out whether 
this relationship is direct, indirect or spurious. They advocate for some methodological 
changes including more longitudinal studies, a broader spatial domain to include minor 
powers, less reliance on military expenditure and multivariate rather than bivariate tests 
of the arms race-war relations. They ask how strong are the effects of arms races vis-â-vis 
the traditional correlates of war, such as power distribution or territorial issues? Can the 
findings on dispute escalation be generalised to broader patterns of international conflict? 
They also note that the arms -race war debate focused exclusively on major power 
conflict: it should also be applied to minor power conflict: and to all types of conflicts, 
and a broader spatial domain allows consideration of major-minor arms races. 
Diehl and Crescenzi (1998) further observe that the debate on arms races has been fought 
on theoretical grounds. Very few of the authors since Richardson (1960) have developed 
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a well-articulated theoretical argument that directly connects arms races with war in a 
causal fashion. They reconfigure the debate giving three possibilities, firstly, arms race 
and war can have a direct as well as causal relationship, which is the claim made by 
Wallace (1979) and Sample (1997a). A second possible structure is an indirect and causal 
association. The third structure of relationship between arms races and war may be 
spurious and therefore non- causal (Diehl and Crescenzi, 1998:112). They further 
theorise by giving three possibilities, first arms can directly lead to war. Secondly, arms 
races influence the outbreak of war indirectly by affecting a given variable that in turn 
leads to war. One possibility is the power distribution, which is most affected in the short 
run by changes in military capabilities through rapid acquisition of arms. Finally, a third 
theoretical suggestion is that positive correlations between arms races and war are 
spurious. 
Wallace (1998) critiques the Diehl & Crescenzi position; he argues that their re-analysis 
may have its own methodological problems. Specifically, by using the existence of a 
longitudinal sequence of serious disputes to operationalize enduring rivalry, essentially 
they deny the temporal independence of the disputes within these rivalries. Wallace 
(1998) reacts to Samples (1 997a) article by accepting that two nagging issues have been 
put to rest, firstly, the issues of index to use for converting military expenditure data into 
a measurement of arms races. His original index (1979) was based on a multivariate 
linear approximation to a curvilinear function. Secondly, Sample makes a second 
contribution by sorting out the different criteria used to choose the test population of arms 
races in the various populations of the studies (Wallace, 1998:119). She demonstrates that 
these variations do not affect the result, as earlier writers had feared. Thirdly, she 
introduces the concept of a time lag. 
If the Diehl and Crescenzi (1998) proposition that individual (local) arms races should be 
addressed, it would challenge Sample's (1996) findings that acceleration in arms growth 
during peace time is extremely rare in the raw expenditure data (Sample 1996: 157) This 
assumption is incorrect if the case of the Ogaden war (1977-1978) is anything to go by. 
(Brzoska and Pearson: 1992; Makinda: 1992; Porter: 1984). Both Somalia and Ethiopia 
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armed during peacetime. Therefore the thesis would only stand if looking at the state and 
not at the domestic level, given the new dimension in current conflicts, where the actors 
are not states but local groups' 35 who are competing for arms during peacetime. 
2.5.5 Expenditure as a Measure of Arms Racing 
While Wallace only addressed the wars by superpowers, the majority of the wars have 
not been fought on superpower ground but in third world countries. Sherwin and 
Lawrence (1979:362) argue that the most commonly used measure of military capability 
is defence budgets. The rationale for using this technique to measure capability lies in the 
belief that weapons capability is related to cost. Wallace employs the arms expenditure 
for each major power as a function of time as part of his unit of analysis. Buzan 
(1987:81) notes that when reliable data can be obtained, defence expenditure is perhaps 
more useful to indicate the difference between arms racing and maintenance of the 
military status quo, than it is to measure a specific action-reaction dynamic between 
states. Although using defence expenditure to measure arms races is obviously 
convenient, it is thought to be too crude for applied studies' 36 . Rattinger (1976:502) 
criticizes the use of aggregate defence expenditure to measure military capability since it 
overlooks a lot of things. One being that weapons are sometimes acquired at bargain 
prices, and money paid for weapons may not reflect their military value especially in 
third world countries. Monetary value placed on weapons transfers may be a misleading 
indicator of military capability if the weapons are transferred as foreign aid or in return 
for other kinds of payment such as base rights and political support. Also, nations may 
misrepresent their defence budgets for security reasons (Sherwin and Laurence, 
1979:363). 
The numerical-inventory approach is a better gauge of military capability. It is more 
reliable than the budgetary approach, particularly since highly visible weapons, such as 
aeroplanes and tanks, are difficult to hide and supply countries are usually known 
135 Mkutu 2003 
136 Buzan 1987:124, Bellany 1975:120; Luterbaker1975: 200 
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publicly. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, (1979: 367) remark that sources of inventory data 
such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) annual publication and 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SPIRI) arms trade register make clear 
the limitations. The other main source of arms transfer data is the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Brozska (1982) questions the accuracy and validity of 
such data, notes that technical aid is not included in some sources of data, and argues that 
the data can be open to manipulation. The question raised is whether arms transfers are 
based on foreign policy instruments, economic system, and military strength 
calculations. It is also important to note that the area of security which defence comes 
under is still in the domain of states, and data on military expenditure is viewed as a high 
security secret. 
2.5.6 Third World Arms Races 
Arms transfer in the past four decades has only addressed transfer to military and police 
within states. (Brzoska, 1982:79-80). This excludes the arms transferred to individuals in 
a country or to sub-national groups (ibid: 79-80). Yet these are the groups that are now a 
major security dilemma to most third world countries. Work on such groups has not been 
adequately addressed by social scientists. 
Brzoska and Pearson (1994:3) and Harkvary (1984) have done extensive work on war 
and weapons and how armament led to escalation in the third world. Brzoska and Pearson 
argue that the relationship between arms transfers and war is similar to that between 
armaments and war, since weapons are the implements of war regardless of whether they 
are produced in the country at war or delivered after the beginning of hostilities. They 
argue that the stakes of arms acquisition diplomacy is higher when the die of war has 
been cast (ibid:8) and that arms transfers may be a contributing factor to war. In order to 
test their work, they postulate three hypotheses. Firstly, the arrival of new arms supplies 
tends to fortify recipients so that violence is most often averted or abated. Secondly, the 
arrival of new arms supplies tends to increase the likelihood of crises breaking into 
warfare, of escalation in on-going warfare, of third party military intervention, or of the 
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failure of negotiation. Thirdly arms embargoes or limitation of re-supply have 
pacification effects, similar to those in hypothesis one (Brzoska and Pearson: 1994). 
The sources of data used by Brzoska and Pearson include newspapers, special arms-trade 
publications, and historical studies of particular wars, yearbooks, current affairs types, 
and trade statistics, journals on arms sales. They found that the answers were not 
straightforward. For some, availability or scarcity of arms had an impact on the decision 
to go into conflicts, but on others, agreements not to arm did not avert conflict. The 
transfer of arms adds an extra dimension to the complex perpetual relationship between 
wars and weapons, in that through the transfer of weapons outside actors become 
involved, and this sometimes intensifies, prolongs or even helps to initiate war. 
Harkvary (1984) notes that the relatively assured uninterrupted arms supply has appeared 
to initiate preventative or rather 'window of opportunity' wars during periods when rivals 
have been engaged in major realignments of supplier-client relationships. The best 
example is Ethiopia. From 1972-1977 before the strain in relationship between the US 
and Ethiopia, Washington supplied arms to Ethiopia worth billions, to protect their 
interests in the ongoing conflict with Eritrea. The continual arms supply to Ethiopia went 
on even in 1977 after the Dergue took over' 37 . Also since Somalia was armed by the 
Soviets, the US had to continue arming Ethiopia as a counter to Somalia, though the 
agreement with the Soviet Union ended in 1977138.  In June of that year, Somalia attacked 
the Ogaden area exploiting the opportunity offered by the turmoil in Ethiopia. But they 
were also encouraged by Saudi Arabia to believe the west would come to their aid and 
supply them arms if they invaded Ethiopia. The ability of the combatants to sustain the 
wars was heavily dependent on the major powers' willingness and capacity to re-supply 
spare parts, provide advice and replace end item systems or failure to provide supplies. 
As argued by Holsti, (1992) all the external use of forces in international relations since 
the end of the World War II has occurred in less developed counies, with the exceptions 
137 This was based on the premises that if the US cut off aid, Eritrea would become independent and aligned 
with the Arab world, and that this would give the Arab states control over both shores of the Bab al-
Mandeb, the narrow mouth of the Red Sea. 138 Haliday, 1977. 
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of the invention in the Greek civil war, Soviet armed interventions in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Secondly, of the casualities 
from interstate wars and international civil wars since 1945, only 176,000 out of the total 
809, 000 perished in Europe. The rest were from third world countries (Sivard, 1989b). 
Thirdly, most of the wars were liberation wars and not interstate. They started mostly as 
guerrilla wars. They did not have a declaration of war, nor uniforms and any standard 
strategic operation procedures (Holsti, 1992:37). Fourthly traditional wars did not involve 
the superpowers, except where they were the possessors of colonial territories. And 
finally, the wars that were not liberation types started as crises of domestic consensus. 
The three deviations make the less developed countries' war different from conventional 
understanding of war. However, most of the systematic and theoretical study of war is 
largely based on wars of superpowers or are Euro-centric and rooted in the cold war 
experience (Holsti 1992:39). In sub-Saharan Africa, the reasons for acquisition of arms 
are nationalism, internal and regional armed conflicts, the political role of the armed 
forces and lastly marginalization and bad governance. 
The most important question regarding arms transfer is what effect do they have on 
causing war and the likelihood of intensifying the war and their general lethality? As 
noted above, the connection between arms and wars is not clearly established. However, 
arms are one of the factors that lead to outbreak of war. More work needs to be done on 
the weapons-war relationship, especially in third world countries and at the localized 
level. The next section addresses weapons and war where other factors contribute to 
intensify the situation before it breaks or during the conflict. 
2.5.7 Weapons and War in the Horn of Africa 
Though not much empirical work has been done on arms races in the Horn, the race for 
arms has played a major role in intensifying and prolonging conflict. Superior military 
force as a result of assistance from both Cuba and the USSR led to Ethiopia's victory in 
the war with Somalia. Again in the Ugandan civil war, Tanzania's help assisted the 
guerrillas to win, though initially the government had superior weapons. The Sudanese 
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war has escalated due to the arms supplied to the different militias by the Sudanese 
government from external sources and the arms captured from the Sudanese government 
by the SPLA. The history of the conflicts in the Horn contributed by the cold war is 
looked at in more detail in chapter 5. As a result, arms are spilling into other areas in the 
North Rift, as will be demonstrated later. Slowly these arms have migrated to relatively 
peaceful areas where they have encouraged development of new low-level communal 
conflicts. 
2.5.8 Meaning 
Sislin et al (1998:394-5) note that: 
Systematic, rigorous analyses of the arms acquisition patterns of disputing ethnic 
groups are lacking. Mostly, this is the product of the shortage of reliable data. 
Also little or no corresponding attention is paid to cataloguing arms shipments to 
dissident groups, at least in public sources. Light weapons such as small arms 
which are thought to be the mainstay of ethnic conflicts, are not differentiated 
within the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) statistics and are 
intentionally not covered by SPIRI or the UN. Thus there are no comprehensive 
compilations of weapons information to aid scholars studying the cause of ethnic 
conflict. 
Although not conclusive this literature review was interested in ways in which weapons 
can get into a situation and exacerbate the conflict. The view and theories given on war 
and causes of war are all western or Euro-centric models of war and its causes. Can we. 
use the above concepts to apply to under-developed countries and especially Africa? 
Weapons are vital to corrupt military officials, self-proclaimed rebel leaders, brokers, 
bankers, shippers and other middlemen who feed off them. It is at the local and regional 
level and in war zones that the issue of arms races needs to be addressed not just the 
states or major arms supply. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This literature brings out strong and active connections between criminals, the weapons 
trade, and governance. There is also a correlation between governance, insurgencies and 
weapons, between provision of security and weapons proliferation in society and between 
criminal gangs' arms races and weaponization of society. 
Bad governance, which allows the diffusion of weapons in society, further undermines 
stability. It is important to note that a large number of young people are involved in the 
possession of arms and their use for criminal activities. The disillusionment of these 
young people with elders, leadership, authority and the entire governance systems, is 
profound. Even if one demilitarises the youth, there is still a population that is angry, 
hungry and fed up with callous, useless, corrupt governments, ethnic discrimination and 
marginalization etc. They will find ways to express their discontent whether they have 
AKs or not. If they are angry enough, blood will be spilled, if not now, certainly later, 
and crime is bound to get worse if governance is not managed right. 
Among the many unresolved question regarding the determinants of violence is the role 
of small arms. The overwhelming presence of weapons in society sustains a permanent 
climate of fear and mistrust, and creates and exacerbates tension, which may lead to 
armed conflicts. No society can thrive in a weaponized society; where power rests on 
weapons, the state can only exert power on the weak. 
Based on this literature review, is imperative to note that little empirical research has 
been done in the proliferation of weapons in society, yet the phenomenon affects the 
entire world. Arms are producing a new type of war, a conflict prototype whose likely 
results are the escalation of conflict, the diffusion, circulation and re-circulation of 
weapons in the society, and the use of weapons by organised criminals. Lock, (1999: 4) 
has argued that the illicit small arms traffic, made possible by the availability of 
significant stocks of weapons and the activities of corrupt officials, bad governance and 
criminal groups, is a global threat to the sovereignty of states both at macro and micro 
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levels. The author's own work addresses the micro level that is under-researched and 
which the well developed weapons and war literature cannot explain. It is this gap that 
the present work attempts to fulfil. 
The key objective of the study is to better understand the inter-relationships between 
pastoralist conflict, governance and the availability of small arms in the North Rift of 
Northeast Africa (Kenya and Uganda). The contemporary proliferation of small arms is 
part of the study, including how flows of arms feed off wider regional conflict and how 
the arms trade is commercialised. The study notes the issues regarding arms as a source 
of heightened insecurity, with a premium on who controls them and for what ends, and 
that arms are now beyond state control, which is itself corrupt. 
It strives to understand the scope and magnitude of the phenomenon of pastoralist 
conflict and small arms at different societal levels (rural' 39, multiethnic, cross border, and 
transnational), exploring the trends, human costs, and changes induced in the chosen 
pastoral areas. It analyses the emergence of commercialised cattle raiding: how 
looted/raided cattle pass through chains of actors stretching from warriors employed to 
raid. The chain includes, elders prepared to lead them in pursuit not of cattle for 
subsistence but for cash accumulation, local police and administrators ready to turn a 
blind eye in return for kitu kidogo (a cut from profits), big merchants prepared to buy 
stolen cattle, and corrupt politicians who may be involved in any of the above or prepared 
to cover up for others. 
It incorporates the relevance of small arms flows and availability to violence in the 
context of overlapping complex conflicts and to the ways in which different governance 
strategies affect those relationships. The research also attempts to understand the 
emerging linkage between Pastoralism and the complexity and dynamics of small arms 
conflict. 
139 Rural area means an area that is not a municipal one. 
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In spite of increased interest in African Pastoralism especially as a result of the 
droughts,' 4° few studies have been made by social scientists to examine the problems 
facing the pastoralists in the 1990s, especially the significant changes caused by small 
arms proliferation. Knighton (2003:431) notes, "relatively little has been published, 
whether anthropological, sociological, political, environmental or developmental, due to 
chronic insecurity". Even less has been published on why the pastoralists are demanding 
arms. The pastoralist communities have participated in the large-scale conflicts of their 
various governments by supplying personnel to the armies (KNA, 1914-1960, Quam, 
1996). 
For the last 100 years, the pastoralists have been marginalized, and most of the areas 
occupied by them have been closed to outsiders.' 4 ' Without effective representation of 
their interests, pastoralists cannot articulate policies, which would work in their favour. 
With little understanding of legal and political systems, they are often unable to resist 
policies that are detrimental to their survival (Mkutu 2001,2003). With no viable 
economic activity, they are expected to be ignorant and "backward". However, they are 
currently the major arms traders. 
The following research questions will guide this investigation. 
How and why are pastoralists involved in small arms conflict? 
What are the dynamics and consequences of the small arms problem in the 
study area? 
What attempts have been tried by Kenya and Uganda governments to solve 
the small arms problems in pastoral areas? 
Can the problem be solved by addressing small arms in isolation? 
The study is guided by the following hypotheses about the pastoralism, governance and 
the proliferation of small arms in the North Rift. The first hypothesis suggests that cattle 
raiding is carried out both for subsistence and commercial purposes. Both of these play a 
'° Dalby et a!, 1977; Swift, 1977. 
'' See Lesorogol, 1998, Mkutu 2001, 2003 op cit; Quam, 1996, KNA, WP, 1910-1963. 
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role in the demand for arms. Secondly, security and governance does not act in the 
interest of pastoralists, raising the question "whose security?" The last hypothesis is that 
diffusion of small arms and light weapons leads to a Jocalised arms race. This increases 
violence and creates a black market and networks of criminal activity in which violence 
is the norm. This in turn affects and undermines governance' 42, development and the 
pastoralist way of life. The dynamics are explained by the figure below. 
Figure 2.3 Triggers and Effects of Pastoral Conflicts 
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142 The term governance is used to imply how people are ruled, and how the affairs of the state are 
administered or regulated by the government. See Hanggi, 2002:6. It is the ability of the government to 
formulate, implement, evaluate and monitor policies and directives and decisions without marginalizing 
any community or individual. It is also the ability of the government to provide security, and public order 
to border citizens. It is participatoly, transparent, legitimate and accountable for its decisions. 
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Chapter 3 
Pastoralism and Conflict in North Rift, Northeast Africa 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines customary pastoral conflict and then goes to examine the 
changes and challenges of the current era thus conflict and emerging links with small 
arms proliferation and violence. The first section looks at pastoralism as a viable 
mode of livelihood in an area of harsh ecology where agriculture is not viable. It 
demonstrates that all aspects of pastoral social and economic life are ordered in 
relation to livestock and their environment. In pastoral societies, cattle hold central 
value and are the basis of association in a complex of social, political and religious 
institutions. The system depends largely on the availability of water and the 
distribution, quality and access to pasture. Survival demands not just defence of 
pastures but sometimes the need to attack to access pasture or livestock to replenish 
herds. Cattle rustling has also traditionally been a mode of demonstrating the courage 
of new warriors and acquiring bride wealth. 
However, pastoralism is under threat. Cattle rustling has undergone a major 
transformation in the last four decades, to an illicit, violent, cash commerce oriented 
business of cattle banditry precipjated and maintained by networks of small arms. 
The changes and causative factors qe ecplored in the second section which covers 
inadequate land and resource management policies and political and economic 
marginalization of pastoral groups, inning with the colonial governments' metJods 
of dealing wjth pastoralists which have left their legacy on modern governmen. The 
section also discusses weak goverpance and increasing insecurity, resulting 
POM 
cattle raiding fuelled by growing access by all sides to the new technology of small 
4 
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arms and light weapons.' Despite efforts to mitigate the conflict, nothing is working 
due to its complexity and vested interest. 
Pastoral conflict has now taken five dimensions: local, national, international, 
regional and global. It becomes a national issue when manifested in intra-conimunity 
raids, when the pastoralists cross district borders and when raids impinge on the 
securities of Kenya and Uganda. It takes an international dimension when the 
pastoral Kenyan Pokot invade Ugandan Karimojong and vice versa, and then becomes 
regional when the Pokot ally with Karimojong in wars with Sudan/Ethiopia. The 
pastoral conflict takes a global dimension with the proliferation of imported small 
arms 2 
3.2 Customary Conflict 
The major source of the conflicts in pastoral areas rotate around the cow as it is the 
source of livelihood, so it has to be "fought for or kept,3" though land to access 
pasture is another source of conflict. 
3.2.1 Pastoralism as a Mode of Livelihood in the North Rift 
The Horn of Africa, where and and semi-arid areas make up 70 per cent of the total 
land area, contains the largest grouping of pastoralists in the world. 4 These areas 
provide an average of 20 to 30 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). At the 
local level, as much as 70 per cent of cash income is generated from livestock 
(ASARECA, 2000). 
'The phrase 'small arms and light weapons' has been shortened to 'small arms' in the rest of the thesis. 
Small arms and light weapons are defined to include revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, 
assault rifles, sub- and light machine guns. See UN document A/52/298 27, August 1997. 
2  The region has bullet factories in Eldoret, Kenya and at Nagasongola in Uganda 
Interview with a local council officer in Namalu, Uganda 3 January 2003. 
"The term 'pastoralist' is used to describe a person for whom the herding of domestic animals on open 
bush land is the dominant economic activity. 
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Dyson Hudson (1966) described the pastoralists that occupy the Kenya, Uganda, 
Sudan and Ethiopia borders as the Karamoja cluster. This is composed of seven ethnic 
groups in all: Teso, Jie, Dodos, Turkana, Toposa, Nyangatom and Nyakwai who are 
closely related. Other groups found in the area include the Pokot of Uganda and 
Kenya, commonly known as Suk5, the Merille of Ethiopia, and the Toposa and 
Didinga of Sudan (OAU/IBAR, 1999). 
However this study only examines parts of this area. In Northeast Uganda it covers 
Nakapiripirit, Moroto and Kotido districts in Karamoja; in Kenya, Alale and parts of 
Kachiliba (West Pokot), Baragoi (Samburu) and Dol Dol (Mukogodo Laikipia 
district). All the ethnic groups in this region keep large herds of cattle and value 
cattle. Cattle are wealth to pastoralists, the foundation of economic and social 
stability; when drought and diseases deplete their livestock, they respond by raiding 
each other. 
Pastoralists get half of their food and income wholly from livestock (Swift, 1988). 
During colonial times or even today, pastoralists faced major challenges from 
drought, causing shortage of pasture and water. This leads to competition for grazing, 
and stock theft (cattle rustling). However, they possessed organised drought coping 
mechanisms including: mobility, leaving land fallow; splitting families to better 
manage family herds; pooling resources; trade ties; diversification of domestic herds; 
raids that distributed the cattle from within the communities! Such mechanisms were 
organised through the customary institution of the elders, regulating conflicts and 
administering justice. 
The nomads' strategies to manage calamities are well known especially in the 1 880s 
and 1890s during rinderpest and pleuropneumonia outbreaks 7 . These strategies were 
The term "West Suk" was coined by the colonial administration. 'Suk' is said to be derived from the 
name given to the Pokot people by the Masai. 
6  See Ochieng, 1975; Odegi-Awoundo, 1990. 
See Lamphear 1976: 220; Kenya Land Commission 1933-34 
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based on the premise that control of a variety of resources was needed to provide 
access to pasture and water at different times of the year and particularly during 
droughts 8 . 
Pastoralists had a highly diversified economy. Firstly, the land was vast and ranged 
from good agricultural soils to desert, with large herds of wild game. Secondly, they 
had the wide and peaceful contacts they established, which facilitated long distance 
trade (Spencer, 1973) 9 .  The current borders did not exist in the pre-colonial era. As 
noted in chapter 2, the pastoralists were never organised on the basis of centralised 
state system structures, had no tradition of administrative or political loyalty to central 
governing figures, and in the immediate pre-colonial period operated a decentralised 
self-government based on territorial units. Colonialism added two significant 
variables important to understanding of pastoral conflicts; boundaries (discussed later) 
and military repression. The native practices though allowed pastoralists to hold back 
their animals from wetter areas keeping grass in reserve for the dry season. 
3.2.2 Scarcity of Water and Pasture 
The primary cause for pastoral conflict is the competition over scarce resources in an 
and land. There is an undisputed link between pastoral conflicts and the need for 
pastoralists to access grasslands and water 10 . The annual rainfall in most areas where 
pastoralists live is between 100mm to 500mm. In seasons of scarcity pastoralists 
migrate in search of pasture and water for survival. In this competition for grazing 
borders are crossed, which results in tensions with neighbours. Frequent droughts 
cause the drying up of dams, pans, springs and rivers. 
8  Ocan (1992) 
example, the Turkana were able to obtain ironware, grain, tobacco, gourds and pots, mainly from 
the Labwor of Uganda, the outstanding blacksmiths and traders of this region: see Gulliver, 1963:5. 
'° See for example Independent Saturday 17 July, 2004 "The Politicians may 'eat like gluttons' but 
Kenyan people face starvation." 
118 
Sometimes viral diseases such as rinderpest and other animal diseases, forcing 
survivors to seek refuge among more fortunate neighbouring communities, exacerbate 
the resultant famines. Sometimes pastoralists cross international borders, which was 
not a problem previously but now generates hostilities and tensions. 
Droughts are common in East Africa. There have been six major droughts in the last 
three decades Mkutu 2001 In 1999-2001 due to severe droughts in the cross border 
areas of Kenya and Uganda, Turkana moved to he County in North-eastern Uganda to 
graze their animals. In a meeting held in Uganda in May 2001 organized by 
OAU/IBAR, Loteng, a he elder from Uganda argued; 
There is one issue I want to raise, general to all. Water, water, for livestock, 
water for people. They go into conflict because water is not available. If we 
had water we could start sorting out the conflict. A lot of fighting is over 
water availability. In dry weather we move to west, and then there is conflict 
with the Teso. Because of lack of water we drive our animals long distance, 
and they come in contact with animals that are sick.... If you don't provide the 
conflict will continue (OAU/IBAR, 2001) 
During the dry season in prolonged droughts, pastoralists are forced to search for 
water across international boundaries. 1939 was a terrible year for Kenya - Uganda 
pastoralists. Rainfall was very inadequate and locusts finished what grazing 
remained. The result was a widespread migration by pastoral Suk (Pokot). The 
majority moved to Uganda, most of them staying in Karamoja, but some being 
reported even as far as the borders of the Teso District. Many more went as far as 
East Baringo (Kenya). 12 
Tensions across national boundaries caused by scarcity of pasture and water can also 
better be illustrated by the following from Laikipia: in 1999-2001. 
"According to statistics in the Laikipia Research Programme droughts strike every 10 years (1960-
61,1973-78, 1982-84,1994, and 1999-2001). 
12  Kenya National Archives, District Commissioner, West Sok, Annual Report, 1939, Nairobi 
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4ap 3.1 Movement of Pastoralists in Search of water and pasture 1999-2002 
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Droughts resulted in scarcity of pasture and water, leading to mass loss of livestock in 
Laikipia. This led to the Mukogodo Masai' 3migrating from their familiar plains. As 
noted in an interview in Mukogodo Laikipia; 
Our people move from place to place looking for pasture. Here there is 
nowhere people can cultivate. People only depend on cattle, but now cattle are 
diminishing due to drought. Also, if there was good soil for cultivation, people 
could cultivate. But it only rains once a year, or after two years. Therefore, 
this causes drought and people to move to where there is water. This affects 
families since they have to move in search of pasture. 14 
The headmaster of Dol Dol secondary school concurred: 
The people are nomads, no water, no rain, it only rains once then misses for 
two years, and the only dependency is livestock. The lack of water makes the 
people move from place to place.' 5 
In response to the 1999-2001 droughts, the Mukogodo Masai migrated from their 
familiar plains into private ranches. This was aggravated by the fact that it was not 
just the Laikipia Masai pastoralists who invaded European owned ranches,' 6 but also 
pastoralists from Samburu. They forced themselves on European farms.' 7 
A warrior interviewed revealed that, "this was a desperate move to save our animals 
from ravaging drought.' 8" As noted by another interviewee, Turkana, Samburu, Pokot 
and even Isiolo-Somalis had travelled from the West and East border areas in search 
of pasture and water. Heavily armed and with thousands of cattle they invaded private 
13  See U. Herren (1987) 
14  Interview Matunge, John, Dol Dol, 3 September 2002; Chairperson of Manedelo ya Wanawake, an 
NGO also noted that due to the climate, the Mukogodo Masai cannot cultivate. Interview Dol Dol, 
Laikipia 4 September 2002. 
15 lnterview, Kairab, Geoffrey, Dol Dol, 3 September, 2002 
16 	70% of the traditional pastoral land in Laikipia is commercial ranching see Mkutu 2001. 
17 	Group Discussion with the elders, Dol Dol, Laikipia, 3 September 2002. Two years later the 
ranches have again been invaded see Daily Nation 1 September 2004 "Masai claims threat to national 
security." 
18 Maasai Moran, Interview, Dol Dol, Laikipia, 3rd, September 2002. 
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ranches in Laikipia. They resisted removal by the police attempting to evict them 
forcing police to seek reinforcement. 
Honourable Ole Kaparo' 9 brokered a cessation of the conflict, and the ranchers agreed 
to share their pasture with the Masai, Pokot, Somalis and Samburu. The arrangement 
did not last and the pastoralists were given orders to move their stock to the slopes of 
Mt. Kenya. The herdsmen resisted, leading to the arrest of 125. They were jailed for 
one month and had their animals confiscated for invading ranches and damaging a 
fence worth Kenya shillings 2million. 20 After this some of the pastoralists moved to 
Mt. Kenya. 
The overseer of the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) in Dol Dol (Mukogodo) told me: 
During the 1999-2001 drought, the common pastoralists were forced to take 
their cattle to Mt Kenya. This was after forcefully invading the ranches. But 
Mt. Kenya was not a suitable area because of: high altitude with very cold 
climate and rough terrain. Many lost their already weak stock to wild animals 
or the indigestible grass. 2 ' 
The herdsmen were trying to save their herds and flocks from certain extermination in 
the harsh conditions in ancestral pastures 22. Laikipia is again discussed with regard to 
the effect of colonial land alienation, and the agro-pastoral interface in later sections. 
The scarcity, mobility and competition aggravated by the climatic conditions lead to 
conflict within and across borders. It further leads to migration of pastoralists, risking 
conflict with settled peoples, and also diseases such as trypanosomiasis, teste fly and 
rinderpest. It also causes the terms of trade to turn against the pastoralists 23. The 
' The Kenya National Assembly 
20  National Council of Churches of Kenya Update, 2000:8 
21  Father Joseph, Interview, Dol Dol, Laikipia 4 September 2002 
22  Interview Masai elder Dol Dol August 2002 
23  For example the current drought in Kenya, the Independent 17 July 2004 cit op. notes that the prices 
of livestock have tumbled since the rains failed. 
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price of essential grains rises markedly while the sale value of stock dramatically 
reduces. For, example during the droughts in the North Rift, the price of a goat 
reduced from 1600 Kenya shilling to 400 (GOK, 2000).24  Competition within and 
among groups grows, causing raiding and tension. Such raids can turn violent. 
3.2.3 Livestock Raiding 
Cattle rustling or raiding is a collective terminology loosely used in reference to 
illegal dealings in stock in both Kenya and Uganda, whether petty or thievery or 
large-scale. The terms rustling and raiding are used interchangeablely to imply anned 
attacks by one group with the purpose of stealing a large number of stock and not 
usually territorial expansion (Markakis 1993:124). 
Cattle raiding has culturally historical connotations among all plain and some 
highland Nilotic groups. It is not a new phenomenon, but has undergone major 
transformation in the last four decades. Traditional songs and dances highlight the 
existence of cattle rustling before the coming of the colonial government to the North 
Rift. Pastoral communities engaged in cattle rustling as a means of expanding lands, 
restocking livestock, obtaining cattle for bride wealth, demonstrating the bravery of 
new warriors, initiating boys into manhood and enlarging the community herds after 
drought, diseases, famine. Usually the raids were organised by the elders, and diviners 
were consulted to ensure that the raid would be successful. The victims of raids were 
normally neighbouring districts. When the warriors returned from successful raids, 
ululation and songs of praise welcomed them. Among the singers are potential brides 
for the warrior. 
Cheboi observed that raiding is done for three purposes among the Pokot. Firstly, to 
sçure basic needs of life and to regenerate the number of animals in the herd as a 
24 pproxiate1y twenty American dollars to five 
123 
response to drought. Secondly, raided cows allow payment of bridewealih 25 for many 
wives, which is a sign of wealth of a Pokot man. Lastly, it was for sacrifice of the 
animals for religious purposes and gained prestige for having killed an enemy. 26 
Lamphear (1976,205-8) notes that successful raiders gained much prestige from their 
prowess, and apart from being the choice catch for unmarried women, could become 
potential organisers of future raids. 27 
Herskovits, (1926) uses the term "cattle complex" theory to emphasis "the very high 
social prestige and prominence attached to the possession of a great number of cattle 
and the glorification of homicide connected with its acquisition". The aggrieved party 
may compound the act by non-involvement of official security apparatus. To them, 
they will have a better forum of settlement by retaliation/revenge or as its called in 
Karamoja: ajore. This compounds the conflict. 
To pastoralists, raiding may not be perceived as a crime or socially unacceptable. It 
was both a cultural tendency and an economic coping strategy that was regulated by 
elders. The elders controlled and sanctioned all the raids and also made peace if it was 
necessary. 
Research interviews in Pokot, indicated two kinds of raiding, the luk and the setat. 
The traditional form is the luk. This is well organised by a large group of warriors for 
retaliatory reasons or the need to acquire cattle, it was often blessed and backed by the 
elders and seers. The rustlers retained the rustled cattle in the local community as a 
source of wealth and payment of bride wealth, which was a redistributed amongst 
families, lineages and affirmed solidarities of cattle owing units. The second type of 
raiding, setat, is considered as stealing/theft or commerce. This is what is now 
25  This was also confirmed in an interview with Bruno Noveili, He noted that for the warriors, raiding 
ensured they got the bride wealth. 
26  Cheboi, Florence, interview, Amukuriate dispensary, Male, Wçst  Pokot, 2 August, 2002 
27  See motives attributed for raiding by East African, Pastoralists Fukui and Turton, 1979: 9-10; Fuki, 
1979; Jacob, 1979; Tomay, 1979. A cross border workshop by OAU/TBAR, revealed similar purposes- 
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referred to as commercialised raiding in this dissertation. It is a theft motivated by 
self-acquisition that does not wait for calamity to deplete the stock. 
Interviews in Karamoja also identified two types of raiding, raids for repletion of 
stock after droughts and epizootic outbreaks (areom), and revenge raids (ajore); and 
commercial raids and cattle thefts (akoro) for cash28 . 
Livestock is a source of survival in pastoral areas. A man's position in society is 
recognised according to the number of cows, goats, sheep, camels and donkeys he 
possesses. A poor person cannot address a panel of elders or even eat the most valued 
meat, "meant for men". In an interview, the late Father Novelli informed me that: 
Through raiding, pastoralists try to compensate losses of cattle due to sickness, 
drought, epidemics of cattle, raids, and confiscation by governments. These 
losses of cattle go against the tendency of the people which is to maximise 
their cattle in order to reach an ideal optimum, calculated to be about 4-6 
heads of cows in order to have enough milk, blood and meat. Until this has not 
been reached they try to compensate since they do not know the techniques of 
cattle breeding nor have the ability due to the habitat they occupy, which is 
and and semi- arid. So they try to do with quantity what they cannot do with 
quality. If a Karimojong bull dies, one may not understand why a Karimojong 
hangs himself.29 
In the past, raids were a form of cattle distribution among the different communities; 
raided cattle remained in the neighbourhood or within the new community or they 
were used for bride wealth. In pre colonial times the weapons used during raiding 
were the spear, arrow and bow30. Muhika (2000:61-62) argues: 
restocking after shortage, revenge after skirmishes with other clans and proving manhood. OAU/IBAR 
2001 cit op 
28  Field notes 2001-2002, 20Q3 and 2004 Karamoja 
29ibid. 
° Thomas (1965) notes about the Karamoja and Dodoth that 'The types of the weapons the Dodoth 
have are almost too many. The primary weapon is the nine foot spear, made with a metal fore shaft 
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Traditionally, under the chieftain era, the instruments of violence were mainly 
close combat instruments like the family spear, bows and arrows. The 
weapons were for personal or community defence against thieves or animals 
and strict age control existed. Nobody was allowed to handle such weapons 
until they reached of marriageable age. Gender control also existed: only men 
bore arms. None was allowed to apply such instruments on a clan-mate, least 
of all a member of the extended family. Social sanctions, e.g. banishment or 
death existed for any breach of this strict social code. 
Mzee Lopumumoe31 , an elder, notes: 
It was considered cowardly to fight from a distance. You had to look into the 
eyes of the enemy as you did battle and when a combatant surrendered, you 
did not harm such a person. Old people, women, and children were ignored. 
Girls were often taken along with livestock. That was our way. 
Traditional raids were under strict control of the elders, community healers and 
soothsayers. Everyone knew a raid was coming. The aspect of surprise in a raid 
involved only time and place. Attacks would only take place at dawn or in the 
evening (Thomas, 1965). Ichumer, a Karamoja elder, insisted that awareness of 
impending raids was made known to every one. A man in traditional war costume 
would alert the other clan. Former President of Kenya Daniel Arap Moi, who is of 
pastoralist background, notes, "Traditionally, cattle rustling does not involve killing 
people"32 
The practice was considered a social and cultural occupation as opposed to a criminal 
activity. The aggressors may simply partake in the raids not out of any tangible 
and a sharp, lead- shaped blade, a short wooden centre piece, and a tapered metal tail, the spear straight 
and light and perfectly balanced. There are different kinds of bows and arrows, slingshots, axes; also 
sticks, clubs, and shields for different kinds of fights." 
31  Mzee Lopulumoe (2001) one of the elders who attended the inter- Communal Meeting held in 
Mbale, Uganda, organized by OAU/IBAR May 19th- 25th. 
32  Daily Nation, 18 April 2001 
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justification but for the mere need of being socially occupied. Rustling aggression 
was generally conducted by the more active youths that felt obliged in the 
participation and preservation of their customary norms. This was concurred with in 
an interview with Mzee Mudongo a Karamoja elder, who noted: 
Raiding was not just a means of restocking, but it was also an ancient form of 
wealth re-distribution among the Karimojong. It is a traditional and central 
form of re-stocking. Young warriors were compelled to accumulate cows in 
- 
order to gain status. Their respect depended on the number of successful 
raids.33 
3.2.4 Fission and fusion of pastoralist conflict 
The importance of fission and fusion for waging war and survival was corroborated 
by Father Novelli, a long time resident of Karamoja, who argued: 
It is a matter of making alliances when it is useful, when not useful they break 
them. Lord Palmerstone argued that' nations do not have permanent alliances 
or enemies, they only have permanent interests'. The Karimojong are fully 
convinced of this. In 1999, Matheniko were allied with Turkana and together 
they were fighting the Bokora (section of Karamoja) Of course in order to 
defend themselves the Bokora allied themselves with the Jie, who are the 
enemies of Matheniko. After one year all the alliances changed. The Bokora 
made peace with the Matheniko, so they did not need the Jie. So the Bokora 
and the Matheniko went against the Turkana. 34 
In an interview, an eyewitness had the following to say; 
33  Mudogo, Moses, Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace chairman and elder, Interview, Moroto, 
17June 2001. 
34  Father Bruno Novelli cit. above 
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I come from Kaabong in Dodoth side, neighbouring the Turkana. When it is 
dry in Turkana, Turkana come and graze, make friends and then make 
alliances. They will go and raid, kill and bring animals and share the loot. But 
the problem with the Turkana is that when they are going back, they take 
Dodoth cattle and go35 . 
Interviews with both the provincial administration in Baragoi and the security 
indicated that local Samburu collude with the Pokot and Rendile to raid the Turkana, 
while the Turkana join forces with their brothers of Turkana district, to raid the 
Samburu and Pokot. 36 
Father Bosco, John, Amudat, Uganda 17 June 2001 
36  Police and Provincial Administration, Interview, Baragoi, 22 August, 2002 
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Figure 3.1 Ethnic/tribal patterns of relationships as of 
November 2002 
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Figure 3.2 Affiances Ethnic/tribal pattern of relationships 
October 2004 
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Map 3. 2 Cross border Sudan-Uganda-Kenya Aggression 
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3.2.5 Conflict and Pastoral Intergenerational Systems 
Different sectors of the communities continue to play different roles in raids and 
triggering pastoral conflict. This section examines the intergenerational conflicts of 
the communities and their consequences. 
Elders 
Pastoral communities were socially organised in to an age-grade system. Age-sets are 
an ethnic institution in the sense that all youths who have been initiated in a 
successive number of years. Prior to colonial rule, elders were collectively responsible 
for the governance of the community dominating the pastoral societies of the North 
Rift. They were the leaders, policy makers, decision makers and resource managers, 
and among them some had religious and mystical powers. There were structures for 
conflict resolution through councils of elders, traditional courts and peer or age-group 
supervision, where each individual or group had to meet certain social expectations. 
In Uganda, among the Karimojong, the elders made important decisions through 
discussions and debates and solved communal conflicts (Quam, 1996:15). While in 
the Pokot in August 2002, the elders took the researcher under a tree, and explained 
how all disputes the council of elders settled democratically. As noted in an interview 
with Rev. Kewasis: 
The Pokot have governance based on the council of elders. Among the council 
of elders, there was always some one or group of people and they came from a 
particular clan that are highly respected ruling clusters of people. When they 
want to consult over matters affecting them, they would go to that clan. Roles 
were divided very distinctively. And these people acd as diviners. They 
would foretell, tey wouci prophecy, they would give gQveancç jssues, for 
example if there was goIng to be an epidemic for that matter or raids were 
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coming they would prepare to take cover before any attack. If raiders were 
37 coming they would foretell ahead of the attack. 
Lamphear (in Eisei and Simonse, 1998:8 1) observes: 
Age-class systems provide the elders with the means to retain control and limit 
the potential excesses of the younger men religiously and economically. As 
the ultimate links with the supernatural forces, the elders can threaten a curse, 
which is much to be feared. Family patriarchs, not age-sets or generation-sets, 
own livestock and regulate its flow through the community but as individual 
fathers postponed the marriage of their sons, so do the elders collectively 
control the bands of youth warriors. The dynamic provides a queue discipline, 
which encourages young men to wait for their turn. In instances, age and 
generations systems emerge as institutions to moderate and control the 
potential violence of the younger men, entrusted with the security of the 
society. The elders were responsible for settling land disputes in cases of 
killings and their decisions was final. In Pokot, the senior most elder would 
act as the leader in the case of Pokot. The senior most elder would sit on the 
throne. The age-set was based on circumcision. Pokot, hold seriously the age-
set system, which was after every 10 years in the case of Pokot. 
In Nilotic societies, and most African societies, elders were dispute handlers and 
lawyers in the comniunity. When people go to raid, they consult elders. In Pokot as 
well as most of the pastoral communities, the elders (Poy) are vital in that they bless 
the raiders (Kiyiltagy). As noted in an interview with Novelli: 
What the elders teach insistently is to go raiding cattle from everybody who is 
not a Karimojong, in order to nwry and to live. The life of the Karimojong is 
to steal many cattle. Once focJ, they give them to their fathers, mothers and 
brothers. 38 
37  Rt. Reverend Bishop Kewasis, Stephen, Angpan Bjs4op of 1ciaie  Diocese, Kitale, l, July, 2002 
38  Interview with late Father Novelli, June 19, 2001. Also see PJfrjon,  G. (1973) Krimojoig text. 
Unpublished notes on the Karimojong, Comboni Missionaries, VeTona. 
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Usually they select the time and the target for the intended raids. But also, they made 
peace with the raided through cleansing ceremonies and compensation- making 
(OAU/IBAR, 2001). What provides the elders their enormous power? All the pastoral 
groups under study believe in the power of the curse. There is a belief that certain 
activities will lead to good misfortune through the agency of supernatural forces. In 
the case of the Baragoi, Masai, Pokot, and Karamoja, elders can curse the entire age 
group that misbehaves. 39 In Baragoi curse is like poison from a poisoned arrow. 
Novelli argued; 
Elderly status puts them on the border as it were, between natural and 
supernatural. Their proximity with the supernatural world and with god is a 
result, not only of their age, but also of the concrete fact which in the mind of 
the Karimojong is the tangible proof that their power is real that if they 
managed to last so long amid the harshness and hazards of life in Karamoja, 
together with their families and herds, they knew, so to say, how to deal with 
god in order to obtain whatever was necessary for their life. From these comes 
the psychological power over those who are still struggling along. To have 
their advice is reassuring, their blessing is a pledge of god's pleasure and 
protection, and their curse is considered one of the most dangerous threats for 
their life. 40 
It is believed that these old men are capable of causing the death of young warriors 
who go against their will simply by pronouncing 4 ' a curse, which curbs the high-
spirited moran. This instils fear in the other warriors who then become reluctant to 
accompany them in case death befalls them. They are forced to apologize to the elders 
in order to appease their ancestral spirits. 
See for example Spencer (1965, 209). 
40  Novelli op.cit. 
41  see Spencer 1965:127, 184-209 Writing on the Samburu he notes the powerfulness of the curse, 
which the ritual leader can hold over members of an age-set. 
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Another factor in the influence of elders is their wealth. Wealth in pastoral societies is 
not considered as personally earned or owned but the rights to it come with lineage. It 
is redistributed not only via cattle raiding but also as bride wealth and on inheritance 
when herds are divided. Wealth is accumulated as much by good luck as good 
management as subjected to vagaries of weather and diseases, raiding, having many 
daughters thus it does not create a pennanent 'class' of capital owners. Singer 
(1982:63) notes "wealth is both material and human". Money, cattle, women, and land 
are all symptoms of possessions of wealth in pastoral societies. Unfortunately, not all 
are wealthy and many elders do not use their influence or their wealth for the common 
good. 
Kraal leaders 
Kraals can consist of up to 50 corals with between 50 to 100 herds of cattle. 42 
Numbers of animals range from between 100-200 per coral hence one kraal can 
possess thousands of cattle. Kraal commanders or leaders are senior image/clan 
members who head each kraai. 43 The kraal leaders have a team who help with their 
work. These are the warriors 44who are from the age-grade system together with the 
shepherds (under 15 year olds) who look after the animals and are responsible for the 
security of the homes. 45 A kraal leader is a man who commands respect and must be 
a good warrior/raider, mobilizer, decision maker and able to ensure cows get security, 
water and pasture. 
42 A kraal visited in Namalu had nearly 800 cows and nearly 200 calves. One visited in Amudat owned 
by Lomgoin had nearly 3,000 c4tle, and i largc npmber of goats, camels, and sheep. 
' Some kraal leaders are also elders. In Nakiloro, L9rot Koriatutinyo the kraal leader interviewed 
happened to be also an Ekatukon (elder) . Elders in kraals are responsible for decision making and 
problem solving. 
44 Men of 16-36 years 
45  Interview Lorot Koriatutinyo kraal leader, Nikoloro, 29 Eanuary 2003 
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The role of a kraal leader includes, discussing with the youth and warriors making 
decisions, and coordinating with other kraal leaders and elders. 46 Kraal leaders are 
also now being appointed home guards and in Uganda they are equipped with arms by 
the government.47 For one to be a kraal leader one must be rich in terms of many 
children and cattle. Owalinga informed me that his work as kraal leader is to guide, 
protect and determine each day where the animals would go to graze and also he was 
an overseer for the shepherds and warriors48 . Lowogonie, a kraal leader, interviewed 
in Upe Pokot noted: 
The work of the Kraal leaders includes seeing to it that the Warriors are 
looking after animals and patrolling. 49 Also ensuring that the cows get pasture, 
water and security where they are. 50 
The kraal leader is directly answerable to the elders. He is mediator between the 
elders and the warriors. 51 Most raids are planned in collaboration with kraal leaders, 
the commnder for the warriors. It is very easy for leaders to manipulate warriors 
for their own political ends. 
Youth and Pastoral Conflict 
The youths have different names in the pastoral areas. In Karamoja they are known as 
karachuas (warriors), in West Pokot they are known as Ngidigidai while in Laikipia 
and Samburu they referred to as morans. In the entire North Rift pastoral area I found 
that the initiated youth (8-18) are the backbone of pastoralists communities as they are 
the herders and also they manage the security. The "security" is based on animosity, 
enmity and revenge and is manifested in the form of violence especially in road 
46  The kraal leader and elders have to come into a consensus. The elders are the decision make1s. The 
kraal leaders are the implementers of the decision taken by the elders. The Warriors look after animals 
and look for pasture and water. 
' For example Lomer Emurongole, a kraãl leader yisted in Nam1u was also a home guard. 
48  Kraal leader Mariko Owalinga, Interview, 25 January, 2003 
50 Kraal leader, Lomoryareng, David, Interview, Ainudat, 270 , January, 2003 
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ambushes and cattle raids. 52 They are the ones that take the herds to graze and who 
protect them against any danger. The youth can fight; that is their work 53 . In Baragoi, 
the moran argued that "we are the security of the community, without us, the 
community would have been extinct. 54 
Diviners/Seers and the Pastoral Conflict 
Novelli (1999: 108) observes, "The diviner's influence on society is strictly linked 
with the success of his activity among the people." While Bishop Kewasis argues: 
Diviners were in every region and they seem to have known each other. And 
they possessed their own way of communicating with each other through 
dreams. They are very secretive. 55 
In Pokot the Weroyon; in Karamoja the ngimurwolc, amongst the Maasai laibon are 
highly respected diviners with powers to tell the future and bless combatants. In 
Pokot the P/can, those who read the innards of animals that had been sacrificed, 
determined what would happen in a raid. It is unlikely that a raid would be carried 
out against a community without being predicated by an emurwon, ngimurwok or 
werkoy (fortune tellers).56 Dietz (1987) argues that the Pokot did not have diviners 
like other pastoral groups. It is incorrect, Pokot do have such people (Weroyon). As 
noted by the study done in Kerio Valley,57the blessings from the emurwon or laibons 
are "believed to increase the powers of raiders." These special seers seem to have a 
penchant for raids since it is their main source of livelihood. After a successful raid, 
Every morning the kraal leaders and elders gather to take stock of previous day and make decisions 
where to take the animals to graze. 
52  See for example Dc Koning 2003:95-97 
' Matunge, John, op cite. Also noted by Lekoidipi, Maurice, Moran- Interview, Dol Dol 3 September, 
2002 
54  Interviews Moran Dol Dol 3 September 2002 
55Rev. Kewasis Nyorosok Stephen, cit. op. 
56  See Lamphear 1998 for the Ateker. LoQking at the Ateker pastoral groups (neighbours to both 
Karamoja and Pokot), he notes the diviners rose to prominent places to the point of leading major 
armies. This gave them respect in the two communities he studied. 
57 Anderson, 1986:402 
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they are rewarded with some of the raided cattle." 58 Among the Kalenjin the Orkoiyot 
or laibon (seers) also stood to benefit from stock raids and were able to instigate raids 
directly through their role as counsellors to the moran (warriors) . 59 During interviews 
in Kraals in Namalu, I was told that one of the roles of the diviner is to read innards 
and detect danger or if it was safe for the warriors to go raiding. He would also 
proscribe which colour of animal to kill for protection; this guaranteed him a share if 
the raid was successful. 60 
Bishop Kewasis of Kitale Diocese noted that; 
I grew up among the Pokot when their culture was still intact. In the 1950s   
and 1960s   and even 1970s, the diviners would foretell, prophecy, give 
governance issues, would foretell to take cover in two months before the 
enemy arrives61 . 
Interviews with warriors in Kotido, informed me the diviners (eke ryon) are 
overpowering elders. Some of the youth admitted that they were now directly seeking 
advice from such ekeryon before a raiding party. The diviners would then sacrifice 
specific animals to make the raid successful. He would be rewarded with a part of the 
booty (10-20 cows) 62. When I interviewed Ekore, a diviner since 1961, he denied 
this.63 
Diviners act as the superpower class of people in the pastoral society and they are 
highly respected, obeyed and followed. Whatever they say, the elders and youth will 
accept, hence they play a major role in triggering pastoral conflict or mediating in 
conflicts. 
58  See NCCKISNV and SARPEP, 2001:9. 
59 Anderson op cit: 402 
60Namalu kraals, Focus groups interviews, 25th January, 2003 
61  Rt. Rev Kewasis Nyorsok Stephen, op cit. 
62  Interview, Chere an ex raider, Kanawat, 2 February, 2003 
63  Ekore,Raphel Interviews, Nabilatuku,28 January 2003 
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3.2.6 Gender Relations in Pastoral Conflict 
Women are part of the pastoral communities in which conflict is endemic. They share 
the cultural values and perceptions about raiding. While they do not go to raid or 
fight, they play instrumental roles in encouraging and inciting men to go raiding and 
revenging. Due to diminishing cattle due to raids, fathers do not have enough cattle to 
contribute towards their son's bride wealth, hence there is more raiding. 
A woman doctor at Matany mission hospital in Bokora County with a private clinic in 
Moroto noted that "the man must pay my family cattle in order to marry me, without 
cattle he cannot many me.M 
As noted by De Koning (2003:96) 
When being raided for a second or third time in a short period, a stockowner 
cannot expect any donations from friends or relatives and the only option left 
for his sons is to counter raid (so raids serve family and individual interests). 
In an interview with Local Council Five 65Helen Pulkol, informed me that, "Boys 
have to look for cows. Where can he get a bride without wealth? Here is where raids 
come in. 66" An elder interviewed noted: 
Married women mobilise other women, sing songs of praise and ululate in 
celebrations when the warriors arrive with the spoils of war while at the same 
time deriding those who have failed. A woman wears a special cloth when her 
man is out on a raid. She taunts her man if he refuses to go on a raid, 
questioning his manhood.67 
Sister Paulina, from the Roman Catholic Church in Moroto told me: 
64  Source did not want to be identified. Interview, Matany, Bokora, 17th  June, 2001 
65  Local council fives are directly elected by the people there fore very power'ul. 
66  Pulkol, Helen LC 5, Interview, Namalu, 24 January 2003. 
67  Ichumer, Philip Ichumer, op cit. Also this was noted in Alale FGD with women who argued that 
women praise the young men after raids. 
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Women, especially the old ones, humiliate the men for not taking care of the 
family. They wear the arapet skin in a special way when they want to send 
their sons to raid. They smear them and they make them pass through their 
legs. When they return from revenge, they dance and sing songs of praise. 
They also perform the ceremony of awatun {water sprinlding}. But they also 
play an important role in peace rituals. For example, mothers from warring 
groups may swap babies and breastfeed them as a symbolic alliance between 
the two warring communities. 68 
In Baragoi, young women sing songs welcoming warriors and shunning those who do 
not raid. The young women have sexual relations with the warriors. 69 Karamoja and 
Pokot women wear a bead belt (lakatia). This is the charm that ties a son to the 
mother's womb even when grown up, as a sign of protection from evil. The lakatia is 
to be worn especially when sons and even husbands go raiding. Women also prepare 
food that the warriors carry on their journey, which can take days or weeks. On return 
the warriors find milk kept for them by their mothers and wives. 70 
The term bridewealth does not mean 'buying women' but giving wealth in exchange 
for her capacity to bear children for the lineage. What is 'bought' are rights to 
reproductive capacity and labour power. Bridewealth varies in pastoral communities, 
but is mostly paid in domestic cattle. Earlier in the traditional Karimojong society, 71 
parents used to meet all the marriage obligations for their Sons; beginning from 
engagement to marriage. They paid dowry and set up the couples with household 
goods. 
Gulliver (1955:42) who made penetrating studies of the Jie and Turkana peoples of 
N.W.Kenya and Uganda argues that the mechanism of bridewealth is of paramount 
68  Field notes January- February 2003 
69  Laskarite, James, Interview, 13aragoi, 21st August 2002. 
70Focus group discussion interviews with, Alale African Inland Church Women groups, Alale, 3 
August, 2002 
71  Matheniko, Pian, Jie and Bokora 
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importance. Poorer pastoralists will add to their flocks through weddings of daughters 
and sisters. On the other hand, a wealthy man expends stock on his own and his son's 
marriages. The late father Novelli observed: 
Cattle are transferred on the occasion of marriage to as many people as 
possible in the kinship of the bride, in order to have as many allies as possible 
on whom to rely, particularly in time of trial. 72 
This was also confirmed in an interview with Cheboi, a nurse at Amukuriate 
dispensary in Alale, West Pokot, Kenya who argued; 
Another influence on raiding is that the cows are distributed to the uncles, 
aunties, sisters and people are grateful if they get a share. Marriage implies 
others are benefiting the clan. Bride wealth is an incentive for raiding. 73 
Christine Nachap the Local Council Five for Karita noted that at least the educated 
Upe Pokot can negotiate the numbers of cattle they pay. 74flenriksen (1974) notes, "It 
surely remains the biggest expenditure of stock that a man has." 
3.3 Changes and Challenges in Pastoral Areas in the North 
This section begins an analysis of the pastoral conflicts in the region. The argument is 
that the deep-seated sources of conflict are diverse. They result from the scarcity of 
water and pasture, the agricultural and pastoral interface, marginalization, 
demarcation of borders, livestock raiding and the fission and fusion of the different 
ethnic pastoral groups. It is also argued that the attempt to change pastoralist 
behaviour in favour of the agriculturists or urban dwellers is partly responsible for the 
pastoral coifJcts. 
72  Father Novelli, Interview, Moroto, 17 June, 2001 
73 Cheboi, Florence, Interview, Alale, West Pokot, 3 August, 2002 
74  Interview Amudat, 27, January 2003. 
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3.3.1 Colonial Incursion 
The boundaries of the colonial East African Protectorate (1895-1926) were unclear 
especially south and north. Initially, East Africa was divided for administrative 
purposes into three provinces; Seyidie, Tanaland and Ukambani provinces. Each was 
further subdivided into districts named after its main settlement. No attempt was made 
to make the boundaries of these provinces or districts conform in any way to the 
ethnic composition of the indigenous population, let alone find a rational base. 75 
Early European explorers first entered Turkanaland at the end of the 1 9 th century and 
contacts were made with British administration in 1903. The area was mainly 
managed by military forces, which by constant patrols and several major expeditions 
waged a lengthy campaign against the Turkana. The area was one of the last to be 
taken over by the colonial govermnent. Meanwhile it was a refuge for ivory poachers 
and outlaws, some of whom had bases in or assistance from Abyssinia (Ethiopia). 
Gulliver (1963) observes that Turkana resistance, made possible by the wildness of 
their country, was stimulated by Ethiopian efforts to gain control of territory claimed 
by the British. Not until 1926 was administration established in Turkana. Even then, 
the military forces were retained. 
Explorers, mainly elephant hunters, reached Karamoja at the end of the 19th  century76. 
Although Uganda was declared a British protectorate in 1890, Berber (1968:117) 
remarks that the first direct colonial control in Karamoja though not part of the E.A 
Protectorate came through military administration beginning in 1911 under the King's 
Africa Rifles (KAR). 
1eeai.4se of the danger it posed to the other parts of the protectorate in terms of 
security against raiders and arms tniders, the administration created was expected to 
disarm the Karimojong and 'pacify' the area using a three-pronged approach: 
75  Ojany and Ogendo, 1973: Mungeam, 1966. 
76  Gulliver, 1963: 8; Ocan 1992:4-5 
142 
shooting them on sight, burning their huts and seizing their livestock. It was then 
considered that modem weapons were largely eliminated in Karamoja but the control 
of borders between two British territories by the colonial government was still 
insecure. A garrison was stationed in border areas until 1937 specifically to guard 
against Turkana traders77 . 
3.3.2 Divisive Borders 
The Colonial rule came with policies such as the creation of borders countries and 
communities. The drawing of boundaries interfered with the social system and 
ecology. It disrupted mobility, limiting access to grazing land and water and thereby 
increasing social conflicts. Borders are the impediments to pastoralists' ability to 
manage droughts confining them to one area. It becomes impossible to trace 
criminals, especially the cattle raiders, once they disappear into a different country, a 
problem experienced from colonial times. 
One example of this is that the current Kenya-Uganda geographical borders did not 
exist in the pre-colonial era. What existed were a number of tribal kingdoms, 
chieftainships or ethnic groups headed by council of elders, that came to be 
incorporated into countries in a process starting in the mid 1 850s to about 1926. The 
grazing area, which is now Turkana, was agreed and marked on the ground in 1938. 
This boundary, known as 'the redline,' is a fertile area J,ut a no go zone due to 
frequent fighting between the Toposa pastoralists in Ethiopia and Turkana in Kenya 
for pasture and water. 
Pokot extended from east Pokot (Baringo) in Kenya to the newly created district of 
Nakapiripirit in Uganda. Colonial authority in thel92Os permitted the Pokot to move 
77  Op. cit. Gulliver 
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and live in Upe County in Uganda in compensation for the loss of some their best dry 
season grazing areas in the TransNozia District of Kenya 78 . 
The modem administration of West Pokot District started in the late 19th  century 
when Pokot became part of Uganda's eastern Province. In those years the British 
were attempting to assert their authority over the area to the north of mount Elgon and 
west of Lake Turkana. This was as a result of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890. 
Through treaties with the leaders of the Sebei, Karamojong and Pokot, some 
administrative control was established. 
In 1902 the Eastern Province of Uganda was transferred to Kenya. Until 1926, the 
Saum river, from its origins on Mt Elgon through the Turkwell to Lake Turkana 
formed the international boundary between Kenya and Uganda. It is a stretch of 933 
km. The southern and eastern sections of the present Pokot district became part of 
Naivasha province of Kenya. The area to the north of Saum River, presently 
Kacheliba division became part of the province of Uganda 79 . 
When the researcher visited the border area in 200 1-2, it was observed to be very 
long, creating difficulties effective positioning of security to regulate the border-
crossing activities. There are no customs points and no immigration checkpoints from 
Mt. Elgon to Lokichogio (Kenya). People are free to move easily across the border, 
as are their animals and arms. The only border locations with international border 
clearance points are Malaba, Busia and Lwakakwa 80 . Families straddle these borders. 
A former senior security boss and an MP in Ugunda observed that; "the people on the 
border are akin to each other. They have the same customs, speak same language, 
they are same people, have same destiny divided by borders". 8 ' 
78  Focus group interviews with ejflers, Alale West Pokot, 2 August, 2002 
79 District Commissioner, West Pokot Annual Report, 1934. 
80  Observations 2001-2003 
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During the field research in the area, the researcher observed the only marker to 
indicate the border was a stone. When the researcher visited Alale, which is 20 
minutes drive into Uganda, the police station had collapsed and there were only three 
policemen. A Somali home guard that had been living in the area for 40 years told 
me; "During the colonial period, the police were well equipped, but what can 3 
policemen do with well-armed cattle rustlers?" 82 
The Pokot live on both sides of the border, crossing frequently as a matter of course, 
rendering the border meaningless. This was expressed by one of the respondent 
interviewed: "Pokot are Pokot and they extend from East Baringo (Kenya) to Upe 
(East Uganda). The border has no meaning because the government operates far 
away from the people". 83 
Father Romerio of Alale Catholic mission observed that: "Pokot do not know the 
border and also people from Nasule Pokot go to Uganda during dry season. During 
rainy season they return- go come go". 84 
On 27th  August 1945, a joint baraza85 was held at Kongelai attended by the two 
divided sections of the (Pokot). The provincial and district commissioners were 
present. The Karasuk (Pokot) from the Uganda side expressed contentment with their 
lot, but the Kenya Suk unanimously expressed the wish to be re-united with their 
brethren on the other side of the river, in one province under one district 
commissioner: whether in Kenya or Uganda was of secondary importance. 86 
In a focus group discussion with elders in Alale (West Pokot) the common view was: 
81  Pulkol, David, Former Deputy Director of UNC1EF and External Security boss for Uganda, 
Interview, Moroto, 18 May, 2001 and 18 January, Kampala, 2003 
82 	gurd, Interview, Alale, West Pokot, 3rd August 2002. 
83  Pokot Elder, Interview 31 May, 2001 
84  Father Romerio- Interview, Alale, West Pokot, 2 August, 2002 
85  Open public meeting 
86 Disjct Commissioner, West Suk Annual Report, 1945:2-3. 
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Pokot have been divided into two. The Uganda Pokot and the Kenya Pokot. 
All of them are Pokot; there is no single moment that the Uganda Pokot and 
the Kenya Pokot will kill each other or fight. The reason for the conflicts with 
Karimojong is the boundary. The Pokot are trying to keep their land, while 
Karimojong fight Pokot to try and take their land. The Pokot elders claimed 
Karimojong are trying to move them from Achirichori and Pokot have refused 
to move but stay and fight for their land. 87 
The borders were created to try and maintain law and order. However, they were fixed 
without due regard for the pastoralists' livelihood needs or future expansion. They 
were political tools to make control easy. This led to the start of migrations of the 
Pokot in search of pasture, water and security for their livestock (Ezati et al 1997). 
Some of the border region is very fertile, but insecurity has prevented the Pokot from 
farming88 it, especially since 1980, a key date known as the 'Dark Year' when over 
10,000 Karimojong and the Turkana in Kenya formed an alliance, invaded the Pokot 
district, raided their cattle and looted their homes. This signalled a mass migration by 
most Ugandan Pokot into Kenya, though now, many have moved back. On January 3, 
2003, the short-lived peace came to an end. A good number of Pokot from Karita ran 
to Kenya again. The Pokot raided Pian settlement in Namalu 89 and raided 200-600 
cows90 . 
Attempts by the colonial government to stop the expansion of groups like Turkana 
migrating southwards into Samburu and Isiolo districts of Kenya create conflict. 
Currently the Turkana make up half the inhabitants of Samburu district near Baragoi. 
The result is tension and considerable conflict. In laying the boundaries between the 
87  Focus groups with elders, Nauyapong, Alale, 2 August 2002. Among the people in the FGD included 
Arimot, the son of Loitamutachum, now 80 years old and one of the most powerful elders in Pokot in 
Nauyapong (Alale), which is 30 minutes to Uganda from Kenya. It must be noted that Achirichori is a 
watering pQ. 
88 Example is Karita, occupied by Upe Pokot (Ugandan Pokot) 
891 visited this village on 26 January 2003, 1 witnessed buried bodies. 
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Samburu and Turkana, the Samburu lost their best grazing grounds. Both Kulal and 
Marsabit mountains were previously in Samburu, however, in 1909, they became part 
of Rendile. Northern Laikipia was alienated for European settlement. From 1912, the 
European settlers in Kenya were agitating for the alienation of Leroki plateau, the 
only dry season grazing preserve for Samburu91 . 
The creation of British-fashioned boundaries aggravated the relations between the 
Karimojong and their neighbours in Uganda. The pressure resulting from the 
demarcation of boundaries continued by the post-colonial administrations is 
discernible in the current cross border conflicts and is manifested by the inter-group 
raids along the borders. There are frequent land meetings between administrators and 
the people, a symptom of the spiralling of border conflicts. As noted by Ocan (1992), 
the borders changed land regimes. Borders were drawn without thinking of linkages 
between people. They are fluid, unrealistic and very artificially drawn without much 
consideration of the ethnic groups though drawn to bring law and order. They have 
failed to act as a buffer against hostilities as envisaged by the colonial governnent. 
Instead they raise the question of what rights pastoralists have vis a vis ljd, through 
which to move in order to graze. For those that live on borclr  areas, issuçs of 
citizenship need to be addressed. Understanding the issue of borders iq vital to 
management of pastoral conflicts since it introduces an international and even 
regional perspective to conflict, complicating any mitigation mechanism. It is this 
regional dimension that feeds the arms and ammunition flows to both Kenya and 
Uganda. 
° This is noted in chapter 4 when I discuss the postcolonial governance relations to pastoralists. 
91  See KNA/PC/NFD4/2 Samburu Affairs Boundaries 1919-1930. 
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3.3.3 Marginalization and Land Alienation 
In this section, we see not the powerful warrior like, wealthy, prestigious, pastoralists 
of the early 19th century92, but the cross border pastoralists who have been forcibly 
marginalized, displaced from their land and restricted in mobility. 
Marginalization 
The insecurity described in chapter 5, is one of the prejudices used to justify the 
marginalization of pastoralists in terms of development. 93 Both the colonial and 
postcolonial governments have marginalized pastoral areas. The colonial government 
acknowledged political and economical marginalization of the pastoralists. In his 
annual report of 1945, the District Commissioner (DC) of West Suk argued that: 
West Suk, after 34 years administration, ranks as one of the most backward 
districts in Kenya. This is in no way the fault of the tribe who are in character 
and intelligence the equal of most and superior to many tribes who have 
passed them in the race, while the country is full of potentialities for 
development. This lag is attributable solely to the fact that geographically 
they are on the edge of the world and West Suk has come to be regarded as a 
Cinderella district where nothing much happens and to which no great 
attention need to be given so long as they behave themselves. This is in 
consonance with the policy which appears to have been adopted by 
Government, possibly without fully appreciating the implications, viz. 'To him 
that hath shall be given.' The inevitable result is that those districts which are 
called 'Advanced' because they are rich are given an ever increasing share in 
the social services and other good things which a bountiful government 
92  Atieno Odhiambo et al (1977): 38-46, also see also Kenya Land commission 1933, which nos that 
Masai were a foriij4ble power in East Africa. They successfully asserted themselves against tle Arab 
slave trade, and réqed tax for those that passed their lands. 
93 Field notes 2003 in Karamoja noted this. 
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bestows, thereby ever widening the gap between the 'advanced' and the 
'backward' areas94 . 
They are no longer "free pastoralists" managing their own life as their lands have 
been alienated. Current governance in eastern Africa is dominated by manipulation of 
ethnicity, patronage and a political culture of exclusion. This has continued from the 
period prior to independence. The governments of the east African region have made 
some efforts to include pastoralists, but they are still not adequately representd in 
political life and in decision-making organs. 
Paullina Isura echoed this marginalization from the Upe Pokot community in a 
presentation in Mbale, Uganda: 
Conflicts come because the people have been neglected since colonial times. It 
looks as though government is dividing people, because some areas are being 
developed and others neglected (OAU/ IBAR, 2001). 
The two North Rift states of Kenya and Uganda have failed in facilitating equitable 
development among the various pastoralists communities and they rate poorly on 
aspects of governance. Their performances have resulted in marginalization of 
pastoralists from mainstream development. The needs of pastoralists are disregarded 
in the planning of national development. 
An interesting viewpoint is that marginalization has enabled pastoralists to retain their 
culture, which has existed for centuries to ensure their mode of survival. Though 
some of the culture has been eroded, much is still intact. The framework that still 
exists can be exploited to manage the armed and resource conflict. 
When communities encounter injustice and continual marginalization and the 
involvement of government officials in supporting criminal activity, tension and 
94:District Commissioner West Suk Annu Report 1945. 
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conflict are created. The prejudice against marginalized areas and the attitude 
governments have is reflected when government sends security forces to these areas. 
They are already prejudiced and take actions that do not meet the reported insecurity 
situation.95 This is further exacerbated by a combination of inequitable policies, lack 
of access to justice and lack of understanding of pastoral areas. Governments have 
always viewed pastoralism as a marginal economic way of life. The media in both 
Kenya and Uganda have argued that pastoral conflict is indirectly the communities' 
response to what is perceived as the two states' inability or failure to guarantee their 
security. 
Land Alienation 
Karamoja is an area abundant in minerals and currently a growing commercial interest 
especially in Moroto district, Matheniko County, where there is rapid increase in 
granting of exclusive mineral prospecting license in Karamoja. Mining is currently a 
booming business. In Moroto district some of the areas alienated cover areas used for 
permanent settlement, dry season grazing and critical water points. 96 Muhereza and 
Bledsoe (2002:27) report that: 
Every inch of land in Karamoja where there are minerals is now covered by an 
exclusive mineral-prospecting license issued by the Commissioner of the 
Geological Surveys and Mines Department. 
Research indicated that six private companies owned by an Indian from Mombasa 
Kenya were exporting cement to Tororo. Exclusive prospecting licenses are given 
without consultation with the community, which is a major problem given that the 
communities see themselves losing out97 . 
95 Speech by Honourable David Ethuro, MP of Parliament from Kenya, given at the International 
conference'on small arms held in Jinja, Uganda 8-13 November 2001. 
96  Interviews with Uganda Wildlife Authority, NakapiripitJafliary 2003, 
97  interviews and observation Januaiy —February 2003, May, and November 2003. I also interviewed 
the Somali businessmen that own the mineral' co' rnie: 
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Laws have continued to restrict pastoralist access to other grazing areas. For example 
the constitution of Uganda restricts Karimojong access to water and grazing and their 
customary rights are not legally recognized. The Natural Environment Statute No.4 of 
1995 that regulates the use and management of wetlands does not contain any 
provision regarding this issue. Furthermore, local governments prohibited their 
entrance to other districts using the argument of the insecurity caused by the 
Karimoj ong herders. The result is the confinement of herds in fertile areas around the 
mountains in Karamoja that are also used by Karimojong agriculturalists, protected by 
environmental conservation policies and recently targeted by private investors for 
ranching, cotton growing and mineral prospecting. 98 
In Samburu, there were attempts by the colonial government to deprive the 
pastoralists of the Leroki plateau, their most reliable grazing zone. Some land has 
today remained alienated for ranching and farming. The drive from Maralal to 
Baragoi is flanked by beautiful large European farms. However there were moves 
made by the post-colonial government to address the needs of the pastoralists for 
land99 . 
The European farms in Kenya's Rift valley were acquired by alienation during the 
colonial period. Before the British administration made Kenya a British colony in 
1889, the Maasai roamed the rich plains of Laikipia, coexisting with wild animals' °° . 
On two occasions 1904 and 1911, the Masai were moved from their lands to create 
room for British settlers after signing separate treaties (Anglo-Maasai) to move the 
community. 
Some of the movement was done through treaties signed between local chiefs 
and Sir Percy Girouard; some by marching the population of entire villages 
98  Interviews David Abaho and Andrew Orgoma, Uganda Wildlife Authority 27 January 2003; Also 
Rafi Atthiyou, Secretary of the District Investment Committee (DIC) Nakapiripirit. Local papers in 
Uganda in September-October 2004 indicated that land has already been given to Libyan investors. 
99 Were and Ssennyonga 1986 
°° See Mkutu 2001 op cit. 
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away fi'om their most fertile lands in Laikipia and Rift Valley at gunpoint in 
exercisenow known as the Maasai Moves' 01 . 
Sir Charles Elliot, commissioner of the Protectorate argued, 
I cannot adm4 that wandering tribes have a right to keep other superior races 
out of large tracts of land merely because they have acquired the habit of 
struggling over more land than they can utilise 102 . 
The agreements gave the British rights to use land traditionally occupied by the 
Masai.' °3 The agreements signed by the colonial regime state that the Maasai would 
cease ownership of areas located next to the Kenya-Uganda border and leave it for 
exploitation by the colonialists. Since then, African commercial farmers have also 
alienated more land in the area. The agreements, "signed" 100 years ago, with the 
Maasai in terms of which the latter handed over their land to the British and now 
taken over by the elite Kenyans, were clearly immoral and fraudulent. An illiterate 
Maasai Chief lacked contracting capacity in law. 
Since that time, ranchers, local investors and private landowners have acquired vast 
tracts of land, with'grabbing' by the governing elite and aristocrats. 104 This has 
reduced the land available to the Masai, and other pastoralists for grazing and access 
to water. 105 As I drove from Rumuruti towards Sunguta, I saw enclaves of white 
farmer ranches on both sides of the road, electrically fenced. I wondered whether I 
was truly still in Kenya. At the same time the Samburu and the Maasai people are 
squeezed into reserves inadequate to sustain their animals in dry weather. 
Interviews in September 2002 noted that some of the large ranches were on sale. 
101 Kenya Land commission 1933-34 "The Masai Province: Some observations on the Agreements of 
1904 and 1911 and their effects. 
102 Kenya Land Commission 1933-34 Part II: Chapter 1:185, paragraph 635 and 642 
103 See Kenya Land commission 1933-34 
104 See Ivlkutu 2001 
105 See Memorandum "The Pokot Land Claims in Trans Nzoia District (1895-2002). Also Karamoja 
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While European farmers own most of the ranches, some prominent Kenyan 
personalities' 06 also possess them. This brings into the Laikipia question not a racial 
issue but a class issue, which demands more research. 107 
Leys writing in the 1970s in Underdevelopment in Kenya noted a new breed of 
ranchers referred to as 'telephone farmers' because they were said not to be very much 
involved in the actual digging and planting' 08 . Over time, the ranchers have been able 
to build boreholes and hence have plenty of water as opposed to pastoralists who have 
to migrate during the dry season. With the alienation of more land traditional 
migration routes are interrupted and given that pastoralists depend on free movement 
for their animals, especially during drought, conflict was inevitable. 
Ole Ntimama (2000), discussed the issue of returning land to the Maasai people: 
If you look at the Kenya today, the people of central Province lost only small 
areas of land like Thika, Kabete, Kikuyu. They have already recovered them 
and settled on them. I don't know what compensation they would be looking 
for. The Kambas have got part of the east Athi River.... most of them are 
occupying those areas. But we (Masai) haven't got anything back. Nobody 
has considered us and this is because we have always been in the periphery 
and not near power like everybody else.' °9 
Ntimama is half Masai, and therefore care must be taken in interpreting whose 
interests he represents. He has been in Parliament for years but has failed to 
consistently represent their 
106 Some of the prominent Kenyans with ranches in Laikipia include: Former President Daniel Arap 
Moi, owns the Eland Downs ranch which is 17, 000 acres, Francis Ole Kaparo, Kenya House Speaker 
and MP, Simon Nyachae, MP has 8,000 acres Manyangalo farm, other ipàlude Njenga Karume. 
107 See Kenya Times 18 August 2004 "resolving the underlying issues in Laikipia land conflict 
"http://kentimes.comll 8augO4/nwsstoiy/opinion 1 .html 
108 Leys 1975 
109 See East African Stafrd 18 May 2000 "Why I crusade for the indigenous land rights". Ole 
Ntimama is a former minister and currently a member of parliament. 
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In 2002 the Organisation for Survival of the Lilaikipiak Group Initiatives (Osiligi) 
presented petitions to the constitutions of Kenya Constitutional Review Commission 
with some claims. 1 " Osiligi wanted the government to ensure that the lands revert to 
the Maasai as stated in the 1904 agreement. In an interview, Legei, a programme 
officer with Osiligi argued that the 1904 and 1911 agreements were "fraudulent in the 
first place and registration of title deeds should be challenged in law." 2 
Ole Kaunga noted that: "the current buyer principle is unacceptable to the Masai and 
other marginalized groups because it is discriminatory." 13 The Maasai Land 
Agreement of 1904 expires in 2004. Appendix IV of the agreement reads in part; "we 
the Masai would, however, ask that the agreement now arrived at shall be enduring as 
long as the Maasai as a race shall exist". Mr. Powyse, a leading large- scale farmer 
and chairman of the vocal Laikipia Wildlife Forum, argues that the call by Osiligi for 
the abolition of title deeds is a recipe for chaos." 4 
On 13 th August 2004, the Masai marched at the British High commission in Nairobi, 
demanding back their land" 5 . Further to this, recent reports indicate that the 
pastoralists decided to invade the ranches and several of them have been charged in 
court for invading private lands." 6 However, one issue that must be addressed when 
examining the Laikipia conflict is the African commercial ranchers that have also 
grabbed land in Laikipia, otherwise this is understood as simply a 'racial'/ethnic 
question. What seems to be happening is that the African commercial 
110 Care must be taken to differentiate between the elite pastoralists and the poor voiceless pastoralists. 
111 See Observer 8 February 2004 "Fight for the Forbidden Land". 
112 Kaipai, Ole Legei, James, Interview, Dol Dol, 2 September 2002 
113 The current buy principal rests on willing buyer seller principal. Most of the land in Laikipia owned 
by pastoralists is cpmmunal land ownership, though a few Maasai's that were educated early managed 
to get individual ownership. 
114 Prof Ruth Oniang'o (nominated KANU MP) recently wanted to know in parliament when the leases 
would expire. See Daily Nation 29 July, 2004 "Private land 'will not be taken back! 
115 See Daily Nation 14 August 2004 "Masai demand ancestral land" Kenya Times 15 August 2004. 
htt2://www.kentimes.coml15augo4/nwsstory/news8.html; See also East African Standard 14 August, 
2004 "Masai Demand 'their' land from British ranchers 
http://www.eastandard.net/headlines/newsl408O42  I .htm 
116 Daily Nation 24 August 2004 "50 Charged over land invasion" 
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ranchers/farmers are very happy to see opprobrium directed at the 'white' farmers. If 
the British/white farmers were to be persuaded to leave (say with British government 
financial support), then this would clearly leave a space for African commercial 
ranchers (rather than the Maasai ordinary folk) to move into. The Kenya "elitists" 
class is quite pleased to let the Masai make the space for them, even violently. The 
Laikipia ranches conflict seems more clearly appear as one of opposing class interests 
(pastoralist subsistence vs. commerciallcapitalist interests) whereas now this is 
obscured by the competition between capitalists (African/British). 
The section on scarcity earlier in the chapter noted the conflict between the Laikipia 
ranchers and Masai and other pastoralists. During the time of research in the field, 
interviews with elders in Dol Dol revealed that the cause of the crisis was not just 
drought. Ewaso Nyiro River and its tributaries are vital to the pastoralists in the 
various districts of Kenya." 7 The source is in the Aberdares Mountains, while its 
tributaries emerge from Mt. Kenya. There are four major economic activities in 
Laikipia district; commercial farming, traditional cultivation, pastoralism and 
ranching all competing for land and water. In Laikipia at present' 18 nearly 38-40 
commercial ranchers and commercial farmers own 70% of the land, 119 the farms 
range from 60 acres upwards amounting a total of 6260 square kilometres' 20 . 
The water needs of the commercial farmers have increased over the past seven years, 
as Laikipia has become one of the areas where large-scile horticultural companies 
have also alienated land and rely on irrigation. The high demand for water affects 
pastoralist communities downstream who compete for the dwindling Ewaso Nyiro 
River. The excessive cotisumption of water from the river by large companies 
117 This are; Isiolo, Laikipia, Samburu, Garrissa. 
118 Do! Dol (Mukogodo division) occupies just (1,100 sq. km ) of Laikipia district (app. 10,000 sq. 
Km) in the RitT Valley of Kenya. 
"9 Muriithi, District Livestock researeh officer, Interview, Nanyuki, 4 September 2002. Also District 
Officer, interview, Nanyuki, 4 September2003. 
120 See Mkutu 2001 
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rendered the "river of God" dry. This was the argument of the pastoralists, though it is 
disputable. 
Without it, pastoralists will not sprive; hence they do whatever they can to get 
pasture and water. The way ranches upstream consume the water, to the detriment of 
those downstream water, is an issue needing a regulatory framework. The competition 
for these diminishing resources ignites pastoral conflict. There is a high risk of 
conflict unless arrangements are made to ensure access during droughts. 
3.3.4 Agriculture- Pastoralism Interface 
Policy makers have always preferred agriculture as an economic activity to 
pastoralism. In 1914, C.M. Dobbs, the Nyanza Provincial Commissioner (PC), spelt 
out the policy of discouraging pastoralism; 
The best interests of the natives are served when they are practically 
compelled to take to mixed agriculture. Among all African tribes excessive 
pastoral proclivities influence nomadic or unsettled conditions in their life.' 2 ' 
The then Governor of Kenya, Belfield, strongly agreed with Dobbs: 
I deprecate in the strongest possible way the suggestion that pernicious 
pastoral proclivities should be encouraged by the grant of any right for grazing 
purposes. My policy is to discourage these proclivities by every legitimate 
means, not only because they are productive of nomadic tendencies but also 
because they inculcate in the minds of people distaste for any settled 
industry.' 22 
Throughout the colonial period and in the postcolonial period up to 1970-1, the 
governments of Kenya and Uganda were mainly concerned with growth in agriculture 
121 See Kenya Land Commission, 1933-34, Van Zwanenberg and King, 1975: 92. 
122 Ibid. 
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for marketing.' 23 This denied any resources for the development of pastoral areas. The 
government's first aim was to 'pacify' the semi nomadic peoples and then merely to 
maintain law and order. 124 
Most of the pastoral areas were 'closed districts' and the maintenance of order 
remained the major goal of colonial government officials. The best hope was to 
transform pastoralists into agriculturists, which would be simple to manage.' 25 From 
the 1950s, the colonial governments in Kenya and Uganda sought to introduce private 
land tenure. The 1954 Swynnerton Plan introduced the concept of title deeds in 
Kenya. There were efforts to integrate pastoralists into the new system through 
creating 'group ranches 126 .' Private group title gave security to these groups but also 
circumscribed their ability to access pasture and other resources outside the group 
ranch. 
As pressure on land has increased in the "fertile" parts of North East Africa, and and 
semi and lands (ASAL) have become the focus for agricultural expansion. 127 in 
Kenya, 24 districts lie at least partially within this area and comprise 80 percent of the 
total area of Kenya, with approximately 25% of human population and over 50% of 
the country's livestock population.' 28 
In Uganda and areas cover nearly 43% of the total land area, with a population of 
nearly 6.6 millions. These areas are spread over several districts. The colonial 
government gazetted (government sanctioned) 25% of this land as protected areas or 
123 See Van Zwanenberg and Kiiig, (1975: 87) 
124 ibid. 
125 In order for Sir Charles Eliot the first Consular -Commissioner General to obtain the acquiescence 
of the African tribes to accept the protection rule, between 1900-1908 a series of military expeditions 
were undertaken against recalcitrant tribes: expedition against the Nandi in 1901, 1905 and 1906 
against the Kipsigisi in 1906. And the Masai were completely moved from their lands 1904 and 1911 
agreements and moved into reserves destroying the entire pastoral life. 
126 terview with elder Matunge noted that in Dol Dol unlike elsewhere in Kenya only a few people 
managed to get title deeds for group ranches, until recently. 
127 While, defmitions vary, Arid and Semi and lands are areas that get too little rainfall for cultivation. 
128 See Government of Kenya 2002:41: see also Government of Kenya 2001: 35, which notes that value 
of the livestock base in the and and semi and lands is estimated at about KSh.70 billion. 
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'wildlife reserves' 129 The most recent strategic meeting in Karamoja noted that 
according to government policy, the Karimojong do not have land (Karamoja 
Strategic Workshop, 2002). This is because the entire Karamoja green belts are 
gazetted. 
During field research, interviews revealed that large-scale agricultural capitalists from 
Libyan and Italian investors had identified Nakapiripit as a potential area for 
investment. They requested the allocation of land to invest in agriculture, (sunflower, 
sim-sim and ranching). Honourable Lokeris, Minister for Karamoja informed the 
researcher that Karamoja MPs are currently advocating for the degazetting of the 
Pian-Upe Wildlife Reserves. He argued: "the land should be given to the African 
International Company, the rationale being that it would create local employment." 30 
However, a letter from the office of the Minister for State of Tourism and Wildlife 
and Antiquities argued that the ministry felt that the Pian-Upe wildlife reserve should 
remain an environmental protected area. 131 Apparently, the Pian-Upe wildlife 
reserve was created in 1965 with the unofficial understanding that the Pian would be 
allowed to graze their cattle within the reserve in critical times. Pian-Upe wildlife 
reserve constitutes about 80% of their grazing area, providing potential grazing for 
20,000 cattle. The excision, which commenced in the 1950s, has taken up huge tracts 
of land and crucial sources of water. 
For the last three decades, the population of Kenya has grown from 6 million to nearly 
30 million'32. Between 1967 and 1979 districts such as Laikipia, Samburu, Kajiado 
and Narok in Kenya (all pastoralist areas), experienced annual population growths of 
respectively 7.3, 5.6 and 5.3 percent 133 . Between 1979 and 1989 the same districts 
129 Mamdani et al, 1992; Mugwera-Kisemba, 2001 
130 Honourable Lokeris, Peter, Minister for Karamoja, Kampala.21 January, 2003 
131 See letter Reference WC230/240/0 I of 7 November addressed to The Chairman LCV Nakapiripirit 
from office of Minister of state for Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities. 
132 Housing and Population Census 1999 
133 Govermnent of Kenya, 1969 and 1979 population and housing census 
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experienced annual population growth of respectively 5.0, 5.7. and 66 percent' 34 
based on migration not expansion. African subsistence and commercial agricultural 
farmers from the densely populated areas are now buying land in pastoral areas made 
available by the liberalisation of the land market. This forces pastoralists to graze their 
livestock on an ever-shrinking range of inferior quality land resulting in tension and 
conflict. 
For decades, Sedentarisation has been preferred to pastoralism by both the colonial 
and postcolonial regimes. In both countries (Kenya and Uganda), privately owned 
ranches such as the Ankole/Masak ranching scheme in Uganda and in Kachiliba areas 
of Kenya were created. The changes reduced the pastoral areas available for herding 
cattle, and became a source of conflict, within cattle grazing areas and with 
neighbouring districts.' 35 
However, due to insecurity and the high risks involved in pastoralism, many 
pastoralists are turning to crop farming. In Teso, Uganda, cattle raids from the 
Karamoja are resulting in the Iteso are becoming crop farmers. 
3.3.5 Changçs in Intergenerational System 
Elders and Diviners 
Many pastoral writers are' arguing elders have lost their power, see for example 
Hendrickson (1999), Masinde et al 2004. This is an incorrect assumption in most 
pastoral groups. Interviews with several elders and unity members in Moroto, 
Nakapiripit (Karamoja) Uganda, Male, Iachili'ba and Kapenguria (West Pokot), 
Baragoi (Samburu) revealed that they still possess considerable power.' 36 Pokot and 
134 SeeGovemment of Kenya 1979,1989 Population and Housing census 
' 35 Ibid:6 
136 Wjors raid and share the loot with the elders while sme elders like The diviners bless the youth. 
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Hogg pointed out that the role of the elders has been affected by the fact that youth 
are now educated and able to operate in a different kind of arena. Elders can no longer 
operate the kind of sanctions they once could 140 . 
In conclusion, the elders' powers originate from the control of access to resources and 
marital rights, they have access to networks that go beyond the clan and ethnic 
boundaries. In addition they possess supernatural powers reinforced by superstition 
and witchcraft. Finally they work as courts with broad and flexible powers to interpret 
evidence, impose judgements and manage the process of reconciliation 141 . 
The role of diviners is also changing. Dr. Hogg, informed me; 
There is insufficient literature on the role of emuron in providing the 
incentives for the young men to go raiding or giving them animistic security 
during raids. It is easy for that relationship to become corrupted in this 
modem day. There is a tendency for it to become a pecuniary type of 
relationship where young men and militias are being used as a way of getting 
money and livestock. Thus the whole commercialisation of the conflict area 
and the role of the emuron has become corrupted.'42 
Alliances made by elders and diviners are acquired for protection, or to add resources 
to the community through retribution. These undefined predictable and sometimes 
unpredictable alliances are "a real source of insecurity" complicating pastoral 
conflicts and making them more lethal. They are vital in determining the move of 
small arms, stolen cattle and ammunition across the borders. Unlike the past, this 
internally regulated conflict alliance is on the increase. It could be attributed to the 
scarce resources competition, increase in raids and also increase in population as 
compared to the past. 
140 Interview, Hogg, Nairobi, October 2002, 
141 See Mkutu 200 1,2003 also see Masinde et al. 
' 42 ibid. 
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Youth 
The role of young pastoralists is changing. In Baragoi, Mukogodo, Alale and 
Karamoja, it was revealed that young men are involved in violent cattle rustling and 
banditry because their livelihood is under threat due a general scarcity of livestock.' 43 
Councillor John Lomering concurred and noted; 
They are the raiders. They are the ones who raid, stealing in order to survive. 
Old men do not do it 144 . Today, due to raiding and famine, livestock is 
diminishing; the youth are idle with nothing to do.'45 
Previously, pastoralism was a full time occupation for all (Odegi-Awuondo, 1990:33). 
Division of labour was by age and sex, and there were no known idlers. Males were 
most economically productive when they were youthful, energetic and agile and could 
move fast and far over the difficult terrain as herders, scouts and warriors. Now, as 
Hogg informed me: 
Employment in pastoral areas is complicated because you are not talking 
about formal employment. For young men, there is increasingly the issue of 
having gone through some minimal schooling and not being able to be 
absorbed in the pastoral sectors. Where do they go? Many df them have gone 
to look for employment in major urban areas as watchmen.' 46 They cannot 
find anything that can gainfully employ them locally so they work as 
watchmen and remit money back and that keeps the local economy going. As 
regards to conflict, suddenly you have a lot of young men who do not have 
anything to do because the traditional avenue is closed. Livestock economy is 
143 Paramount Chief Narenga, Joseph, of Samburu Interview, Baragoi, 21 August, 2002 
144 This is clearly nottruQ as the eWers do snmetimes order the youths to raid. 
145 Counsellor Lemoyine, John, Interview, South Hoff, 22 August 2001. 
146 	Borana are employed as watchmen. 
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not as booming as it used to be, so not absorbing as many young men; the 
nature of herding has changed, as money is a factor; yet these young men 
cannot be absorbed in the 6conomy. What do these young men do? Formal 
sector is small. Therefore, the young men will look for other alternatives and 
many of them are now being involved in banditry.' 47 
Osamba (2000), talking about the pastoral youth in Turkana argues that they are 
available and ready for mobilisation offering service to the highest bidder. 
More "unemployed" youth will join raids; others will be forced to become 
bandits on the roads. The youth are becoming more involved in violent 
occupations, with the cattle diminishing 148 ; they are playing a major role in the 
system of racketeering and are easily manipulated to join militia groups. They 
are the principal perpetrators of violence in the pastoral regions and with the 
population on the rise, violence in the region is bound to increase as illustrated 
in the role they played in the 1992 and 1997 Rift valley clashes in Kenya. 149 
Youth is a period of great emotional, physical and psychological stress through which, 
in pastoral areas, there is no safe passage. Most of the  adolescents have been 
domiriited by war and the relationship between youth and te adult has not adapted 
adequtely' 50 . In addition young men in pastoral settings weTe obliged to be violent 
to protect caqie and people, to raid (defence/offence). Suçl yiqince had customary 
constraints, but those who wield them are no longer officially recognised. Violence is 
therefore 1ss constrained and its impact is greater due to the new technology of small 
arms. 
147 Interview, Dr. Richard Hogg, Nairobi, September, 19, 2002 
148 Most of the raided cattle are spkj in the markets see De De Koning op. cit for Jie 
149 See Report of the Parlianenxwy sele t,co,mmittee to investigate ethnic clashes in Western and other 
parts of Kenya, 1992; Akiwumi report, 2002). 
150 See Chapter 5 
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During fieldwork young people were found chewing khat, 15 ' (a wild drug similar to 
amphetamine) grown on both Mount Napa and Mount Kadam, on the border of 
Uganda. Chronic users develop some degree of psychological dependence; 
depression, anxiety and irritability while longer use may even lead to aggressive 
behaviour among the young people. With no other prescribed role the youth are now 
found to be idling in town centres drinking alcohol and chewing the khat. This is a 
new phenomenon in Karamoja as it is mostly Somalis who are known for this habit. 
In April 2003, three girls from Lia Primary School on the outskirts of Moroto from Jie 
were on their way home when three shepherds decided to shoot them for no reason. 152 
Apparently the shepherds obtained their guns from the warriors, their older brothers. 
This is a horrifying new dimension of the pastoral conflict where now some of the 
under 15 year olds are using arms. Interviews indicate that the youngsters were 
drurk' 53 
Conclusion on Traditional Power Structures 
The elders are still vital to understanding conflict in pastoral areas. Traditional 
governance retains an important part in responding to conflicts. The harmonization of 
administrative/ local councils are a good example of how synergy between traditional 
governance and modern public administration can be achieved which is lacking in the 
entire pastoral area in the North Rift. The erosion of the traditional structures for 
conflict resolution through councils of elders, traditional courts and peer or age-
groups supervision, has rendered pastoralists' ability to control conflict more 
151 Khat is a green literally brownie green leaf of a shrub, which takes five years to reach maturity then 
bearing fully for perhaps 10 years. This drug is indigenous to East Africa and the main active part is 
aipha-aminopropiophenone, cathinone. The effects of the cathinone are related to those of 
amphetamine, which is a stimulant drug. It has a wide range of names like Mirungi in Kiswahili, 
Mairungi in Kikuyu, Miraa by the Meru or Ol-Meraa by the Masai and also the widely used term Chat 
attests to it's widespread use and geographical distribution. 
152 	note interviews January, 2003 Moroto, Uganda 
153 Interview Edision Achia, Moroto 2 October 2004 
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ineffective. Such structures can still be used if indigenous knowledge and culture are 
recognised and respected by modem public adniinistration.' 54 
It is obvious that the pastoral communities in the North Rift are undergoing a major 
transformation in all levels of the society. However, with the weakening of the role of 
elders and the emerging conflict with the young people, life in pastoral communities 
is bound to change. The direct roles of the kraal leaders and diviners and their 
relationship with the warriors could allow them to wield enormous powers. 
3.3.6 Gender Relations Under Growing Tension 
Nowadays, male youth, especially those from poor families, have to raise bride wealth 
by themselves, sometimes through armed cattle raids.' 55 
The Deputy head teacher of Kaala girl school told me: 
The girl is the one that causes the problem of insecurity. The man wants to 
marry and needs the livestock to marry, so he has to go livestock raiding... If a 
woman is not married with cows she is invalid, any man can collect you, and 
women are commodities to trade' 56 
• Data collected from areas of study indicate that bridewealth prices are high in the 
entire North Rift as compared to other non-pastoral communities. This is one of the 
major causes of the persistent raids by warriors. A KISP elder, argued "youths from 
poor families risk their lives by raiding in order to get cattle to pay for their bride 
price." 57 
154 Interview with Father Paul op cit. noted that if you capture the elders, you will have captured 75% 
of the youths. Some of the people thatraid on roads are the elder's sons. 
Paul Interviews, Namalu, 24 January, 2003 
155 See Mkutu 2003:15-16 
156 Rachel Christine Deputy head Kaala girls school Interviews, Amudat, 15 June, 2001 
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Fig 3.3 Bride wealth in terms of Livestock in the Study areas. 
Place and type of Laikipia Masai Samburu Karamoja' 5 Pokot- Kenya 
livestock Dol Dol Baragoi and Uganda 
Mukogodo 
division  
Goats 1-2 3  30 
Cows 10-15 8-15 30-60 1530 159 
(Matheniko, Pian) 
130-160 (Jie)  
Camels - 
Donkeys - 
Sheep 2 
"Gifts" 6° Ksh.4000-5,000 I 0,000ksh 
& shuka (sarong)  
Sources: Interviews, Focus group Discussions, in-depth interviews, field research 2000-2002. Gifts, Sheep, Goats and Camels are 
required in addition to Cows. 
Interviews in Samburu revealed it is not just bridewealth, which ranges from 8-15 
cows, but also, they have to pay fees 161 for the negotiation by elders. This is similar 
among the Masai in Dol Dol Laikipia. The young morans must pay fees if the girl was 
made pregnant and removed from school, which is very common. For the Laikipia 
Masai, it is sufficient to note that the cows paid are few due to the diminished cattle in 
the division.'62 However, the price depends on negotiations. The cows given for the 
bridewealth are not just given to the girl's parents but to others in the image! clan. 
Whilst it is possible to marry without bridewealth it is problematic, as noted by an 
elder: 
You can stay with my daughter, if you get the first child, you pay! You come 
and say I have sinned! You compensate the blood of my daughter. You also 
157 Ichumer, Philip, op cit. 
158 The Karamojong pure refers to Matheniko, Pian and Bokora North-eastern Uganda 
159 Nachap, Christine LC5, Karita, Interview Amudat, 27 January, 2003, confirmed that bride wealth is 
1-30 cows, but the education the lady has attained matters. Learned couples can negotiate for the 
dowry. 
160 thterviews with moran varied. In Mukogodo, Alale (Pokot) the morans complained that they have 
to pay fees especially food for the elders who negotiated. On the side of the women, the morans pay. 
shuka (sarong) as fees. 
161 Focus group interviews with Morans, Bendera, Baragoi 21 August, 2002 
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say thanks! You pay 30 goats or 3 oxen. You stay with the girl and it's up to 
you. When you die the children come back. When it's time for initiation, the 
clan of the mother initiates the children.' 63 
This demonstrates that without bride wealth reproductive capacities of women remain 
with their own lineage. 
Therefore the bridewealth is a very important motivation and pressure to accumulate 
small arms and to go raiding, for the young warriors. The warriors use the small arms 
to raid and acquire the cattle for their own and make money. The youths are 
challenged to develop their own economic base revolving around animals so that they 
may be initiated into adulthood and be in a position of paying for the bridewealth. The 
transfer of wealth at marriage is also important to create alliances with extended 
families. Perhaps a major problem is the breakdown of collective responsibility for 
funding bride wealth. 
3.4 Escalation of the Pastoral Conflict 
The change from customary pastoral conflict, and the inability of the state to contain 
this conflict has led to an escalation. The spate of killings, thefts and destruction of 
property especially cattle rustling seriously escalated from the 1980s.   164 
It is useful to view the conflict at different levels: local, district and internationallcross 
border conflicts. The conflict levels may be analysed separately, but the levels are 
also complexly interrelated. This section describes examples of conflict at these 
different levels. Since the beginning of the 1990s, new factors have become evident in 
this escalation, including the technological change in weaponry, which has in turn 
162 The dominant herds paid in Mukogodo are sheep and goats because of droughts and raiding. 
163 Interview elder Ichumar op cit. 
164 See Muhereza, 1997b 
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allowed the emergence of commercialised cattle raiding for profit, and criminality and 
corruption in pastoral areas. 
3.4.1 Internal conflicts 
Internal conflicts within pastoral communities are very rare. For example the killing 
of a fellow Pokot usually imposes a very high fine on the offender. They have to 
compensate for the killing through "lapai ". The high fine imposed on the offender 
and their family serves as a deterrent. This does not extend to when one kills an 
"enemy" from another tribe such as the Turkana or the Karamojong.' 65 
The first group among the east African pastoralists to raid among themselves are the 
Karamoja pure (Matheniko, Pian and Bokora) from the same clan.' 66 According to 
interviews in Karamoja,' 67 in 1979, after the collapse of Idi Amin's regime, the 
Karimojong broke into the military armouries at Moroto barracks, taking small arms 
and ammunition.' 68 For the first time in their history the Matheniko used arms to 
terrorize their own kin. It was theoretically forbidden for a Karimojong to steal cattle 
belonging to other Karimojong or to fight other Karimojong with spears. A wrong 
(akisec) had to be punished by the elders in local tribunals (akiwo), compensated, or 
avenged. For homicide compensation has always been standardised at 60 heads of 
cattle. 169 
165lnterviews, elders, Male op cit. Also, Nyongesa, John, a victim of Lapai compensation. Interview. 2 
August 2002. 
166 Ichumer, Philip, KISP chairman Namule, Interview Namalu, 19 June, 2001 also confirmed by 
interview Mudongo, Moses, elder apd KISP chairman Moroto, Moroto, 17 June, 2001 
167 Matany, Moroto, Naa1u, Kangole and Amudat 
168 Discussed in chapter 5; 
169 	notes January-February, May and November 2003.  Field 
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Fighting between various Karimojong clans has however continued and in 1989 at 
Lorengdwat 300 people were killed in one such battle between the Matheniko and the 
Bokora who are 'cousins'. 170 
Pazzaglia (1982:77-89: 129-130) writes on division between Karimojong: 
Whereas in the past, the three Karimojong sections, the Maseniko, the Bokora 
and the Pian were united against the common raiding foe, this unity has now 
been destroyed. The sections are quite ready to align themselves with former 
enemies to fight the Pian, the Maseniko against the Bokora, and so on, in 
diverse combinations. Once nigkaitotoi, (brothers) the groups are now ngimoe 
(enemies). It is true that from time to time attempts are made to secure peace, 
but the process of disintegration seems irreversible. 
The fights between cousins implies that cohesion cemented for years by the elders has 
collapsed, though this phenomenon is not really so new when it is related to tribal 
expansion. Karimojong now suffer from an identity crisis. During the field research, 
the researcher learnt that now the Matheniko would rather be called Matheniko 
instead of Karimojong' 71 
3.4.2 District' 72 Level Conflicts between Pastoralists and Other Communities 
Including "Non Pastoralists", Kenya and Uganda. 
Border conflicts take place not only between pastoral communities, but extend to non-
pastoralist societies. The difference between pastoralists and non-pastoralists is that 
they practice mixed farming but also crop production using better equipment like 
° The New Vision (1989). December, Kampala. 
171 While the Pian would rather be called Pian. Apparently the most important ceremony, which 
involves all the Karimojong coming together to a single location, is the ceremony of power transfer 
from senior generation to a junior generation set. This is done at the sacred grounds at the Apule River 
in Matheniko country. However, it has not taken place due to the breakdown in the cohesion of the 
community. 
172 A district is geographical division of the nation state. It is an administrative district with an 
administrative centre. 
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tractors and ox ploughs as an economic activity. The following examples have been 
chosen to illustrate the various district level conflicts. 
Figures 3.4 Selected District levels conflict in the North Rift 
Conflict name Country 
Iteso vs. Karamoja Uganda 
Pokot vs. Marakwet Kenya 
Sam buru vs. Turkana Kenya 
Field interviews 2001-2004 
Karamoja vs. the Teso- Northeast Uganda 
In Uganda, the Karamoja warriors have often attacked the Teso and the Katakwi 
districts, which are completely agricultural districts. The Karamoja-Iteso conflict has 
been going on for the last fifty years. During a field trip, I went through Kumi and 
Katakwi, and noted many round huts in the area. I was told that they housed 
thousands of internally displaced persons (IDP) of the Teso community victims of 
cattle rustling conflict 173 . One of the largest of such camps is now situated in Katakwi. 
Egadu, an NGO official, noted that in the year 2000, the Iteso local council authorities 
of Katakwi and Kumi denied the Karimojong herders access to their pasture. In March 
2000, a joint security committee ordered the Karimojong to leave Katakwi and the 
"Kumi declaration" was issued. Despite this, the cattle raids and resource conflict 
between the Iteso and Karamoja has escalated. This can be illustrated from one 
example (Pian!UPDF): 
On 136 September 2001, at 0 1:30 p.m. a group of 200 Pian raiders from 
Nakapiripirit district, dressed in UPDF fatigues, attacked the Iteso camp of 
Ngariam in Katakwi district. They ran away with 600 head of cattle killing 17 
people, 14 civilians and three soldiers. One group attacked the Local Defence 
Units and confined them in the barracks, the second stole cows that were 
173 See IRIN 3 October 2001 "Turkana accused of raids on Karamoja" 
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grazing and the third went to the camp, and shot indiscriminately, looting 
household properties' 'fl'. 
According to the Anny and individuals interviewed, the attack was not anticipated. 
The raiders came stealthily after dark, killing indiscriminately with no regard to age or 
sex including an 80- year old man and a three-year-old child. The warriors destroyed 
homes, looted personal properties and relief supplies and carried off as much food as 
possible. What remained like, maize porridges, was destroyed by mixing it with sand 
and human urine. 175 
The cause of this indiscriminate massacre was partly ascribed to denial of access tO 
Iteso territory for dry grazing and watering since 2000. An interview with Terrance 
Achia the Local Council 5 of Moroto, noted that when the Karimojong were expelled 
from Katawi, they left behind some of their stock. Hence the attack was maybe an 
attempt to recover their cattle.' 76Another reason was relational. 
They were an annoyance. A Pian from Nabilatuku, had bought a tractor and 
had left it with his Iteso friend. He went to him to take it back. By the time 
Bokora had problems with Iteso, the Iteso refused to return the tractor. 
This was also confirmed in interviews with the chief of Nabilatuku 177 . 
The day following the Ngariam raid, on 10 1 of September, the Iteso took the 
law into their own hands. Nine people (7 Bokora and 2 Iteso) mistaken to be 
Karimojong were killed by an angry mob that barricaded the Katakwi- Moroto 
road in Katakwi town and Ocorimongin cattle market, Eastern Uganda. The 
crowd stopped a bus, dragged them out and killed them; the killings were in 
retaliation for the Ngariam raid. 
174 Interview Romano Longole, Kotido Peace Initiative, Kotido, 2 February, 2003: Also John Bosco, 
Okore, and Karamoja Peace and Environmental Protection Service, Interview, Kotido, 3 February, 
2003 
175 ibid. 
176 Achia, Terrance Local Council 5, Interview Moroto, 30 January 2003. 
177 ibid. 
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Pokot vs. Marakwet 
In Kenya Marakwet neighbours West Pokot, and both speak the Kalenjin language. 
The Marakwet population is fairly settled producing maize, beans, tea, Irish potatoes 
and vegetables; rearing cattle and goats for meat and milk. Sheep is reared for wool 
and meat. Insecurity is high 178  since the 1990s when raids from Pokot have increased. 
The immediate cause of the conflict is competition for the scarce natural resources of 
water and pasture. Pokot is characterized by a very and and semi and environment. 
They are compelled to venture to Marakwet in search of water and pasture. The 
Marakwet see such actions as aggressive and respond by violence. 
Several peace meetings between the Marakwet and the Pokot have not improved the 
situation. The clans who have fallen victim to the Pokot cattle rustlers especially from 
Baringo .east have started to move away from the common borders displacing the 
clans already settled. 
Samburu vs. Trkana Baragoi (Kenya) 
Samburu form 75% of the Samburu district whose inhabitants occupy 90% of thp 
territory. Both Samburu and Turkana tribes occupy Baragoi division with the former 
occupying the eastern part and the latter the west. I saw the road thrming the 
boundary between the Samburu and Turkana. Livestock is the mainstay and patoral 
conflict is not new. 
When either of the communities meets its opponents in the grazing areas or at water 
sources, conflicts arise since these areas are under no authority.. Nothing 
differentiates between Turkana and Samburu. However, since 1996, field research 
indicates that the conflicts are worsening, with Turkana raiding Samburu stock with 
178 See Cappon 2003 
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devastating results. The seriousness of armed cattle rustling in Baragoi can be 
demonstrated by the raid of December 1996, when more than 600-armed warriors 
rustled over ten thousand (10,000) head of cattle and butchered more than fifty 
persons in North Samburu. According to interviews, this raid was revenge for the 
death of fifty Turkana including an assistant chief Julius Nakelo in a similar raid. In 
an interview with the District officer, he noted that once the cattle disappear into the 
Suguta valley, they are gone forever. 
In the ensuing series of battles involving all sections of the Kenyan armed forces, the 
Samburu District Commissioner Mr. James Nyandoro and two security personnel 
were killed when his aircraft was shot down by local bandits taking cover in the 
Suguta Valley. 179 
In April 2000, a gang of 500 armed bandits invaded Baragoi and went away with 
5,000 cattle, camels and donkeys. Five Kenyan armed personnel were hurt, 20 people 
were killed and 100 animals left dead. 180  The latest and most publicized attack 
happened in April 2001, when four workers of an NGO were ambushed and gunned 
down by bandits at Soitokokoyo about 10 kilometres from Baragoi town. 181 
As noted in an interview with Counsellor Thomas Lemogin: 
Cattle rustling started in Baragoi increasingly around 1965. It was started by people 
rumoured to be ngorokos,'82 believed to have come from a neighbouring district. It 
started as stealing but later it grew into sporadic attacks between the Samburu and 
Turkana.' 83 
179 Interviews in Baragoi August 2002 with several people including the paramount chiefs Joseph 
Nareng and Letele for Samburu and Turkana, the area district officer Hussein Noor, civil and religious 
leaders. 
380 t African Standard, 21st, 2000) 
181 Http//www.nationaudio.com/newsfDailyNationlToday/Features/Feature  I .htl 
182 The bandits that fought in the Somali's attempt to try and take parts of North-eastern, Kenya 
183 Counsellor Lemogin,Thomas, South Hoff, 22 August , 2002. Thomas has been a civic leader for 15 
years. 
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3.4.3 Larger Scale Conflicts Transnationalllnternational Borders 
Pastoral conflicts have moved beyond the Kenya/Uganda borders into countries like 
Sudan and Ethiopia. In September 2001, twelve were killed during clashes between 
rival pastoralists on the international borders of Kenya and Uganda. One hundred 
Sudanese Toposa raiders anned with AK47 assault rifles in 2001 attacked Nanam 
village, 80 kilometres northwest of Lokichogio town. Ten Toposa (Sudan) and two 
Turkana (Kenya) herdsmen were killed during a battle lasting more than two hours. 
This happened less than a week after Toposa raiders killed eight Turkana in an attack 
at Kamutia, 160 km from Lokichogio.' 84 
On the border of Kenya and Ethiopia live the Turkana and the Dongiro. These 
groups, with the Ethiopian Merrille and Sudanese Toposa, are pastoralists and have 
common cultures and values. The area under conflict is called the Ilemi tiangle and 
was transferred to Kenya in 1968. It is an area of plain grassland with plenty of good 
pasture. The conflict can be traced from the time of European colonial rule; when the 
government established administration in the area. The Dongiro decided to move to 
the interior. They felt the Turkana had the support of the British colonial government. 
Three conflicts have affected the area, first, the conflict between the Dongiro and the 
Turkana for grazing pasture. The second kind of conflict is over water, and the third 
are indigenous cattle raids, which have escalated to major cattle rustling. The trans 
national border conflicts are bound to continue, given the frequency of droughts in the 
area. 
3.4.4 Recent factors Intensifying Pastoral Conflicts 
New technology in weaponry, and the resulting power that this places in the  hands of 
raiders, has led to a change from the customary raids after droughts Or as inter- 
174 
communal revenge (ajore) to raiding for commercial purposes. Instead of cattle being 
retained for bridewealth and security they are being sold directly to the markets and 
the profits benefiting the individual few. With diminishing cattle and declining 
pastoralist livelihood banditry has emerged amongst the young men, characterised 
mainly by road ambushes making the region extremely insecure and hampering any 
attempts at investment and development. Finally there is the sinister fmding of cattle 
raiding racketeers, who are believed to control groups of warriors, and benefit from he 
conflict and the arms trade. The new dynamics are intensifying pastoral conflicts and 
making conflict resolution mechanisms difficult. 
Commerciajisation of Raids, Technological Change and Pastoral Conflict 
The North Rift pastoralists have traditionally practised iiiding with traditional 
weapons to acquire wealth, for prestige, retaliation, young girls, trophies, bridewealth 
and a desire to claim victims in association with the death of favourite oxen, heroism, 
and some times to get back stolen cattle, land and arms 185 . With the current economic 
realities, and pressures mentioned above, pastoralists have turned raiding into an easy 
option of resourceful commerce. Moni, who has been in the cattle business in 
Karamoja since 1963, informed me: 
Before you even reach the market to sell your cattle, criminals, from either 
Bokora or Matheniko, hijack you on the way. In oklen da's, 
commercialisation of cattle raiding never existed, but now the chief traders 
buy animals from two sources, prominent well-known traders, or homes. The 
chief traders agree with one buyer, which never used to happen. Due to the 
{institutionalisation} of raiding, raiders bring cattle to the markets. If animals 
are raided in one place, they are sold in another market. The high demand for 
cattle does not assist the situation. 186 
184 IRThI (2001). Twelve killed in cattle raid in the Northwest. Nairobi. 
185 Anderson, 2000; Abraham, 1987; Fleisher, 2000, see Mkutu 2001,2003; Egesa and Mkutu, 2000, 
Cappon, 2003; Fukui, 1979 
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A former raider now a local chief in Karamoja interviewed told the researcher: 
The raided cattle are now sold on parallel and hidden markets at a lower price 
and transported to towns like Mbale, Soroti in Uganda and even Kitale, 
Kenya. Some karachunas' 87 do not wait anymore for the blessing of their 
parents and elders who are not informed about their plan 188 . 
Some of the raided cattle are sold directly to markets as observed by a former raider 
"currently there are businessmen who are mounting raids to restock their business' 89". 
In Rupa, the Matheniko karachunas interviewed admitted they were stealing animals 
from the Bokora because of hunger: "if you have nothing to eat, you steal and then you 
sell on the market," they noted it was "easy to steal and divide the money." 90 
It has been said that livestock is the valuable commodity which oils the wheels of 
conflict. 19 ' Thousands of cattle are raided at a time. On April 21, 2000, more than 500 
Pokot armed with AK47s, G3s and Mark 4 rifles attacked two Turkana (kraals) 
manyattas and made away with 5,000. The 11am attack began at Leilei and 
Soitokokoyo manyattas and the exchange of fire lasted for seven hours. The result 
waslO bandits killed, and 5 army personnel critically wounded. During the fighting 
100 animals were also killed and only 3,000 animals were recovered by security 
personnel at Soitokokoyo.' 92 The limited extent of recovery indicates the magnitude 
of the situation. The terrain plays a major role but the question remains, how can such 
large number of cattle move out of a district without the security forces discovering 
where they have gone? Interviews with well-linked community members in Samburu 
claimed that raided animals were used for bridewealth, restocking and survival, but 
additionally it was mentioned that there was a likely possibly of the some of the 
186 Moni, David, Interview Namalu, 25th January 2003. 
187 Karamoja warriors 
188 Former raider, interview Rupa, Uganda February, 2003 
'89 ibid. 
'° Owalinga, op cit. 
191 NCCK/SNV/SARDEP opt cit. see also Kenya Times 19 March 2004 
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raided cattle meat being sold as far away as a way South Africa and Saudi Arabia193 . 
An intelligence officer interviewed argued: 
It is well established that majority of rustled animals, which are dealt with 
commercially, are sold to other passive groups, i.e. animal brokers, who 
dispose of them in established slaughter houses and animal auction centres. 
These places are as far as Dagoretti corner in Nairobi, markets in Western 
Province, i.e. Bumala in Bungoma and the interior of Uganda, implying i Well 
co-ordinated network of transitional business given its high profit margin.' 94 
Similar trends were found in Baragoi in Kenya, where the cattle raided were again 
found in Dagoretti Corner market in Nairobi.' 95 Additionally, at the height of cattle 
rustling in Kenya, Goldsmith (1997:21), notes that one riddle of the security situation 
is that conflict and insecurity rarely disrupt the cattle trade itself. Animals are still 
driven as far as Nairobi on the hoof. There are organised cartels stealing cattle, not to 
pay bridewealth or replenish their wiped stocks, but stealing purely for commercial 
purposes. 196 
Though research has not been done to ascertain the identity of the cattle merchants, it is 
rumoured that they are powerful and well-connected people in authority in Kenya, 
Uganda and the SPLA, who also have access to weapons. One of the customs officers 
affirmed that lorries have crossed the Kenya-Uganda border several times carrying 
cattle197 . In research done in Baragoi, Samburu District of Kenya, it was revealed by the 
community that raided cattle had been seen transporting them in lorries. 198 This is 
192 	African Standard 21 April 2000 
193 Field notes 2002 
194 CID officer, interview. Also see Hansard (1996:2315). The MP for Samburu Leshore told the 
Speaker of the house that Turkana had stolen 2,000 cattle since August 1996; another 11 raids had 
taken place since. More work needs to be done on the sources of the cheap meat currently sold in 
Nairobi and Kampala and some of the rural areas in Kenya and Uganda 
195 Mkutu, 2000 based on fieldwork and interviews done in Sambura. 
196 Ouko opt cit. 
197 Example see Nyaba, 2003; 
198 Ibid. 
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validated by a statement by President of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki in October 1996, in 
Parliament: 
We have kept records over the last six months of at least five, six and seven 
instances, of cattle rustling where cattle was taken from one part of Kenya, 
whichever district, and the number of the cattle was identified and in once 
case, it was 2,000, and another case, it was 3,000 or 4,000. The Police 
established the direction the livestock was driven... in some places we are told 
the police used helicopters. Obviously, trying to track the livestock. For five 
days, they clearly established where the livestock went. They definitely did 
and the police know... when that livestock is driven from one part of Kenya 
to another, lorries transport it. It is sold to butcheries in Kenya. It is not 
exported out of Kenya. So, the police officers know that many of these thieves 
are protected. 199 
In 1999, a Provincial Commissioner for Rift Valley in Kenya was questioned about the 
commercialisation of cattle raiding. He replied: 
I wouldn't want to comn1t myself on that. I canflot say no, but neither can I say 
it is there. This is the ñrst time I'm hearing abo -4t it. But it certainly needs 
investigaring.200 However, he admitted, 'There were some tra4ers  who want to 
obtain aninals cheaply. So, itead of buying a cow legitimately for say Kenya 
shillingl5, 000 (€157), they bjiy a s9lçn qiç for Kenya Shillings 10,000 (€105) 
or even less'.20 ' 
Cheere, an ex raider and currently the chief of Rupa in Moroto Karamoja gave me the 
story of Keete, who originates from Bokora. Keete owned a business and would raid 
with the warriors. After raiding, he would buy all the cattle from the warriors. He 
199ply Hansard 24 October, 1996:2334. 
200 Dj1y Nation 20 July, 1929 
201 ibia 
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would then sell the cattle and use the money to fill his shop. Cheere noted that 
currently there are businessmen who are mounting raids to restock their business 202 . 
The financing of raids originates from the urban areas, where the rich merchants in 
collaboration with some people at the local level organise the raids in rural areas. The 
merchants then organise to get the markets in urban areas. The current migration from 
rural to urban centres in Kenya and Uganda has led to the gradual depopulation of 
rural areas by people gravitating towards urban centres. The result is the increase in 
demand for nyama choma (roasted meat) from townspeople, implying raiding as a 
commercial activity is increasing in line with the rising demands. The 
commercialisation and intensification of stock raids can be largely linked to the 
mushrooming markets for livestock and the proliferation of small arms. 
With the local economy in complete shambles and the entire border awash with small 
arms, and the absence of a regulatory body there is a shift towards the militarization 
of economic relations and the weaponization of the entire region. It is proving more 
dangerous to end cattle raids because of their organised nature. Those who benefit 
and whose interests and purposes are well served by the raids complicate the search 
for a solution. 
In 2003 mobile phones were introduced in Karamoja. With the use of mobiles the 
commercialised pastoral conflict could escalate, as mobiles could assist in 
coordinating activities and sales. 
The current ongoing peace process for Sudan in Nairobi promises two developments. 
Firstly, the formally planned pan-African road from Mombasa to Southern Sudan, 
though to West Africa completed. Secondly, the construction of the Nakuru, Kenya to 
Southern Sudan railway line, which has already been negotiated by a German 
company. If nothing is done to check the current security situation, commercialisation 
202 Field Notes Cheere, James, Ahitania Interview, Rupa, January, 2003 
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of cattle raids could increase assisted by the new routes, with lorry loads of raided 
cattle leaving the region. 
Banditry and Pastoral Conflict 
Insecurity in North Rift remains one of the most intractable problems in east Africa. 
Armed bandits continue to terrorise civilians and, sometimes even military personnel. 
Banditry is occasioned by conflict over cattle, and in many cases, helpless civilians who 
do not even own herds are targeted. Assaults on vehicles started with the killing of a 
World Food Programme (WFP) official by Karimojong demobilised soldiers in 1985.203 
Pastoral youth spend most of their time looking after the cattle before getting married. 
Interviews in Samburu revealed that the youth previously took care of the cattle (cattle 
economy) but as increased raiding has depleted the community herd they are finding 
themselves idle and join so-called cattle gangs. The arms are not just used in raids any 
more, now they are used in banditry especially on roads. Similar fmdings were noted in 
Karamoja. 
In Kotido since January 2000, a total of 15 victims died in 20 different incidents. 204 
During the field study, some roads were impassable due to bandits. As noted by Father 
Bosco: 
You can walk day and night in Pokot, all roads are safe, but once you join the 
Nakapiripirit—Moroto road, then your heart is divided. At any time expect a 
bullet to sound. The Kenyan side, none will shoot you.205 
The dhjiiriishing of cattle through raids seems to be forcing the warriors to target. 
innocent car travellers on roads as a means to survive. NGOs at present are advising 
203 See chapter 6 for impact of small arms. 
204 Mr. Dradringa, Dani,.former Resident COmmissioner, Kotido District, Interview, Jinja, 12th  
November 2001. 
205 Father Bosco, in charge catholic diocese Amudat and victim of road banditry, Interview, Amudat, 
27th January 2003. 
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their staff to avoid the Nakapiripirit-Moroto road, Moroto-Kotido road, and Moroto-
Katakwi road, due to the incidents of banditry and other forms of aggression 
frequently experienced on these routes 206 . The impact of this increasing trend of 
banditry is explored in chapter 6. 
Racketeers 
Some businessmen and traders involved in cattle raiding in the North Rift are taking 
some of the characteristics of racketeers. Some African scholars (Ocan, 1 992;Olaka-
Oyango, 1993:17; Muhereza, 1997ab;) have borrowed the term 'warlords' to equate 
them to these racketeers as they are making profits from the conflicts. Mirzeler and 
Young also used the same concept (2000) without attempting a hypothetical 
justification. Evidence suggests that the commercial cattle trader, the arms merchant 
and the 'warlord' are increasingly one and the same person. 207 
The competition for diminishing resources and the introduction of small arms is 
slowly introducing new players in the pastoral areas and especially on the border of 
Kenya and Uganda; these are cattle racketeers or "warlords'. Warlordism is a 
pejorative expression, evoking brutality, racketeering and the suffering of civil 
communities. Duffield (1997) defines a warlord: 
A leader of an armed band, possibly numbering up to several thousand 
fighters, exercising political control through coercion, who can hold territory 
locally and, at the same time, act financially and politically in the international 
system without interference from the state in which he is based. 
Jackson (2003: 137-138) notes that warlords: "appear when there has been a 
catastrophic collapse in centralised power, internal structure and norms, either at a 
206 Field notes Sept 2004 
207 See Daily Monitor, 20 February, 20, 2002 "Bullets, Not Guns are the problem in Karamoja 
ammunition brought all the way from Congo to be sold in Karamoja; see Mirzeler and Young 
2000;Kenya Times, 19 March 2004 "Enters MAPOTU", what next in Cattle Raids saga." Daily Nation 
6 March 2003 "Four KANU MPs blame their party for banditry"; Daily Nation 24 March 2003 
"Politicians funded rustling, say MP. 
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state or imperial level." They "fight for wealth and position, exploiting personal 
relationships and their access to arms." Hill observes that; 
In the 20th century, warldrd has been used to describe a man who is over lord 
of a particular group or geographical area by virtue of his control over some 
form of significant conventional military power obeying no higher authority 
than himself'. The main difference between the use of the term in the 1960s   
and its application in the 1990s   lie  in the scale of the activities so labelled, the 
weapons used, and the degree of international awareness (1997:36). 
Many North Rift208 authors associate commercial raiding with the emergence of 
Karimojong racketeers who control the cattle camps (kraal leaders) and order cattle 
raids without the approval of elders and challenging their authority through military 
strength.209 Interviews with Cheere a former raider, informed me that most of the 
warlords/racketeers trace their origin to the army, active raids or trade. 21° 
In chapter two, various levels of warlordism were provided. In the North Rift we find 
the level of warlords who are not highly organised, and do not control large territories. 
They use local resources (cattle) and tax local communities to survive and have not 
developed the international links of the first category. The best examples are Kony of 
the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda (Jackson, 2002) and the 
Somali warlords. Chapter two also mentions a lower level of warlord, or racketeer, 
including the businessman, kraal leaders, politicians, and traders making profit from a 
localised communal conflict economy. There are many of these in the North Rift. The 
activity is linked with an increase in banditry in that the average warrior who is 
sometimes employed by the big time racketeer in his raiding business uses his weapon 
to tax the local economy (road banditry) as part of his survival, since he is not 
normally paid. 21 ' 
208 	 in Karamoja, North East Uganda.  Especially 
209 Ocan, 1992, Oloka-Onyano et al., 1993:17; Mirzeler and Young, 2001. 
210Cliief Chere, James, Inteiwiew, Rupa, 1 February, 2003 
211 Especially on the borders of Northern, and North-western Kenya, North-eastern Uganda. Tanzania 
borders and even in West Africa Ghana borders with Cameroon, Chad etc. 
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Frequent fighting along the Kenya-Uganda border area has slowly brought about the 
development of these racketeers. Challenges to both states' monopoly of coercion and 
violence are evident in the privatisation of violence by the emergence of these groups 
for the purposes of predatory accumulation (Osamba, 2000).212  The racketeers have 
the capability to recruit or draft people for campaigns such as raids on property, 
resources and territory. 213 The continuum below illustrates where they appear to fail. 
Fig 3.5 The different tiers of security in the Horn 
Various tiers of Formal sector in Informal sector in 
security security services (FSSS) security service 
monitors  
Regional Peace-keeping forces GuerillafRebel 
alliances 
National State- owned armed Rebels and Militias 
forces  
State/local Para-military and police Militias and warlords 
forces  
Community Vigilantes/home guards! Warriors 
Kenya police reserves 
In his work on the Turkana of Kenya, Osamba (2000) uses the term 'warlords' to 
describe wealthy men who control raiding in the region: 
They appear to be the wealthiest among the Turkana and the Pokot and control 
all aspects of social and economical life, and even the political orientation of 
the people. 
Evidence from three kraal camps visited in Karamoja in Juhe 2001 and in the cross 
border areas of Alale (2002) in January and February, 2003 strongly indicated that 
some of the kraal leaders are racketeers, commanding large numbers of warriors and 
takthg large hutribers of raided cattle for themselves, not distributing it in the 
212 Oinrfiba ddes not provide the rational for his use of the terminology of warlords in North-western, 
Kenya. As noted, a big difference exists between a warlord in North Western Kenya, Somalia, West 
Africa and d'en in D1C. The term warlord is also a contested term. 
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community. However it is not true that they are the only wealthy people. One kraal 
leader visited had 300 warriors taking care of 3,000 cattle. He also had camels, which 
in an interview he indicated were raided in Turkana, Kenya. Another kraal leader 
visited, believed to be one of the most powerful racketeers, had 600 armed young 
warriors under him. Interviews as far as Kapenguria indicated that he got his wealth 
from raiding. 
Further evidence from the field indicated that a number of army soldiers who fought 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) came from the cross border areas of 
West Pokot and Karamoja. These men have become racketeers through raiding and 
are now employing and training young warriors. 214 A young wealthy racketeer 
interviewed had this to say. 
After all my cattle were raided, I acquired a gun, joined one of the raiding 
groups. After going raiding 4 times, I managed to acquire cattle; I now 
stopped raiding and am employing 4 warriors to take care of my raided 
cattle215 . 
In one of the countries, border security discovered raided grade cattle from Kenya in 
the home of a wealthy and prominent man. However the man could not be prosecuted 
due to being "above the law"216 . 
Racketeers within Karamoja and in other pastoral areas within the Kenya-Uganda 
border region pose a significant threat to any kind of peace and stability. As long as 
they exist, cattle raiding will not cease and neither will the use of firearms. The 
positive factor keeping the situation from escalating is that pastoral groups have no 
permanent dwelling, but migrate from place to place, hence it is difficult to organise 
213 Note should be taken that the cross border 'warlords' are not big time like those in Somalia, but they 
have power locally. 
214 More work needs to be done on the link between former army personnel who fought in the DRC for 
Uganda, in the involvement in the framing of youths on the cross bordet ai'eas. The issue was 
mentioned several times including by senior government officers in both Kenya and Uganda. 
215 A former warrior Interview Amudat, June 2001. He is now wealthy cattle owner- and racketeer. 
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them into a resistance group. The racketeers do not control any territory but are 
mainly localised though some of the pastoralists question their existence. 
The racketeers are still emerging in the North Rift, where most funds needed for 
development are redirected to security. They are also contributing to the development 
of the trans-national sale of small arms. It is important to note that with political will 
and good governance of the security sector, the racketeers in the North Rift are easy to 
deal with. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 3 has addressed the way of life of pastoralists and the reasons for customary 
pastoral conflict. Pastoralists have always been involved in conflict, as they sought to 
survive in their harsh environments of drought and disease. As well as livestock 
raiding, they formed relationships with neighbouring ethnic groups, both pastoral and 
settled. State initiated changes, which have disrupted these survival mechanisms, have 
included divisive borders, land alienation to settlers and political and economic 
marginalization. Cattle keeping is a way of life, with numbers of cattle defining 
wealth and status, such that raiding takes also place for revenge, honour, marriage and 
prestige. 
Pastoral communities and practices are under severe pressures. Pressures of access to 
land and water have increased competition for scarce resources, bringing pastoralists 
into consiant friction with other users including agriculturists. Another issue is the 
alienation of land and appropriation of pastoral resources. The rate of land 
expropdtion in pastoral areas is severe. In Laikipia (Kenya) most of the land has 
been expropriated for ranching by European settlers. This is different to Karanoja in 
that most land in Karamôja was appropriated as state land (gazetted), which is now 
216 Field notes 2001-2004 
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being de-gazetted by the Government of Uganda to private foreign investors. 217 Both 
mean that the pastoralists do not have fertile land to graze their animals, and in 
Karamoja if the land is allocated to investors for any period of time it will ultimately 
be lost land. In the absence of coherent national land and resources polices, violence 
over land may increase. 
Due to these disruptions the conflicts are now visible not only at local levels, but they 
also act at district (national), international and regional levels. Spurred on by the flow 
of small arms, and the further weakening of the state, the last 2 decades have seen an 
alarming increase in the conflicts. Governance and security is addressed in chapter 4 
and Small Arms flow in chapter 5. 
The issue of cattle raids has become embedded in wider criminal networks. It has 
increased enmity, animosity and revenge. The wider and easy availability of small 
arms and light weapons has the potential to transform raiding into a commercialised 
enterprise leading to the escalation and intensification of pastoral conflict. The 
greatest impact the gun is having is on cattle raids and banditry on roads, and this is 
dramatically changing the character of traditional raiding. 
The post-independence period has seen a further weakening of traditional governance 
institutions in pastoral areas. This is partly due to the failure of the Kenyan and 
Ugandan governments to recognise the role of the traditional institutions in 
management at the community level, and also to changing property rights regimes. 
Indigenous institutions are no longer significant mechanisms for resource 
management as they have been weakened, though they still exist. The erosion of 
traditional governance institutions among the pastoralist communities has weakened 
the ability of community elders to exercise control over young men. Indeed, 
217 Terrace Achia, LC5 Moroto, noted that over 65% of fertile land is gazetted in Karamoja, while the 
rest is dry areas that cannot be utilized C9piment at the Breaking the circle of violence: The challenges 
of Small arms, capacity building and development in Karamoja. Mbale, Elgon Hotel, May 14-16, 2003. 
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'eldership' can now be attained by wealth, and armed youth are often well positioned 
to attain wealth if they can gain access to guns. Elders now have to 'negotiate' with 
such youth. However de important fact that must be understood is that some of the 
elders continue to encourage their sons to go raiding, because of the benefit, which 
they can reap, while others see the involvement of their sons in raiding as causing 
misfortune on their own people and hence tiy to discourage raiding. 
At the same time, official governance structures since independence have usually 
been either entirely absent or weak. Police on both sides are poorly paid and unable 
effectively to control movements across the Kenya-Uganda border. Co-operation, 
collaboration and co-ordination are relatively uncommon unless a raid takes place. 
The authorities have undermined traditional structures without effective 'modern' 
alternatives being established. Though the power relationship has shifted as small 
arms become available, within traditional and relatively non-hierarchical pastoral 
communities, the right to rule still belongs ultimately to the elders. 
More conflicts should be expected as the area occupied continues shrinking due to 
overpopulation, alienation of land, increasing competition for the limited natural 
resources. The diminishing resources, which includes cattle, leads to the young people 
getting arms and continuing the circle of violence in the local community. 
It is clear that the new technology of small arms has been a major factor in 
intensifying previously controlled and regulated conflicts. This chapter has thus 
brought in the issues of commercial elements and racketeers (warlords) cashing in on 
the existing conflicts and fuelling the fire by ultimately taking the scarce resources 
from pastoralists, offering them in return a militarised culture. 
The subject is clearly complex but discrete issues have been identified for further 
analysis with examples of useful and unsuccessful ways that have been used to 
manage the intensifying, and escalating violent pastoral conflict. The following 
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chapters will follow the thenè of the violence generated by pastoral conflict, consider 
the role of governance and examine the small arms dynamics further. 
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Participatory observation: talking to women while they milk camels in Upe Pokot, January 2003. 
Below: Samburu Paramount chief in Baragoi, August 2002. 
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The researcher standing on a dried river in Alaie 2002 during the fieldwork! Droughts lead to complete 
drying up of rivers. Below: Kraals are pastoral homesteads. 
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Aerial view of kraals near Moroto Karamoja. Mkutu 2003 The lack of development is striking. 
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Chapter 4 
Issues of Governance and Security in Pastoral Areas in the North Rift 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapters 2-3 alluded to flawed governance at all levels, as one of the root causes of pastoral 
conflict, though not the immediate origin. This chapter continues to examine this 
relationship, arguing that effective security hinges on good governance both in general and in 
the security sector. The relationship between governance and security is intricate, and there 
has been little study of the linkage in pastoral areas. 
This chapter examines this relationship and provides more empirical evidence that the failure 
in governance in North Rift (Kenya-Uganda) has intensified the pastoral conflicts and is 
related to the arms demand by local communities. 
There is a demonstrable government failure to guarantee security of local communities so 
basic needs relating to growth and development cannot be addressed. Inadequate application 
and implementation of policies and laws and access to social institutions (general 
governance) is primarily responsible for the increase in arms acquisition to protect livestock 
and in ensuing conflicts 1 . The confidence of the pastoralists in the ability of government to 
do anything to restore security is eroded and the governments (Kenya and Uganda) are 
accused of failing to take preventative action to stop the raids, despite adequate advance 
warning. Additionally governments are accused of failing to put a stop to illegal trading in 
guns and ammunition, since state structures are not able to control and regulate the supply 
See Daily Nation 14 April 2004 on devolution promises power to the people. See also 
http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynationlnmgeontententrv.asp?category  id25&newsid6 179 
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and demand of small arms and light weapons 2 . As noted by Lindijer (2003:4) 
The national authorities based in Nairobi, who are mostly representatives of farming 
highland tribes, don't understand the dynamics of savannah and desert life. They are 
more adept at oppressing than governing them. 
The mistrust of government pushes individuals towards the more localized loyalties of 
powerful men or racketeers, and demand for weapons for self- protection. People resort to 
their customary 'traditional' system of governance that has been partially eroded, especially 
in regard to the administration ofjustice and peaceful conflict resolution 3 . 
In some places states are willing to implement changes but not capable. However, in some 
places, especially Kenya, the state is capable but there is a lack of political will. 
The situation has been further complicated by state decisions to provide arms to civilians 
who are not trained in their responsible use4. In both Kenya and Uganda, governments have 
developed the Kenya Police Reservists (in Kenya) and in Uganda Local Defence Units 
(LDUs) and militias which are now operating in pastoral areas carrying out the everyday 
duties of policing. 
Vigilante groups represent community thinking given that the civilian is viewed as 
able to maintain order instinctively, representing community norms that are 
internalised and undisputed5 . 
Vigilantes in the pastoral areas, and here I use the term generically and without implication 
of criticism or approval, are private citizens who work as volunteers. The term is used 
2 For the case of the Kerio valley in Kenya see Cappon, 2003:10-12 
See Mkutu 2001 op. cit.; Masinde Ct al 2004 
See Knighton (2003) also see East African Standard, 6 April 2004. See chapter 8 
Zedner, 2000 and Johnstone, 1996: 2000:Abrahams, 1986; 1998-8-9 
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alternatively with militia, as they are all civilians armed by the state for policing. It has been 
argued by John stone (1996), that they represent a form of "autonomous citizenship" that 
emerges when an established order is under threat. At the local level in North East Africa 
they are accepted, as they address issues of security and moral order that are significant to the 
people living on the periphery of the formal state apparatus in pastoral regions. In pastoral 
areas, they are anned, by government, which may lead to criminality. 
This chapter outlines the concepts of governance and security. It then examines those 
concepts in relation to the colonial and post-colonial systems of safety, security and 
accessibility to justice including inefficiency in recovering of raided cattle. The civilian 
security forces in Kenya6 and Uganda7 are examined with regard to their metamorphosis over 
time, and their merits and demerts 8 . The chapter also addresses post-colonial governance in 
both countries. The questions examined include: 
What was the colonial governance system in pastoral areas? 
Is a vigilante system the best security system of governance in pastoral areas or is it a 
failure of governance by the state? 
How do vigilantes relate to long-term security and what are the risks, advantages, 
disadvantages and implications of vigilantism? 
Can vigilantism sustain good gOvernance, safety, security and the rule of law? 
home guards or Kenya police reservists. Kenya Police Reservists is organized by the government of 
Kenya (under the constitution) and the community to provide security to the people. 
local defnee units and vigilante! militias 
8 It is very difficult to differentiate between vigilante groups, warriors and the local defence units in most 
pastoral areaJ1iis section will use vigilantes and home guards, local defence units and Kenya police 
reservists intethaugeably. For more on vigilante see chapter 2. 
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4.2 Pastoral Governance, Security and Safety in the Colonial Period 1920-mid 1960s 
There have been attempts from the colonial times to deal with the plethora of issues in 
pastoral areas noted in chapter three. These include: alienation of land, vulnerability to 
droughts, degraded resources conflict, insecurity, and poor services. However, policies seem 
to have lacked careful thought, planning and execution. Since independence, successive 
governments in the North Rift have not only failed to enforce the rule of law and the practice 
of good governance principles in pastoral areas, but also have a dismal record in providing 
credible protection to the pastoralists from external raiders, let alone inter-clan raids and 
conflict noted previously in chapter 3. 
This section provides both a descriptive and analytical view of interventions undertaken to 
manage and resolve the issues of cattle raiding by governments in colonial Kenya and 
Uganda. Their policies emphasised the recovery of cattle because firstly it demonstrated that 
state security was active in the areas but also that the main immediate trigger of pastoral 
conflict was community revenging their cattle being raided. For example, Berber (1968:34) 
notes that frequent fighting between the Pokot, Sebei, Karimojong and Turkana led the 
British government to push them to conduct a peace ceremony, but hostilities only reduced 
for six months. Cattle recovery was a form of deterrent in the prevention of cattle theft. 
Cattle raiding was a major security puzzle that the colonial administration in pastoral areas of 
East Africa grappled with from the start. Pastoral communities in North Rift have 
customarily demonstrated both need and greed for livestock. To deal with the problem of 
stock theft, governments had to deal with a people's culturally defined way of life. In the 
words of one colonial administrator, "In the tribal code it is an honourable act rather than a 
crime to steal stock from other tribes." 9 I suggest that livelihood imperatives are rationalised 
9 KNA- PC/NZAI3/52/1 Letter dated 15th December 1926 from Senior Commissioner Nyanza to Hon. 
Chief Native Commissioner. 
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as 'honour'. This clash of civilizations made it difficult to regulate the problem in both pre-
colonial and colonial periods. 
The colonial government wanted to encourage productive livestock farming among pastoral 
communities by ensuring that there was high productivity per unit of land. The livestock 
rearing practices of most pastoral communities were deemed less productive for the market 
as cattle kept by these communities were hardy but neither high meat nor milk producers. 
Additionally, the colonial administration wanted to settle pastoral communities so that they 
did not need large tracts of land for their nomadic way of life. In the thinking of the colonial 
administration, they were also to be settled in order to pave the way for white settlers to farm 
without interference from nomads roaming the area' 0. Native Reserves were created within 
which pastoralists were to be confined in order to limit unnecessary competition for land 
between them and the white settlers. The Mukogodo Masai reserve in Kenya, discussed in 
this work, was one such reserve. From the onset of colonial rule, in the Northern Frontier 
Districts of Kenya, within the territory of the Laikipia, Samburu and West Pokot, and in the 
territory of the Karamoja in Uganda, the maintenance of 'law and order' to protect the 
colonial regime, took precedence over all other considerations. As expressed by Sir Geoffrey 
Archer, the first district administrator of the region and the founder of the first government 
post in Samburu: 
There is only one way to treat these Northern Territories, the home of 
nomadic camel, cattle and sheep owning people, and that is to give them what 
protection one can under the British flag and otherwise to leave them to their 
own customs, as far as possible, and under their own chiefs. Anything else is 
uneconomic (quoted in Barber, 1968:415-416). 
This policy never changed during the colonial period as noted by Trench (1964:4) 
10 See chapter three 
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who served in both Garissa and Samburu districts in Kenya: 
For a nomadic population inhabiting a desert, there are only two essentials- law and 
order and the livestock industry, which was used to feed the military and civil 
administration. 
The nomadic pastoralists were left on their own as long as they obeyed the law. The colonial 
government practised indirect rule or government to manage them. Towards the end of 1928, 
the colonial government experienced a great deal of trouble. One lesson learnt was the urgent 
need to involve the local "traditional" institutions in the maintenance of order. The colonial 
government came to rely more and more on decisions made by the councils of elders. The 
chiefs and headmen attended these councils in their capacity as elders, not as colonial agents, 
but they reported their decisions to the colonial government. The administration attempted to 
restructure the traditional institutions in order to impose an overriding control and thereby 
regulate and contain intertribal conflicts. The colonial government ensured that in addition to 
the police station at Kapenguria, police posts were located at Keringet, Kanyarwart, Kongolai 
and Sigor all equipped with wireless communication systems. One sergeant, one corporal 
and eight constables manned each. A platoon of the General Service Unit gave periodic 
assistance in patrolling the border of Karasuk"aid their appearance in Riwa and Sook 
locations undoubtedly helped to reduce the activities of stock thieves. 121n addition to the 
above, each country devised laws to deal with the criminals and communities that violated 
them. 
1 .I Fokot 
12 
bistrict Commissioner/WestPokot/13 Annual Report 1962:2 
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4.2.1 Governance and the Recovery of Rustled Animals in Kenya 
Cattle raids were the biggest challenge colonial government faced in relation to security in 
Kenya. The crime of cattle rustling was such a serious offence and so prevalent in colonial 
Kenya that special ordinances were passed to deal with it. There were two main ordinances 
that touched directly on stock theft. The first was the famous Stock and Produce Theft 
Ordinance of 1930. 13  This was retribution in the form of a fine, imposed when someone was 
convicted of theft of stock or produce. Alternatively, there was the Collective Punishment 
Ordinance." When an offence could not be brought home to any individual, a communal fine 
was imposed that the family of the offender shared out amongst themselves. These two 
ordinances were used effectively in almost every case of stock thieving. 
Under the Stock and Produce Theft Ordinance, the magistrate, a colonial officer, was 
bound to inflict a fine of at least ten times the value of the stolen livestock. The fine, 
when raised to ten times actual value, would often be too much for the individual to 
pay. The senior commissioner would endorse a warrant to be levied on the offender's 
family or sub tribe, or on the inhabitants of a village where stock was hidden. In this 
case, the individual fine became a communal fine. 15 
When a stock theft was reported to the local distrjct cQmmissioners' office, every effort was 
made to follow the tracks at once by local police supervised by the District Commissioner. 
Speed in tracking was always emphasized, and notig deterred the police from carrying out 
the search to the furthest limit possible. Local people were often summoned to assist the 
recoveries and administrative officers of the area to which the stock were traced were 
13 Cap. 79, laws of Kenya 
14 Cap. 77, laws pf(enya 
on Stock thieving written by C.M. Dobbs, Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza, 22 January, 
1930. Also see KNA- PCINZAI2/5129 Stock Thefts-General Matters 1929-31 for ordinance. 
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informed in order to cooperate in finding "impartial witnesses to testify in court." 16and 
perhaps also in protection for members pursuing thieves. 
The collective punishment for stock thefts was applied when no individual accused person 
was found. Representatives of the community were cited as accused persons and were called 
upon to show cause why a collective punishment should not be imposed on the community, 
which they represented 17 . 
The procedure followed for collective punishment was similar to that in ordinary criminal 
cases. It was the duty of the prosecution to prove that a theft had taken place, that the tracks 
had been followed into some particular village, area or district, that the inhabitants there had 
been shown the tracks and given every opportunity to restore the property stolen and had 
neglected to do so, or had failed to follow the tracks beyond their area. 
The inhabitants of that particular area should be recorded as if they were accused persons in a 
criminal case and they should be given an opportunity of calling witnesses in their defence. 
The representatives of the village, area or district should have an opportunity given to them 
of cross-exam rning.' 8 
If the magistrate who presided over the inquiry was satisfied that a punishment be inflicted 
on the particular area, he was to record his finding, and give full reasons for it with 
recommendations of what fine should be imposed. The case file (six copis) was to be sent 
for sanction to the provincial commissioner, who in Nyanza, Northern Frontier and Turkana 
Provinces, had the governor's delegated powers. In other provinces, the magistrate had to 
forward the case file with his recommendations to the Colonial secretary in London. 19 
16Dobbs, op.cit. 
17 For details see PC/NKU/2/1 5/48 Collective Punishment Ordinance- stock Theft Inuiry Report 1934-51 
18 APCZ2/5/59 Memorandum on Stock thieving written by C.M. tolbs, Provincial 
Commissioner-Nyanza- Dated 22nd January, 1930 
19 IisiAPc,1vP.6Ai3A/8 Letter, 21 March 1932 from Mr.O.F.Watldxs, Provi,cil Commissioner, Nzoia 
to Honorable. Chief Native commissioner. Also Interview, Egesa John, former District Commissioner, 
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The main objectives of the Collective Punishment for Stock thefts were first to 
compensate the victims who lost their stock, and secondly to create a public opinion 
antagonistic to crime within a given community. 
The point of view of an administrator is not quite that of a magistrate. It is his 
concern to build up a public opinion antagonistic to crime, and particularly to 
crime of an inter-racial or inter-tribal aspect. Between border raiders 
hereditary and traditional feuding is always ready to burst into flames at each 
and every instance of cattle lifting and the bereaved, white or black, will take 
the law into his own hands if he does not get back his cattle or their value. 
Thus, compensation is perhaps the first consideration. It is, however, equally 
essential for the safety of our public ways, to create a public opinion, which 
holds that crime, whether against persons or property, is the concern of the 
local authority and the local resident.20 
Great emphasis was placed on building public sentiment against stock thieves by making 
natives in the relevant area responsible for policing their areas and arresting suspicious 
persons. If they did not do so, they would be subjected to heavy fines. The success Of this 
policy rested on the responsibility of the administrator to maintain an effective police force 
by special local taxation as well as from general revenues and fines levied for stock theft. Of 
these, the fine imposed on the neighbourhood involved was an additional source used. 
From the above, it can be argued that the colonial concept of community policing and 
ensuring cooperation between the police and community, was effective to a degree in Kenya 
with a considerable amount of stolen stock being recovered. The police were able to deal 
Mombasa, Mombasa, Kenya. 16 September 2002. Hon Abdulahi Aden a legislator with the East African 
Cooperation also mentioned this at the African Peace Forum/International Resource Group regional 
conference on Security Sector Reform. 26-27 2003, Leopard Beach Hotel, Mombasa, Kenya. 
20 KNA.. PC/RVP.6A134/8 Letter, 21 March, 1932 from Mr. 0. F. .Watkins, Provincial Commissioner, 
Nzoia, to Hon. Chief Native Commissioner. 
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with the crimes and police posts were maintained and functional. Though there was frequent 
resentment, the view of police as upholders and custodians of the law was appreciated 21 . 
4.2.2 Governance and the Recovery of Rustled Animals in Karamoja, Colonial 
Uganda 
The colonial government in Uganda resorted to cutting Karamoja off from other parts of 
Uganda. Permits were required to enter and leave in order to alienate its "vices" from the rest 
of Uganda. 
A system of collective punishment for raids was imposed where raiders were not specifically 
identified and this would be executed by confiscation of cattle to pay a raided neighbouring 
district ('blood tax money'). This section examines the record of colonial government in 
recovery of raided cattle. 
In Karamoja, a worsening colonial governance system saw increased cattle raids. 
The annual report for the years from 1955 to 1962 indicate increased cattle raids between the 
Karamoja, Teso, and Mbale district in Uganda 22 . Cattle raiding between Suk, and 
Karimojong (Pian, Bokora and Matheniko) saw twenty people killed and 2,000 cattle 
stolen23. On 23-24 May 1962, 107 men, women and children were murdered in one night 
from a revenge raid by Pian raiding Suk (ibid: 100). Therefore as Uganda was approaching 
independence in 1962, lawlssness had increased in Karamoja. 
Knighton (2003:435) concurs and notes that "the colonial administration had failed to meets 
its top priority of 'law and order' even when they had forced a preponderance of spears over 
guns, and ruled that one of those should be carried". 
21 See for example East Aiican Standard 1 June 1949. 
22 See Cisterino (1979: 79) Also see Weatlieby, 1962:2000. He notes that "Mount Elgoi, which borders 
Karamoja was the scene of j9flns3yç cAttip raiding warfare during the 19th and early decades of the 20th 
century, when the Sebei-speakin semi-pastoral tribes living on the mountain were involved in conflict with 
cattle-raiders from the surrounding tribes" 
23 Clayton and Killingray, 1989:94 
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Colonial Laws Related to Cattle Raids in Karamoja. 
Laws were devised specifically for Karamoja just before independence in 1964.24  These 
were made after exhaustive sociological studies of the area, with the support of the 
Karimojong themselves. 25 
The Karamoja Act of 1964 abolished the presumption of innocence for accused suspected 
raiders. Under the law, any suspected raider was presumed guilty until proved otherwise. 
These questions were debated in the Bataringàya report of 1961 just before independence in 
1962. As far as administrative powers were concerned: 
The Karimojong elders dealt with "ameto" which involved the 
community searching for the evildoer and dealing with him. Though 
this system still exists, their administrative authorities have been 
taken over by appointed Chiefs who have been imposed on the tribes. 
They cannot therefore claim, and actually do not get, spontaneous 
loyalty from the tribes. The strong chains of custom have been 
removed and replaced by strange strings of local administration, 
which are too weak to hold tribesmen away from raids (Bataringaya 
Report, 191). 
Regarding justice, the intricacies and the finer details of the Criminal Procedure Code and 
Evidence Ordinanpe were condemned. The rçport said: 
They cannot understand why there should be a delay of anything from one to 
six months between the commission of a crime and the passing of a sentence, 
and why a person who raided cattle and killed someone in the transaction 
should be released or only sent to prison for a short time, fed and dressed, and 
24  See The Administration of (Karamoja) Act Chapter 26 revised edition, 1964 
25 Iteso, Karamoja seek peace in Uganda Political, letter from Cuthert Obwangor to the New Vision, ref 
KT/2(Ql, 24/0412001. 
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then returned to society only to do some more raiding and killings. 
The report also assessed the special laws of 1958: 
The Special Regions Ordinance was a wrong step in the right direction. Right 
direction because we feel that Karamoja needs special legislation to suit 
unique conditions and circumstances and to enable the Government to 
establish law and order and force the pace to development. Wrong step, 
because the legislation has not proved the deterrent it had been hoped it 
would prove (ibid.). 
The following observations were made: Firstly, the seizure of cattle by the government 
reduced the number of animals possessed by individuals, thus making their desire to acquire 
cattle more acute26 . Secondly, the punishment of the innocent and the guilty alike made the 
innocent feel that it does not pay to be law abiding and therefore inadvertently encourages 
them to go raiding. Thirdly, by limiting inter-tribal contact, the only means of inter-tribal 
influence and opportunity for an attempt at inter-tribal co-operation was removed. It gave the 
raiders a sense of security because they knew that once they crossed certain boundaries, 
enemy tribesmen, who were only as tough and mobile as they, would not chase them. There 
existed shortfalls in punishment for stock thefts, which undermined the application and 
efficiency of colonial policy on these issues. Though, opinion was often expressed that much 
of the efficacy of the remedy was lost owing to the delay in securing its enforcement. 27 
Under The Stock and Produce Theft Law, if the members of a tribe succeeded in catching a 
thief by their efforts and he was convicted, they thereby rendered themselves liable to pay a 
large fine unless the senior commissioner ruled otherwise. If they adopted a passive attitude 
with the result that no one is arrested, in nine cases out often they got off scot-free and the 
26 See for example Etengu, Nathan, BBC Moroto, 6 October. Elders expressed anger and vowed to hunt 
down cattle raiders after the government confiscated 1,238 head of cattle from them. Colonel Andrew Guti 
the commanding officer of the Uganda Peoples Defence Force, third infantry division noted more cattle 
would be confiscated from ethnic Pian Karimojong in Nakapiripirit to make the required number of 2,057. 
tribe was enriched by the addition of stolen stock. The result of this is that there was no real 
public opinion among the Lumbwa (Masai) against stock thieving 28 . The arrest of a fellow 
tribesman brought tribal opprobrium on the man who gave information and may also entail a 
fine on other members of the same tribe. 29 
In conclusion, in both countries the colonial administration ensured that livestock raiding 
was minimized. Punishment options existed but varied in application from tribe to tribe. It 
served as a check on stock theft and effectively managed conflict, even if the legal system did 
not function well. Noor, a former District officer for Baragoi, noted that the colonial system 
with all its faults, managed cattle thefts through communal punishment30 . Moreover, he 
wondered if the  modern legal system could be successful for this purpose if solely and 
uniformly used in all pastoral areas in East Africa. 
4.3 Postcolonial Uganda: Governance and Cattle Recovery 
Athio (75years old) who experienced the colonial administration notedin an interview: 
The colonial government built police posts near kraals. Currently all those poJe 
posts have been destroyed. There was at least means of communication during ihe 
colonial times, Landrovers existed, and there were police in Karamoja called the 
Track Force. Today, all that was developed by the British is finished. 3 ' 
27 KNA- PCINZAI3I52/1 Letter from Senior Commissioner, Nyanza, 26 August, 1926 
28 Ibid. Lumbwa was part of the eastern Province of Uganda which Karamoja came under before 1926. 
29 KNA- PCINZA/3/52/1 Letter, 15 December 1926 from Senior Commissioner, Nyanza, to Hon. Chief 
Native Commissioner. 
Hussein Noor, former District officer, Baragoi, Kenya, field notes August 2002. 
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As noted previously, the Karimojong adopted a military style of engagement with the 
colonial government and with all those they considered enemies, so that even after 
independence and the departure of the colonial army, the postoIonial government was 
viewed in the same way. The Karamoja have never ceded their right to violence, or 
corporately acknowledged that they constitute part of any state. 
The military and confrontational relationship between the Karimojong and the state has 
continued to this date, so that insecurity has continued to haunt the Karimojong. Initially 
insecurity was manifest in cattle rustling, but recently, because of widespread possession of 
small arms, there is increased banditry, road thuggery and unnecessary killing. 
This section examines post-colonial cattle recovery in Uganda, arguing that it has been 
repressive. Efforts by the Uganda army and local defence units to manage local conflicts 
have displaced people. Their response in animal recovery is too hasty and authoritarian, 
creating conflict and blood shed between government forces and local communities over 
stock theft. As stressed by the various people interviewed, "they never use the right 
channels." The following subsections document instances of conflict and bloodshed between 
government forces and local communities over stock thefts. 
1960s and 1970s and the Militaristic Approach in Karamojong. 
According to the MP for Upe Pokot, in the 1960s and 1970s cattle rustling was not as 
rampant and sophisticated as today, and there was better containment by the government who 
were on the ground during these years 32. Other reliable interviews indicated that President Idi 
Amin was very ruthless, and that seemed to have controlled the Karamoja raiders and 
31 Athio, Lorika, Edward, Chairperson, District Service Contnission- Nakapiripirit, Interview, MordtÔ, 21 
November 2003. See KNAIWP1/13 West Pokot District annual Report 1962: 5 
32 Interview, Hon Lolem Mika, Moroto, 22 November 2003. 
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reduced raiding. As noted in a speech by Aliero Omara who served in the Obote II regime: 
Raids went down between 197 1-1979 because law was law. The Idi Amin regime 
saw less raids by the Karimojong because they feared to test Amin's ruthless resolve 
to crush any raids especially after the Amin decree forcing the Karamojong to wear 
clothes was enforced ruthlessly resulting in the deaths in Namalu and Matany. Obote 
II government of the 1980s took a militaristic approach by deploying tribal militias. 
Much as this deterred raids against the neighbouring districts, it did not change the 
attitude and outlook of the warriors, who instead acquired more arms and attempted 
raids in Lira and Soroti districts. The peak of cattle raids came with the Tito Okello 
regime in 1986 when the raids reached proportions never seen before. The 
Karimojong made incursions reaching as far as Pallisa district, and the River Nile at 
Masindi Port and Karuma Falls without any government interventions. This was to 
create bitter enmity and xenophobia against the Karimojong and government and to 
some extent justifying rebellion against the government that was fought in Teso and 
Lango. 33 
With the coming of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government in 1986, 
Karamoja was included in a ten-point program. This was followed by the inauguration of the 
Karamoja Development Agency (KDA) and a Minister for Karamoja affairs. Other projects 
were designed specifically for Karamoja, but all these efforts failed to bring peace and 
security to Karamoja. Cattle raids continued, generating more conflict. Pressure has mounted 
on government to disarm the Karimojong. But also the military confrontation between the 
Karimojong and the army has increased as illustrated by the cases below. 
33 Aliero, Oiara, speech given at the Sustainable disarmaments and Development in Karamoja workshop in 
Moroto, 22-23 November 2003. 
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The Lomaratoit Massacre: Bokora/UPDF 2000 
In 1995, as raids escalated, a faith-based NGO named Christian Initiative for Peace Services 
(CHIPS) began to promote mixed resettlement of Iteso and Bokora from the Central Plains in 
Lomaratoit and Apetolim to the regional border (Lomaratoit being located inside the current 
administrative limits of Katakwi district). Due to the escalation of raids, the Army had been 
brought to guard the settlements. The Uganda People's Democratic Army temporarily 
abandoned these new settlements after attacks in 2000. 
On 13/03/2000 and 03/04/2000, the Army attacked Apetolim and killed 85 head of cattle and 
one warrior, using helicopter gun ships. On 14/01/2001 Iteso Anti Stock Theft Units and 
UPDF killed 17 persons and stole 200 head of cattle in Lomaratoit. They justified their action 
by claiming they were searching for Karimojong cattle rustlers. Witness accounts claimed the 
villagers were murdered in cold blood with no obvious reason. 34 
The case of Lomaratoit was reported to the Uganda Human Rights Commission (1111CR) on 
21, March 2001. They were requested to investigate the arrest and detention at Soroti military 
barracks of Lt. Owen George Bada. Lt. Col. Sam Kavuma, Brigade Commander, 306 
Brigade, Soroti, related the incident as follows: 
The suspect, together with other officers and men of the UPDF mounted an operation 
in Karamdja in a place called Amoloton at the border. of Karamoja and Iteso. The 
motive of the operation was to weed out suspected cattle rustlers in the area. 
Apparently, the Army reached a camp called "CHIPS" run by some Christian NGO 
where they sighted a wanted felon called "Luuka" and in the ensuing attempt to 
apprehend him, overreacted, and in the process killed 17 people including the wanted 
34 Awas Samuel, Interview, Lomaratoit, 24 April 2001. 
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felon's women and children. Preliminary investigations carried out by the UPDF 
authorities found that the civilians had been killed in cold blood and thus arrested the 
suspect together with two other officers, who were produced before the Unit 
Disciplinary Committee (UDC) on 26 th February 2001. The offence being capital, the 
matter was to be heard before the Divisional Court Martial. 35 
The case was out ofthejurisdiction of the Uganda Human Rights Commission as the Uganda 
Peoples Defence Force was handling it. It clearly shows those expected to protect the 
civilians may be the same agency harming them. It also shows why the Karamoja have less 
confidence in the ability of the army to protect them. 
Pangyangara shoot-out: Jie and UPDF 2002 
The community identified the cause of this incident as having been a disagreement arising 
from discussions with the army over animals reportedly stolen by Be from Bokora. Gunfire 
reportedly broke out on 3 May 2002. Fire exchanges continued between the warriors and 
UPDF for the next three days. In the ensuing battle, the UPDF burnt any structures in their 
path. By the end of the third day, the warriors unilaterally declared a cease-fire and vanished 
from the battlefields. The aftermath left several villages, shelters and granaries burnt, 
household items looted, people and animals burnt in houses and some animals driven away 
by elements of the UPDF. Widespread displacements occurred 36. Anger and mistrust 
between the local community and the UPDF now runs deep. "The community reported fear 
of continued harassment by soldiers. The women fear most being intercepted on their way to 
collect firewood for sale or going to the market or well." 37 
35 UHRC, Internal memo from Solomon Ossiya, HRO chairperson, U}{C/Sf01/33, 21 March 2001. 
36 By the time of this research, families had begun to return to their locations, and were rebuilding shelters. 
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Karita Uprising: Pokot vs. UPDF (cross border incident) 2003 
Karita is situated on the border of Kenya and Uganda. On 3 January 2003, the Pokot raided a 
Plan settlement in Namalu and took 200 cows. They targeted a new settlement ofPian from 
Namalu that hosted some Pian cows from Nabilatuk. Other Pokot from Kenya assisted the 
raiders. In the evening of 6 January, a group of UPDF based in Karita moved to the village 
where the footprints were leading. On the way, Pokot warriors ambushed them and a lot of 
soldiers were killed. Interviews with an elder who is also a Local Council 3, noted that over 
70 UPDF and Local Defence Units (LDU) were killed. 38. (LDUs are former vigilante, ex 
Anti Stock Theft Units now based in barracks with the UPDF). The Local Council 3 
Chairman Lokim and LC3 Secretary education for Karita confirmed the incident but Lokim 
noted, 
I was still waiting for them (the army) to call me so that we can dialogue, I was not 
informed, no meeting, no consulting leaders, they just attacked. The army was 
overpowered and most of the army men died. When they returned on 7th  January to 
check and collect the bodies of their colleagues, again, there was a fight with the 
warriors and LDUs. They were overpowered and forced to go back to the barracks 39 . 
On a visit to Amudat mission hospital, interviews revealed that eleven injured UPDF soldiers 
were admitted from the raid. The former Resident District Commissioner of Nakapiripirit 
told me that he was not informed of the UPDFs decision to attack Karita although he is 
responsible for security in the entire district. 40 Interviews with Father Paul of Namalu 
revealed that the Pokot LDUs had united with the community warriors to fight back the 
UPDF and Pian home guards (a phrase borrowed from Kenya). Different eyewitnesses on 
37 Pangyangara Assessment Report (minutes of May 2002 by District Disaster Management Committee). 
38 Interview elder and Local Council 3 did not want to be named 
39 Interviews Lokim, Amadi, Local Council 3 Karita and Maruti, Ibrahim, Local council 3 Secretary for 
education. Moroto, 20 November 2003. 
40 Interview Peter Ken, Resident District Commissioner Nakapiripirit, Nakapiripit, 27January 2003: 
Confusion of responsibilities is a recipe for conflict 
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the ground indicated that between 607241  soldiers were killed. Father Bosco noted, "that 
the warriors were now 72 guns richer42" The Pokot only lost a few warriors. 43 
Morulem Forceful Disarmament vs. Iteso-Bokora 
On 12 January 2003, Jie raided both Iteso and Bokora in Aheket (Katakwi district) and went 
away with 75 animals. The same night, Jie raided three Bokora herds in Kink and killed four 
people. A joint team of Teso LDUs and Bokora warriors traced the footprints of the animals 
as far as Morulem in Labwor. In the evening, they reported to the detachment so they would 
not be confused with raiders and so they might be given help. 
The military asked the warriors to surrender their illegal guns44 . They even disarmed the Teso 
LDUs. When two warriors ran to the barracks to take their guns back, they were shot dead. 
In the confusion, nine other warriors and LDUs were killed 45 . 
However, based on observation from the ground, one cannot blame the army for moving 
swiftly. Stolen cattle are speedily re-sold. Father Michael Apurio ofNabilatuku noted, "What 
I have realized is that if animals are raided in one county, they are immediately sold locally 
or taken to the market." 46 This indicates levels of commercialization, against customary 
norms. Sometimes, UPDF soldiers are involved in grabbing cows from locals and selling 
41 Father Bosco, John, Interview, Amudat, 27 January 2003. Father Bruno an Italian lived in Karamoja 
from the 1970s till his death in 2002. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Interview, Father Paul, Namalu, 23 January 2003. Also confirmed in interviews with Lomoryareng, 
David, Kraal leader Amudat, 26 January 2003: also LC5 Karita name with held. Interview, 26 January 
2003. 
44 Interview Longole, Romanao, Kotido, 3 February 2003. 
45 Ibid. The army interfered in ajoint effort of the Bokora warriors and the Iteso LDUs to trace the 
footprints of cattle stolen by the Jie. The soldiers tried to disarm them instead of assisting them. 
46 Father Apurio, Michael Nabilatuku, 29th, January 2003. 
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them.47 At the time of the fieldwork, an army captain was in prison for his alleged misdeeds. 
Certainly not all the UPDF personnel are corrupt, but those who are have created serious 
problems. 
Father Paul noted that army versus community wars were partly attributable to the manner in 
which the government handled the community. In the process of cattle recovery, brutality and 
force are used. The government may even fail to return recovered cattle so that the 
community viewed the army as raiders and enemies towards which retaliation was due. 48 For 
example during the Ngariam raid of 13 September 2001, 502 head of cattle rounded up by 
the army from the Pian never reached the owners. 
In conclusion sometimes the UPDF has adopted harsh measures to recover raided animals 
even when peaceful negotiations would have been possible. Faced with large number of 
sophisticated weapons in the hands of warriors, the UPDF sometimes act with excessive 
force to contain such situations, which lead to civilian casualties 49. The army rarely consults 
local government or customary authorities (senior elders), which in January 2003 resulted in 
the breach of a peace agreement between the Jie and Bokora that was noted above. It has 
been noted by Longole that the current means of addressing pastoral conflict is just an 
emergency measure to contain the raids. 50 What is needed is peace building by good 
governance. 
47  See Knighton (2003: 449) had even argued that the Uganda state was also a raider because of such 
incidents. 
48 Ibid. Interview, Namalu 24, January, 2003 
stressed by almost everybody interviewed in Kararnoja: 'they never use the rjght channels to 
peacefully trace perpetrators of raids'. 
50 Inteyiew, Longole, Romano, JQtido Peace Initiative, jotido, 3 February 2003. 11 interview with 
chief 4rninstrative officer for Kotido- Irama WaIter 3 February 2003, Kotido, he noted that current peace 
building iniliatives are just "fire brigades, they only appear when there is a problem then fizzle away" 
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4.4 Post-Colonial Kenya: Governance and Cattle Recovery 
Between 1963 and the nid- 1 980s, Kenya was a haven of peace with an expanding economy 
and one of the most stable countries in the world. Economic growth in the first 15 years of 
independence mitigated resource and economic conflicts. The decline in Kenyan security 
started around the mid 1980s, contributed to by a number of episodes including the 1982 
coup attempt, land driven conflicts, 'tribal clashes' in 1992 and 1997 and instability in 
neighbouring countries as seen in chapter 3 and 5. The major cause however, was bad 
governance in general and in particular in the security sector51 . In the late 1980s   and early 
1990s,   violent crime was directed mainly towards foreigners and slowly extended to cover 
everyone52, and in the pastoral areas there was escalation of cattle rustling. 
In December 2002 following introduction of multiparty democracy, the opposition party the 
National African Rainbow Coalition (NARC) defeated the Kenya National African Union 
(KANU), the single party that had ruled Kenya from the colonial period. In his inaugural 
speech, President Mwai Kibaki outlined the role Of government as among other things, 
to maintain law and order, provide social services that can enhance the quality of life, 
defend the country against internal and external aggression, and generally ensure that 
peace and stability prevails. 
Yet two years to date since the inauguration, there is very little evidence of government 
efforts to improve security, rehabilitate infrastructure or economic reconstruction in pastoral 
areas. 53 Most insecurity is linked with pastoralist areas. This section examines the recovery 
51 See East African Standard 13 January 2004 "District Commissioner calls for disbandment of the. 
Provincial Administration. 
www.estandard.net/archives/ianuary/tuel3012004/headlines/newsI  301 200407.htm. "He notes let us admit, 
we have completely failed to live to our expectations and they (public) are right by calling for the scrapping 
of the Provincial administration." He for instance noted how they allowed themselves to be used wrongly by 
politicians to help them settle scores with their opponents. 
52 	
i See Daily Nation 6 March 2004 Insecurity n city Alarming 
53  See Kenya Times 8 April 2004 http://www.kentimes.com/editorals/comm1.htm1:  Daily Nation 8 April 
2004. Devolution won't solve our problems. See also East African Standards 6 April 2004 Thorny issue of 
thugs in Uniform. 
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of cattle and argues that post-colonial governance has not been effective at managing raiding, 
which is partly responsible for the increased incidence of cattle raiding. 
Structure of Provincial Administration 
To effectively manage national affairs at the grass roots level in Kenya, the colonial 
government developed a system popularly known as provincial administration. The 
postcolonial governance was indigenised with continuity of colonial policies. Provincial 
administration remained the same except now it was not white faces but black faces. 
The mission of provincial administrators is to maintain law and order, to provide leadership 
and policy guidance, and to set the agenda for social, economic and political development. 
This administration is expected to effectively control activities and manage conflict. When 
the provincial administration was developed, it was charged with maintaining law and order. 
However, due to the challenges of a growing and more educated populace, the role of 
provincial administration has broadened and expectations have increased. Nowadays the 
provincial administration is charged with interpreting, implementing and coordinating 
government policies, activities and programs. The goal of these governance systems is to 
ensure that government services reach the entire population of Kenya, both rural and urban. 
Consequently, the country is still divided as in colonial times into 7 provinces 54, which are 
further divided into 68 districts. The districts are sub-divided into divisions, locations and 
sub-locations. 
The duties of co-ordinating provincial administration lie with the Office of the President 
(OP) where a Permanent Secretary (PS) is appointed to oversee activities at the national 
level. His responsibilities are to implement the various programmes and take charge of 
54 Western, Nyanza, Rift Valley, Nairobi, Eastern, Coast, Northeastern. 
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internal security, overseeing the role of the Kenya Police to ensure maintenance of law and 
order. He also presides over the finances for the entire ministry. 
His office's goals are achieved through the provincial network. Provincial Commissioners 
are in charge of their provinces and responsible on behalf of the President for the progress 
and welfare of the people. They are also responsible for good governance through 
interpreting government policies. The District Commissioner then exercises similar 
responsibilities within districts under his general supervision and control. District Officers 
(DO) take responsibility for sub-districts under the general supervision of the District 
Commissioner. So the provincial administration structure is expected to provide 
representative government authority from the village level, leading up through a simplified 
and well defined hierarchy of assistant chiefs, chiefs, district officers, district commissioners, 
provincial commissioners, permanent secretary, to the president himself. 
The significance of provincial management has been examined for the period of early 
independence. 55 
Goran, Hyden et al, (1999) and Ruseyemamu and Hyden (1982) argue that with the 
departure of colonialists at independence, it was expected that there would be a change in 
leadership style to make provincial administration more people friendly, especially since it 
now permitted Africans (Kenyans) to lead their fellow Kenyans. This was not the case, 
however, as their role in the co-ordination of development activities quickly brought them 
into conflict with politicians, department heads and the general public. Kenyans from all 
walks of life complain about provincial administration and the various ways in which it has 
contrived to oppress them since colonial days till today. 56 
55 Not much has been written on the provincial administration in Kenya. 
6 They also state that politicians, even in the period  right after independence, claimed that provincial 
administration had !ost its relevance with the achievement of independence, for it had been the basic 
instrument of colonial oppression 
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Frequent Turnover of Administrative Officers 
Governance and the frequent turn over of administrative officers is a scenario that puzzles 
everyone in pastoral regions. 57  In Kenya, only one District Commissioner stayed for six years 
in West Pokot, thereafter the longest time served was two years; after a year or two most 
were reassigned. This also applies to the Resident District Commissioners (RDC) in Uganda 
who like the District Commissioners in Kenya are responsible for the entire security, 
development and governance of the Districts. 
Two schools of thought exist about this scenario. Firstly, the politicians have an influence 
over the transfer of District Commissioners/Resident District Commissioners. If a politician 
disagrees with them the politician may ring Statehouse or the office of the President to 
demand their transfer. Frequent transfers are clearly linked with local politics. Another 
District Commissioner interviewed gave an example in which he argued strongly against 
chiefs who colluded with cattle rustlers. When he spoke about it, the politicians demanded he 
be transferred. Secondly, it is believed that if they stay in pastoral areas for too long they will 
be compromised or lose track of the administration, a thinking that goes back to the colonial 
period. Long before new District Commissioners acquaint themselves with the people, their 
culture and traditions, they are transferred and a new one is brought. 
This has complicated governance operations. An interview with a former District 
Commissioner of Kitale, Macagoya noted, "development does not occur well. You have 
initiated a project but because of the short tenure in the area, the project stalls because 
whoever replaces you, takes a different approach". 58 If the public cannot see the District 
57 The transfer of most District commissioners is always linked their failure to toe the line with politicians 
see for example Daily Nation, 22 June 2004 
http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?categorv_idl &newsidl 0143 
58 Macagoya, George former District Commissioner Kitale, Kenya. Interview, Kitale, 29 July 2002. 
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Commissioners/Resident District Comhiissioners as individuals authoritatively upholding of 
security, law and order then they will not cooperate with go to them unless they have 
problems. 
Failings of Provincial Administration 
With the growth of multiparty politics in Kenya from 1992, provincial administrations are 
still accused of partisanship, corruption, power grabbing and rudeness in their dealings with 
pastoralists, and they were linked to the 1992 Rift Valley clashes 59. Evidence and 
information available to the committee to investigate the clashes indicated that generally the 
Kenyan public had few words of praise for the role performed by the security personnel 
comprising the Kenya police, administration police and general service unit during the 
clashes. Various witnesses recounted instances showing that some of these officers 
compromised their expected role by either remaining inactive or disinterested, facilitating the 
activities of the fighters and instigators, or did not simply act as would have been expected of 
them.60 On some occasions, the security personnel assisted the warriors in their activities; on 
other occasions government helicopters belonging to security forces were used to assist the 
warriors61 . Some of the officers however, acted admirably despite the currents around them. 
The provincial administration is the pillar of Kenya's governance process, and administrators 
are government appointees, in contrast to the elected councillors. The administrators are the 
main link between the grass roots and central authority. In Kenya the provincial 
administration has taken on devolved political roles despite its lack of accountability to local 
59  See Government of Kenya (1992) Report of the Parliamentary Select committee to Investigate Ethnic 
Clashes in Wesn and 9#w PWU,of Kenya. See Akiwumi Report of 2002. 
60 23 Oôtolr 2002 Akiwumi report. See als94Qta4s see National Assembly, Report of 
the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western Kenya and Other Parts of 
Kenya, 1992:71-73; Akiwumi report, 2003:63.) 
61 ibid. 
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people. It is therefore expected to be effective, efficient and transparent so as to inspire 
confidence and trust among the communities. In many areas, these public servants have been 
the only government that people have known62 . Unfortunately, in the past, they have given 
the government a bad name due to their corrupt and coercive practices, often regarding 
themselves as either the law or above it. 63 
In 1996 in Parliament Honourable Murungi notified Parliament that Samburu warriors had 
stolen 6,000 head of cattle from the Meru. However in reply another Member of Parliament 
said it was not true that the Samburu had stolen the Meru cattle, but that it was the District 
Commissioner and his askaris (security) that stole them. That is, the District Commissioner 
and security people were the raidersM . 
Honourable Kibaki, who later become President in the NARC government, revealed in his 
contribution to the insecurity debate: 
We have kept records over the last six months of at least five, six and seven 
instances of cattle rustling where cattle were taken from one part of Kenya, 
whichever district, and the number of the cattle taken was identified as 2,000, 
3,000 or 4,000. The police established the direction the livestock were being 
driven. We are told that the police took action. In some places, we're told 
that the police used helicopters, obviously to try to track them. For five days, 
they clearly established where the livestock went. They definitely did and the 
police know it. But, .. .up to today, the livestock have not been recovered and 
nobc4y has been arrested. Therefore, those who took the livestock by force 
have been allowed to keep them ... Government has no will or determination. 
(Ibid: 2334). 
62 	my fieldwork in Alale West Pokot, the chiefs Were highly respected. 
63 See Daily Nation 14 January 2003 "Lets rçthink issue of PC's". Noted in other sections were the 1996 
parliamentary debates on large numbers of cattlo stolen in Samburu- Baragoi. 
64 See Daily Hansard 24 October, 1966:2316 
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Recovery by Kenya's postcolonial government has been worse than the colonial 
administration. Evidence for this is provided in Chapter 6, where police data on recoveries is 
provided. It is evident from this discussion that the inability or unwillingness of the 
government to provide security or to disarm raiding communities and the collusion of some 
government officials with the raiders has led to diminished trust in government. The next 
section shows how the result of this is the arming of civilian vigilantes to provide security. 
4.5 Security and Governance in Pastoral Areas 
4.5.1 The Vigilante Concept in North Rift 
States have the mandate to protect citizens and their properties and therefore possess the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of force. In Karamoja, this mandate has been partially 
relegated to paramilitary institutions with vigilante and Local Defence Units and militia not 
being embedded in the constitution. In Kenya, the Kenya Police Reservists are the modern 
incarnation of the tribal police that were used by the colonial authorities to maintain law and 
order in African rural areas since 1927. This is arguably security on the cheap. This section 
specifically examines the role played by paramilitary units in peace building first in Kenya 
then in Uganda. 
The areas concerned in this study are extensive, and and wild, with weak state presence. 
Administration is further made difficult by lack of communication; officers seldom visit 
some areas. There is low morale and negative attitudes amongst government personnel due to 
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low salaries and lack of personal security. The loss of trust in government to provide security 
has created the demand for vigilantes, mentioned in chapter 2, in the pastoral areas, a move 
towards the involvement of local populations in security management. The growth of the 
vigilante system in Uganda can also be attributed to uneasiness with state agencies 
(Kibandama, 2002: 9), the failure of policing, and to an absence of the rule of law. Another 
factor is the 'military solution' "high-handedness with which the army dealt with the security 
issues, which alienated the Karimojong communities even more65 . In many areas no courts 
exist,66 especially at the parish and sub-county levels67 . 
When local people find that the state does not protect them or their concept of order and 
justice differs from that of the state, they may organise independently of the state to impose 
order and security. A growing desperation has gripped both Kenyans and Ugandans due to 
the escalation of insecurity in the North Rift, and the feeling has spilled over into most rural 
and urban areas alike68 . The police fail to contain crime, and a number of them have been 
implicated in violent crimes themselves.69 Every level of society hunts for practical ways to 
deal with soaring crime. Some have formed private security companies (PSC) or vigilante 
groups. The chairman of Kenya Private Sector Foundation (KPSF) argues that vigilante 
groups allow communities to play a bigger role in security and police work. 70 In the context 
of this section, privatisation of security means provision of security by non-state actors, by 
65 Muhereza I 997a 
66 Rosenau (1995:13-43) says governance is "Systems of nile that can be maintained and their controls 
successfiully and consistently exerted even in the absence of established legal or political authority". 
67  For details see also Recommendations of the Workshop on Security for the communities of Karamoja. 
Organized by Pax Christi, Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Programme hind Kotido Peace Initiative. Held at Mount 
Moroto Hotel, Moroto 20-21 November 2003. Also see Sustainable Disarmament, Pece and Development 
in Karamoja workshop. 22-23 November, 2003, Moroto, Uganda. 
68 East African 5 April, 2004; Kenya Times 8 April 2004; For Uganda see East African 22 March, 2004 
Uganda 'Could Slide into Genocide" 
69 ibid. 
70 Mwaura, Samuel (2002), remarks at the proceedings of the International Resource Group Regional 
Annual Conference on Good Governance and the Rule of Law in the Horn of Africa. 11-13 September. 
Held at Leopards Beach, Mombasa Kenya. 
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civilians who are armed by the state for protection of their communities. Though again it 
must be understood that the pastoralists have to some extent enjoyed their isolation and lack 
of central control. 
This shifting of responsibility then raises the questions: 
Why can states not protect people? 
Is there a vigilante concept of order and justice different from the state? 
Who organises the groups and who becomes a member? 
4. 	Where do resources originate? 
Organisers and members of vigilante groups are most likely to be those with local power or 
others whom they authorise to act on their behalf. Warriors7 ' are a pool of ready-made social 
category labour for this purpose in pastoral areas. States may on occasion, and due to their 
own weakness or lack of resources, exploit this vigilante activity, turning vigilantes into local 
defence units, people's militia or voluntary police and incorporating them into state 
structures and regulations72 . Other parties may also attempt to do the same including guerrilla 
armies, criminals and commercial interests. 
The term is contested. 73 The consequence of conflict has been the production of aggressive, 
courageous warriors and vigilantes. The term 'vigilante' implies action taken to control 
violence outside official systems. Little and Sheffield (1996: 226) define vigilantism as an 
'establishment [of] violence', designed to create, maintain, or recreate an established socio- 
71 In the case of pastoral areas among the Masai, they noted that there was favouritism in recruitment of the 
local militias 
72 See for example East African 24 March, 2004; Daily Monitor 4 October, 2003 
73 See Johnstone 1996, 2001; Abraham 1986, 1998:8-9. "Who note they are Social movements that give 
rise to premeditated acts of force and corporal punishment or the thr to use violence or corporal 
punishment; activities that arise as reaction to transgression ofe4ives well established, sometimes 
institutionalized, norms: acts that fckcused upon crime and/or social  control in for the form of providing 
security to participants and membqrs of established orders;  and groups that are seen as constituted outside 
legal frameworks enforced by thet" 
219 
political order'. Vigilantes can be state officials or private citizens. Higgins (1991: 8-9) 
argues further that they can include on-duty policemen engaged in extra-legal violence (1991: 
8-9), members of 'quasi-official death squads and paramilitary/para-police groups.' The 
terms 'vigilante' or' 'militia' are alternately used in this section as both are community based 
and organised and sometimes they are the same bandits that prey on the same community. 
(See Figure 4.1) 
Figure 4.1: Security Actors in the North Rift 
Uganda tiers of security Kenya tiers of security 
Uganda Peoples' Defence Force (UPDF) Kenya Army 
Police Police! General Security Unitl Anti Stock 
Theft Units 
Anti Stock Theft Units 
(Talibans) 
Home 	Guards/Kenya Police 	Reservists 
(KPR) 
Local Defence Units (LDU) Militias 
Local Administration Police  
Militias  
Lords Resistance Army  
Allicd Defence Force  
Patriotic Reformed Army  
Source: Field interviews 2002-2003 
Inter-clan, cross-border incursions in the North Rift have always required intervention by 
central government forces. In Uganda, the UPDF has been used to restore peace and security 
in the region from time to time. Auxiliary forces in the affected districts are most often 
mobilized to address security problems in Karamoja. The arrangement between militia and 
Local Defence Units (LDU) is part of wider security measures there. The current tiers of 
security in Karamoja are: the Local Defence Units (LDUs) composed of ex-vigilantes who 
were warriors and ex-anti stock theft people who were original ly warriors, retrained in 2002 
and nicknamed the 'Talibans' There is also the militia, but they are being used to fight the 
74 This is because their training coincided with the Afghan war with the USA 
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Lords Resistance Army in the North ofUganda. 75 In some places, especially in Plan County, 
warriors have been re-armed as home guards. The LDUs are now based in barracks while the 
home guards are expected to move with the animals and are based in the kraals. There are 
also local administration police (LAPs) but they are very few. 
LDUs have no central command and in the case of Uganda they have no legal status. As 
noted by Honourable Lokawua: 
There is no statute that covers the LDUs. We are currently using a certain Police Act, 
which I think has expired. The tribal militias are answerable to the elders as much as 
they are answerable to the police. 76 
In Uganda the diversity of actors complicates the governance and security situation. It is also 
acceptance by the Ugandan government of its inability to provide security to its own citizens. 
In Kenya the tiers of security in pastoral areas include the home guards or KPR, and the 
warriors. Theoretically, the army is available, but it is based in barracks and only interferes 
in cattle rustling conflicts when they escalate. Normally the Kenyan government uses the 
General Service Units (GSU), and the police, which are very thin on the ground. The anti 
stock theft unit, which was formed in the 1970s exists, but one wonders what work it does, 
given the escalation of cattle rustling. 
In Kenya, KPR are embedded in the constitution. However they are still lacking clear 
recruitment and disciplinary  procedures, which has allowed the provincial police officers the 
powers to hire and fire at will. There is no clear chain of command, a situation that has 
allowed them to create their own cartels, perpetuating crime in pastoral areas 77 . 
75 IRIN 8 September 2003; see also Daily Monitor 8 September 2003. 
76 
77  
Interview, Michael Lokawua, Kamp 16 May 2003. 
Seaily, Nation 6 April 2004. http://ww.eastandard.netJheadlines/news060404O2.htm.  
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4.5.2 Security and Governance in Karamoja, Uganda. 
The Uganda Army and the Local Defence Units who are not embedded in the constitution 
have worsened the security situation in Karamoja, retarding peace and development efforts 
and displacing people. As noted earlier, their response in animal recovery is too fast and 
authoritarian. In a recent security meeting in Moroto, the majority view was that there should 
be village security force in Karamoja to protect the people 78 . This sub section examines the 
origin of vigilantes, which are relatively new in Karamoja and how they have now 
metamorphosed into LDUs and militias. 
The rise in Vigilantes in Karamoja 
The creation of vigilante groups was a response to the increase in cattle raids and banditry in 
Karamoja79 . People initially wanted to create camps Where vigilantes would live, so that from 
the camps they could follow the stolen cattle. 8° The vigilantes' duty was mainly recovery of 
stolen animals by tracking them, and errant warriors responsible for raids, down. The 
vigilantes were also supposed to convince the people to stop raiding, hand in and register 
their guns and become vigilantes81 . Although these groups tried to contain the cattle-raiding 
problem, it became evident that they could not do so without the aid of the government, 
whose support was not initially forthcoming. 
At first a small force of ten vigilantes was formed. Abura Pirir got support from non- 
78 See Workshop on Security for the People of Karamoja and its Neighbouring Districts: The Way Ahead 
Workshop organized by Paxi Christi Netherlands, in partnership with the Karamoja Agro-Pastoral 
Development Programme and Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN) Mt. Moroto Hotel, Moroto, 20-21 
November2003. 
79 See Mkutu 2003 op cit. 
80 Interviews, Father John Bosco, Amudat, 17 June 2001. 
81 Interview Peterken former Resident District Commissioner for Nakapiripirit and a founder member of the 
vigilante Nakapiripirit, January 203. 
222 
governmental organizations (NGOs) and churches. 82 They first started by securing the roads, 
which the Ugandan army had not been able to accomplish, even when travelling in convoys. 
The vigilantes were effective in greatly reducing insecurity on the roads 83 . 
President Museveni was pressed to address the problem of cattle raids and insecurity caused 
by Karamoja warriors. On a visit to the area, he decided to support the concept of 
vigilantism. He appointed a minister for Karamoja, as the president's representative on 
security, who spoke the language and understood the problems. The president put the 
vigilantes under the Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF). The vigilante force was then 
increased from its initial 10 to 1000 people in each of 8 counties in Karamoj a. 84 
In the beginning the idea seemed to work well, since the vigilantes were able to stop cattle 
raids and highway robberies for a while. 85 As in the words of Father Bosco; 
A friend of mine.., would ride a motorbike from Moroto to Namalu for 80-90 km 
distance, and he was never ambushed 86 . 
Interviews revealed that in the beginning, the efforts of these groups were embraced by the 
community. The people were part of the community, so it was assumed they could 
understand their own people. They were paid for their work by the government to encourage 
them to use their weapons for the right purposes, and not to settle internal conflicts. To 
qualify as a vigilante, one had to register his firearm. Retired men and women were not 
required to register their guns, the rationale was that if they had firearms, they had bought 
them from the government and must have registered them at the time 87. Some women were 
82 Other researchers attribute the vigilante conception to the "Karamoja Pacification Committee" (KPC) 
headed by a Divisional Army Commander comprising mainly security personnel in the Region and 
mandated to find a solution to the militaty problem in Karamoja. 
83 See Mkutu 2003 op. cit 
84 Field notes June 200 1-2002 and 2003 
85 Interview Father John Bosco, Amudat, 17 June 2001 and January 2003. 
86 Ibid. The Church of Uganda backed the vigilante concept as a people's initiative and at one time even 
bought uniikrms for the recruits. 
87 	notes June 2001, January- February 2003 and November 2003. See also Mkutu 2003 op. cit. 
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also hired as vigilantes, mainly being used as informants. Retired elders, prison wardens, 
policemen and soldiers also became vigilantes. The warriors that agreed to register their guns 
were paid 10,00088  Ugandan shillings each month by the government 89 . In recent times that 
amount has been increased  to 30,000 0. The money is distributed by the UPDF on behalf of 
the Ugandan government. In Namalu, warriors I interviewed said that the money is not 
reliable. Sometimes the government is in arrears by as long as three months. 91 This angers 
the warriors who will sometimes go on the roads and rob motorists in lieu of payment. 
Father Bosco, a victim of vigilante attack, informed me: 
As I talk, I am carrying a bullet in my leg. I was travelling, taking school 
children to Kangole, and when we neared Moroto they shot at the van. 
Luckily, I was the only one wounded. 92 
Father Bosco also mentioned that a friend of his managed to overcome a bandit, and when 
the attacker's gun was recovered it had a vigilante registration number93 . When I talked to the 
vigilantes, they defended themselves, claiming that they did not engage in violent robbery but 
said other warriors with non-registered arms were the bandits and cattle rustlers 94. Evidence 
from the ordinary citizen acknowledged that the vigilantes, despite doing a very good job 
initially, now threaten the very security they are supposed to protect. The people interviewed 
said that the unrestrained use of small arms by vigilantes was alarming, and the rise in 
civilian casualties and domestic violence was causing many to question the validity of these 
88 Equivalent to £3.80 
89 By the end of 1995, the government was spending 60 million Uganda shillings per month to pay 
vigilantes in Karamoja Daily Monitor 9 October 1995 "Government Spends Shs.60m on Karamoja 
Vigilantes. 
to £13 in 2001 
91 Ibi 	 id. This was also confirmed in nterviews in November 2003. 
92 Interview, Father John Bosco, Amudat, St. Joseph, 14 June, 2001 
93 Ibk. Field  nOtes January 2003 
94 Fiel4otes January-February, May and November 2003. 
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groups. The late Father Bruno, informed me that: 
They are using the bread [payment] from the government without helping the 
government; they are milking the cow without feeding it. 95 
Another respondent said; "The warriors are earning salaries and yet still killing people." 96 
This state of affairs seems mainly due to ineffective payment and corruption97. Evidence 
from the field indicated that with the introduction of disarmament in Uganda (chapter 7) in 
December 2001, the vigilante groups were not dissolved but their formal contract with the 
government ceased to exist, though their guns were not retrieved 98 . The same guns are now 
used for general crime (banditry and road ambushes). It is worthy of note that not all areas in 
Karamoja had vigilante groups. 
Metamorphosis of LDUs 
The chart below shows the metamorphosis of the vigilante groups from the early 1990s to the 
present. 
Figure 4.2 Metamorphosis of Vigilante to current status in Uganda 
Warriors 
I Vigilante 1993-1995 	I 
LDUs 2001-4 	I 	I ASTUs 
Home guards 2003 I I LDUs/militias 	I I Talibans/ASTU 
95 Interviews, Father Bruno, Novelli and Moroto, 16 June, 2001 
96 Field notes January-February, May and November 2003 
97 lnterview Honorable Michael Lokawua, former MP Moroto Central and Assistant Kampala, 17, May 
2003. 
98 Field notes January and February 2003. 
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Warriors are community members, appointed by the elders to protect the cattle of the 
community against raiders. Most have been armed for many years. Vigilantes were former 
warriors, responsible for protecting the wider community and later paid by the state through 
the army, as mentioned above. The LDUs are mostly former warriors and vigilantes, which 
have moved through the processes above. They are trained for one month, are under the 
'command of the UPDF and are paid between 30,000 and 60,000 Uganda shillings, which 
sometimes takes months to reach them. Unlike the former vigilantes, the LDU\s are given 
guns by the government to help the UPDF. It is not very clear if these are arms they 
originally owned as vigilantes or if they were re-armed. They share the same barracks as the 
UPDF and mix with them. In addition to being in this chain of command, they are also under 
the authority of the elders, and receive instructiort from them. 
Problems with creation of such paramilitaries include the fact that there was no legislation 
establishing LDUs. The non-legality of the LDUs as well as their welfare has been a subject 
of debate from Ugandan parliamentarians99 . There is no clear definition of their chores, term 
of office, and command structures. 100  In an interview with Lokawua he noted "the tribal 
militias are answerable to the elders as much as they are answerable to the UPDF". He also 
said "To me, the LDUs should have been under the command of the police, because they 
have been changing from the police to the army and vice versa, which I do not understand." 
101 Other major problems are decision-making, communication, and lack of evaluation. The 
99 See New Vision 17 May 2003 "Defense grilled over LDUs" 
100 Furthermore, the RDC does not have powers over the commanders of the military. The commanders 
usually receive orders from higher-rankingcommanders and are supposed to communicate orders to the 
people. The RDC is the President's security man in the districts. 
101 interviews Honorable Michael Lokawua, Presidential Assistant on Disannament, former MP for Moroto 
municipality (1996-2001) and chairman Moroto District Local Government (1991-1995). Kampala 17 May 
2003 and 22 November 2003. On 21-22 November 2003 during a workshop in Moroto on Security for the 
people ofKaramoja and Neighbouring Districts. A question raised was: who should control community 
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creating and disbanding of the various paramilitary institutions has caused severe confusion. 
LDUs are recruited from among the warriors. The recruitment criteria are not clear, and their 
training does not instil responsibility. The Dodoth, the Jie, the Bokora, the Matheniko and 
even the Upe Pokot still behave like warriors and are not ready to work as a national army 
but only as a tribe. In the training of LDU, they are not mixed with other tribes, hence they 
are not encouraged to become nationalistic but remain tribal. 
The activities of the LDUs and of warriors are sometimes similar in many respects, especially 
as their activities can sometimes be classified as illegal or extralegal. 102  The LC5 Kotido 
noted: 
In most cases recovery of rustled animals by UPDFILDUs has become a source of 
contempt as they missed targets, hurt more 'innocent' people than criminal elements, 
took advantage e.g. rustled cattle were sold as fast as possible. UPDF/LDUs are 
'suspected' of selling recovered cattle.' ° 
As noted by the Inspector General for Police in Uganda, "Whereas some LDU\s have 
demonstrated their worth, some have done the opposite ... They continue to engage themselves 
in violent crime" 104 . 
While in the field, it was mentioned that the LDUs were being trained and taken to fight by 
the Lord's Resistance Army in the North.' °5 In one instance, two men jumped off an army 
lorry because they were being taken to Lira to fight. The Members of Parliament wanted to 
based security forces and how? Given that the Uganda government has failed in providing security to the 
Karimojong. 
102 Note early they are involved in the sale of arms and ammunition, and in cattle raids. See Knighton, 2003 
103 Hon Adome Lokwii Callistus LC V Kotido ibid. 
104 Mr. Katumba Wamala, Speech given in workshop in Kampala, 2001 
105 This was confirmed in an interview with Alerio Ornara, the Uganda Human Right Commissioner, 
interview, Moroto 21 November 2003, who noted that they have complained to President Museveni about 
the use of Local Defence Units to fight Kony. See Also IRIN 9 September 2003; IR1N 8 September 2003; 
Daily Monitor 8 September2003. 
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know from the Minister of State about the deployment ofLDU personnel in military combat, 
arguing that LDU were being used as cheap labour. 106 Deployment of LDU in combat was 
problematic, since they were not yet covered under existing law. What happens to their 
causalities in war? Also, without the LDU embedded in the constitution, the government can 
use them to abuse human rights, and government cannot be held accountable. 107 Similar 
abuse can be noted when corrupt officials built houses using their LDU allowances. 
In field interviews, the LDUs said that when they were recruited, they thought they would be 
protecting their communities while living in them, being paid a salary to benefit their 
families and being able to direct family affairs, but they were disappointed in their 
restrictions. One mentioned that he had three wives, yet was required to stay in the barracks. 
When cattle raids occur, even those involving their own cattle, they are not allowed to 
respond promptly but must follow the UPDF command, something they are not used to. So 
people violate the rules or leave the LDU. 
Because of dissatisfaction with their treatment and pay, the men in LDU are deserting. 
Interviews indicated that the well-trained and armed Karimojong desert with their arms and 
return back to the society, then train other warriors. But an interview with one of the UPDF 
revealed that LDUs and other paramilitary units have been subject to military law, though it 
could not be produced in writing. Desertion contravened section 38(1) of the National 
Resistance Army Statute of 1992, and constituted the commitment of an offence, and upon 
conviction, one was liable to either suffer death or life imprisonment. The fact that LDUs still 
deserted meant that either they had been left with no option, or they were aware that nothing 
would happen to them when they deserted. 
106 New Vision 17 May, 2003"Defense Grilled over LDUs" 
107 i-ton. Ruth Nankabirwa recently said, while defending the creation of paramilitary units, that their 
existence was justifiable under Article 17(1) and (2) of the Constitution. See Namutebi, J. and H. Mukasa, 
"Arrow Group militia to get shi lb facilitation", New Vision, 3 September 2003. 
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At a Moroto Workshop in 2001, it was suggested that the LDUs should be properly 
facilitated. At the security meeting in Moroto in November 2003, it was noted that LDUs 
should be at village level where they can provide security to the communities instead of 
being turned into an army reservist. However, in the field in 2003, those interviewed said that 
they were not given food regularly and had not been paid for two months, and this forced 
them to go raiding' °8 . The inconsistent and poor pay, along with inflation, makes for an 
unreliable local defence system open to bribes and corruption. They are deserting from 
serving the "states" with their arms without being traced by the states; this further perpetuates 
the banditry and road ambushes, leading to more arms in the communities. Some of the 
deserters are responsible for training the warriors, which provides them with better skills to 
be even more violent. It in turn contributes to the weak governance as they turn against the 
governing bodies that arm them. This is also a breeding ground for future racketeers, which 
have already caused problems in Karamoja.' 09 The civilians concurred with the LDUs 
saying that the LDUs involvement in raiding is partly due to their low salary, but lack of 
human security is making the communities demand the vigilante back claiming that at least 
they are community based as opposed to the LDUs ° 
Creahon of Militias to Fight Alongside the Army 
In Uganda, militia groups are emerging as the security of the communities. Some Of these 
are armed civilians who volunteer to assist the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) to 
fight the Lords Resistance Army. They are mainly unemployed youths who have nothing to 
do. They have been created with the argument that UPDF could not cover the whole cOnflict 
as the recruitment into the army has been constrained by the relatively small defence budget, 
108 When I visited the field between 18-23 November 2003 the Local Defence Units had still not been paid. 
109 Again as noted early the term warlord is contested, but for more details see Muhereza, 1997, Ocan, 
1992, Mkutu, 2003 
110 Field notes, Moroto November 2003. 
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which is under constant scrutiny by both the donor community and the country's 
opposition.' 1 'In the Langi area, the government of Uganda has created over 8000 militias to 
fight the LRA (Wax, 2004). Recently the Uganda government admitted that its technique of 
arming militia groups in the eastern Teso region is succeeding in weakening the LRA rebel 
group. The army spokesperson noted "in the last few weeks, slowly but surely, we are 
neutralizing (LRA) Kony in Teso." 12 
The development of militia groups like the Kenya Police Reservists (formed by the 
Government of Kenya, as discussed in the next section) and Local Defence Units, the Arrow 
boys" 3 and Rhino groups in northern Uganda who are armed by the states, leads to the 
weaponization of society, putting arms into hands of people poorly trained in their use." 4 
The main interest of the militia groups is just to defend their tribes from those seen as 
'enemies'. The Ugandan government's decision to arm home guards in Pian even resulted in 
the arms being used to terrorize their cousins, the Bokora. 
4.5.3 Security and Governance in Pastoral Areas of Kenya 
From their very historical beginnings, the Kenyan police never enjoyed a comfortable 
interaction with Kenyan citizens. The history of the Kenyan police force goes back to the 
incorporation of Kenya into the British colonial Empire and the construction of the Kenya 
Uganda railway (Mombasa to Uganda). The first formal police structure dates back to 1896 
III See East African 22 March, 2004 "Uganda could slide back into genocide"; Also East African March 
22, 2004 
112 IRIN, Kampala, 8 1h September 2003. 
113 See Daily Monitor, 12 February 2004, "Arrow boys a security threat" 
http://www.nationaudio.comlNews/EastAfrican/22032004/Regional/Reg1ona12203200439.html  
http://www.monitor.co.ug/news/news02128.php.  
114 The cattle rustlers have struck a deal with the rebels. They get guns, the LRA take the animals. This new 
twist intensifies the proliferation and sales of arms and makes the conflict moreeomplicated. 
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in Mombasa where a force comprised of a British Assistant Superintendent, two inspectors 
and Indian personnel was established.' 15 With the hostility that the British faced in the 
construction of the railway from various African communities, especially the Masai and 
Nandi, security was of paramount concern. The genesis of the police force then was tied to 
the security of the colonial officers and the protection of their property. It became then the 
weapon of punishment and 'pacification' of communities. At its colonial beginning, the 
police force carried the marks of a punitive force to ensure law and order rather than a crime 
investigating and customer service oriented body. At independence in 1963, the structures of 
the colonial regime were transferred, in their entire state, to the new government. No 
retraining of the police was undertaken and the only sign of change was the rapid promotions 
of African officers to the top (Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2002). The repression of any who 
opposed their purposes continued. The police's tactics, philosophy and attitude have been the 
subject of various condemnatory studies by Kenyan and international human rights groups, 
the media as well as other civil society organizations' 16 . 
Unlike the other states in the Horn of Africa, Kenya has not had a tradition of allowing 
vigilantes to develop in non pastoral areas until recently. The appearance of localized, semi-
political, largely informal militias first surfaced during the return of multiparty politics in 
1992 as part of an effort to counter political liberalization and reform movements through 
violence. Discussions with Kenyans from different parts of the country, together with media 
reports, have identified over a dozen of these groups, the most prominent of which is the 
Nairobi based Jeshi la Mzee (Army of the Old Man); others include Mungiki, Jeshi la 
Embakasi, Baghdad boys, Chinkororo, Amachuma, Taliban, Sungq Sungu and Kaya Bombo 
115 For a fuller discussion on the beginnings of the police force in Kenya, see Clayton and Killingray 
(1989). Ohio, 1989. 	- 
116 	
i See, for nstance, Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), Quarterly Repression Reports (1994-); 
African Rights, Kenya: Shadow Justice, London, 1996; African Rights, Destroying Soweto: The Burning 
Issue of Land Rights, 1997; US State Department, US Country Reports on Kenya, 1999. See East African 6 
April 2004 www.eastandard.netlheadlines/news06040402.htm. 
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boys. Several of these groups are associated with individual politicians associated with 
different parties. This section describes their emergence with a bias in pastoral areas. 
Increasing Insecurity and Lawlessness in Kenya' 17 
The infusion of weapons from Uganda, Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia, the competition for 
scarce water and pasture, and the increase in cattle raids (all noted earlier), combined with 
limited security, persuaded the Kenya government to use the Kenya Police Reserve' 18 They 
are similar to the Ugandan vigilantes mentioned earlier. 
Firearms are now to be found in rural areas where in the past, criminals only had access to 
crude weapons. In pastoral areas the problem is so serious the government has been forced to 
allow the worst affected in the North Rift to arm themselves with guns as aneans of seif-
protection from cattle raiders. The government has had to similarly issue guns to police home 
guards and reservists to augment mainstream security efforts in the more remote parts of the 
country. The plan was basically meant to allow locals to be involved in underwriting their 
own security. 
This section examines the ongoing development of the vigilante home guards (KPR) in 
Kenya, with their merits and demerits. 
Origin of the KPRJHome Guards in Kenya 
During the colonial era, the government saw little need to provide for the security of 
pastoralists. The policy adopted in regard to the pastoral communities in this region was one 
117 See East African Standard 21 April 2004 "the dangers of run way crime now facing Kenya" 
118 For increasing insecurity see Daily Nation 3 April, 2004,Kenya Times 3 March, 2004. 
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of "observation only, while efforts were to be made to establish native courts and to build up 
a force of tribal police." 9 In 1953, the entire police force in Kenya was 5,288 officers of 
whom 166 were Europeans, 60 Asians and 4,962 Africans (1953 Police Commission 
Report). They mainly operated in the settled areas. 
Outside of the regular police there was the tribal police force, constituted by the tribal police 
ordinance, 1929. This had originated from District managers who needed to carry out police 
duties, and used local people to do so. This maintained closer touch with the people than the 
regular police drawn from all parts of the colony. The Kenya Police Reserve, a body of 
unpaid volunteers, was established in 1948 to bridge the gap between the regular police and 
the civilian population. In 1953 constables in the home guard received KSh 132 per month 
plus housing and uniforms. They were under the care and supervision of district officers, 
were to assist the regular police to enforce control of movement, and also could be called out 
for other local duty. 
The home guard was a strong base from which the colonial government carried out offensive 
action against any group that tried to terrorize or in any way interfere with the labour force on 
the farms. At first the home guards were mainly used as guides, trackers and collectors of 
information. Soon they were able to undertake night patrols to enforce government curfew or 
other regulations. Later they played a role in collection of communal fines imposed under the 
provisions of the special districts ordinances, but again, they worked with military protection. 
By March 1953, the home guards' total strength in just the Kikuyu districts of Nyeri and 
Kiambu had risen to about 15,000. On March 3rd, at a meeting chaired in Nairobi by the 
Deputy Director of Operations, Major General Hinde, it was tentatively agreed that 20 per 
cent of the home guards should be armed, with European officers to command them. They 
119 KNJJPCFD7/1/1• NFD Handbook, (1917.106) "The Northern Frontier, Its Boundaries, Districts and 
Inhabitants" 
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were well trained and there was a well-organized force in settled areas. On 20 April 1953, 
Hinde issued a directive formally establishing an African home guard named the Kikuyu 
Guard; a large part of its responsibility was to resist the activities of the Mau Mau, the 
nationalist militant group pushing for Kenyan independence. 
Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) now operates under the Police Act Cap. 84 laws of Kenya 
(1970, revised in 1998). They are civilian volunteers employed to assist in the maintenance 
of law and order, the preservation of peace, the protection of life and property, the prevention 
and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, and the enforcement of all laws and 
regulations. Owing to a shortage of security officers' 20, the government uses the Kenya 
Police Reservists to supplement the work of the police, especially in marginal areas. 12 ' 
Currently, there are about 5,000 reservists in Kenya. Nearly 2,000 of these are in North Rift 
and North Eastern Province pastoral areas. They tackle insurgents and cattle rustlers from the 
neighbouring countries. In Nairobi, there are about 500 reservists trained in rapid response in 
case of bank robberies and carjacking.' 22 
The reservists have hierarchical rankings ranging from corporal to sergeant and discipline is 
supposed to be as any other force' 23 . As security personnel they are entitled to possess 
firearms. However these arms are supposed to be inspected, controlled and accounted for. A 
question that arises here is why would people do such a risky job for no pay? 
120 The current number of police in Kenya is listed at 30,000 in the nation of approximately 30 million 
people. That means currently unfavorable police-to-citizen ratio of 1:1150. Far below the United Nations 
recommended ratio of 1:450. 
121 Pastoral areas like Samburu, Turkana, West Pokot, Wajir, Marsabit and others. The total number of 
KPR in pastoral areas is believed to be 5,000. 
122 See Kenya Times 21 April, 2004 "Reservists were becoming the antithesis of law itself" see also Sabala 
and Mkutu, 2004 
123 Cap 84, section VII, 1988: 20-21 
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It is worth noting that in urban areas the KPR force was disbanded as of 18 April 2004.124 
The reasons included the fact that officers had become a threat to national security instead of 
defending it. In some areas the officers commanding police divisions did not know the 
number of men they had even though they were issued with firearms, ammunition and 
walkie-talkies' 25 . 
Merits and Demerits of KPRs 
Provincial administrators are the organizers of local security efforts, and they work in 
collaboration with the administration police to maintain law and order. Between January 
2001 January and November 2003, a questionnaire was administered to District Officers in 
various parts of Kenya. Among other things, the questions aimed to learn their views on 
disadvantages and advantages of KPR as an effective security organ in Kenya. Out of 180 
questionnaires, 79% were returned. 
The responses reveal a number of things. Firstly, the District officers felt that KPR had an 
advantage in protecting the community, their animals and resources since they were within 
reach when needed to counter attacks from external aggressors. Secondly, their familiarity 
with the local people and the local terrain allowed them to get wind of an impending attack, 
and to respond quickly and effectively. 
An Officer in Charge of Police (OCPD) who was interviewed concurred with this: 
Home guards play a very important role; they scare away Karimojong. The issue of 
using home guards is not good but due to border conflicts it is good to guard 
124 Daily Nation 10 April 2004 "Kenya Police reserve force is disbanded"; Daily Nation 21 April 2004 
"Police reserves 'were a threat to security'; Kenya Times 21 April "It is worthy to point out here that there 
are two types of KPR in the urban areas, the Asian based one that they use to terrorize Kenyans and 
normally Kenyans who are also KPR. They work does not address either of these two groups but examines 
the village KPR. 
125 Daily Nation 21 April, 2004 "Police reserves were a threat to security" 
235 
themselves against Karamoja and other tribes of neighbouring countries. 126 
Owing to the few police posts in marginal and border areas, KPR supplement and support the 
work of the Administration Police and the Kenya Police, saving money (since they are not 
paid). Use of vigilantes/KPR is an acknowledgment by the government of the scale of 
insecurity in the region. Since the government provides arms to the vigilantes, someone 
becomes officially accountable for their use. Therefore, from the state's perspective, using 
KPR is a cost effective security method. 
Despite the merits of the Kenya Police Reservists, there are problems. First, they contribute 
to insecurity by misusing the arms in their possession. This was recently confirmed on his 
tour in the North Rift, when the Minister for Internal Security, Chris Murungaru, said that all 
the 5,000 police reservists would be disarmed, accusing them of being partisan in the war 
against crithe "The government would no longer entrust the security of its people [to] non-
uniformed officers and armed civilians." 27 
The vigilantes are prone to use illegal guns on pretext of official use. In some cases 
government weapons have been used to raid neighbouring communities. While in West 
Pokot during fieldwork in 2002, a government official interviewed told me that the Kenya 
Police Reservists colluded with rustlers to go raiding. From January-August, 2002, five aims 
that were recovered in raids belonged to Kenya Police Reservists.' 28 Also it was noted that 
in March- February 2002, people went to raid in Uganda, and a G3 was confiscated by the 
Uganda security. On checking the source, it was discovered it belonged to a KPR. 
Sometimes arms are given to untrained KPR personnel. Evidently some police reservists 
126  Interview OCPD 8 June 2002. Did not want his name quoted. 
127 Daily Nation. (2003). All 5,000 Police Reservists to go, says Murungaru. Nairobi. Daily Nation. 
Naimbi. 
128 Interview, government official, name withheld, Kachiliba, Kenya, 2 August 2002. 
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compromise their security role and contribute to the diffusion of arms in the society and the 
race for arms among the different ethnic groups 129 . 
KPRs are not forced to follow orders, as the police are, hence it is difficult to control and 
discipline them. This has allowed the provincial police officers, the only ones with powers to 
fire and hire reservists, to abuse the process with impunity. Because KPR are not directly 
answerable to a clear chain of command, they have created their own cartel that perpetuates 
crime 130 . Some even hire or loan out their weapons for criminal activities.' 3 ' 
The laws of Kenya Cap. 14, section 5, (1) states that all firearms are issued by a firearms' 
licensing officer. However, in practice reservists obtain their firearms from the senior police 
officer in the district, after they have successfully completed an interview and have been 
found to be of good character. This is in contradiction to the above law (Kenya Cap 14, 
section 5, 1). It is exactly against this backdrop that the move by Police Commissioner 
Brigadier Mohamed Ali Hussein to disband Police Reservists in all urban areas should be 
seen. However, in pastoral areas and rural areas they were not.' 32 
4.6 Implications of Using KPR and Vigilantes LDUs) for Security 
The vigilante groups used to supplement the police have consequences for governance and 
democratic accountability. Falling outside full recognition of government authority, they live 
independent of other parts of society. Kampala and Nairobi pass the laws, but the people in 
North Rift decide which laws to obey and respect. 
129  See for example East African Standard 18 August 2004 State told to disarm home guards 
http://www.eastandard.netlheadlines/newsl  8080413 .htm 
130 East African Standard, 6 Apnl, 2004 
131 For example in April, 2000, security personnel in pursuit of bandits driving away stolen cattle from the 
Lorogon reserve in Turkana district, exchanged fire with the bandits and in the process recovered a 
registered KPR rifle. 
132 See Kenya Times 21 April 2004. 
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Semi autonomous security groups affect governance and democratic accountability in that, 
firstly they are the main focus of arms proliferation as I shall show in chapter 5, and secondly 
they challenge the official military, thus weakening the structures of governance, as noted in 
later sections. In case of political change, they might weaken governance further, since the 
LDUs are tied to both rebels and warriors' 33 . In Uganda, as President Museveni comes to the 
end of his term, these semi-autonomous units could split into smaller factions or merge with 
the rebels with devastating effect on the governance of the entire country. Such groups also 
undermine the effectiveness of the police. 
The involvement ofKPR/militias/vigilante in raids, in renting their arms, and in diffusion of 
arms to society, indicates a lack of discipline and a system infected with corruption and mal-
administration, one that seriously threatens effective border control and security. There is 
mortal danger in having a large number of unpaid, ill-disciplined but armed people who can 
easily be on hire and be turned into private militia to serve even political ends. This has been 
experienced before in Kenya when such groups were used in the Rift Valley clashes of 1991-
1992 and the 1997 clashes in Coastal areas of Kenya. Using the KPR in the short rUn saves 
the government much money, but in the long run it increases the potential for conflict and 
terrorising of innocent citizens.' 34  The shortage of personnel dictates that everything possible 
should be done to improve the knowledge and skills of the KPR, if they are to be effective, 
especially when located in border areas 
The cases of the Local Defence Units, militia and the home guards, clearly illustrate how 
weapons and bullets begin legally then enter the black market through inadequate 
documentation, irresponsible stockpile management, or unscrupulous arms trading. Without 
133 See for example Daily Monitor 4 October 2003 "Saleh angry over Ugandan shillings 4bn project. 
134 See for example Daily Nation 28 May 2004 "Home guards sacked after torture claim". 
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standing orders they cannot be easily controlled. These groups sometimes take the law into 
their own hands and use government weapons to settle personal scores. 
The vigilantes exacerbate inter-tribal cattle rustling and communal conflicts because each 
tribe has its own vigilante "police". They reinforce the self-destructive/defensive pattern of 
cattle raids and counter raids, causing alarming rates of unruliness and suffering by innocent 
citizens. The use of vigilantes has increased insecurity and destabilized the states, making 
security expensive to implement, monitor and control. 
Further, arming one community leads to others demanding arms for protection, legitimising 
misuse of both legal and illegal firearms. It causes suspicion of favouritism toward certain 
communities, and as a result, different ethnic groups which are friendly and peaceful, 
become hostile both to each other and to the government. 
47 ConcIuson 
In conclusion it is worth returning to the questions asked at the beginning of the chapter. 
What was the colonial governance system in pastoral areas? The colonial government mixed 
both modem public administration and a customary system of justice (council of elders) to 
reduce raidsand force fair settlement of disputes. They made maintenance of law and order 
the first.priority. They gave pastoralists what protection was possible under the British flag, 
but otherwise left them to their own customs and chiefs, as far as possible. As a result, the 
pastoral areas remained neglected and unaffected by other aspects of colonial governance. 
A second question was, if governance were strong would pastoralists still demand arms to 
protect themselves? As noted in previous sections, the only proper purpose for seeking arms 
is protection. The state is the authoritative political institution that is sovereign over a 
recognized territory. The weakening of one function drags others down with it, though it is 
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hard to determine an absolute threshold of collapse. At present, the state is unable or 
unwilling to implement its policies. And when it responds to insecurity through the police, 
they inflict punishment as much as protection. This situation is central to communities' 
demands to protect themselves. The result has been continued marginalization of pastoral 
communities and increased cattle rustling, so that they demand arms to protect themselves 
and their property (examined further in chapter 5). The failure of governance has produced 
inter-ethnic confrontations in the form of cattle rustling, and the loss of much life and 
property. The failure of governance is the main cause for this internal arms race, which is 
examined in the next chapter. 
Thirdly, is vigilantism the best system in pastoral areas, and can it sustain good governance, 
safety, security and the rule of law? The prevalence of vigilantes in the North Rift 
demOnstrates that the two states (Uganda and Kenya) are no longer the only entities citizens 
rely on for security. Moreover, it reveals that states no longer have a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence. The arming of citizens has not and will never eliminate crime. 
Instead it intensifies the problem beyond control and fosters anarchy. The rise of semi-
autonomous security forces is at the centre of bad governance and the inability of the state to 
fulfil their responsibilities. . 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, prohibits states from undertaking or permitting a 
range of abuses. Some of the arms being given to home guards end up being used for 
crithinal purposes. Government's failure to ensure that these arms are not improperly used. 
makes it partially responsible for abuses forbidden under these covenants. By using 
vigilantes, states abdicate their role of protecting life and property. The lack of policy, to 
regOlate the paramilitary forces creates problems of coordination, command, and control, 
which compound the current security dilemma in North RIft. The management and handling 
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of the local communal conflict has intensified and exacerbated the pastoral cattle raids and 
small arms proliferation, creating a conflict between the states and the community. 
Finally, the deserting of the LDUs and the use of militia in fighting the Lords Resistance 
Atmy has major implications. Firstly, there are now more arms in the community that cannot 
be traced. Secondly, the deserting LDUs are now trained and can organise and train others in 
major groups for raiding. 
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Chapter 5 
The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the North Rift 
"The gun is looked at as convertible currency. With a gun one can get cash; from 
cash, cows; from cows, guns; from guns, other general merchandise." 
5.1 Introduction (SALW dynamics) 
Chapter 2 noted the schools of thought on the cause and effect relationship between 
weapons and war. It concluded that although weapons may not be the root cause of war, 
they could be seen to exacerbate a volatile situation. However, it was noted that there was 
insufficient literature on the phenomena with regard to pastoralist conflicts. 
Availability and proliferation of arms in the North Rift contribute toward intensifying and 
escalating localized communal conflicts by increasing the lethality and duration of 
violence. Any localized communal confljct over pasture and water can lead to arms  being 
used for self-defence to repel a supposed criminal assault that threatens imminent danger 
of death, or to raiding for profit. The weaponization of society may lead to the use of 
arms by different local groups to destabillse  governance. This would result in further 
insecurity and weakened states, and if not checked, in anarchy. More small arms  in the 
comnunity lead to more violence and death, as previously law-abiding citizens take arms 
to sçtç arguments over small offeces. The widespread carrying of guns in the North 
Rift jççpardizes the safety of both the polie and cickzens  wit1qut weapons, and it leads to 
false confidence in the safety provided by small  aris. Thc çsy ava,ility of arms from 
wars in the Horn of Africa and their low cost is responsible for their diffusion in pastoral 
arcs. 
Interview, Peter Lokeris (Mster for Karamoja, Government of Uganda) Kampala 22 February, 2003 
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The proliferation of small arms and the competitive race to acquire them is clearly 
demonstrated in these words of a former District Commissioner of West Pokot in Kenya: 
Initially it was the Turkana who possessed arms because of their 
exposure to Ethiopia, and they used to raid Pokot, so Pokot decided 
to arm themselves and defend themselves. It was overdone, and the 
Pokot are fully armed. Later as the Pokot used their arms to molest 
their neighbours, the Turkana and Marakwet, the Marakwet 
decided to arm themselves in order to hit back. Now as we stand 
the Marakwet may be more armed than the Pokot. They may not be 
good fighters but they are well armed. This is because their 
armament has taken place in the past 5-6 years. They have 
deliberately armed themselves, so that they can hit the Pokot. They 
are not innocent. It is just that the Pokot are better fighters and are 
brave.2 
The proliferation of small arms is associated with the increased communal resource 
conflicts by pastoralists. The only livelihood option for most pastoralists is herding cattle. 
This is no longer viable without arms to protect them from potential raiders and to 
restock. 
Apart from intensifying and exacerbating the conflict within the larger region, the spread 
of the AK47 has made it hard to distinguish between conflict and criminality. Small arms 
lead to a syndrome of lawlessness, which now characterizes the North Rift. Finally, with 
proliferation, small arms themselves become convertible currency. 
The diffusion of arms in the North Rift starts with the story of Turkana. It then links to a 
regional perspective on conflict, which led to the spill of arms into peaceful areas. It also 
links the entire conflict to the cold war, where arms were brought to the region from 
opposing parts of the globe. The Disarmament in Uganda 200 1-2004 is also mentioned 
in this chapter, though the process and its impact are addressed in much greater detail in 
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chapter 7. The objective is to demonstrate the dynamics of accumulation and flow from a 
global perspective. 
5.2 Background to SALW Accumulation and Flows Among Pastoralists in the 
North Rift. 
This section examines the wider history of the development and build up of arms 
availability between 1900-1980 in North Rift, starting with Turkana and then in the 1950s 
with the cold war. As reported by Ali Omar a Somali in November 1913, "Abyssinians 
are selling rifles to the Northern Turkana, the price for one being 70 sheep, I donkey and 
I bullock."3 
Although Turkana land was generally dismissed as useless wasteland and not fit for 
colonial exploitation, it was a hotly contested area in East African colonial history until 
about 1921. Turkana is located in northwestern Kenya and is the second largest district. 
It shares international borders with Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda. Turkana's first contact 
with the outside was through the Swahili, Arab and Ethiopian (Abyssinian) ivory and 
slave traders4. European explorers, hunters, adventurers and colonial agents then followed 
with their trained soldiers. This period saw the introduction of small arms and light 
weapons for hunting wild animals. This destabilized the power balance in the 
northwestern region where the Turkana had been the dominant power. 5 The Turkana first 
obtained arms in the fallout from British-Abyssinian war of 1866, in which the British 
government sent an army to intercede on behalf of Charles Cameron and his staff, 
(Fabb 1987: 15). However, its proximity to Ethiopia played another role in diffusing arms 
into Turkana land. In November 1913, the Abyssinians (Ethiopians) were said to be 
2 District Commissioner (name withheld). Interview, Kenya, 25 May 2001. Also see KNA/DCIRVP 
report 1913; for a similar dynamic on how arms have spread in Acholi, Uganda, see Daily Monitor 18 
April 2004 "Genesis of gui-pawer in Acholi" 
KNA DCIJVP / AivaI report 1913; Another Somali trader Mohammed Yusufrcported a large number 
of tower muskets or Legas rifles, 450 near Kobua and the price was 50 sheep, I donkey, I bullock for a 
rifle with 20 rouis. SQ rounds oarnunition was being purchased for a donkey, the marks on the 
cartridges were said to be F.S.M or S.F.M. Capt Leek 4th, KAR in Dodos, confirmed this. 
Knighton (2003:433) notes that "they were business people after ivory and hides, and they killed with 
guns." 
Awuondo- Odegi, 1990; Barber, 1968; Lamphear, 1976; Pazzaglia, 1982; Fabb, 1987 
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selling rifles to the northern Turkana 6. In 1932, another report was received of 
Abyssinians selling weapons and ammunition to their Merrille neighbours at a higher 
price. 
The current circulation and re-circulation of arms in the Horn of Africa has some of its 
roots in the Italio-Ethiopian (Abyssinian) war of 1866. The draconian manner in which 
the colonial government later subjected the Turkana led to the acquisition of more arms 
for protection but also to match those of the colonial state. In order to build a strong 
resistance they sent well-drilled warriors into Pokot, Karamoja, Samburu, Dodoth, and 
Toposa areas. Collins (1961) notes that the political effects of these raids were far 
reaching. Not only did the southern Turkana, who were under partial administration, join 
their more warlike brothers to the north, but also the inability of the administration to 
check Turkana warriors spread disaffection among the tribes hitherto loyal to the 
government. From 1884 to 1886, conflicts between the different groups from Britain, 
Ethiopia, Egypt, and Arabia who were hunters, explorers and traders, gave the Turkana 
opportunity to stage what later turned out to be the longest resistance to European 
colonialism anywhere in Africa (Lamphear, 1982). 
The first group to acquire small arms in the region was the Turkana due to their proximity 
to Ethiopia. This inevitably led to demand for arms by neighbouring ethnic communities 
and supply was sustained by ongoing war in the region. 
5.2.1 Cold war, and post cold war civil conflicts and arms accumulation and flows 
in the Horn of Africa. 
During the Cold War period, though conflicts existed in the region, very little was talked 
about arms. However, as the Cold War came to an end it was discovered that there had 
been a slow but steady accumulation of arms in the Horn of Africa, which was a 
6  The price for one rifle was 70 sheep, one donkey and one bullock, according to a report by Ali Omar, a 
Somali (KNA/ DC/RVP/ report 1913). With firearms, the Turkana were able to raid the Pokot, Samburu, 
and even the Karamoja. In 1932, Turkana warriors were estimated at 2,000, with over 1,600 rifles (KNA 
DC/TurkJ3I3/ Histoiy of Turkana, 1951). 
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battleground between the superpowers. With the end of the cold war in 1991, many states 
experienced internal wars in which arms were used, and this in turn attracted more arms. 
Between 1989 to 1993, the majority of the disputes around the world were minor armed 
conflicts or localised (internal) wars, caused by multiple factors ranging from oppression, 
marginalization, unequal distribution of resources, dictatorial government policies, 
cultural and historical factors, religious or ethnic divisions, territorial issues and border 
disputes and insurgencies. Wallensteen and Sollenberg, (1998) note the regional 
distribution of armed conflicts for 1989-1997. Asia and Africa was the scene of most of 
the conflicts. Only in 1992 and 1993 can Europe be included. Goulding (1999: 157) 
shows that all the conflicts in Africa since the end of the cold war have been localised 
wars or "new wars" 7 , in which small arms have played a major role. This section reviews 
that progression on arms races/transfers and war at the domestic or localised level in the 
Horn of Africa. 
The case of the Ogaden War 1977-1978 
During the colonial period, Somalis found themselves being the victims of the partition 
and the scramble for Africa. The Berlin conference of 1884-5 split ethnic Somalis into 
five states; French Somalia (now Djibouti), Ethiopia, Kenya, Italian Somalia and British 
Somaliland. Italian and British Somaliland united to form Somalia. In the 1960s Somalia 
campaigned to create one Somalia called Greater Somalia, a move that led to the war 
with Kenya and Ethiopia in 1977, commonly called the Ogaden war8 . This was a turning 
point in arms availability in the region. 
Prior to the war, weapons purchases authorised to Ethiopia under the foreign military 
assistance (FMS) sales program reached an absolute peak of almost $63 million in 1976, 
Duffield 2001 and Kaldor 2001: The three most salient examples were Somalias claims on the territories 
of Djibouti, Ethiopia. ,Wo Kenya from the early 1960s to the 1980's, the Eritrea conflict from 1961-91 and 
• 	2003; and the civil war in Su4an  1956-72 and 1983 to 2004. 
8  Markakis 1998, Makinda 1992 
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$25 million of which was financed by the US governments at commercial rates (Brzoska 
and Pearson 1994: 182). (See figure 5.1).9 10 
Figure 5.1 US military Assistance to Ethiopia 197o-1976 
Year Grants in US$, 
000s 
Sales in US$, 
000s 
Personnel Trained in 
US 
1970 10,494 6 
1971 11,763  140 
1972 10,645 10 159 
1973 9,439  156 
1974 1 	11,719 7,440 147 
1975 12,999 22,127 130 
1976. 7,277 135,339 192 
Source: US arms policies in The Persian (jult and Red Sea Areas, 172,175 
In 1975 after a renewed request by Ethiopia to the US, $7 millions in small arms was 
supplied. In early 1977, with the Carter Administration emphasis on human rights and 
with the change of US policy, the new military regime in Ethiopia turned to the Soviet 
Union and other suppliers getting F-5s from Iran and arms worth $100 million to 
Ethiopia". in May 1977, another larger agreement of deliveries ranging from $350-500 
million was concluded and also a declaration on the foundation of friendly relations and 
co-operation (Patman 1989:204). 
It is estimated that from 1977 to 11980 the Soviet Union provided $11 billion worth of 
arms to Somalia before changing sides to Ethiopia (Lefebvre, 1992). In actual fact, 
between 1967 and 1976, before the relationships were strained Mogadishu had imported 
$185 million worth of arms, of which $181 million had come from the Soviet Union. In 
early 1977 with the declining relationships with USSR, Somalia turned to the West for 
arms 12 . In July 1977, Somalia attacked Ethiopia; the Soviet Union decided to back 
Ethiopia with more arms. Additionally, Cuba sent 15,000 soldiers and technical 
assistance, and Soviet Union dispatched 1,250 experts to Ethiopia (Pierrel981: 272: 
Chiland, 1978). Ethiopia also received small arms from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, 
With the defeat of Haile Selassie in 1974, the US policy towards Ethiopia dramatically changed 
consequently the Americans were forced to leave under the foreign military assistance sales continued to 
supply military assistance to Ethiopia. 
iO  US department of defence, 1986:234-5. 
' See Brzoska and Pearson 1994: 186, Flaliday: 1977; Leefebvre: 1992:42; Chaliand: 1978 
12  See Haliday, 1977; Lefebvre, 1992:44; Porter, 1984 
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though it was believed they bought dn the open market (Lyons1978: 11). These measures 
guaranteed its success, but left 26,000 Ethiopians and 8000 Somalis killed.' 3 
IUCN (1991 :61-62) estimates that thth1967 to 1976, Ethiopia's arms purchases in the 
ten years to the outbreak of the Ogaden war amounted to $190 million, during the period 
covering the war this increased to $4,895 million. The US-Soviet rivalry, led to the over-
supply of arms between 1970-1993, which helped to fan regional escalation and 
intensification of conflicts in the Horn (Makinda, 1992). By the Soviet Union arming 
Somalia between 1963-1977 and building the strategically located port of Berbera, a 
naval installation and an air base, including a 15,000-foot runway and a control tower 
(Makinda, 1982:100) the Soviet Union had provided the means to carry out the first 
attack triggering the war. The ability to exploit its Islamic ties throughout the Middle 
East' 4 and the arms build up made Somalia to feel comfortable to attack Ogaden. The 
creation of artificial borders by western powers, years before, was also a factor. 
As remarked by Lefebvre (1 992:35-36), after the 1977-1978 Ogaden war, Ethiopia began 
to providing support to insurgency movements seeking to oust the Siad Bane 
government, including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali 
National Movement (SNM) whose military successes in 1988-1989 placed Somalia in a 
state of civil war leading to a failed state, and resulted in the diffusion of arms in the 
region. 
Unfortunately the insecure situation spread to other pastoral areas, engulfing the whole of 
northern Kenya up to the Uganda border. To date, this entire corridor is insecure with the 
situation made worse by the prevailing semi and climatic conditions. 
13 Matthies, 1987:244; Pierre, 1981:272; Lyons, 1978:10-11 
14 With those countries4tiat were seeking confrontation with Israel 
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The case of the Tanzania-Uganda War, and overthrow of Obote II 1978-1979, 1980-
1985 
The level of weaponry involved in the Tanzania-Uganda confrontation remained 
relatively rudimentary, though they played a role in the domestic equation of insecurity) 5 
In 1978, Tanzania did not have an army except peoples' militias. Before the war, they 
had received arms from China, UK, USSR and US. In the course of the war major arms 
were shipped by UK and USSR16. The Ugandan forces were superior to those of 
Tanzania. Between 1975-1978, Uganda had received arms from Libya, USSR, US, Iraq 
and Switzerland and during the war Libya had continued to supply both arms and 
manpower.' 7 Equipped with arms, Amin decided to push for his irredentist policy by 
demanding parts of Tanzania, Kenya and Sudan 18 . 
In October 1978, Amin invaded the Salient (Kagera area) of Tanzania' . But bad 
governance had led to insurgency amongst exiled Ugandans in Tanzania and the 
formation of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNILF). In January 1979, President 
Nyerere of Tanzania attacked Uganda and eventually deposed Amin, in league with 
UNLF. Their task was made more difficult by Uganda's MIG-21s fighters and Tu-22 
bombers. However, Brzoska and Pearson, (1994:208) note that Uganda suffered from the 
lack of weapons and spares and the economic boycott which eroded their military power 
and that Tanzania won due to their tactics of capturing barracks and enemy equipment 
and also recovered weapons of fleeing soldiers. 20 Additionally Libya did increase the 
supply of troops before Amin fell. This illustrates how much of a role small arms can 
play in prosecuting a war. 
15 See Brzoska and Pearson, 1994; Khadiagala, 1993 
16 Brzoska and Pearson, 1994:205 
17 Ibid:201 
18 According to Amin the whole of Southern Sudan extending right up to the present border with Ethiopia, 
was under the administration of Uganda until 1914. He argued that it is this land that had produced all the 
wealth in Kenya (FIBs, East Africa, 1976). 
19 Brzoska and Pearson, 1994, Khadiagala, 1992; Kum, 1990:450 See also 
http://www.rionitor.co.ug/specialincüdes/ugprsd/amin/articles/index.php  
20 Pascal, 1998; Brzoska and Pearson, 1994; Mazuri, 1980; Tindigarukayo, 1988 
249 
After the 1980 Uganda elections, Obote 11 21  returned to power. Between 1980-85 he 
improved the economy but his inability to improve the domestic security situation and 
governance frightened potential investors. The President's favouring of the Langi 
community and the death of Ojok the commander in chief of the army made the regime 
extremely fragile. Human rights abuses were on the increase and Amnesty International 
estimated that 300,000 were killed (Tindigarukayo, 1988: 617). There was growing 
unrest amongst guerrilla groups including the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) 
and Museveni's National Resistance Army (later the Movement (NRAJM)). The failure 
of the Nairobi peace agreement between UNLA, NRA and Obote II saw continued 
fighting. In 1986, Tito Okello easily overthrew Obote II, and in the same year, Museveni 
then took over. 
The 1980 war between Obote II and Museveni can also be considered a war of small 
arms and guerrilla warfare. Since 1970 Uganda was a society that had known nothing but 
war, and by 1980 every household had arms, the society was awash with them, and would 
freely offer them to any liberator. 
The strategy used by both Tanzania and later Museveni was attacking barracks and 
getting the arms! By 1980 Museveni knew all the barracks in Uganda and knew where 
arms were kept. As a defence minister in Geoffrey Binaisa's government he had the 
opportunity to build a power base. In November 1979 Museveni was fired and relegated 
to the inconsequential ministry for regional co-operation22. However despite his 
demotion, he retained a strong: base inside the army itself. Further Museveni was still 
linked to FRELIMO guerrillas in Mozambique. In January 1980 when he launched his 
war, Museveni's military men numbered at 5,000 Banyankole23 . The boost by Libya to 
the NRM with weapons cannot be underrated. Like the Ogaden war mentioned before, 
the Tanzanian-Uganda war diffused arms into civilian pastoral communities in the North 
Rift, contributing to arms build up and spread in the region. 
21 Obote II is used to refer Milton Obote's second come back to rule Uganda after Amins fall. 
22 Africa Confidential No.24 28 November, 1979:5 
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The case of the Holy Spirit Movement and the Lord's Resistance Army 1986-2004 
From 1986, war continued in the North of Uganda due to Museveni's inability to establish 
good governance and to manage arms in the society, such that the splinter groups 
continue to wage war against each other. First there was the Uganda People's Democratic 
Movement/Army (UPDMA/A) in Acholi (1986 to June 1988), which took weapons to 
fight NRA, then Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Liberation Movement (HSLM) from 
January to December 1987 and also the West Nile Bank Liberation Front, loyal to 
Amin24. Joseph Kony founded the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in 1993 after a 
complicated metamorphosis of the HSLM and mergers with other groups, spurred on by a 
situation of anarchy in Northern Uganda. 25 
Alice Auma Lakwena founded the HSMF after the Tanzania Peoples Defence Force 
(TPDF) and UNLA troops ousted the government of Amin 26 . Later civil war broke out 
between Museveni's NRM and the UNLA, which NRM won in 1986, overthrowing 
Obote. With the defeat, thousands of Acholi soldiers who had formed the majority of 
Obote's army filed back to their villages in the North, hiding their weapons and triying to 
lead a normal life. But only a few were successful in regaining a livelihood. 27 After the 
NRM took over Gulu and Kitgum, the NRM soldiers were brutal, took revenge, murdered 
and raped. NRM then ordered the disarming of all Acholi. This gave rise to the HSMF. 
Lakwena stressed moral rehabilitation of her soldiers. She was able to address the internal 
terror reigning in Acholi. She responded by first cleansing all the soldiers. She issued the 
Holy Spirit safety precautions, which went against theft, looting, lying, killing, sex, rape, 
smoking cigarettes, drinking alcohol and other sins. These precautions served to 
23  African Confidential, Vol.21. Number 3 13 February, 1980:6 
24  Omara-Otunnu 1992, Watson 1988 
25 Part of the HSLM became the Uganda Christian Democratic Army in 1989, and in 1991 it merged with 
Uganda People's Army to form the Union for Democracy (UFD). It eventually renamed to LRA in 1993. In 
Teso, there was the Uganda People' Army (UPA) from December 1986 to October 1992. In Lango, there 
was Cel-ibong in the early 1990s,   the short -lived Citizens Army for Multi-Partism (CAMP), which was 
started and defeated in 1999. Others included the Ninth October MovementlArmy (NOMJA) which 
operated in Tororo district between 1989 and 1993 See IGAD,2001:23-26;Muhereza 1997b:18. 
26  in a rigged elections often termed as Obote II 
27 	Behrend, 1998, 108; Vlassenroot and Doom, 1999, Jackson, 2002 
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reconstitute the moral order and also create consciousness. Lakwena claimed to receive 
power and guidance from spirits. The HSIvIF did not fight a guerrilla war, but a more or 
less conventional war: its military wing was organized according to the British colonial 
pattern (Behrend, 1998:110). The HSM acquired its weapons from the community, from 
UNLA that joined them, and also the National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan (Jackson, 
2002). 
In the course of her March to take over Kampala, Lakwena was defeated and fled to 
Kenya in July 1987, where she still lives in Kakuma refuge camp. However, the HSMF 
did not die. It was taken over by her father Severino Lukoya and renamed the Lords 
Army. Unlike Lakwena, his army was more decentralised and became a guerrilla 
movement which fought mainly in Kitgum. Lukoya was caught by government soldiers 
and imprisoned until 1992. Lakwena's cousin, Joseph Kony, continued the movement. 
Renaming it the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). Kony combines Lakwena spirit tactics, 
claiming to be possessed by seven demons, with modern western military techniques and 
like his uncle, he fights a guerrilla war from Southern Sudan against the Uganda 
Government. 
While neither Alice nor her father got support from other countries. Kony has received 
support from the Sudan government, in retaliation for the support, which the Ugandan 
government had given Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)28 . The Western Nile 
Bank Front (WNBF), led by Amin's former minister Juma Oris, has also supported Kony. 
The participation of outsiders has prolonged the war; Kony has also accessed the world of 
global media for support and published the LRAs Ten Commandments. As argued by 
Africa Confidential (Jackson, 2002), the National Islamic Front regime has quartered and 
supplied Kony's rebels from their inception to counter Uganda's long-standing support 
for the SPLA. With weapons from Sudan, and with planting of land mines from the early 
28  See East African 1 March, 2004 "Massacre; Where did LRA Get Guns" 
Http://www.nationudio.comINews/EastAfrican/current/RegionaIIRegional0  10320047.html Humanitarian 
agencies say that the "war zone is becoming more saturated with automatic rifles so that among farmers in 
northern Uganda, the AK47 is replacing the spear" 
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1990s,   the war has moved to a more brutal level. 29  The participation of outsiders was 
noted by President Museveni recently, when he acknowledged Khartoum's support for 
the Lords Resistance Anny3° as well as the presence of al-Qaeda operatives in Southern 
Sudan supporting and supplying arms to them. This has prolonged the war in the North. 
The Ugandan government's attempt to destroy the links between the LRA and the local 
population led to the building of militias and local defence forces, the ones that were 
really fighting the LRA. In addition, the Acholi in some areas were forced to arm for self-
defence. This led to further militarization of northern Uganda, and to escalation of the 
war in the north, with the most recent brutal massacre being over 200 although the 
president disagrees. Museveni put the toll at 80 civilians and four Amuka militia 
fighters. 3 ' 
Although Museveni has done much to improve the security of Uganda, the democracy 
which Ugandan felt they were fighting for is not yet fully realized. These along with the 
presence of many insurgencies, militia, paramilitary and warrior groups, all well armed 
and supported by third parties or the government, creates a security dilemma which could 
plunge Uganda back to war. 32 Additionally the conflict has become a major point of 
accumulation and dispersal throughout the entire North Rift Valley, as the other sections 
will show. 
The case of Sudan 
Since 1956, Sudan has known peace for only 11 years. The war has brutalized Sudan off 
and on for most of the past half-century, making Sudan's the oldest current civil war in 
29 	most obvious change in the LRA has been the intensification of violence many people being 
massacred such as at Atiak (1996 (an estimated 170-220 dead, 22 April, 1995); Karuma (50 deaths, 8 
March, 1996); Acholi refugee camp (100 deaths, July 1996) Lokung Palabek (over 400 dead, January 1997) 
the victims were hacked and clubbed to death (Viassenroot and Doom, 1999:25). 
30 	Press, 13 June 2003.  Associated 
31  IRIN, 23 February, 2003 "Gov't Forces Pursue Rebels in Uganda"; IR1N, BBC, 22 February 2004, 
"Rebels massacre Uganda civilians" http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3511109.stm  
32  With Uganda recently training and arming militia to fight the Lords Resistarlee Army. Militias like 
Arrows boys, Rhino and Amuka. See Agence France-Presse (AFP) 1 March, 2004 "Uganda bishop warns 
against use of ethnic militias to fight rebels" http:// 
www.reliefweb.intlw/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c I 256f6004c8ad5/cee4268a6b07; Daily Monitor, 12 
February, 2004 "Arrow Boys a security threat" http://www.monitor.co.uglnews/news02i28.plp;  
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the world33 . The numbers of internally displaced peoples and Sudanese refugees all over 
the world make it the longest and most destructive current conflict in the world (Mogire, 
2003). 
The war has mainly been waged by small arms, though the government of Sudan has 
sometimes used more powerful conventional arms. The Sudan government has armed 
ethnically based militias, other armed groups and rebel groups in the South. 34 Groups 
which have direct arms support in the south include the Toposa on the border of Kenya, 
Uganda and Ethiopia; the Lotohus in Equatorial Province, and the Mandaris from the 
Terkeka area north of Juba, and the latter two both in Uganda. Riak Machar before 
defecting back to SPLA in 2002, was supported by the government. The Sudanese 
government has also supported Ugandan rebel groups like the Lords Resistance Army 
and the West Nile Bank Front. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army has 
received arms from both internal sources (by capturing the governments arms) and 
external military assistance especially Ethiopia during Mengistu's regime, and the 
Ugandan Government. This has exacerbated and intensified the Sudan conflict, claiming 
two million lives in the past two decades and displacing more than 4 million people 
(IDPS) with refuge all over the world (Reeves, 2002). Sudan is now one of the major 
sources of arms into the entire North Rift, and especially amongst pastoralists. 
In conclusion these dynamics of cold war, succession wars and liberation wars after the 
end of colonial era in the Horn of Africa have ensured that at the dawn of the 1990s, a 
large stock of arms had built up in the North Rift, and the area was beset by armed 
conflict. The next section looks at the continuing process of accumulation until 2004. 
5.2.2 Accumulation of Arms in the North Rift 
Why be interested in the flows, transfers and accumulation of small arms? If as Sislin 
argues, arms produce political instability, facilitate the outbreak of violence, prolong 
fighting and increase its severity, prompting the spread of violence into neighbouring 
Verney et a!, 1995, Reeves, 2002 
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countries, which raise the costs of, and thus deter, conflict resolution (1998), then 
increasing numbers of arms exacerbate the problems and we need to trace their paths of 
proliferation. As noted previously, conflicts in the North Rift region are now more lethal 
than a half century ago. It is estimated that in eastern Africa 5 million small arms are in 
circulation (Africa News Service, 2002a). In conflict prone areas of Kenya alone, there 
may be 150,000 small arms and 1.5 million rounds of ammunition with an estimated 
60,000 illicit arms from Somalia finding their way into Kenya since 1991.35  In Karamoja 
alone, it is estimated that 80,000-200,000 small arms, mainly AK47, are in circulation. 36 
include the Toposa on the border of Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia; Lotohus in Equatorial, the 
Mandaris from the Terkeka area north of Juba and the Janjweed in Darfur , 
35 Kenya Times, 22 April, 2004 http://www.kentimes.com/editoriaIs/edtorial1.html  
36Muhereza, 1997b; Walker, 00; Mkutu 2003: Also see East African 12 November 2001 "Karimojong 
Arms; Govt Drops $2m Plan" 
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Figure 5.2 General picture of arms movement as of October 2004 
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5.3 	SALW accumulation in Karamoja Northern Uganda 
Karamoja is not only part of Uganda, which was beset by civil war in the 1970s, it also 
shares an international border with Sudan, which has experienced continuing violence 
political turmoil and internal civil strife, the origins of which are mentioned in the 
previous section. Sudan is the major source of arms into Karamoja. 
In pre-colonial times pastoralists were armed with crude traditional weapons to ensure 
protection against predators. However with the increase in commercialization of cattle 
rustling, road ambushes and the lack of provision of security by the State, the Karimojong 
have acquired sophisticated weapons, which have become vital for their survival in a 
pastoral economy. 
initially, hunters and ivory traders introduced small arms into Karamoja from Egypt and 
Abyssinia and later from Arabia through the East Coast of Africa around 1880. Like the 
Turkana situation previously, Karamoja experienced a massive influx of Arab, Ethiopian, 
Greek, British, Swahili and American ivory hunters starting from 1897,coming via 
Turkana and Ethiopia. By 1903 the Karimojong had established 56 ivory markets across 
Karamoja, and traders taxed arms and cattle at the markets. By 1909, the ivory trade 
accounted for 10 percent of total exports from Uganda and earned the colony about 
£10,000 between 1903 and 1906. The Karimojong exchanged their animals for arms 
and also received cash payments in exchange for ivory. Barber (1968: 100) also argues 
that by 1910, the Karimojong were exporting arms and ammunition to other parts of 
Uganda with whom they traded, particularly the Bunyoro, Acholi, Bukedi, ançl Teso. The 
threat of arms diffusion in Karamoja ledL  the colonial government to establish its presence 
in the Northeast of Uganda in July 1912, but also to intervene in the arms trafficking. 
37  Barber, 1968: 60-90 
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However, this made the colonial government uneasy. Barber (1968:9) captures the 
concerns of Mr. Stanley Tomkins, the acting governor of the protectorate, whose 
correspondence to London in 1910 stated, 
I hardly need to point out the grave consequences, which might arise from 
allowing the Karamoja district to become stocked with weapons of modem type. 
On 27 March 1911, the Provincial Commissioner of Northern Province sent an urgent 
correspondence to Entebbe. 
The matter is of the utmost importance as there is little doubt that in the near 
future considerable force will be necessary to deal with the natives when they gain 
confidence in the use of their weapons, as the number of breech loaders in their 
possession, I am informed, already far exceeds, by some hundreds, those of our 
police, and the position becomes more dangerous every day unless prompt 
measures are taken 38 . 
As noted in an interview with Honourable Ael Ark Lodou, he concurs with early arms 
entry into Karamoja: 
External economic and political forces started to impinge upon the Karamoja area 
in the later half of the 19th  century. Mercantile networks extending from 
Khartoum, Ethiopia and Zanzibar reached the region, with ivory from Karamoja 
as the main attraction. Some traders found the exchange of guns for ivory 
attractive, as it raised the efficiency of elephant hunting and hence their access to 
ivory. Thus began the first diffusion of weapons more lethal than spears39 . 
Interviews for this. study with elders, warriors, women, businessmen, administrators, 
doctors, kraal leaders etc., revealed that initially the Karimojong were unarmed. 
Mudongo of the Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peaàe KISP) in Moroto noted "all 
the Karimojong had were spears, arrows and bows while the Turkapa had guns". 40 Arms 
diffused from Turkana into Karamoja through the ivory traders. The elders interviewed 
could remember suffering under the Turkana of Kenya. The KISP chairman for Namalu 
said, 
38 Quotgo in Barber, 1968:100 
Interylew Honourable Ael Ark Lodou MP 
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Our homes were under siege, and the Turkana, who got their guns early while we 
had spears, rendered us totally helpless. From 1950 to the 1970s, the Turkana 
depleted our livestock through raids. The government could not protect us. It was 
only when we managed to get guns that we were able to stop the Turkana from 
raiding us and the other neighbours. 4 ' 
According to the Bataringaya Report of 1964, between 1958 and 1961 the police in 
Moroto reported 407 cattle raids, with 405 persons killed and 69,420 cattle stolen, out of 
which 7,713 were recovered. After independence, cattle raids continued but with reduced 
efforts made to tackle the problem. Things got even worse after the 1971 coup bringing 
President Amin to power in Uganda. During this period there were no checks on the trade 
in small arms, and their possession became widespread. The Bataringaya report shows 
the continuity of the issues from 196442  to now. Father Novelli in an interview said: 
The check on possession of small arms practically ceased, and a constant 
flow of arms into the region became a common feature. Traders, trans- 
border dealers, soldiers and other interested groups kept supplying the 
Karimojong with arms, which the Karimojong wanted in order to 
counteract the Turkana and other neighbours who were using them to 
raid.43 
In the early 1960s, armed Turkana from Kenya, Toposa and Didinga from Sudan who 
had early acquired their arms from Ethiopia were raiding Karimojong. Due to state failure 
to provide security to the Karimojong from external attacks, they  resorted to making 
homemade guns (ngamatidae), which the military State attempted to prevent.' 
40  Mudogo, Moses, KJSP elder. Interview, Moroto, 18 June 2001. 
41  Ichumer, Philip, KISP Chairman and Co-coordinator. Interview, Namule County, Uganda, 21 June 2001. 
42  Dietz, 1987:72 notes that in 1966 when Uganda got independence there were 740 killed in raids 
including police r*ls. 
43  Novelli, Bruno. Interview, Moroto, 21 June 2001. 
44 Interview Cheere James former raider and now Chief of Rupa. Rupa 1 February 2003 
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The Karimojong do not manufacture arms, though small craft industries exist for making 
homemade arms. 45 Ammunition is manufactured in factories in Uganda, Tanzania and 
Kenya. The introduction of modem small arms is the biggest change agent in Karamoja 
magnifying the traditional pastoral communal conflict. The changes mainly began in the 
1970s   but in 1980s   they intensified and have persisted till the present. 46 The primary 
source of arms in Karamoja is southern Sudan, as noted in an interview with Peter 
Lokeris. He said, "The closer you are to Sudan border, the less expensive are the arms 
and ammunition."47 But the Karamoja case also shows that whilst governments may 
profess concern about private and "rogue" suppliers such as insurgent groups, they 
themselves are by far the most important sources of small arms to local communities 48 . 
When Idi Amin was overthrown in April 1979, the Matheniko Karimojong broke into the 
Moroto barracks and looted the guns that had been left behind by Amin's retreating 
soldiers. It was during this time that the Karimojong acquired a substantial number of 
weapons for themselves. Novelli further revealed, 
1979 was the turning point when Amin was toppled. His fleeing soldiers left 
behind the armouries of their barracks full of newly acquired guns and a lot of 
ammunition. Karimojong carried them on donkey loads. 49 
Paula Wangoola (1999:4) also depicts how the Karimojong obtained their arms: 
For decades the Karimojong were brutalized by the state. They always 
longed for modern guns to defend their cattle and to defend themslves 
better against the state {brutality of the state}. Their chance of a lifetime 
came with the defeat of Idi Amin's army in 1979. The army f14, leaving 
unattended an armoury of sophisticaed weapons, which Amin had been 
proud of. It took weeks before United National Liberation Army and 
45  See Mkutu 2004 
46 Mubettza, 1997b;Mkutu 2003 op cit 
47  Lokeris,Peter, Minister for Karamoja, 1nterviw, Kampala 21s  January, 2003 
41  See Knighton, 2003, IRIN 8 September, 2003;IRIN 9 September, 2003; Daily Monitor 8 September, 
2003;Daily Monitor 4 October 2003; Mkutu, 2003 
49  Ibid. 
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Tanzania Peoples Defence Force reached Moroto; by which time the 
armoury had been emptied.... 
Then in 1985 after the overthrow of Obote 11, thousands of Karimojong 
are reported to have joined the UNLA. When the National Revolution 
Movement/National Revolutionary Army took over, the Karimojong 
withdrew; this time with yet more modern weapons, particularly AK47s. 
In the meantime, yet other opportunities provided more small arms 
supplies: the Lord's Resistance Army, the Sudanese Peoples Liberation 
Army, the insurgency in Teso, etc. By 1998, papers gave an estimate of 
15,000-35,000 guns in civilian hands in Karamoja 50 . 
Dradriga, the former Resident District Commissioner of Kotido, estimated the number of 
arms to be about 80,000' in civilian hands in 2001. Contemporary media reports estimate 
that the Karimojong had 160,000 small arms in civilian hands, but they do not indicate 
how they arrived at the figures. 52 
To date, the supply of arms has been continuous. Some have equated it to the flow of the 
Nile. Externally, guns and ammunition flow in mainly through Sudan either from the 
local tribes of Southern Sudan, the Didinga, Toposa and the SPLA forces, or directly 
from Eastern Europe. This demand is high because out of a family of say, ten, which is 
quite typical in pastoral areas on the border, three are often men and each is in possession 
of a firearm, with boys as young as fourteen having guns. 53 This could make the number 
of arms even higher than these estimates. 
Abenyo of Intermediate Technology Development Group asserted that currently, there 
are two types of guns among the pastoralists. First each family's inherited gun. It is this 
gun that enables the pastoralists to survive from generation to generation. This gun is 
customarily owned for security purposes and often kept secret. It cannot be sold as it has 
50  Kiii,hton, 2003:438; though Muhereza 1997b gives the figure of 60,000 stolen during the raids on the 
barracks. 
s' Dadriga, Dan. Interview, Jidj 12 NOVthber 2001. 
52  See for example Weekly Uganda Confidential, 17-23 Marth 2000. 
53  Interview, 19 June 2001, with a victim of small arms. 
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a special status, and each of the family's warriors identifies with it. 54 The second gun is 
one the warrior buys, usually on the open market, with his own money or cattle. In 
addition, there are homemade guns (ngamatindei). Therefore, in every household there 
are at least 3 guns. This makes it impossible to quantify arms in pastoral areas. One can 
only guess how widely these weapons have diffused in the community. 
The government of Milton Obote decided to arm and recruit tribal militias in all the 
districts neighbouring Karamoja, in order to keep the Karamoja at bay 55 . The fall of 
Obote's regime in 1986 brought the end of these forces, but before his fall in 1986, 
hordes of Karimojong joined the Uganda National Liberation Army to fight for the state. 
When NRA defeated the UNLA in 1986, the demobilized Karimojong soldiers fled to 
Karamoja with all their weapons. During this period between 1987 and 1989, the herds of 
the Iteso were seriously depleted by the Karimojong and by fights between the forces of 
President Yoweri Museveni and those of his opponents. Militias in neighbouring districts 
had been disbanded; the result was widespread Karimojong raids that left those areas 
virtually without livestock. Tremendous localized raids erupted in Karamoja between 
1986 and 1989, and cattle rustling reached an intensity never seen before in the region 
(Muhereza, 1997b: 44). 
In 1995, the Uganda government sought to control the use of weapons in Karamoja by 
having them registered with a group called a vigilante force. 56  Some Karimojong have 
also joined various armed factions that have jostled for political power in Sudan, 
especially the National Islamic Front (Nyaba, 2001). Evidence from Kotido in February 
2003 during fieldwork, showed that, although at the beginning of Operation Iron Fist 57 
attempted to negotiate peace with the Lords Resistance Army, the LRA fought fiercely 
against the Sudanese armed forces, it seemed that they had reconciled. Eye witnesses said 
that Kony was receiving substantial supplies from Sudan, and the same interview sources 
54 Abenyo, Jacinta, Pastoral Field Co-coordinator, Intermediate Technology group-Lodwar. Interview, 
Jinja, Uganda, ii November 2001. 
Field notes 2001-2003 Karamoja; Achol, Joshua Acholi. Interview, Inn, Uganda, 19 April 2002: 
Muhereza, 1997b: See also Daily Monitor http://www.monitor.co.ug/specialincludes/agenda/rd04l51.php . 
56Bosco, John. Interview, Amudat, 17 June 2001, and 27 January 2003. 
57 An attempt to negotiate peace with the Lords Resistance Army. 
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also claimed that during the battle for re-capture of Torit from the SPLA later in 
November 2002, LRA forces commanded by Tabuley fought alongside the Sudanese 
army against the SPLA 58 . 
Other forms of arms accumulation have included capture of weapons from opposing 
military forces and capture from rival militias. 59 Another example is the fight between 
UPDF and pastoralist Pokot on the border of Kenya and Uganda in 2002 in which the 
UPDF lost 28 people. A focus group discussion with the elders in Naupong, Alale, a 
border town between Kenya and Uganda, revealed that they captured many weapons. As 
evidence, the elders took the researcher to the site and quickly collected over 20 empty 
shells. In the absence of effective government and security in Karamoja, government 
soldiers have also sold arms to the Karimojong. 6° 
The accumulation and proliferation of arms have also been through purchase by sale of 
cattle or in the course of cattle raiding. As noted by one senior elder from Matheniko, 
As you raid, lives are taken; the number of guns in the area is reduced due to the 
several deaths. But in the county of the raiding, the arms are increased, hence the 
movement of arms. 61 
The accumulation of arms in Karamoja has therefore been a long process, starting in the 
colonial period and continuing, due to conflicts in the Horn of Africa and the Great 
Lakes, to weak governance, and to failure of the Uganda government to provide adequate 
security to the Karimojong. Regional instability, civil strife, welfare conditions and 
indiscipline in the army, inadequately prepared/equipped Uganda Peoples Defence Force 
soldiers, desertion from the army by local defence units, rearming of the communities by 
the Uganda government and affordability are responsible for the proliferation of arms in 
Karamoja. The Karamoja accumulation of weapons cannot be de-linked from the other 
It will be difficult to convince the LRA to negotiate a peace agreement while Sudan periodically renews 
their supplies of arms and ammunition. 
59 lnterviews with Amudat hospital personnel, January 2003, and interviews with several members of the 
community, concurred that the warriors killed nearly 70 UPDF and obtained their guns. 
60  Interviews with a cross section of the community, 2001 and 2003 
61  Elder and kraal leader Koritantoyo. Interview, Nakiliro, 1 February 2003. 
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dynamics in the region and neither can it be totally be de-linked from the operation of the 
state. 
5.4 	SALW Accumulation in Kenya 
This section examines the continuing diffusion of arms on the Kenya side among the 
Pokot, Baragoi (Samburu) and Maasai (Mukogodo, Dol Dol). The minister for foreign 
affairs recently told a conference on the proliferation of small arms in the Great Lakes 
that since the collapse of Somalia an estimated 60,000 arms have found their way into 
Kenya. 62 Unlike the Uganda side, in Kenya the government appoints and pays the chiefs, 
so the government has some authority at the grassroots level. The diffusion and 
accumulation process here includes home made arms sold by the Luhyia, and arms issued 
to the Kenya Police Reservists by the government for self-defence. The case of 
Mukogodo shows small arms accumulation but linked to the competition for resources 
and livelihood63 . The accumulation of light weapons in the area is also associated with 
the collapse of various regimes and civil wars in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Uganda. 
Lastly, as with Karamoja, there are inherited guns that have passed from generation to 
generation. 
5.4.1 Case Study: West Pokot 
The Pokot have not always possessed arms. Frequent attacks by the Turkana on the 
Pokot, or on Karimojong who later acquired arms and attacked Turkna and Pokot led the 
Pokot to join the cIejnd for arms as discussed in an earlier chapter. Initially, similar to 
other pastoralists, thp jokot only possessed crude weaponry such as spears and bows and 
arrows. The introduction of small arms among them is a fairly recent phenomenon. 
Field discussions held with elders in Alale, noted that Turkana terrorized both Pokot and 
Karimojong. The Europeans came and carried out a major operation on Turkana land, 
recovered animals stolen and gave them to the Pokot. Since being given their raided cattle 
62  See Kenya Times, 22 April, 2004 "Move to decisively to mop these 60,000 illicit arms" 
63  See Daily Nation 29 July, 20 "Arms Trade booming in northern Kenya" 
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back, the Pokot stopped the raids. Another generation followed among the Turkana that 
came saying the "white man took the cows to Pokot and Karamoja". TM 
The neighbouring Luhyia community manufactured homemade guns that were exchanged 
for cattle from the Pokot. In an interview, a young Luhyia man who grew up in Kwanza 
district, which is next to Kolongolo, revealed, 
Kolongolo borders West Pokot and it's in Kwanza constituency in Trans-Nzoia 
district. Some of the people made guns. The skill had been learnt from the Kenyans 
who had moved into Uganda and also the Bagisu who had moved into Kenya from 
Uganda. The Pokot used to come to Kamkuywa where a big stock market existed. 
They would bring their big bulls and exchange for heifers. The Luhyia would use the 
bulls as oxen for farming. 65 
Ncherepu, a Pokot and former educator noted: 
This was a business fetching as many as 40 cows, and this encouraged 
the Luhyia who are agriculturists to sell firearms to Pokot. Pokot 
traded their oxen for guns. 66 
Bishop Kewasis confirmed this and said, 
There are Luhyia who came to Kolongolo and they had a small gun 
manufacturing p1an. These were the first guns in Pokot. I even saw 
it with my eyes 20 years ago. It became a booming business 
between the Luyia and Pokot. But immediately the real firearms 
came after the fall of Amin, it collapsed immediately. 67 
64  Focus group discussion with elders in Alale, 3 August 2002. 
65  Odongo, Pero. Interview, Kjtale, Kenya, 31 July 2002. Pero grew up in Lunyu, which is 10 krns from 
Kolongolo. 
66  Interview May 31, Kapcngqda, 2001. The Luyia benefited in the sense that they used the oxen for 
agricultural activities (to plough) 
67  Rt. Rev. Kewasis, Stephen, Bishop of Kitale, ACK, Interview, Kitale, Knya, 1 July, 2002 
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The Bukusu (Luhyia) at times embittered the Pokot by selling them guns, which 
would not function. This brought about conflicts. 68 That the Bukusu had the 
knowledge to make guns was recently confirmed by the Akiwumi report (2002): 
"The Bukusu did not take this lightly. On April 12, they raided the home of one of 
the Sabot killing a member of his family." 69 
Modem arms proliferation in Pokot accelerated with the overthrow of Amin. The 
Karimojong used the weapons gained to raid and take the property of Pokot and 
Sebei. They also decided to market the arms to Pokot and Sebei. 70  A former District 
Commissioner for Pokot confirmed this, saying: 
There are two types of arms circulating in West Pokot. Those given to the people 
by the government for self-defence. These are the arms issued to Kenya Police 
Reservists, for protecting livestock 71 . A Kenya police reservist is under the officer 
in charge of police districts, but some of them have been changing sides and have 
been arrested. A few of the arms have been found. Secondly, due to the arms 
race, they have been buying arms from Southern Sudan. 72 
The proliferation of arms in Pokot was confirmed by the 1979-83 West Pokot District 
Plan73 , which mentioned the problem of small arms in Pokot as a concern to the 
government of Kenya. But apparently, the government of Kenya did nothing. 
Instability in Uganda was a major factor in the diffusion of arms into West Pokot. The 
Pokot area straddles the Kenya-Uganda border, and the instability in Uganda forced 
many Upe Pokot (Uganda) to flee to Kenya as refugees, taking their arms with them. 
68  Loreto, Stephen, former district officer Kesai division in West Pokot. Interview, Kapenguria, Kenya, 28 
May 2001. 
Nation/Special Report (2002:27-28) "Akiwumi Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to 
Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya Part Ill Nyanza and Western Province". Daily Nation 
www.nationaudio.comlNews/DailyNation/TodayfNews/Akiwumj Nyanzawestern.pdf 
70  Luyunala, Christopher, former mayor of Kapenguria. Interview, Kapenguria, Kenya, 31 May 2001; Rev 
Londiyo, John. Interview, Karita, Uganda, 31 May, 2001, and 4 June, 2001, Nairobi; Kawtiot, Samuel, 
Pastor Baptist Church, Kunyao, interview, Karita, Uganda, 31 May, 2001. Warriors during the 1984-1995 
disarmament in Pokot victimized him for supporting disarmament. 
71 The Kenya government has given guns to home guards in West Pokot, Turkana, and Samburu and also 
among the Marakwet and Baringo 
72Did not want to be named a former District Commissioner, West Pokot. Embu, Kenya, 25 May 2001. 
73  West Pokot Development Plan 1979-83 
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The Kenyan West Pokot pastoralists used the opportunity to join the arms race to 
expand pasturelands, rustle more livestock to compensate for lost cows used to 
purchase guns, and to revenge for earlier raids by Turkana and Karimojong. 74 
Bishop Kewasis concurred with this: 
Pokot got a lot of firearms due to alliances from Karamoja. They 
will make alliance with Matheniko or Dodoth in the north, and 
they will bring the guns, then fight the Pian in the south that is their 
common enemy or fight Bokora. They will ally with Sebei and 
fight the Pian while the Turkana will make alliance with a section 
of Karamoja to fight another section of the Karamoj a. 75 
During raids in West Pokot the warriors kill the 'enemy' 76 and seize their guns (see figure 
5.3 arms captured p.272). 77 In interviews with the different groups in Kangole, Namalu 
and Inn, it was said that the warriors in Karamoja were instituting the AK47 as their 
official weapon, ambushing soldiers on the roads, killing them, and taking their AK47s. 
An interview with a top Kenyan security officer revealed that in May 1998, three askaris 
(security officers) were killed and the raiders stole two G-3s and one HIK1 1. The police 
never recovered the arms. 78 One of the warriors interviewed said, we get some guns in 
raiding. The people killed are sources of guns' . 79Another source has been the sale of guns 
during peacetime. Even at the time of field research, purchasing a gun was not a problem. 
Kenya Police Reservists or home guards have been given guns by the government, and 
some have also managed to purchase guns privately. They are sometimes involved in 
74  Field notes from elders in Alale, West Pokot, Kenya, 3 August 2002; Also interview with Lomogoinie 
James Interview, Amudat, 27 January 2003 who noted "There are no guns flowing from Kenya. In 1979-
1980 there were arms from Somalia through Lodwar to the Pokot. We don't get guns from the Turkana 
because they are our enemies; arms in Upe-Pokot are coming from the north in Moroto and the Jie. The 
Matheniko are now at peace with the Pokot, and they bring them guns. We are not on good terms with Pian 
and we don't get guns from them". 
Kewasis Stephen. Interview, Kitale, Kenya, 1 August 2002. 
76  The enemy here includes the official security personnel and neighbours with whom they are in conflict. 
Similar dynamics were also experienced in Uganda. 
78  Interview with security officer. Kapenguria, August 2002. The killing of security personnel by raiders is 
common, and no data exists on how many security people are killed by bandits or raiders and their arms 
stolen. 
Name withheld. Interview, Kangole, Uganda, June 2001. 
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cattle rustling, and several times guns have been recovered, later being traced to Police 
Reservists. 
5.4.2 Case Study: Laikipia (Dol Dol-Mukogodo) 
Laikipia District in Northern Kenya provides an opportunity to examine resource-based 
conflicts and the accumulation of small arms. Small arms are not the cause of the conflict 
with ranchers, farmers and horticulturalists but their use is often extended from conflict 
zones to non-conflict zones to exacerbate the situation. Pressures on water and land 
resources have increased greatly in recent years, with increased farming activities, rapid 
population growth and periodic drought. 8° 
The problem of small arms and cattle raids in Laikipia can be illustrated by the following 
two cases: 
In January 1998, armed Pokot stole 15 goats in an attack on the home of Esther Njeri 
Mburu. The assailants were followed by a group of Kikuyu who, unable to catch them, 
attacked 54 animals belonging to other Pokot. This increased tension in the area and as a 
result, the District Officer of Ngarua Division, Mr. Soi, organized a peace meeting on 13th 
January between the Kikuyu and the Pokot communities. However, shortly after the 
meeting ended, raiders who had come from the Pokot and Samburu communities, 
supported by some Turkana, retaliated, killing four people in Laikipia. They also burnt 
and looted houses in Olmoran. This was followed by a series of attacks in the area on 
different homes. As a result, nearly 2,000 people fled their homes talking refuge at the 
Catholic mission at Olmoran and the NCCK Compounds. On January 171h,  the Kikuyu 
organized a response to the attacks and over 100 men armed with pangas (machetes) and 
rungus (sticks) confronted the raiders at Rum-Rum valley, Mutamiayu. 8 ' The majority of 
raiders had guns. Almost all the deaths in Laikipia district were from bullet wounds. The 
availability of weapons and the insecurity means that many Pokot and Kikuyu have to 
° Mkutu 2001 op cit. 
268 
acquire arms to protect their lives and assets. Such conflicts led to Maasai arming 
themselves and to a demand for home guards. 
Interviews in the field in Dol Dol, Mukogodo division in revealed a more aggressive 
invasion of Laikipia ranches (private commercial enterprise) occurred in June 2000. 
Heavily armed herdsmen from Samburu, Turkana, Isiolo (Somalia) and Pokot with 
thousands of their cattle invaded several private ranches. In response the government sent 
the police to try and resolve the situation. The police alone could not manage, therefore, 
the General Service Unit was sent and the government armed the Dol Dol Maasai home 
guards. 
Research revealed that in 2001 during the drought period, migrant pastoralists brought 
over 50,000 heads of cattle, 5,000 camels and 19,500 goats from the 6 districts in 
northeastern and northwestern Kenya (this included Samburu, Turkana, Isiolo, Marsabit, 
and Garissa). 82 Assuming that there were two armed guards for every 100 head of cattle 
and 10 camels, Laikipia district received an additional population of around 1000 herders, 
all armed. This further increased the number of small arms in the district, placing the 
figure slightly above 500 illegal automatic weapons and 500 licensed small arms. 
Interviews in Dol Dol indicate that the ranchers are also armed and they employ armed 
guards. 
The pastoralists were demanding that the government either protect them from raiders or 
give more arms to the home guards to protect them from the cattle raiders and ranchers 
who sometimes shoot their animals. 83 As noted by Leakey and Morell (2001:31), only 
white farmers were allowed by the colonial government to have guns. 84 However as 
private individuals, home guards were also issued with arms. Native Kenyans took a 
much smaller share of game with their bows and arrows, spears, and traps. The 
government tended to regard this kind of killing as "poaching." 
81  See Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and other 
parts of Kenya, 1992 
82  Matunge, John op cit. Elders focus group interview, Dol Do!, Laikipia 2 September 2002; Kaipai Ole 
Legai, James, interviews, Do! Do!, Laikipia 3 September, 2002. 
83Marijo, Laban, Interviews, Laikipia, Dol Do!, Kenya, 3rd September 2002 where did the rancher get the 
arms to shoot the dog? He must possess either illegal or legal arms. 
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It is because of the proliferation of arms that regular police and General Service Unit 
(GSU found the task difficult to accomplish. It is vital to mention that the police station in 
Do! Dol does not have the same quantity of sophisticated firearms in its armoury, as do 
the pastoralists. As noted by one of the interviewees: 
Small arms are plenty but not easy to find. Here people of Mukogodo were 
encouraged to have them, by the Samburu, Turkana, Pokot and the Somali from 
Isiolo. But the raiders have better arms than the police. 85 
The accumulation of small arms in Laikipia has resulted from the state arming the home 
guards, which is an increase of arms into untrained hands, secondly the purchase of arms 
by pastoralists from Pokot, Samburu, and Isio10 86, and lastly we have arms owned by the 
ranchers and their guards. 
5.4.3 Case Study: Samburu 
Pastoralism is the main economic activity in Baragoi. Livestock supports 80% of the 
division's population with approximately 75% of the residents of Samburu district being 
nomads. Like the Turkana, Samburu experienced early threats by bandits from Abyssinia 
and Italian Somaliland in the late 19th century. The insecurity was aggravated by the use 
of small arms, which found their way into the region from Abyssinia. By 1909 the 
proliferation of arms had "already assumed alarming dimensions and there was a grave 
danger that the possession might incite tribes, hitherto friendly and peaceful, to set 
themselves against each other and the Government. 87" In addition the spread of small 
arms was leading to the depletion of game, particularly elephants and rhinoceros, killed 
for their tusks and horns. The greatest threat to Samburu security from colonial times 
emanated from the Turkana, who had acquired arms. 
84  still think even the post colonial government 
85  Rev. Moire, John, Anglican Church of Kenya DOLDOL Parish, Interviews, Laikipia, Dol Dol, Kenya, 
4th September, 2002 
16  Isiolo forms the triangle of arms dynamics in Kenya as all arms from Somalia and even Ethiopia end up 
in Isiolo before being distributed to otherparts of Kenya. 
81  See KNAIPCINFD7/1/1:NFD handbook, 1917:93 
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The history of cattle rustling is age old in Samburu. In Baragoi Division it is recorded in 
1893 during the Iterito age set (though it dates long before this) when the Samburu raided 
and exchanged donkeys and small stock for cattle with the Turkana (Spencer, 1973:87). 
The warriors (moran) carried the heaviest responsibility in the community and they 
performed most of the challenging and dangerous tasks with regard to acquisition and 
protection of essential communal resources such as livestock. In 1914, the Lmerisho and 
Iterito age sets joined the King's African Rifles, which enabled them to go raiding 
neighbouring tribes for compensation. In 1917, the Turkana bandits Ng'oroko invaded 
Samburu manyattas (Kraals) in Baragoi when the Lmerisho ages set were warriors. After 
the raid, the Samburu retaliated by invading Lochotom, Kerio, Naliyo and Turkana. 
Many animals were taken, together with girls, and many others killed. 
in the early years of independence (1969), the Ng'oroko invaded the villages of Lekupe 
and Lesokoyo at Tuum in Baragoi Division, injuring one and stealing several livestock. 
In 1970, the Ng'oroko raided Baragoi area killing Lentoimaga of the Lmekuri age set. In 
the same year they raided Lepatoiye in Simale taking livestock. In 1972, the raiders 
invaded Tuum where eighteen of them were killed. In 1980, the bandits raided Lengees 
and Uaso-Baragoi manyattas88 injuring many people. In 1986, the government of Kenya 
noted that insecurity both within Samburu and neighbouring districts contributed to 
increased out-migration (Were and Ssennyonga, 1986). The progressive militarization 
with modem weapons acquired from neighbouring countries by the Turkana, Somali and 
Pokot was noted to have rendered the Samburu, with few weapons due to their 
remoteness from supplying 'chains', very vulnerable and radically and redefined the role 
and scale of the traditional stock raiding. 
For fifteen years, (1980-1995) there were no incidents of Ngoroko cattle rustlers. But on 
27th August 1996 a big armed gang invaded the Sigira area of Baragoi Division taking 
5,000 heads of cg4lp and killing niieteen people. Since then cattle rustling with use of 
arms has become common and very lethal. The technology shift from spears to small 
88  Homes steads. 
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arms has totally altered traditional stock raiding, turning it potentially into a commercial 
activity. Arms accumulation in Baragoi has been primarily through purchase or 
smuggling from neighbouring districts. 89 In addition the government has issued licit arms 
to civilians' home guards, which later disappeared. Lastly figures suggest that there are 
16, 478 illicit arms in the community held mainly by Samburu warriors (Masinde Ct al., 
2004 : 83) 90 
The reason for the high rate in purchasing and smuggling guns is due to overall 
insecurity. As stated by Counsellor Lemoyin of South Hon: 
Police force is not very visible: they should be present where rural communities 
are proximal to borders. This invisibility leads to smuggling of arms. 91 
In conclusion the need to protect wealth (cattle) and to restock in case of drought is 
responsible for arms accumulation in Baragoi. The survival equation is complex and only 
the natives know how to balance it. The gun has become an important factor in the 
survival of the Samburu. Commercialization of raids makes it difficult to determine the 
parties to the conflict. 
5.5 Weapons Flows 
Early sections of the chapter establish the main sources of arms in the region, and 
demonstrate their accumulation in the study areas. This section shows in greater detail the 
sources of arms flows, provides a brief methodology on how the data on flows and cost 
was obtained. It then examines the routes, methods and costs of arms and ammunition in 
the North Rift between 200 1-2004. 
89  Interviews with various members of communities in Maralal and Baragoi, 19-25 September 2002. 
90  It is very difficult to determine the arms in a community; hence the above figure is questionable, as the 
authors do not state the methodology they used to come at the figure. As noted elsewhere, an arms market 
used to exist in Parao, Samburu; hence the figure could be much higher. 
ibid. Worth to note is that arms into Baragoi are also coming from the Oromo Liberation Front rebels. 
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Over 500 people were interviewed. Interviewed personnel included: warriors, 
government officials (civil servants), border guards, elders, members of parliament, 
administrations, resident district commissioners, and their counterparts in Kenya; district 
commissioners, religious leaders, business men, arms 'traders', and former cattle raiders 
who normally operate on these routes. Those who were literate were provided with a map 
of the Horn and told to draw the routes. The claims were discussed with security agents, 
and in the case of Kenya with District Commissioners and district officers who are the 
chairmen of the District Security Committees. Figure 5.3 below shows the pictures that 
emerged from this exercise, of regional arms trafficking dynamics across the border of 
Sudan, Kenya and Uganda. 
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Figure 5.3 Arm trafficking across the Border of Sudan, Kenya and Uganda 
October 2004 
	
Didinga 	I I Toposa 
Acholi 	I 	V 	I Dodoth V 1 	3# Turkana 
Jie 
Lango 	 Labwor 
II 	 __ 
I 
Teso 	 Bokora 	I I Matheniko 
Pian 	 Tepeth  
I P 	
Pokot 
okot  
4 
I Sabeiv 	I 
Armstrade 	 I 
9 
Arms captured in battle 
Foads  ambushes 
Source: Kennedy MkUtU, Field interviews 2003 
274 
5.6 Routes and Personnel involved in Movement of Arms (Trans border Sudan, 
Kenya-Uganda) 
Map 5.1 below shows the routes used by traders and arms traffickers to move small arms 
into the Kenya-Uganda area as of January-February 2003 during the fieldwork. It is 
important to note that routes change as circumstances change, including the level of 
official security.92 This is particularly the case on the Kenyan side, where the security 
forces regularly mount checkpoints and patrol randomly. Any sale of arms by soldiers on 
the Kenyan side is subjected to heavy punishment, including dismissal. 93 However, on the 
Ugandan side, security is laxer and the routes are changed less regularly, and indeed 
when the security forces have gone, the routes are re-established to some extent. 
Those involved in small arms trade range from racketeers to vigilantes, from warriors, 94to 
small traders to wealthy businessmen, and personnel of the Uganda Peoples Defence 
Force on the Ugandan side, Kenya Police Reservists on the Kenyan side 95.. The law in 
both countries prohibits arms sales where those involved have no license. Bollig (1993) 
notes that members of parliament and other such 'big men' may act as market 
intermediaries for both livestock and armaments. Women too are involved, mainly 
trading in ammunition independently from the trade in guns. It is easy to carry bullets in 
food bags, milk gourds or water jugs. Security forces rarely check women, making it 
relatively easy for them to carry loads of ammunition across the bOrder. Women evade 
security checks more easily than men, since they arouse fewer suspicions, and it is 
difficult for men to carefully search women. 
92  Mkutu 2003:24 
ibid. 
94  In Uganda, Karamoja the warriors are called karachunas, while in West Pokot they are referred to as 
Nigidigidai) 
95 Mkutu 2003 op cit; Muhereza 1997b; Cappon, 2003 
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The racketeers are now major players in the arms markets. 96 This was clearly pointed out 
by a former warriOr who stated that cattle raiders came to his home and stole all the 
cattle. So he became a warrior employed by one of the local racketeers and was issued 
with an AK47. After obtaining a gun, he joined a gang of 200 raiders, who from time to 
time would go to raid cattle from Kraals, and the ring leader (racketeer) would sell 
proceeds and give them a share. Being a warrior already he had the necessary 
'experience'. After raiding several times and getting enough money, he purchased his 
own cattle and returned the gun he had initially been loaned. Thereafter, he left the gang 
and formed his own to acquire cattle for himself through raiding. 97 He now employs more 
than four armed warriors to take care of his own cattle. He, however, stopped going 
raiding as he felt it was risky. 
Through raiding, racketeers, businessmen, and traders have become significant owners of 
livestock, especially cows. They use cows as a form of exchange for guns. Racketeers 
then employ warriors, provide them with weapons, and send them out to raid more cattle 
and camels. The racketeer thus acquires more cattle, which are sold for more guns, 
thereb.y allowing more warriors to be hired to raid more cows, and so the vicious cycle 
continues. Racketeers are now among the biggest arms sellers and wealthiest pastoralists, 
and they control some of the arms markets. Cattle are now concentrated in the hands of a 
few wealthy herders. 98 
The Kenyan and Ugandan governments have acknowledged the significant security 
challenges in northwestern Kenya and Karamoja. While some attempt has been made to 
address small arms problems in the region, a truly effective and comprehensive strategy 
addressing the multiplicity of demand and supply factors has yet to be introduced. 
Tracking the nature of the small arms trade in the region and in particular the trading 
routes by which small arms and ammunition reach the regions are of particular 
importance to tackling this issue. 
96  Mirzeler and Young 2000:422;see Nyaba 2001 ;ADOL, 2001; MkUtU 2001 
' Former raider, name withheld. Intryew, Amu4it,  14 June 2001 
98  Field notes Karamoja and West Pokot. A well-placed politician confirmed and noted that racketeers are 
now the big time owners of cattle especially on the cross border areas of Kenya and Uganda. 
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It is worthy of note that barter for consumable products (use) is different from exchange 
for profit (accumulation) as social relations and outcomes are different. There, is a 
difference between legitimate trade (for profit) in legally acquired goods, barter for 
consumption goods and trade in goods acquired illegally- by raiding, banditry, looting or 
where trade itself is illegal (drugs). Some of the participants only sell, not buy (i.e. the 
bandits who ambush cars). All these processes are existing in the trade in arms. These 
dynamics are different from states or militias supplying arms freely to promote stability 
or instability. The fact is that arms are exchanged for foodlgoods and the arms further 
sold for a profit, which makes it very complex to differentiate between genuine and 
corrupt traders. 
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Map 5.1 Arms Flows in the Northeast Africa- Sudan-Kenya-Uganda border 
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Map 5.1 shows five main routes for the movement of small arms into the Sudan-Kenya-
Uganda border areas. It only gives the cross border flows as the Kenya internal flows are 
shown elsewhere (maps 5.3,5.4 and 5.5 below). 
The first and most commonly used route is into Karamoja from Sudan. The second is the 
'north-eastern route' into Kenya from Somalia. The third is the route from Sudan into 
Lokichogio in Kenya (that route is not indicated on map 5.1). The fourth is the Sudan-
Karenga-Lopoch-Kotido route; lastly is the Southern Sudan-Uganda-Kenya route. There 
used to be a sixth originating in Ethiopia and connecting to Uganda via Sudan, but the 
eviction of the SPLA from Ethiopia has led to the decline of this route (Mkutu, 2003: 24). 
Sudan-Karamoja Route 
This is currently the main route for arms into the Karamoja region. Large quantities of 
small arms are brought across the Sudan border to Kotido district (see map 5.2 below). 
From there, some are taken to Pokot and Samburu in Kenya. Others are taken on to 
Moroto and Nakapiripit districts in Uganda99. It was claimed in interviews that a very 
wealthy businessman has also been involved in transporting arms illegally and miraa 
(khat) from Kotido district in Uganda to Kachiliba town, West Pokot district, in Kenya' °° . 
Evidence from interviews with Sudanese refugees and with high-placed sources have 
revealed that during 1993-94, the SPLA laid off several hundred officers, giving them 
varying quantities of small arms as a 'retirement package'. The officers sold many of the 
arms to sustain themselves at gun markets on the Ugandan side of the border. The SPLA 
itself has also regularly traded guns in Karamoja region for other items, as evidence from 
the field confirmed. 
[The] SPLA come into Uganda with donkey loads of ammunition 
and guns and they exchange them for grain and livestock. 
Interview with several people, Amudat, Pokot Uganda, 16 June 2001. Also field notes with elders and 
community focus group interviews in Kanawat, JiKotido January 2003. Interviews with ex- cattle raider 
Cheere op cit. 
°° With the current disarmament ongoing in Uganda, interviews in the field revealed that he is now 
cooperating and helping with the disarmament. 
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Livestock captured with the use of arms are sold or exchanged for 
arms, which actually increases the quantities of small arms in the 
hands of traders/warlords or warriors. The arms are then traded for 
more cattle. The SPLA army needs food, and that is how they are 
getting part of their food. 10 ' 
Depending on the type of AK-47 (Chinese or Russian), the rate of exchange in Ugandan 
Villages is 2-3 cows for one gun. The major mode of payment is through barter. The 
SPLA denies that it trades arms for food, including cattle, arguing that they have no link 
to the arms traders moving through its areas into Uganda.' °2 
North-eastern Route from Somalia directly into Uganda 
The North-eastern arms trafficking corridor operates between Mt. Morungole and Kidepo 
National Park through 1k territory into Kaabong, and is one of the oldest arms trafficking 
routes in the region' 03 . This route begins in Somalia, moving through the Merrille area in 
Ethiopia and then onto the Karamoja region in Uganda. From there, small arms move 
through Upe Pokot areas in Uganda and cross the border into Turkana and Pokot areas on 
the Kenyan side. This route is very costly because the arms have to pass through a series 
of brokers over a long distance. For this reason, relatively few arms currently come 
through this route. In addition, the trademark gun of the Karimojong is the AK-47, while 
the guns that come through this route are G3 rifles. This rifle is considered outdated. 
However, if the Sudan-Karamoja route was to be more effectively policed this route 
could quickly become more important.' °4 The Somali involvement in the small arms trade 
may also be facilitated by the fact that they operate the main bus transport system from 
Sudan to Uganda. One respondent asserted; 
The best arms smugglers are Somali; they carry guns on donkeys and they 
exchange them for oxen. They do not follow roads. They take miraa (khat) to 
101 Interview, Moroto, 20 June 2001. Source did not want to be identified. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Muhereza, 1997b: 26;see also Mkutu 2003; 2001. 
104 Somalis are very influential in the Kenya-Uganda border area. 
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Kachiliba in Kenya, inn, Karenga, Namalu in Uganda. Sometimes they transport 
the guns hidden in miraa. 105 
When warriors were interviewed they noted, "We go to the mountains to get the 
miraa. ,,106  Miraa chewing in pastoral areas is a new phenomenon. 
A local prominent individual who is knowledgeable on the small arms problem, argued: 
Somalis inhabit the eastern province of Kenya. The Somalis are known for their 
close-knit family clans; ties which can stretch from Kampala to Kotido to 
Mogadishu, the Somali capital. The ties are vital for long-tenn survival in the 
Somali harsh climate, and they provide an underground network that protects the 
small arms traders. They are in touch with Somalis in Somalia who are armed to 
the brim.' 07 
Surprisingly, Somalia traders are often 'strangers' not local. The main reasons are that 
they adapt easily to and environments. Traditionally, their economic occupation has been 
associated with trading and exchanging goods. They were especially linked to the Arab 
trade (barter) mentioned earlier. A District Officer interviewed in Kapenguria also noted, 
"The Somali would bring guns to East Baringo; they would in turn reach West Pokot." 08 
As noted above the problem with this route is that it was a small source and the guns very 
expensive. 
Sudan-Lokichogio Route 
Traders from Sudan sometimes pass through the Kraals or local villages and bring arms 
directly to the Turkana in Kenya without passing through Uganda. Arms entering Kenya 
along this route are then sold to Karamoja and from there they are sold back into Kenya. 
105 Interview, 20 June 2001. Source did not want to be identified. Miraa grows wild on Mount Kadama and 
Mount Napa in Inn, Uganda. Karenga, Amudat, and Namule. 
106. Interviews, Karachunas, Namalu Market, 24 January 2003. 
107 Interview. Source did not want to be named. Namalu, 21 June 2001. 
108 Interview with District Officer. Name withheld. Kapengunia, 31 May 2001. 
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While the Turkana and the Pokot in Kenya have a volatile relationship, this enmity does 
not stop Turkana traders and racketeers from bringing arms to sell in Pokot. This trade 
occurs mainly during periods of peace between the two communities. While arms along 
this route often go via Kenya to Uganda and are then returned to Kenya, those that end up 
in the Samburu region of Kenya often come directly from Sudan through Lokichogio.' °9 
These arms in the Samburu region are mainly sourced from the Borana. 
Sudan-Karenga-Lopoch-Kotido Route 
This trafficking route, dominated mainly by the Toposa, a Sudanese pastoral ethnic group 
which speaks a dialect akin to Ng'akarimojong, runs from Southern Sudan into Karenga, 
entering Karamoja via Mt. Zulia in the extreme North to Pirre, then Kathile and finally to 
Kaabong gun market. 110 These arms are brought to Kaabong from Nimule, Kopeta or 
Juba in Sudan. The arms and ammunition from both transit routes filter further 
southwards into Jie territory and beyond. Interviews indicate that this is one of the main 
routes to bring arms to Jie County. In interview Jie informants told noted that there are 
several other sources of arms flow to Jie. Arms from Sudan come through Labalangit and 
Dodoth County. Some of the guns come through Sudan to Nyangia-Karenga to Dodoth 
and Jie, and then they percolate to various parts of Karamoja. As noted by a Matheniko 
former raider, Cheere, who is now chief of Rupa, "As a raider, we used sometimes to buy 
guns from Dodoth. During the time of Amin when the guns first came to Matheniko, the 
type of gun I managed to get was the SLR rifle." 11 The Jie, who seem to be major 
distributors of arms to other areas, have several secondary sources. The first is the 
western axis mainly involving arms trafficking from conflict-afflicted Acholiland 
(Acholi-Padar-Adilang route and the Longor-Alerek route). Another route goes through 
Lango (the Langi), specifically Olimi-Otukei sub-county in Labour county. 
' 09 1n a questionnaire given to 120 households in Baragoi-Samburu district of Kenya (2000) and to twenty 
home guards, respondents indicate4 that arms came Jirectly from Sudan to Lokichogio. 
"° This route has also been referred by ADOL (2002), which argues that significant arms markets exist 
along the Kotido-Sudan border. 
111 Cheere, James. Interview, Rupa, Karamoja, 2 February 2003. 
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There are two main types of arms that go through these routes. First, old guns, as noted 
by Lobugret; 
Currently, Acholi provided the Jie with guns. In the past, there were no arms from 
Acholi, but now they are coming. They bring them to be sold. The guns 
apparently are not new but are rusty, implying they have been buried for some 
time. 112 
The Jie believe that these arms were buried during the civil war in Uganda and are now 
being sold due to the high demand for arms, especially after failed disarmament (see 
chapter 7) and also due to the current conflict between the Jie and the Bokora. The second 
source of arms on the Acholi route to Be is probably the Lords Resistance Army of Kony. 
It is believed that Kony's" 3  men are bringing arms to their own people (Acholi), and the 
arms are resold to the Jie. Deserting Lords Resistance Army rebels are also selling their 
arms to Jie openly, in the kraals in Acholi. They further exchange them for cows as 
ADOL (2002: 100) notes, "Guns are believed to be abundant among the former rebels, 
who do not use them because of security vigilance." It is also believed that cattle rustlers 
have struck a deal with the rebels. They get guns, and the LRA take animals in 
exchange.' 14  This is presumably for food. The other source is the "enemy". It was noted 
that warriors kill the "enemy" and get their guns. During raids when Jie go to Dodoth, 
they can kill ten or more Dodoth and get their guns and vice versa. This told by a current 
active raider "We raided Kiamion a big kraal and got over 1000 cattle. In the fight many 
people were killed and that is how I got my first gun." 5 But lastly you can hire a gun. 
Kangole an active raider noted "if I hire your gun, I return back with one cow, its sold 
and the owner of the gun gets a higher share" 116 Map 5.2 below shows the movement of 
arms into Karamoja. 
112 Lobuet, Andrew. Interview, Kanawat, Kotido, Uganda, 3 February 2003. 
113 Elders in Jie also indicated that Kony was recently seen in Acholi, in Lira. Interviews in Kotido with 
various people, including Akore (KAPAPAS), Local Councils, (KOPE1N) in Kanawat and Kotido 1-4 
February 2003. See IR1N, (2003) Arthy claims Successes over LRA, 19 January- local leaders in Lira 
warned that LRA still has a presence in LIRA. 
114 Field notes 2002 and 2003: see also Daily Monitor 4 October 2003 
http://www.monitor.co.uglarchives/2003main/octlnews/1  004/newsi .php 
"5 Interview Active 16 year old raider NakaelrnQru, 6 Octler, 2004 
116 Inteiew Kangole (not his real name) Nakapelimoru, 6 October 2004 
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Map 5.2: Gun Trafficking into Karamoja 
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The secondary sources were government soldiers. In January, a UPDF soldier was caught 
selling a dismantled AK47, in Kotido town. The soldier had come from Lira and sold the 
gun to warriors in Kotido Sub County. Secondly a member of the Local Defence Unit, a 
Teso but based in Kotido Sub County, sold a gun to one of the warriors in Kotido. 
Arms and ammunitions are brought to Kaabong (see map 5.2 above) by the SPLA in 
donkey loads and exchanged for grain and livestock. The donkeys pass through Kraals 
carrying the arms." 7Stock is exchanged for arms. The arms are then brought to Kangole 
and Moroto. On Mondays, arms used to be sold in Moroto and on Thursdays in Kangole. 
However, with the recent disarmament, the traders are now very careful. Disarmament 
has made the arms invisible, but it is claimed that trading has actually increased. 
The difference between Kangole and Moroto and other locations is cash payment. The 
reason is that the traders need money to buy goods" 8 that are in demand in source areas 
(borders of Sudan and Uganda) to exchange for arms. One source told me that traders 
often have orders for goods to buy when coming to major towns like Mbale, Jinja and 
Kampala. 
Somalis control the main public bus from Nimule on the border of Sudan and Uganda to 
Kampala. Passenger and goods transports were linked to the traders in Mbale and even 
Jinja, where one can obtain foreign exchange dollars or sterling easily, through 
unorthodox means. The researcher managed to exchange dollars for Uganda shillings 
after only a few minutes in Mbale. 119 The limestone and marble mining in Moroto and 
Tepes is managed and monopolized by Somalis. Mineral exploitation is currently a 
growing commercial interest, especially in Moroto District, Matheniko County. If 
security improves in the long term, mining activity could increase. Mining raises a new 
type of conflict of interests with the pastoralists. The mining and exploitation of 
pastoralist labour in mining could cause them to get more arms to defend their wealth, as 
they are educated on the value of the minerals. 
117 In the kraals they have assured sources of food 
118 Radios, electronics, shoes, clothes, etc 
19  Evidence indicated that the Somalis made their money through the Karamoja connection, selling gold 
obtained from Karamoja and also trading in arms. In January 2003, I interviewed the Somalis who have 
been given the permits for mining in Karamoja. 
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Since 2002-2003, the Karenga route is being policed by the UPDF; hence only minimal 
arms are coming through. Labwor does not supply guns and ammunition to the Jie but 
they used to get them from Labwor people who had deserted the forces in the early 80s 
and 90s. There are no established markets for guns and ammunition, but the business 
continues. 
Southern Sudan-Uganda and Kenya route 
Arms are also entering both Uganda and Kenya from southern Sudan. The government of 
Sudan has supplied arms to the Merrille, Toposa and Didinga ethnic groups as a means of 
destabilizing the rebel SPLA movement. The large quantity of arms that are available has 
led to trade across the borders of Uganda and Kenya (Nyaba, 200 1:84). Southern Sudan 
is well known for lawlessness and insecurity, making small arms prolific. As argued in 
the Daily Monitor, 20 Febmary 2002, " There are three possible factors that make the 
Southern Sudan a major arms source; the government of Sudan, due to its active support 
of various militia groups in Southern Sudan, the Lord's Resistance Army, and the 
Sudanese Peoplcs Liberation Army (SPLA)." 
The above represent the arms routes into Karamoja and into Pokot in Kenya. It is perhaps 
also worth mentioning the now largely defunct Ethiopia-Sudan route, along which 
President Mengistu supplied arms during the 1980s   to the SPLA, helping establish them 
as an effective fighting force. With the fall of Mengistu in 1991 this route declined in 
importance. 
5.7 Small Arms flows and routes: the Kenya Dynamics 
The proliferation of small arms across international borders was a problem identified in 
1979 by the Kenya government as noted previously.' 20 The large number of small arms 
circulating in Kenya is partly a result of the civil wars in the Horn of Africa, particularly 
120 See West Pokot Development Plan 1979; GOK, 1986:8 
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the disintegration of Somalia. Kenya alone cannot address the problem. As solution to the 
problem of SALW must be embedded in a regional framework. Adirizak Juma recently 
said, "A fire is burning in Somalia, and as long as there is a gap here, any efforts 
elsewhere will be useless, as arms will continue to pour into Kenya." 21 It appears that 
wars in Southern Sudan and in Uganda also contribute a great deal to the flow of 
weapons, their wide dispersal, and their cheap cost in Kenya' 22 . Most arms flowing into 
Kenya originate from conflict areas and Kenya is the market for SALW in the region. 
To understand the dynamics I administered a questionnaire to 200 administrative officers 
from all over Kenya. This included the following questions: 
Why are Kenyans, especially pastoralists, suddenly demanding arms? 
How has the problem of small arms and cattle rustling manifested itself in your 
division or district? 
If you have worked on the border towns, what is the nature of border security 
(customs officers, immigration)? 
Is the trafficking of small arms on the border regular, occasional, or is the supply 
of arms becoming organized and why? 
In your last station do you know of weapons caches? 
What are the routes of arms into Kenya? 
If you were to draw a map of the routes weapons take in Kenya, what would be 
the start off points, transit areas and arrival points 123? 
Observation was also used in areas visited by the researcher. The questionnaires were 
also given to security and District Commissioner's seasoned administrators who have 
served for over 10 years in various parts of Kenya. They were also given to border and 
customs officers who the researcher could access. Out of the 200 questionnaires that were 
returned, over 30 drew maps. The data was checked with in-depth interviews in the 
various areas. The information was then used to draw the arms mapping dynamics and 
routes for Kenya. 
121 FECCLAHA and NCA workshop, 2002 
122 M1(utu 2003 op. cit. 
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Map .i: Mapping Arms flow Dynamics Into Kenya 
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5.7.1 Primary Routes 
There are four primary arms routes into Kenya. The Somalia route, which has three major 
branches, the Somalia-Dadaab-Garissa-Nairobi path being the best known. The second is 
the Somalia-Mandera-Elwak-Wajir-Isiolo-GariSSa-Nairobi path. The third is the Elwak-
Wajir-Isiolo path. In 2001, one of the interviewed administrators and his security team 
managed to intercept 17 guns in an old house. The arms were said to be in transit to 
Nairobi on the Elwak-Isiolo route.' 24 Once arms arrive in Isiolo some are diverted to 
Meru. In an interview, a Kenya Wildlife Service warden observed: 
The push for arms to Meru is due to the Meru National Park, east of Mt. 
Kenya, which is one of Kenya's largest parks covering 870 square kilometres 
(340 square miles). It has suffered heavy poaching especially that supplying 
the ivory trade.' 25 
Interviews with the elders in Samburu indicated that arms are also brought into East 
Pokot from Wajir, Kenya. Pokot go to Wajir and return with loads of arms carried on 
donkeys, especially the new model AK-47 from Russia, which is common in East Pokot. 
They also noted arms coming from Ethiopia via Marsabit. According to Police reports on 
the types of arms used in cattle rustling in Baringo, the Russian Kalashnikov was very 
heavily used, followed by the G3, while the HK21 and HK1 I rifles were moderately 
used.' 26  This suggests the Wajir arms route as the source. The first two routes converge in 
the arms triangle of Kenya, (Marsabit/Isiolo and Wajir) which is the main source of arms 
used in many crimes in Nairobi and Mombasa or the eastern part of the country. It is 
divided into two. Those arms entering directly from south Sudan to Turkana then flow 
through Kalapata and Lokitanyala and Akoret (see Map 5.4). The second arm is directly 
through Upe Pokot into West Pokot. 
124 Djstrict Administrator, Maragua District, September 2001, questionnaire no. 11, name withheld. 
125 	withheld. Interview, Kenya Wildlife Service headquarters, Nairobi, September 2002. This route is  Name 
also served by the arms from the Indian Ocean through lungalunga border area and Tana River via Garrissa. 
116 Police headquarters, Vigilance House, Nairobi; also police headquarters, Baringo Police Division. 
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Map 5.4: Arms flows into Turkana and Pokot in Rift Valley, Kenya 
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The second route comes directly from Karamoja to Upe Pokot (Uganda Pokot) to West 
Pokot, Kenya, then into Marakwet Rift Valley and other parts of Kenya. 
Loki-Lokitung-Lodwar route 
The fourth primary route is commonly called Loki (Lokichogio) and Lokitaung-Lodwar 
route. From Sudan the arms come to Loki, Kakuma, Lorugumau, Lorengipi, and Loya in 
Turkana. These derive mainly from the Sudan civil war, the SPLA play a major role.' 27 
Also, there is the Ethiopia- Kibish-Todonyang route into Turkana and Moyale.' 28 
Interviews with well-placed sources in Samburu indicated that the collapse of Kopeta in 
Sudan in 2002 had a major impact. The SPLA launched a surprise attack on the Sudanese 
barracks at Kopeta. However they were not adequately prepared and did not get control 
of the barracks quickly, and the Toposa managed to get into the barracks and seize many 
small arms. This spawned high arms traffic from Sudan to Turkana in Kenya, and 
especially to the refugee camp at Kakuma. Hostilities existed between the Turkana and 
the refugees, due to rights over for resources, and the Toposa cashed in by selling arms 
both to the refugees and to the local Turkana. Some of those arms found their way to 
Pokot.' 29  Additionally, the arms moved from Pokot to Marakwet, and though the 
Marakwet are fighting the Pokot, the sources of arms into Marakwet are paradoxically via 
Pokot. 130  Interviews also indicated that this route is a source of arms into Samburu.' 31 
5.7.2 Minor Routes 
The Ethiopia-Marsabit-Isiolo path, though a minor route, joins the Wajir route and forms 
a triangle the Marsabit-Waj ir-Isiolo triangle- making the area a triangle of small arms 
127 Field notes 2001,2002 and 2003 
128 Advanced Public Adminisfration questionnaires, 2002, 2003. 
129 	notes 2002  Field 
130 Interviews in Alale West Pokot, Kenya, August 2002. Also SPLA, Interviews with senior officers, in 
Nairobi and also ICRC staff operating the Hospital in Lokichogio. The tension between the refugees and 
the local Turkana led to a meeting between top government officers and some of the local UNHCR and 
ICRC staff. 
131 Some traders are bringing arms as far as Samburu on this route. 
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conflict in Kenya. The triangle feeds the Nairobi Eastleigh area with arms. The second 
minor route is the Lake Victoria route. The arms come from Democratic Republic of 
Congo via the Mufangano Islands in Lake Victoria and then pass to Trans-Mara and 
Nairobi. The arms used in cattle raids in Transmara originate on this route. The third 
minor route is the Tanzania-Tarime-Isabania route. The route was primarily used during 
the Tanzania-Uganda war and the Great Lakes conflict (Egesa and Mkutu, 2000:17-18). 
A large part of the Tanzanian forces that invaded Uganda and toppled the Amin regime 
were from Kuria, and the arms traffic on the route has now decreased. The arms enter 
Kenya through Isabania-Migori and some make their way to the Trans-Mara conflict. 
More research is needed on these routes. The final minor route is the Zanzibar-Lamu 
(Lunga Lunga) route. Interviews with Kenya Wildlife Service people indicated that the 
main feature of this route is that the arms are for poaching game in Taveta and Voi 
areas.' 32 
On 28 November it was reported that "al Qaeda" had blown up the Israeli Paradise Hotel 
at Kikambala Beach near Mombasa, and synchronously launched a missile attack on an 
Arkia Airlines Boeing 757, taking off from Mombasa Airport en-route for Tel Aviv with 
264 Israeli passengers on board' 33 . This Lunga Lunga route is thought to have been used 
by the terrorists to bring in the missile to Kenya. Because of these routes, Kenya is a 
major destination of arms from all the surrounding countries that are experiencing 
conflict. 
5.7.3 Arms Flow Dynamics: Baragoi and Mukogodo 
Most of the previous cases of arms flow and dynamics were in border areas in the vicinity 
of civil wars. Baragoi and Mukogodo are located in the interior of Kenya. Thus it is 
important to understand how arms make their way to non-conflict areas. The current arms 
circulating in Baragoi include AK47s, G-3s, M16s, Mark4s, and 303s.' 34 Arms started 
132 More work needs to be done on this minor route. 
133 htto://english.people.com.cn/2002 11/29/ena2OO2 ll29 1 07657.shtml 
134 Interviews, Samburu, 2000, 2001, and 2002. 
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getting to Baragoi en-masse in 1996. The progressive militarization of Baragoi is linked 
to the conflicts in the Horn and to cattle rustling. This has thoroughly redefined the role 
and scale of traditional stock raiding in Baragoi. The Samburu Baragoi are the most 
vulnerable as they had no access to arms till recently. The arms routes into Baragoi are 
interesting. Baragoi is right in the middle of the flourishing trade in small arms from 
Isiolo. All the primary routes feed into Samburu because a cross section of people lives in 
Baragoi, including the Somalis. 
The primary arms route into Samburu is first, the Sudan-Turkana- Pokot, including the 
Marakwet route. The second route is the Ethiopia-Moyale (Marsabit), which comes to 
Isiolo and down to Nairobi with some arms diverted to Samburu. While I was in South 
Hon thirty miles north of Baragoi, Councillor Lomogin informed me that Marsabit was 
less than one hour away, and it was a major source of arms flow into South Hon. The 
arms then make their way down to Baragoi 40 kilornetres away. Thirdly, there is the 
Somalia-Garrisa- Mwingi-Nairobi route, which also diverts arms to Samburu. Fourthly, 
there is the Marsabit-South Hon route. The route is referred to as the Rendile route. The 
Rendile are said to descend from the Samburu, and they have close kinship and economic 
ties with them. In 1996, Rendile were the main source of arms into Baragoi. They lacked 
water in that year and hence moved to Samburu. When they moved, they were well 
armed. During the Rendile and Samburu vs. Turkana cattle rustling conflict, the Rendile 
were able to arm the Samburu. Fifthly, there is the Uganda-Pokot-Marakwet-Samburu 
route. 135 The possession of heavy arms by the Marakwet was confirmed in an interview 
with a former District Commissioner for Pokot. 
Lastly, there is the Turkana-Suguta Vallcy-Baragoi route. This route, apart from 
supplying arms to the Baragoi area, also allows Somali and Turkana arms traders to bring 
guns to sell at Porro (Parao) every Monday on market days. Security officers know of the 
Parao market, but it has been ignored by the system. 136 Donkeys mainly transport the 
135 Interviews, March, 2000 Maralal; focus group discussions, Samburu, August, 2000, Baragoi, Samburu, 
2002, Baragoi and Maralal, in-depth questionnaire to APA, warriors, elders, civil leaders. 
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weapons into Baragoi; however, the Somali often uses camels. As noted in an interview, 
"The communities are mobile; it's very easy to transport arms and ammunition." 137 
Interviews with Somalis residing in Baragoi confirmed that the main suppliers of arms 
and ammunition to Baragoi are the Somali from Marsabit. They bring the arms on 
donkeys and camels and sell to the local people. Most of the guns are like the G3 and the 
AK47, which can be easily assembled and concealed in camels without anyone knowing 
that they are arms. 138 
It was also noted that arms are sometimes stitched into goat's carcass. This smuggling 
method used to be very common, but since the security forces discovered it, traders use it 
only occasionally. Arms from Baragoi and Isiolo and Baringo have made their way into 
Dol Dol. Like Baragoi, Do! Doi is located in the interior and the arms dynamics can be 
observed below: 
137 Kulus, Marit, of NCCK. Interview, Maralat, 19 August 2002. 
138 Mohammed, Mi Osaman. Interview, Baragoi, 21 August 2002. 
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Map 5.5 Arms Dynamics into Dot Dot 
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The arms mainly find their way from Samburu, Baringo and from Isiolo (Map 5.5). The 
main routes noted in all feed into Mukogodo. 
5.8 The cost of SALW and ammunition 
A growing body of evidence makes it possible to gain some understanding of the barter 
and cash value of the arms entering the North Rift area from 1970s to 2003. From this 
evidence, it is clear that we must distinguish between guns and ammunition. Without 
ammunition guns are useless. Additionally ammunition is specific to makers of guns and 
local factories do not produce for all guns. 
This section first provides the methodology used, examines the costs of guns and 
ammunition in Karamoja and then examines the Kenya-Uganda border region, before 
examining the same in Kenya. The price of small arms is one of the best guides to their 
availability. "Prices convey a general sense about demand and supply, demonstrating 
whether or not they can be easily obtained." 39 Prices also indicate which arms are 
commonly circulating in an area. Ammunition prices are also important, but quantifying 
ammunition costs is difficult as the trade is often through bartering. 
The main method of trading in small arms in pastoral areas of Northeast Africa and the 
Horn of Africa is barter, though in some places cash is paid. Interviewees were all asked 
the same question what is the cost of arms and ammunition both at the source and the 
interior. The information was aggregated for each area. 
5.8.1 Cost of Arms and Ammunition in Karamoja, Uganda 
Various reasons explain why gun prices have dropped. First is the high saturation rate and 
easy access. Second, at one time several open arms markets existed in Karamoja, and one 
139 See Small arms Survey 2002: 65 
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could just walk to the market and buy guns. Further, when the Lord's Resistance Army 
and the Sudan People's Liberation Army, needed food,they sold their arms for low 
prices. The prices of arms have come down enormously since the late 1970s   in Karamoja 
Uganda, due to increased supply and less demand. At that time, a gun could cost up to 
70-150 cows. During the 1990s the cost of a gun dropped to between 20-30 cows. At 
one point, it reached 10-15 cows. In my first fieldwork in the area May-June 2001, in a 
saturated market, guns were being exchanged for 5-10 cows in Upe Pokot! 4° In 
Karamoja, the original Russian AK47 was worth 3 bulls. Interviews with the elders and 
ex-raiders in Kanawat parish revealed that before disarmament (1990-2000), the price of 
an AK47 in cash was between 300,000- 500,000 Uganda shillings or 3-5 cows per gun.' 4 ' 
Currently (October 2004) the cost of a gun has reduced to between 200,000 and 400,000 
Uganda shillings per gun or for an AK47, 2 bulls. The SAR (a Chinese made gun) is 
cheaper, costing 150,000- 200,000 Uganda shillings or 1-2 cows. 142 The price of the gun 
depends on the amount of bullets it takes. The Chinese AK47 takes 10, AK47 which is 
Russian, takes 30 bullets and the G3 takes 20 1 . However, the G3 is still more 
expensive, because it is rare, to the credit of the Kenya government, which is its main 
source, and also it doesn't get as hot. These figures show that the cost of a gun has 
dropped nearly 33% between 2000 and 2003 in Karamoja. As noted in interviews, 
conversion of arms into currency made them cheaper. 
According to the Local Council 2 of Kanawat parish, there is a new dynamic in arms 
buying in Jie. Previously guns were valued in cattle, but now the price is not fixed and is 
in the form of cash. One sells animals and then purchases a gun with cash.' 44 If this is 
true, a cash economy is being introduced into the small arms trafficking. An informant in 
Jie said, "When my family got our gun, we paid 25 head of cattle. Then the guns were 
very rare; we bought from dealers from Lobelagit. Before 1979 Moroto barracks 
Pokot 
141 Bpsco, Joip. Interview, Akore, Kanawat Parish, Kotido, 1 February 2003. 
142 Interview: Lobugret, Andrew, Local council 2 Kanwat parish, Kanawat, Kotido, Uganda 3 February, 
2003 
141 Interview Active raider Nakapelimoru 6 October, 2004 
144 Interview, Kanawat, Kotido, Uganda, 3 February 2003. 
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intervention, we used to get the guns from the Turkana during peacetime at 150 cattle. 
When Amin was defeated, people just stole the guns." 45 
Figure 5.4 Costs of Guns in Terms of Cattle in Karamoja 2003 
County Before 1979 1990 1999 2000 2001 2003 
1979 
Jie 40-60 20 	- 10 5 3-4 2 1-2 
25 
Bokora N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Plan N/A N/A N/A 5 3-4 3-5 
Matheniko N/A 20 10 8 4 3 2 	or 
UG 
300,000 
Upe Pokot 60 30 12 10-12 8-10 5-10 5-6 
Sources: in-depth interviews and locus group aiscussions wim warnors, reiormeu laluers, KruaI leauels, Iutal pui willuwly, 
2003. 
A Jie interviewed noted, "We are very happy to buy the gun at two cows because it 
makes it easy to Own a gun". Cheere, an ex-raider and now chief of Rupa, noted: 
Currently, the guns have become so many, no one wants to buy them, and 
also disarmament has made people afraid to buy, and this has pushed the 
price lower and [created] a demand for markets .... '46 The high cost of guns 
before 1979 was because of scarcity, and the Matheniko did not know where 
to get the arms.'47 
Ac! Ark' 48 revealed that during the early days, the Karimojong sold guns for between 
20 and 60 cows. Other interviewees noted that before 1979 barter trade dominated 
the scene and people exchanged their cattle for firearms. At that time, a gun could 
fetch up to 70 cows. 
145 op. cit. 
146 Cheere. James, ex-raider, chief of Rupa. Interview, Rupa, Uganda, 2 Februaiy 2003. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Member of Parliament for Dodoth county 
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Before disarmament, a gun in Pian County 149 was expensive. A former Local 
Council three interviewed indicated that he bought his AK47 through a friend 
who had travelled from Kaabong in the north near the source. The cost was 
300,000 Uganda shillings. 150 
Interviewees said that guns are bought and sold for 3-4 cattle in Pian, though a good 
gun was said to cost 5 cows. The high cost of small arms in both Pian and Upe Pokot 
as opposed to Jie is because of the distance to the source. The nearer to the source, 
the cheaper the arms. 
In conclusion the cost of small arms in Karambja has drastically gone down, depending 
on whether the area has proximity to the border or interior. Around Jie Kotido, which is 
near the source (borders) the small arms price has reduced to nearly 1-2 cows per gun. 
While in the interior towards Pian one can obtain a small arm with 3 cows. The most 
expensive place to buy a small arm is Upe Pokot with 4 cows though that has also 
drastically reduced. 
By contrast, the cost of bullets has risen drastically. A decade ago one paid three 
Ugandan shillings for one bullet. However, by 2001 the price had shot up to 50 
Uganda shillings' 5 ' Interjes in Jie i iated thatAIets could'rbought from 
wholesales at 100- 20for one blone ei. Wholesa1mmunitiones 
have now droppe'50-100 ts for a%l cow a,n<00-200orrge bull. 
Before disarmament, one could get single bullets for between 200 and 500 Uganda 
shillings (in Jie which is near the source) or 10-20 bullets for one goat and 50-100 
bullets for a small cow.' 52  Currently ammunition is selling for 500-1000 Uganda 
shillings per bullet, though soldiers sell their ammunition at 100 Uganda shillings for 
one bullet, for their short term needs. Recently a UPDF member was arrested in 
Kotido with 700 rounds of ammunition in a waggire (local brew) container. 
149 In the interior of Karamoja 
150 Former Local council 3, name withheld. Interview, Nakapiripit district, 27 January 2003. 
op cit. Mkutu 2003 
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Before disarmament, bullets were used as currency. 
You could buy brew with a bullet. If you went to a shop and you had a 
balance left, you could top the money using bullets.' 53 
The buying of beer with bullets is prevalent in rural areas especially by warriors. A 
father interviewed noted the surprising fact: 
Once or twice we have had bullets in the church collection, but also as a 
down payment for using the mission car to bring a patient to the hospital. But 
we would make an agreement to either exchange them with shops in the area 
or we would ask them to come back with cash and we would give them their 
bullets the next day' '. 
The prices for bullets in Kotido are fluctuating. A reformed cattle raider interviewed 
in Kanawat, said: 
I was getting my bullets by killing other raiders and some from 
traders. From traders, we could buy 1000 bullets for one bull. One 
bullet went for 500 shillings. We could use the bullets as money 
for drinking, and even buying things in shops, medicine etc. The 
shop could even take bullets for less money. This was mainly for 
the AK47 SMG, which is the common gun in Jie. 155 
Figure 5.5 Costs of Ammunition in Karamoja 2001-2003 (Per round) 
County Before 
1979 
1979 1990s 2001 2003 
Jie 200 200-500 and 500-1000 
Matheniko 200 500-1000 
Pian 600-1000 
Upe Pokot 200 700-1000 	/ 
Sources: Interviews and FGD with warriors, kraal leaders, former raiders, local defence unit personnel; 2003. 
152 Longole, Romano, Interview, Kotido, Uganda, 2 February 2003; also Akore John Bosco. Interview, 
Kotido, Uganda, 2-3February 2003. 
153 Romano, Alongo. Interview, Kotido, 3 February 2003. 
154 Interview name with held, Catholic father 6 October 2004 
'"Apue, Aregenta, rehabilitated raider. Interview, Kanawat, Uganda, 3 February 2003. 
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In Matheniko, the going price for ammunition was between 500-1000 Uganda shillings 
per round. It was noted that during great abundance, they sell for 500 Uganda shillings. 
Since 2001 costs have increased by 500 percent (from 200 to 1000 Uganda shillings). 
This could be attributed to the ongoing disarmament, which has increased insecurity in 
Karamoja. Ongoing disarmament in Jie since 2001 has seen a rise in cost from 200 to 
500 Uganda Shillings per round. Towards the interior Matheniko, Jie, Bokora, Pian and 
even Upe Pokot, the price was rising from 200 to 1000 Ugandan shillings. 
5.8.2 Cost of Arms and Ammunition on the Kenya-Uganda Border. 
The Pokot straddle the border. The greater distance from the source of arms makes them 
more expensive. Though the cost of guns depends somewhat on their model. 
Figure 5.6 Costs of guns in terms of cattle in Upe Pokot, Uganda, 1971-2001 
Year 1971 1979 2001 
Cost in number of cattle N/A 60 10-12 
Cheapest N/A N/A 4 
Soui-ce: Interview with Chief Shaban Mururi, KISP elder, Karita Pokot (Upe) June 2001 
This information is based on an elder and a former retired chiefs memory that served 
both in Kenya and Upe Pokot. However, it is supported by interviews in Alale in 2002 
with elders who provided data summarized in the following table. 
Figure 5.7 Cost of guns in terms of cattle, Atale Pokot, Kenya 1970-2002 
Years 1970-1971 1979-1980 1990s 2000 	1 2002 2003 
Costinnumberotcattle 60-100 30-50 15-30 14-16 5-10 3-7 
Source: Focus group cuscussion wun elaers, Alale, west roKor, August ZJVL 
The figures also agreed with those collected in 2001 on the cross border areas of Kenya 
and Uganda (figure 5.8). 
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Figure 5.8 Cost of guns in terms of cattle, Kenya-Uganda Border, 1979-2001 
Years 1979 1985 1990s 2001 
Cost In number of cattle 30 15-20 10-13 3-5 cows + 2-5 goats 
Sources: rnterviewS and observation, icenya-uganoa ooruer area, Jviay-Juue LVJI 
In his research Dietz (1986:190) found the cost of arms to be between 10-20 cows in 
1986 in Pokot. Ncherepu noted, "Earlier with 40 cows one could get a gun. Now it is 10 
cows in Pokot." 56  The elders play an important role in negotiating the exchange of arms 
and cattle, for cattle cannot leave a homestead without sanction of the elders, however, 
more and more the racketeers also play a major role. 
On the costs of ammunition, one administrator noted, "For ammunition, it is now 50 
Kenya shillings for one round of live ammunition, though they are not readily 
available." 57  Seven months later (2002) when the researcher visited the cross border 
areas of Alale, bullets were selling for between 20 and 50 Kenyan shillings. Ncherepu 
agreed. "For ammunition it is 50 Kenya shillings for one live round. Though they are not 
readily available, the source of ammunition is the same as the source of guns".' 58 
The prices have fluctuated with the intensity of the civil wars and cattle raids. A warrior 
from Upe Pokot noted, "Ammunition is now a problem. It is scarce and as a result very 
expensive, whereas the cost of guns is drastically reducing. In 1990 ammunition was as 
cheap as 3 Kenya shillings but now they are 50 shillings." 59 Chief Shaban of Karita also 
noted that the cost of bullets is rising. "It's because they are rare. It is a problem, but the 
gun has gone down" 60 
In Kenya, bullets are nearly twice the cost of those in Uganda. This may be partly due to 
the drying up of the supply initially raided, by the Karimojong from the Moroto barracks. 
156 Ncherepu, Kamonye. Interview, Kapenguria, Kenya, 31 May 2001. 
Name withheld, did not want to be quoted. Interview, 31 May, 2001 
"8 Ncherepu, op. cit. 
Respondent did not want to be ilentified. Interview, Amudat 16 June 2001. 
160 Shaban, Lomada, chief of Karita. Interview, Amudat 19 June 2001. Shaban is now an LC3 for Karita 
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Also disarmament in Uganda has played a major role in the increase of prices. Further, 
the area's location in the interior affects the costs of ammunition. A factor working in the 
opposite direction is the strength of the Kenyan shilling compared to the Ugandan 
shilling, which makes the bullet less expensive than it would have been. The reduction of 
ammunition could be a short-term solution to the problem of small arms. Some evidence 
in chapter 7 suggçsts that reducing the supply of ammunition could be a step to solving 
the problem, but more research is required. 
Interviews with Kenya police reservists also revealed that ammunition is not available. 
Hence they were demanding more live rounds from the Kenya government. 161 
Although prices have fluctuated with conflict in the region, the overall trend during the 
last ten years has been for the cost of ammunition to increase by nearly 80 percent. Price 
increases from 2001 to 2003 in Uganda are explained by the scarcity of ammunition. 
During this period the Dodoth would bring ammunition due to proliferation in Kaabohg 
area, and then on reaching Matheniko the price would increase by 500 percent. In Pian, 
ammunition came from Kaabong, and during the disarmament exercises, ammunition 
increased to about 1000 Uganda shillings per round. At the time of research, ammunition 
was going for 600 Uganda shillings per round. Before the disarmament process, a round 
of ammunition cost 500 Uganda shillings. An additional reason for the increase in the 
ammunition prices is to do with demand, which is related to the escalation of the conflict 
between the security and the communities noted in chapter 4. 
The high cost of ammunition has led pastoralists to use the available supply carefully. 
Moreover, their sources for ammunition are not stable. On the Ugandan side, interviews 
revealed that the Uganda People's Defence Forces and the Local Defence Units are 
known to sell ammunition to some pastoral groups, especially warriors. A warrior 
inter1iewed in the Karita area of Uganda, said that apart from ammunition being provided 
by the defence forces for official purposes, the People's Defence soldiers would 
sometimes sell them. Sometimes they would use bullets as payment to buy local beer; one 
glass was equivalent to one round. Five or ten rounds of ammunition in their pockets 
16  FGD KPR Alale, 2 August 2002. 
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Source: Focus group discussion and interviews with users, dealers, civic leaders, warriors, women, government officers, security 
officers, NGO officers, religious leaders, and elders in 2000,2001,2002. 
Type of gun 1990 2000 2002 
G3 5-6 KShs 50,000 4 
AK47 4 KShs 35,000 4 
Mark4 4 KShs 30,000 4 
guaranteed them plenty of beer for the evening. Father Bosco elaborated. "At one point, 
the Ugandan soldiers were not paid but had access to the armoury. This made the soldiers 
sell arms to their people, partly for survival." 62 
5.8.3 Cost of Arms and Ammunition in Kenya (Baragoi) 
The preferred method of buying arms in Baragoi is barter. The arms are exchanged for 
cattle. Due to the fluctuation of prices of cattle and the fluctuation in the currency values, 
the figures below must be taken with caution. 
Figure 5.9 	Cost of guns in terms of cattle/money, Baragoi, 1990-August 2002 
From data collected in Samburu in 2000, based on a survey of 150 people, 83.4 percent of 
the respondents indicated that an AK47 sold in Baragoi for 15,000-20,000 Kenya 
shillings, while the G3 cost 40,000-60,000. With two to three cows, 163 one could easily 
acquire a gun, though gun types varied. They include the FN, which was not popular due 
to lack of ammunition. The most popular gun was said to be the AK47. In 'a focus group 
discussion, a civic leader stated, "The AK47 was now as popular as Coke," In Baragoi, 
the warriors interviewed noted that the AK47 was popular, but most people preferred the 
G-3 since it is efficient and unlike the AK47, it does not get very hot while in use. 164 
Interviews also revealed that the availability of AK47's fluctuated depending on the 
security situation. It was noted that in times of conflict, it went up, but during my 
162 Bosco, Moyo. Interview, Amudat, Uganda, 19 June 2001. 
63  The work done by ILRI found that the market price for adult male cattle between Marsabit and Nairobi, 
Kenya, in 1997 1ptuated between KSH  4,000 and 20,000. The figure often to twenty thousand per head 
of cattle is obtained from this data. (Sep mmary Proceedings of First National Research and Outreach 
Works hop for Ethiopia and Kenya, "Improving Pastoral Risk Management in East Africa," 1999.) 
164 Moraas focus group discussions, Bendera, Baragoi, Kenya, 23 August 2002. 
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fieldwork, the situation was calm. The ammunition costs of the older guns were more 
expensive as the ammunition was difficult to obtain. 
In Baragoi as elsewhere, interviews revealed that ammunition was scarce. In fact the 
home guards (KPR) complained bitterly that the government does not give them enough. 
Figure 5.10 Cost of ammunition, Samburu 1990-2002 
Type of gun 1990 1998 2000 2001 2002 
G3 50 130 40-50 N/A 50 
AK47 N/A 130 100-150 80 80 
FN 50 170 40 170 30 
303 N/A 150 N/A 150 50 
M16 N/A 100 70 N/A 70 
Mark4 80 N/A 50 120 120 
The ammunition prices ranged from as high as 170 shillings to 40 shillings per bullet. 
The price for the AK47 ammunition (the most popular gun in Samburu) was not constant; 
it fluctuated based on the security situation. 
The dealers, mainly the Didinga, bring large quantities of ammunition to Baragoi from 
Sudan. In an interview with Kenya Police Reservists in Samburu, they claimed, "We do 
not steal ammunition but buy from crooked police and other people, and then use it for 
raiding." 65  Other people who did not want to be quoted indicated that the distribution of 
ammunition to home guards in Baragoi by the government was very imbalanced; some 
clans got more than others, and those that got more ended up using it for raiding. 
Small arms proliferation in Samburu is driven largely by individual, household and 
co,imunal perceptions of economic and physical insecurity. Good governance by the 
local administration was largely responsible for the reduction in arms and 
ammunition sales as evidence shows in chapter 8. The assurance to the community 
Source: Survey of 150 people in 2000, and interviews in 2002 with elders, government officers, security personnel, home 
guards, and ,norans. 
165Kenya Police Reservist, name withheld. Interview, Baragoi, Kenya, 20 August 2002. 
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that their raided animals would be returned made the people less likely to bother 
about buying arms or ammunition. 
5.9 Conclusion 
Proliferation of arms has a genesis in the ivory trade in the early 20th  century, which was 
followed by the stockpiling during the cold war. The region was battleground for the 
major superpowers, as arms played a major role. Since the end of the cold war the major 
conflicts changed to localised communal wars, where the former arms are now playing a 
role. However there has also been a proliferation of arms, with new arms flowing in. The 
security problem is not only due to the pool of arms purchased by warriors and 
communities, but also the absence of effective government and security management of 
arms. In the case of Uganda the LDU and UPDF are active in selling arms and 
ammunition provided by the states. 
Though conflicts have always existed, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons 
explains the intensification of violence at the localized levels in pastoral areas. The 
Karamoja, Pokot, Samburu and Laikipia pastoralists in the North Rift in the last 25 years 
and continued to engage in conflict, and changes brought by the gun culture are visible. 
The proliferation and trafficking of small arms is now part of the micro economy. 
There are various ways arms diffuse in the communities in the North Rift. Study shows 
that accumulation is through several mechanisms. There is external licit supply to official 
goverIments in the Horn, which owing to conflict or bad governance, are then diverted to 
illegal private owners, insurgents groups, militia groups and private security companies. 
There are illitii external sourcs, which feed directly to militia groups and which then are 
distributed to warriors and vigilantes. Some weapons have found their way to militias and 
vigilante groups due to conflict. Arms also come from insecure government stockpiles. 
The borders in the r46rth iif region are vast, and the capacity for effective policing 
by state organs is minimal. This further complicates the problem of small arms 
flows. Unscrupulous busitrnen and middlemen exploit weak bordet security to 
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sneak arms into the region. Supplies maintained in these pastoral areas, or diverted 
from the ongoing wars by the different combatant armies, also sustain a parallel 
market in arms. The conflicts in 'Sonialia, Sudan, and Ethiopia divert arms into both 
Kenya and Uganda. The accumulation of small arms in the North Rift region has 
implications for the immediate bordering areas as well as for the entire region. In any 
strategy for management of light weapons, improved border control must be a central 
theme. 
The more arms are diffused at every level into civilian hands, the more likely is 
further, decline in security and increase in intertribal tensions, hostility and violence. 
Further the more one ethnic group feels that the states are favouring their opponents 
and arming them, the more arms they will also purchase. Continued diffusion of 
these arms could lead to further subversion of state sovereignty in the region. The 
spread of the AK47, apart from intensifying and exacerbating customary conflicts 
within the region, has made it hard to distinguish between conflict and criminality. It 
appears that small arms set off a pattern of lawlessness, leading to weak governance, 
which is now characteristic of the North Rift. Once peaceful communities seem 
trapped in a spiral of rising violent crime and insecurity that is fed by the flow of 
small arms. 
The legitimate transfer of legal arms to illicit or unauthorized recipients parties also 
escalates the conflict. The legal traded arms issue must also be addressed and the 
government must re-examine their policies and practices that lead to perpetuation of 
the SALW problems. 
More weapons in an area do not guarantee security but create insecurity and 
instability. Weapons used in a conflict can move to stable areas and create instability 
there if not checked. Even if arms are limited by law to legitimate sources, without 
efficient governance and effective policing, the flows will continue as the pastoralists 
continue to seek weapons to preserve their autonomy, traditional politics, religion, 
identity and interests. 
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Better laws and more effective regulation are essential. A legal framework of norms 
and standards is vital to prevent the trade in and accumulation of modem light 
weapons. However, addressing the demand is essential, too, through provision of 
security, good governance, and non-monetary incentives such as tools and schools, 
construction materials, health care services and roads. Inevitably the flow of arms is 
likely to undermine relationships between the countries in East Africa unless efforts 
are made to combat the problem. Not only does the illicit flow of arms give 
opportunity for violent conflict to begin or grow, it also presents a formidable 
obstacle to the cessation of cattle rustling and banditry. When conflict seems to be 
resolved, the availability of arms can undermine cease-fires, peace agreements, and 
peace-building programmes. It makes it easier for demobilized combatants later to 
resort to banditry, crime, or insurrection, and it increases the risk that a quiescent 
conflict will resume. Arms transfers can neutralize disarmament programmes across 
borders or between regions. Thus, there are numerous conditions that facilitate the 
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in the North Rift, and they have serious 
security implications for the region. The trade in modern light weapons could 
undermine the entire fabric of security in the region and any hope of creating 
stability. 
Main causes underlying the demand for arms are the absence of security provided by 
states and the struggle and competition for livelihood. Various communities, 
therefore, have joined the arms race in the name of self-protection or economic 
security. The arms race is therefore not just by super powers but different ethnic 
groups as they make alliances for protection. While the acquisition of arms may 
provide an increased sense of security in the short term, in the long term it feeds a 
cycle of increasing insecurity, banditry, violence and escalation of tribal conflict in 
formerly peaceful areas such as Baragoi and Laikipia. 
As one gets to the interior arms get more expensive, though in all the research areas 
the casts of arms have drastically reduced from 1970 to now. The reduction of arms 
prices reflects their easy availability. The costs of ammunition also differ. On the 
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Uganda side, the prices have gone up by 80 percent from 2001 to 2003. They are 
cheaper on the borders of Uganda and Sudan and among the Jie who are close to the 
source but as they get to the interior, the prices have drastically increased. On the 
Kenya side, the ammunition is more expensive than in Uganda. As one gets to the 
interior of Kenya (Baragoi) it is even more expensive. 
The high price of ammunition reflects its relative scarcity. Given that small arms are 
valueless without ammunition, it may be that a coordinated strategy to control its 
supply and use could be a valuable interim measure to reduce violence and insecurity 
while longer-term efforts to promote complete and sustainable disarmament are 
pursued. The question raised by these studies is; why has the short-term solution not 
been addressed by targeting the bullets and allowed the pastoralists to keep their 
arms? Without bullets manufactures the arms cannot work. Therefore, some research 
needs to be done on the major sources of ammunition with the aim of controlling its 
supply and use. A suggested source is the SPLA. If that is true, then it complicates 
the entire situation given that anarchy is the order of the day in southern Sudan and it 
-also complicates the identification of ammunition, since the SPLA use -their own 
supplied ammunition, and those captured from the Government of Sudan. 
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Warriors crossing the Kenya-Uganda border at Kachiliba in 2001, 60 of them all armed with small arms. 
Photo by Kennedy Mkutu, 2001 
The researcher with warriors and their AK47s in Karamoja 
• 	 - 
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A picture with the warriors and their AK47s in Karita, Uganda, 2001. These warriors are the security of the 
community, but are not visible as such. The guns they are carrying are illegal. 
The beginning of warrior hood, this child's sister was killed in the Namalu -Pokot raid noted in the text in 
Chapter 4. Photo by Kennedy Mkutu 2003. 
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Chapter 6 
Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Pastoralist Areas 
While it has been generally accepted that the proliferation of small arms has a very 
damaging impact on people, little research data has been available to show the linkage 
between human suffering and the spread of small arms (Oxfam, 2001: 2). Building on 
previous chapters, this chapter first examines the public health impact by looking at 
evidence from clinics in Uganda and Kenya. Secondly, the chapter examines the impact 
of small arms using evidence from the police; though such data was only available from 
the Kenya side. The police data shows that indeed, small arms are an issue. The chapter 
examines the general impact of small arms proliferation, arguing that this has been 
profound for the individual communities in terms of deaths and injuries, economic 
disruption and destruction of infrastructure. Also at the domestic level, small arms have 
caused starvation, displacement, insecurity and misery. As observed by the Small Arms 
Survey (2002: 155), "Amidst all of the debate about controlling the proliferation of small 
arms, there is a glaring, fundamental omission - the human face." Additionally, "Most 
published analyses of deaths from conflict have relied on press reports or eyewitness 
accounts and official announcements of combatants" 2 . 
The World Health Organisation notes that data from public health institutions on small 
arms injuries is still not available. 3 While Cukier (2002:275) notes that "it is surprising 
that there has been so little on its dimensions and effects," the main reason why it is not 
available is because of the sensitivity of patient  information in health and social care. 
Research and policy tends to focus on supply-related issues such as the production and the 
mismanagement of stockpiles, inter-state transfers and illicit trade, technical aspects of weapons tracing, 
marking, collection otp4 destruction, and on gal or normative regimes designed to stop the flow of 
weapons. See Small Arms Survey, 2002: 155 
2  Seybolt, 2001; Wa1lnsteen, 2001; Murray ct al 2002:347. 
According to information extrapolated from the World Health Organization's World Health Report 
Database, in 1998 an estimaççd 2.3 million people worldwide died as a result of violence. Among people 
aged 15-44 years, interpersonal violence and suicide ranked third and fourth, respectively among the 
world's leading causes of ill-health and premature mortality, while war-related injuries ranked sixth. A 
large proportion of these occurred through the use of small arms (WHO, 1998). The WHO data for 2002 
had more research. 
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This concern is acknowledged here in the following section and whenever practicable, 
references to personal names are removed to reduce the chances of anyone being 
identified. 
This chapter highlights the devastation from SALW in the North Rift by attempting to 
provide a quantification of losses and damages, which is rarely presented in the 
literature4 . It considers in particular the plight of people wounded by small arms. 
It was difficult to quantify this information due to problems in obtaining the data. Most 
areas occupied by pastoralists are difficult to access because they lack infrastructure. 
Additionally, information related to crime and other matters related to state security is in 
the custody of the two countries' security institutions and generally remains classified 
and confidential. Only a handful of people are privy to the relevant deliberations, which 
has inhibited researchers and seriously hampered careful analysis of the information to 
inform policy. The first section below utilizes data that has never been exposed in the 
public domain, particularly police and medical data. As noted by May (2001:71) the 
amount of material routinely collected by governments and their agencies provides a rich 
source of data for the social researcher. However, there is much debate as to how official 
statistics should be used. 
Bulmer (1984c) notes that though such records are problematic because they can be 
distorted by state interest, official statistics produce interesting perspectives on 
contemporary society that, despite their shortcomings, have been used by radical and 
realist researchers alike. Official statistics such as police data are criticized for their 
limitations in accuracy and reliability, but in the absence of other data on the incidence of 
arms violence they do suggest the size of the effect on communities as perceived by the 
authorities. Additionally in these official statistics, it is very difficult to differentiate 
commercial raiding (for the market) from raiding for livelihood. 
Osterle and BoIlig, 2003: 13 
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6.1 SALW and Public Health 
Section 6.1 uses hospital records. The data was obtained by perusing hospital records for 
each day, week, month and year and extracting all the patients admitted with any gun 
related injuries. 
On May 31, 2001, on the border of Kenya and Uganda, I witnessed a patient with a gun 
wound being carried from Karita, which has no modern means of transport, to Kachiliba 
37 km. away, on an improvised stretcher carried by four people. This exposed what this 
section explores, the impact of small arms from a public health perspective in the absence 
of infrastructure. I investigate the frequency of small arms injuries, the mortality and 
morbidity of those injured; the paucity of medical services to deal with victims, and the 
likely scenarios of injury, raising issues of gender, domestic violence and injuries in 
children. 
Various authors have commented on the significance of small arms related injuries, 
referring to the problem as a "scourge" (Boutwell et al., 2000:48); a "global epidemic 
affecting civilians" (Robin, 1996:450-41); as a "preventable health problem" (WHO, 
2001,2002); and an "international public health hazard" with violence as pandemic 
(WHO, 1996). 
I focus here on particular pastoral areas in the North Rift, first Karamoja (Nakapiripirit 
and Moroto) in Uganda, and second West Pokot and Baragoi (Samburu) in Kenya. I 
chose these areas because they are "hot spots" of violence, where one would get the most 
pronounced evidence of impact. Other areas might be less affected. Karamoja and West 
Pokot are border areas, and Baragoi is a new centre of violence but located on the 
periphery away from major urban centres. Two hospitals in the border area were visited, 
one in Kapenguria in Kenya, and the other in Moroto in Uganda. In addition, two 
missionary clinics were observed, one in Amudat in Uganda, and the other the Alale 
dispensary in West Pokot, Kenya. Two other missionary clinic sites were also visited, but 
they were not in operation. Smaller private clinics existed but they did not keep records. 
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There are also government clinics in these areas, but they have no resources. In the 
1990s, a wave of neo-llberalization swept Africa, and most hospital services were 
privatised by the state. The privatisation of health services in Kenya also led to 
understaffing in government hospitals. The state expected private sector providers to 
meet the shortfall and to act as self-regulators. However, given the remoteness of pastoral 
areas with the infrastructure, the only providers who went to these areas were 
missionaries. What is described here, therefore, is what is actually available to the 
population in these violent areas, not what supposedly is available. 
Some valuable qualitative evidence can be found by looking at medical records on those 
who are admitted, their demographic details, types of fatalities and the circumstances of 
their injuries. The impact of the accumulation of small arms can be measured from the 
number of gunshots or causalities or fractures in hospitals. It is not possible to 
differentiate aggressors from victims adipitted with gun wound injuries, though 
interviews with public health care workers in the institutions suggested that most 
admissions were aggressors, however it is clear that a person could occupy both roles. 
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Figure 6.1: Statistics of Gun related injury in All Hospitals and Health Centres 
Visited 200 1-2003 
11996 	11997 	11998 	I 1999 	2000 	2001 	12002 	I 2003 
Moroto (Referral Centre)  
Female adults fA j N/A N/A [N/A N/A N/A 7 0 
Deaths 	j N/A N/A N/A 2 3 1 
Total fF7A TN/A N/A f47 40 22 46 61 
Matany Mission Hospita 	(Referra Centre)  
Female adults N/A N/A 1 	9  16 N/A N/A 10 
Children N/A N/A 	JQ 2 3 N/A > 248 13 
Deaths N/A N/A 115 0 5 N/A N/A N/A 
Total N/A N/A 187 73 163 N/A 1237 94byFeb 
Amudat Mission Hospital  
Female adults N/A N/A 2 1 3 N/A N/A N/A 
Deaths N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 N/A N/A N/A 
Total N/A N/A 9 10 17 11 N/A 12 by Feb 
Small Clinics6 in Karamoja_(dispensaries)  
Total 	[N/A 	I N/A 	[N/A 	[N/A 	N/A 	2420 	4226 	N/A 
Amukuriate Mission (dis )ensary)  
Female adults N/A I N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Children I I N/A N/A N/A I I N/A 
Total 3 7 5 9 2 11 5 N/A 
Kapenguria (Referral Centre)  
Female [0 6 3 1 2 N/A N/A N/A 
Children 1 3 1 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Deaths 0 1 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 
Total L6 19 9 5 9 N/A N/A N/A 
Baragol Health Centre - 
Female adults N/A 4 [3 0 0 [0 N/A ] N/A 
Children N/A 13 [6 1 0 [1 N/A j N/A 
Deaths N/A 2 L 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 
Total N/A 25 	j6 1 8  N/A 	IfN/A 
Matany Mission hospital, DUllS Nakapiripit, MorOtO 1-lospital. Icapengurla ilstrlct nospital. Alale MISSIOn Hospital and Haragol 
health Centre 2001 -2003 
Figure 6.1 collates data from all the centres over 8 years, giving data on total number of 
patients. It demonstrates where possible total injuries, mortality, children (under 16) 
affected and women, although it is not certain whether all the women were adults (this is 
noted where available). Data from Kapenguria, which was available from 1990, is given 
later. From the data given, there is no obvious increasing trend, at last in the last 8 
years. However, there are some 'hotspots' seen particularly in Matany in 2002 (despite 
data on children being difficult to confirm) and on Karamoja clinics, which have 
The '>248' figure means that it was difficult to confirm. 
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astoundingly high figures. This has to be questioned but the data was collected first hand 
from the centres and may be accounted for by the dangerous locality. The researcher was 
not aware of any reason why figures should have been doctored and I requested the staff 
in various clinics/hospital to verify. It should be noted that people in larger centres may 
be counted twice since many of them were referred from smaller health centres and some 
female children may have been counted twice as both children and female. 
6.1.1 The Cases of Moroto District Hospital, Amudat Mission hospital and Matany 
Mission Hospital in Northeast Uganda 
MOROTO 
Moroto is a district hospital in the Karamoja region of Uganda, 30 km. from the Kenyan 
border. It is a government hospital, poorly equipped and staffed by nurses and a doctor. 
The next nearest hospital is Matany Mission, which is 80 km. away. There are three other 
substantial hospitals in Karamoja, which has a population of around 950,000 (UBO, 
2003). The original data indicated the date of injury for the years 1999-2000, which is 
valuable information since injuries frequently occur in clusters and indicate when raids 
took place. Additionally the data demonstrates hot spots by indicating the village from 
which victims originated. See Figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.2: Areas of origin of Moroto patients 
Village Year gun injuries 
most problematic 
Approximate 	distance 
from Moroto 
Number 
of 
patients 
RupalArmy Barracks Throughout the year 3 km. 15 
Nabilatuk 2000- 2001 80 km. 14 
Nakimisitae 1999 10 km. 10 
Lorengdwat 1999- mid 2000 40 km. 8 
Nadunatau  Unknown 7 
Nadunget  Unknown 6 
Tokora  100 km.  
Kidepo 
G  Source DDHS Nakapiripirit,2003 
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Raiding and banditry in Lorengwat declined due to the creation of vigilantes in 1995; 
however, it has begun again recently. The Resident District Commissioner Peter Ken's 
car was ambushed and burned in 2002, and on November 21, warriors attacked two army 
detachments near Moroto. In the exchange of fire, the military people were defeated and 
several soldiers were killed. 7 One soldier told the researcher in an interview that he only 
just survived by the mercy of God. 8 Rupa seems to have many patients, despite being 
located 2 km. from the army barracks and near the police station, but the high number of 
patients seems due to its proximity to Moroto. Nabilatuku and Lorengwat, which are both 
a long distance from Moroto, with insecure roads and only a single bus per day, provide 
still a number of patients. 
The original data gave names of those admitted from which it was clear that two of the 
patients were treated twice, with a few months between admissions. This shows how 
hospital data might identify ringleaders but also key victims. Interviews with hospital 
staff in another area noted that many victims are also perpetrators 9 . Hospitals are not 
required to submit data on criminally related injuries to identify villages where there is 
trouble, though this could serve as an early warning mechanism. Of course it would be 
unethical to submit data on individuals, since impartiality and confidentiality are 
overriding principles of medical care and this would deter people who need medical help. 
From the original data, it is noted that only two women's names are mentioned. This may 
be an underestimate, and begs the question whether women are actually getting to 
hospital when they are injured. It more likely indicates that parties to the conflict are 
largely male. 
MATANY 
Matany hospital is a mission hospital about 120 km by road from the border. It is 
supported by the Italian government and is well equipped. The Matany data demonstrate 
Observations in the field, 19-23 November 2003. 
8  Peterken. Interview, Nakapiripirit, Uganda, 26 January 2003. 
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the exacerbation of the problem with small arms, as there is a dramatic rise in admissions 
in 2002, indicating a rising tide of conflicts in this area. Although there is no data for 
2001, when the researcher visited Matany in June,' 0 there were 17 gunshot victims in the 
hospital." It is extremely disturbing to note the proportion of children injured, some of 
whom are warriors under 16, and others are children caught in crossfire. The original data 
also gave details of the types of injury seen. 
Figure 6.3: Site of Gunshot Injuries, Matany, Jan. - Aug 2003 
15 
33 
20 
23 
60 BOthers 
Source: DDHS Moroto, 2003 
Figure 6.3 shows the range of injuries sustained. Bone injuries are likely to be disabling, 
and chest, abdominal and neck injuries may be life threatening. One head injury was to a 
child who was shot in the face. A child of 15 was injured in both femurs. 
Serious injuries constitute an estimated two thirds of the total but this can be accounted 
for by the fact that many are referred. However, it can be seen that Amudat has a similar 
proportion of serious injuries, suggesting that many less serious injuries are just not 
counted in the data. 
Dr Kaadu, Stephen, former Doctor at Amudat mission hospital Interview Amudat, 18 June 2001. Also Dr. 
Motaiiya, Dvi, former Ministry of Health in charge, Kapenguria District Hospital, Interview, Kapenguria 
29 May, 2001. 
10  Due to a road ambush of the supervisor at Matany, and because a big raid had just taken place, she was 
so upset that she çefised to release any data. 
' Superintendent of Matany Hospital. Interview, Matany, 20 June 2001. 
13 Head & Neck 
o Chest & abdomen 
o Hip & leg bone 
o Shoulder & arm bone 
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AMUDAT 
Amudat Mission Hospital (AMH) is a small clinic located on the border of Kenya and 
Uganda. It has two medical doctors seconded by Medecins Sans Frontières plus a local 
doctor. There is no operating theatre. More serious cases are referred to Kapenguria. 
Twelve people with gun injuries were admitted in January and February 2003, and 
interviews with the medical personnel indicated that they were UPDF soldiers from the 
Karita (Pokot) fight.' 2 
Details of the injuries sustained showed that a quarter of the patients had fractured bones. 
Interviews revealed that of those admitted in 2002 and 2003, most had limb fractures. 
Such injuries have long-term implications for mobility and livelihood. 
Interviews with the superintendent of Amudat Mission Hospital indicated that due to high 
payment costs for those admitted,' 3 many preferred to go to Kapenguria hospital across 
the border in Kenya, as it is free and has better facilities. Transport for those referred to 
Kampala or Mbale is problematic due to the costs of travel. Air travel is safest but costs 
78 Pounds Sterling to Kampala. Interviews with doctors from Medecins Sans Frontières 
indicated that those who travel by road have to go via Kitale in Kenya to get to Kampala 
due to the insecurity of the Namalu-Mbale and Namalu-Nakapiripiriti roads.' 4 
CLINICS 
The data from 13 health clinics was collected from July 2001 to December 2002" in 
Nakapiripiriti district, Karamoja. Most of the clinics were small dispensaries run by the 
Catholic Church, the Church of Uganda, the government, or non-governmental 
organizations. None had doctors. Those run by the government of Uganda had no 
medicine. For instance,  the researcher visited Tokera in Nakapiripiriti, which is the 
12 Lokwang Petr. Intçrview,  Amudat Hospital, 27 January 2003. 
13  The hospital charged 20,000 Uganda shillings before they would touch any one admitted with a gunshot 
wound. The purpose was to discourage cattle raiding. 
14  Interviews in June 2001, and also interviews at Amudat, 27 January 2003. 
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headquarters since 2002, and no medicine was available. One can imagine the plight of 
the other clinics. Different hospitals kept different kinds of records. Only the clinics 
shown in Figure 6.4 kept such records. 
Figure 6.4: Causes of Trauma in 13 Health Clinics in Nakapiripirit District, July 
2000-December 2002 
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At Matany hospital, which is in the vicinity of the current conflicts, between 1998 and 
2000, there was an increase in small arms injuries from 72 tol6l. But in 18 months the 
number of victims recorded with gunshot wounds in the clinics in Nakapiripit was an 
astounding 5000 persons with 1041 sustained during raids (see Figure 6.4),16  yet it is not 
even a centre of pastoral small arms conflict. The staff provided several explanations. 
They claimed that the 'accidental' gunshot wounds were often domestic incidents where 
arms were used. However, when the people came to the clinics they claimed, "it was an 
accident." Far fewer were prepated to say the cause was domestic violence. Notes from 
field observations, mainly in Nabflatuku, revealed that domestic violence involving arms 
was often related to the brewing of local beer 17 . Interviews in the community confirmed 
Ognon, Moses. Interview, DDHS Nakapiripirit, 23 January 2003. 
16  Records of District Health Office, Nakapiripirit, July 2001-2002. 
' 7Variou Urs ioh X09ole, Moroto, Namalu and Amudat, Uganda. Note that the Lutheran World 
Relief is tlying to assist W16mvn in Nabilatuku to buy grain to sell But most of the women invested their 
money in local brew as it gives them better returns. See for example Daily Monitor 2 June 2003. 
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that sometimes shootings were caused by 'a small quarrel', which resulted in the warriors 
using their guns, especially when under the influence of alcohol. This was clearly 
confirmed by the medical superintendent for Kapenguria Hospital in Kenya who noted 
that 
Often, I think, it is just squabbles at home and they happen to use guns in their 
squabbles accidentally. Or a person will be fiddling with it and it goes off and 
probably injures somebody 18 . 
This is a new understanding of the impact of small arms and how the presence of arms in 
the home and community can lead to indiscriminate disordered violence. This incredible 
figure serves to demonstrate how the anns problem can rapidly escalate. It shows the 
picture in local areas, since many would not travel to a major hospital due to distance and 
the criminal nature of the activity that produced their injuries. Novelli speaks of one of 
the fights between Karamoja and the UPDF after which he saw 300 dead bodies left for 
the vultures. As noted in an interview with the Local council Chairman for Kotido" in 
Karimojong culture men killed in battle are not buried but left to in the bushes to rot" 19 
6.1.2 The Cases of Amukuriate Mission Health Centre (Alale), Kapenguria 
District Hospital in West Pokot, and Baragoi Health Clinic in Samburu, 
Kenya 
Having examined in the preceding section the public health impact on the Uganda side, 
this section examines the public health impact in the areas visited in Kenya. Two health 
centres (Amukuriate) and Baragol health centre, one mission clinic (Alale) and one 
District hospital (Kapenguria district hospital) were visited. 
http://www.monitor.co.uglarchives/2003mainhiunlnews/0602/news8.php . It notes that waragi (local beer) 
drinking has heightened insecurity is and therefore a cause of deaths in the area. 
18 Motya, David, Interview, Kapenguria, 22 May 2001 
19  Adome, Lokwi, Interview, Moroto, 22 November 2003. 
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AMUKURIATE 
Amukuriate Mission Health Centre is located 20 km. from the Kenya-Uganda border. 
Data for Amukuriate Mission Health Centre was extracted from the Amukuriate 
dispensary and mobile clinic in Alale, West Pokot. The centre was well staffed with 
nurses, being a missionary centre, but an interview with the nurse revealed that they did 
not have a doctor2° or operating theatre. A mobile clinic used to go out on Tuesdays and 
Thursdays, but due to the migrating nature of the Pokot, it reduced its services. The 
church runs the centre, and as a result the local bishop is well respected and influential in 
the area. 
The original data gave the dates of admissions. Clusters of admissions would probably 
indicate raids. Interviews indicated the factors leading victims to attend. "Sometimes they 
come, and some times they do not, due to fear of explaining the cause of gunshot 
wounds." However, when they realize they are in danger, they end up coming for 
treatment. Some periods of the year during droughts, admissions of people with gunshot 
wounds increase drastically, which implies that more raids are taking place.2 
Out of the total 43 admissions to Amukuriate Mission Health Centre, 60% were between 
18 and 30 years old, and 23% were under 18 (see chart below), typically young males. 
20  The ratio of doctor to patient in West Pokot is 1:84, This is 528 in a popuhition of 337,870 people. WP 
annual report 202-2008, 2002:8 
21  Amukuriate Dispensary staff. Interviews, Alale, West Pokot, 2 August, 2002. 
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Figure 6.5: Ages of gunshot wound patients in Amukuriate 
EE 11.5 I 	belowl8 I 	 4.7 D D18-30 	I 60.5 031-40 0over40 	 23.3 
Information from an in-depth interview with the bishop of Alale Catholic Mission, Father 
Romerio, agreed with the public health data showing a majority of the injured people 
being aged 18-30. "In the past, it involved a lot of people and families who assisted in 
organizing the raids to Karamoja, but now it is just young people." 22 The nurses noted 
that they treat many people with gun wounds, but the most serious wounds are referred to 
Kapenguria district hospital (KDH), which is 173 km. away. Father Romerio said, "The 
area is completely cut off, and it is difficult to get essential services or important things to 
survive."23  Florence, a nurse who has worked with the clinic for eight years, noted, "The 
local dispensary does not have a surgery to operate on serious cases; it is forced to refer 
them. By the time the patients arrive in Kapenguria, they are probably dead." 24 It was 
also mentioned that if local people were needed to give blood, it would have to be carried 
in refrigerated cars, which are not available, or be donated on site in the remote areas. 
KAPENGURIA 
Kapenguria is a district hospital 30 km. from the border with Uganda. It serves West 
Pokot in Kenya, a region with a population of 350,000. There are other district hospitals 
in the region. Kitale is 30 km. away, and Eldoret is 80 km. Kapsowar is about 60 km. 
22  Romerio, op. cit. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Cheboi Florence, op. cit. 
324 
away, and it is 40 km. to Orotum, but the terrain is very difficult in most of West Pokot. 
Kapenguria is able to deal with most admissions. 
Data for this centre is from 1990-2000. Although only the recent figures are in the main 
table, in fact the figures for the previous 5 years are worse in terms of numbers of 
victims25 . Therefore these figures do not prove an increase in gunshot violence in recent 
years in this area, though the problem is still evident. 
BARAGOI 
Baragoi Health Centre is a small clinic staffed by nurses and has neither operating theatre 
nor doctors. Neighboring Tuum, 35 km. away, is without a facility at all, so patients 
travel to Baragoi, which gives an indication of the scarcity of resources in the area. There 
are hospitals in Maralal and Wamba, 110 km. and 160 km. away respectively, but 
Baragoi division's population of around 40,000 is largely clustered around Baragoi. As 
noted in chapters 3 and 5, Baragoi's people were armed only recently. The data shows 
how the entry of arms into a relatively non-violent community has escalated the violence 
and injury rates. 
The Baragoi Division is the worst in Kenya for transport with very poor roads and only 
two petrol stations, both in Maralal. In such circumstances, those who are seriously ill or 
losing blood are significantly less likely to survive the journey to hospital 26 . 
Figure 6.6: Distal!ce and Number of Patients Travelling to Baragoi Health Clinic 
f..,s.w, Qvilevmaneiincy Arpac  
Residence Main 	problem  
years 
N.her 	of 
pptients 
Distance 	from 
Uacgoi 
Tuum 1997 7 35c.m. 
Bendera 1998 6 2 km. 
Lesirikan 2000 6 1 Unknown 
Nchola 1998 11 20 km. 
Marite - 1 70km. 
South Horr - 1 50 km. 
25  The data was too much but it is available upon request. 
26  In addition, the ratio of patients to doctor in Samburu is 1:76,600 in a population of 156,126 SDDP 2002-
2008 Annual Report 2002:8 
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Figure 6.6 summarizes the main problem years for each area. The Nchola figures can 
probably be explained by the fact that the army barracks were placed there in 1997. 
Conflict there is between Samburu and Turkana living in Samburu. Most small arms 
victims are referred to other hospitals. As noted by the local district officer, "Most of the 
patients with bullets were referred to Wamba, Maralal or Nairobi (serious cases). They 
are never charged any fee for treatment since they only are given the first treatment while 
waiting referral."27 
It is notable that the original figures include seven (10%) adult women and 22 (33%) 
children, most of whom were girls. From Baragoi it is notable that there were 22 (33%) 
children, mostly girls, and this, with the seven women injured, suggests a large number 
were injured in cross fire. This clearly indicates that innocent people are injured in cross 
fire who are not involved in fighting. Baragoi like Matany indicates the sites of injury. 
Figure 6.7: Site of Gunshot Injury for Baragoi Victims. 
Site of Injury Number of Victims Percent 
Head and neck 2 3 
Chest and abdomen 1 1.5 
Hip and leg bone 8 12.1 
Shoulder and arm 7 10.6 
Multiple fractures 2 3 
Excessive bleeding 8 12.1 
Minor/ not stated 38 57.7 
Total 66  
Once again it can be noted that a significant proportion suffered serious injuries. 
In Baragoi many victims feared attending clinics and instead attended 'traditional' health 
workers. These workers can be characterised into two groups. The first can bring harm 
and injury, and the second consists of herbalists, surgeons, bonesetters, circumcisers, 
psychosocial therapists and physiotherapists. The latter are often called muganga or 
seers. The victims of small arms would rather seek the services of a muganga whose 
services are utilised regularly by pastoral communities. I was unable to obtain 
27  Achuka, Wilfred, registered nurse. Interview, Baragoi Health Centre, 21 August 2002. 
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information from any Muganga, though attempts were made in all areas. I did interview 
one in Amudat; however, he was unwilling to provide any information. 
6.1.3 Conclusions on Medical Data 
Gunshot injuries are a potent indicator of the humanitarian impact of small arms. 28 This 
data demonstrates substantial numbers of people attending the hospitals and clinics in 
recent years with a huge number recorded in the local clinics of Nakapiripit. However the 
data does not consistently demonstrate an increase over recent years in all areas. There 
may be underestimation of the rise in violence due to lack of data from previous years, 
and missing data more recently. 
There are other reasons why hospital data does not give the full picture. Alternative 
medicine is still strong. Deteriorating safety of roads plus staffing of health facilities 
deters people going to hospitals. Lastly there is the introduction of fees noted in Amudat 
and Matany, to discourage raids. In Alale, the interviewer noted that an explanation must 
be prQvided to the hospital as to the cause of the injury. Given that many injured are 
themselves raiders they would rather not divulge this. In the hospitals studied, deaths 
range between 3% and 15% of those attended. Patients that have already died in the 
conflict are clearly not likely to be brought to hospital. The late Father Bruno Novelli 
along with elders and chiefs noted that in Karamoja, corpses are often left for the hyenas 
and vultures to eat. 
Most patients are young men, suggesting that raiding is the main cause of injury. This 
was confirmed by interviews with hospital staff, and data point to possible dates and 
locations of raks. Some of the data  show a worrying number of women and children 
injured. Some children are combatants but the large numbers of female children 
suggests cross fire. It is notable that the AK47 is a very easy weapon to use, such that it 
can be wielded by a child and lethal shots rattled off in an arc of destruction. 
28  See for example WHO (200 Ib) which argues that they are among the top five contributors to the global 
health burden among people aged 15-44. 
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Baragoi and Kapenguria show a decrease in injuries since 1996-1997, which may be 
attributable to the government sending in the General Security Unit and the Army, 
stationing them in these areas. But also, as will be noted in chapter 8, good governance at 
the local administration unit was also responsible for more stability. In West Pokot the 
people saw the church as responsive to local needs but not the Kenya government. The 
government responded to the annual malaria outbreak by sending medicines too late, and 
then to an understaffed government dispensary. 
The data highlights the sparse medical facilities in these insecure regions, exacerbated by 
the fact that insecurity dissuades all but the most determined workers from going there. 
Some of the data on the nature of injuries may suggest which would be the most valuable 
and lifesaving interventions. Many of those who survive an injury will suffer long-term 
disability. Particularly vulnerable are children whose limbs are still growing, a process 
that is impaired by fractures. Disability would negatively impact families by diverting 
scarce family resources and limiting the capacity to work and to survive. 
The cost of hospital admission is impossibly high for many pastoralists. Matany Hospital 
started to charge 60,00029  Uganda shillings to discourage raids while Amudat is now 
charging 20,000 Uganda shillings. In Amukuriate pastoralists are charged 250 Kenya 
shillings for dressings. Government facilities are free, but many are completely without 
resources. Even aspirin is hard to come by. The major impacts of neo-liberal structural 
adjustment can be clearly seen in pastoral areas. Without a doubt the health service is 
heavily reliant on missionary and church help, and the church organisations are well 
respected in the region. Working with them to build up existing facilities is a sensible 
way to improve available health care. 
Transport also is a significant problem in the areas studied and may be the reason why the 
local clinics in Nakapiripirit saw so many more injuries than the district hospitals. 
29  Interviews in November 2004 indicated that before you are operated it is now 100,000 and if wounded 
while in a raid it is 200,000 Uganda shillings. 
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6.2 SALW Impact: The Police Evidence on Human and Economic Costs 
The police data on deaths during cattle raids, rustled cattle and their value is utilized. 
Police data illustrate the human and economic impact of small arms misuse and also 
demonstrate the trends in rustled animals and human lives lost. The data was obtained by 
perusing the police data, by going through the records for each day, week, month and 
year and extracting data on cattle rustled and on people reported injured or killed. 
Limitations and Considerations 
Taking the figures at face value ignores the dynamics underlying their collation. Only a 
quarter of all offences are detected by the police, meaning that the public voluntarily 
reports the remaining three-quarters. However, reporting a crime does not ensure it will 
be recorded. Police officers may consider no crime was committed or decide to take 'no 
further action', in which case there will be no record. Police recording practices also vary, 
so the same act may be recorded differently in different areas. Additionally pastoral areas 
suffer from inaccessibility hence the data presented below is indicative rather than 
representative. The areas chosen are divisions and not districts; figures for the whole 
district will be significantly higher. Police data also suffers from lack of logical 
investigation to conclusion; political interests may influence this. The failure by the 
police to recover cattle from kraals of merchants/criminals is likely to reflect corruption 
by the police who would rather cooperate with the big man. 
However with all these limitations police data can be subjected to statistical analysis so as 
to play a crucial role in intelligence decision-making. Because of their vast network, data 
from the police is likely to cover all forms of crime. Also the police data is detailed at the 
national, provincial, district, and probably even to the local village level. It provides 
evidence of the nature of crimes committed and the parties involved, which makes it very 
valuable. Information in daily papers is actually gleaned from police records, as 
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journalists do not access these difficult areas. The police are also knowledgeable in 
identifying particular types of gun and possible sources of guns e.g. illicit /Iicit. 
Open access to the data is impossible, since police are extremely wary that data will be 
used to unjustly accuse them of corruption. I managed to gain access to the police 
occurrence records, which give dates of all raids, recoveries, and human injuries or 
deaths. These were then summarised to give yearly totals, and financial losses were 
calculated from the market value of the animals. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the 
police data was only available from the study areas in three districts in Kenya but not 
available in Uganda. 30 
It is valuable to consider police records alongside interviews with local community 
leaders, politicians, security forces and civilians, which adds to the accuracy and breadth 
of information. 
6.2.1 The case of Laikipia 
In interviews with administrators who have served in Laikipia, 3 ' they noted that prior to 
1979, cattle raids in Laikipia were relatively few and the cattle that were stolen were 
often recovered. However, since 1979 there has been a dramatic increase in both the 
number of cattle stolen and unrecorded, as well as of human casualties. The table gives 
police information on cattle raids from 1993 to 2000. 
30  The police in Moroto were unwilling to provide data on the issue. 
31  Field observations, 2001- 2003. 
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Figure 6.8: Cattle Raids in Laikipia: Arms Used, Injuries and Deaths 
Year Arms Arms Animals Animals People People32 
Used Recovered Stolen Recovered Injured Killed 
1993 0 0 Cattle 152 Cattle 120 8 3 
Goats 95 Goats 60 
Sheep 152 Sheep 130 
Total 399 Total 300  
1994 0 0 Cattle 260 Cattle 8 1 3 
Goats 96 Goats 10 
Sheep 153 Sheep 141 
Total 509 Total 159  
1995 1 0 Cattle 250 Cattle 66 3 4 
Goats 589 Goats 137 
Sheep 43 Sheep 30 
Total 882 Total 233  
1996 0 0 Cattle 78 Cattle28 15 5 
Goats 302 Goats 28 
Sheep 9 Sheep 0 
Total 389 Total 56  
1997 0 0 Cattle200 0 5 14 
Goats 50 
Sheep 95 
Total 345  
1998 0 0 Cattle 285 Cattle 67 0 0 
Goats 39 Goats 60 
Sheep 142 Sheep 14 
Total 468 Total 141  
1999 0 0 Cattle 146 Cattle 97 0 0 
Goats 137 Goats 15 
Sheep 258 Sheep 82 
Total 194  
2000 1 0 Catt'e 99 Cattle 73 0 0 
Gots 420 Goats 92 
Sheep 143 Sheep 65 
Total 62 Total 230  
Source: Mkutu 2001 
Many raids are not known to the police due to remoteness and the difficult terrain, which 
hinders police or those rortipg to them. Interviews in the field indicated that often, even 
if raids are reported, nothing is donç, as people see little point in involving police. In 
some places, police posts 40 pot even exist. The data is therefore incomplete, and 
moreover, the figure zeço is liey to represent under recording in many cases. The fact 
that guns are barely recorçc acve table is due in part to the fact that Masai often 
use indigenous non-lethal weapons like spears, bows and arrows in customary raiding. 
32  Note that the number of people killed and injured is for Rumuruti alone and not for the other divisions or 
locations. 
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However interviews suggested that there is a significant under-reporting of the use of 
weapons. People are afraid to report anyone in possession of arms. 
An analysis of economic costs shows that over eight years, a total of 858 cows, 1487 
goats and 595 sheep were lost as a result of atmed cattle rustling. This equals a value of 
£210,276 (pounds sterling) in the eight years 33 and is a great loss to the pastoralists of 
Laikipia who depend entirely upon livestock. Although some would have simply changed 
places between tribes, many would have been lost to racketeers with little return. In terms 
of human costs, at least 44 people were injured and 16 lost their lives in the eight years. 
Additionally it is common knowledge that many deaths as a result of cattle rustling go 
unreported. 
6.2.2 Baragoi 
The data from Baragoi police occurrence book in Figures 6.9 and 6.10 was obtained for 
the period from 1991 to August 2000. First the loss from raids by Turkana is presented, 
followed by raids by Samburu. 
prr sspn when there is no droqght, a cow sells for about Ksh 20,000 (167 pounds), and 
a shecp qr qa fqr gbout J(sh.2, 000 (33 pounds) 
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Figure 6.9: Cattle Lost by Samburu in Baragoi to Turkana Raiders 1991-2000 
Year Arms Arms Type 	of Number Number People People 
Used Recovered Animal Stolen Recovered Injured Killed 
1991 - - Goats/Sheep 13 0 - - 
1992 - - Goats /Sheep 3 0 - 
Camels 13 4 
1993 - - Cattle 1 0 - - 
Camels 10 0 
1994 Cattle 1 0 
Camels 10 0 
1995 Goats/Sheep 2 0 
Camels 6 6 
1996 Cattle 17749 320 4 54 
Goats/Sheep 21747 0 
Camels 2422 0 
Donkeys 313 0 
1997 Cattle 937 0 1 7 
Goats/Sheep 2194 2 
Camels 14 0 
Donkeys 4 0 
1998 Unspecified Appr. 5 1 
1000  
1999 Cattle 50 0 2 
Goats/Sheep 23 0 
2000 Cattle 2691 0 1 13 
Goats/Sheep 4361 510 
Camels 20 20 
Donkeys 87 0 
Source: Police Occurrence book 1991-2000 
Data from the police occurrence books indicate a dramatic increase in stolen livestock in 
1996. In that year a large number of people were also killed and the security lost 8 
homeguards whose arms were also taken by bandits. In the same year the District 
commissioner was also gunned down from the air. In interviews with community 
members, they explained the great loss in Samburu from 1996 until 1998 by the fact that 
the Samburu were armed only with non-lethal weapons such as spears and arrows, which 
encouraged the Turkana, who were well supplied with guns, to raid them. Interviews also 
noted that it was because of lax government security that their herds were being raided. 
The Turkana had acquired arms from neighbouring countries that were in conflict. The 
Samburu have better grazing grounds than the Turkana, so during drought, the Turkana 
forcibly occupied Samburu pastures. The raiding during drought exemplifies raiding for 
livelihood in this situation as opposed to raiding for market. 
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Figure 6.10: Cattle Lost by Turkana to Samburu 1991-2000 
Year Arms Arms Type 	of Number Stolen Animals People People34 
Used Recovered Animal Recovered Injured Killed 
1991 - - Goats/Sheep 3 0 - - 
1992 - - Goats/Sheep 10 0 - 2 
Camels 10 0 
1993 - -  0 0 - - 
1994  Unknown Unknown Unknown  
1995 Cattle 6 6 2 
Goats/Sheep Unknown 200 
Camels 8 5 
Donkeys 2 2 
1996 None recorded but violence 
noted by Turkana (see table 
above)  
1997 Cattle 79 0 10 
Goats/Sheep 1058 0 
Camels 9 0 
1998 Cattle 6 0 
Goats/Sheep 2 0 
Camels 7 0 
Donkeys 15 0 
1999 Cattle 183 145 11 
Goats/Sheep 1726 0 
Camels 4 0 
2000 Cattle 424 0 7 
Goats/Sheep 5384 0 
Camels 14 0 
Source: Police Occurrence book 1991-2000 
Arming of the Samburu 
Figure 6.10 shows the animals the Turkana lost to the Samburu. There was a rise in raids 
beginning in 1997. The increase at this time can be explained by arms accumulation in 
Samburu. In interviews, elders and local leaders told the researcher: 
"Due to frequent raids, the Samburu decided to arm themselves by acquiring arms from 
the Pokot and the Borana from Marsabit. 35 "Samburu were begging to buy arms from 
neighbouring districts since we had been totally made poor by rustlers. The Somali and 
34 Note that the number of people killed and injured is for Rumuruti alone and not for the other divisions or 
locations. 
Focus group discussions with elders and local counselors from Laikipia and Samburu, Maralal, 22 
February 2000. 
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Marsabit sold us the guns, Samburu heard about the guns when they were on the Somali 
border. The guns then came to the Borana and now they are with us; more guns are 
coming."36 Interviews also indicated that Samburu37 were assisted with arms training by 
their clansmen who have served in the military to be able to revenge, a point that requires 
more research to ascertain. 38 
Interviews revealed that the arming of the Samburu, who traditionally are good warriors, 
has helped them to keep the Turkana at bay and also protect their animals from being 
raided. However, arming a community may ultimately be false security since it leads to 
unsustainable arms races between neighbours. The decline in losses in 1998 can also be 
explained by the fact that the government opened an army operation camp in Baragoi and 
situated a General Service Unit (GSU) security camp at Nchola in addition to the 
administration police that were already in the area. The government also decided to 
increase the Kenya police reserves to assist in security restoration at home in addition to 
conducting operations that aimed at flushing out the bandits 39 . 
Possible Inaccuracies of large figures 
Police and community inaccuracy in reporting should be considered when the number or 
raided cattle reported is very large or a rounded figure as in one report of 5000 in 2000. 
However the number of people killed confirms the violence at that time,  and also some 
good recoveries confirm the initial loss. This is demonstrated in the episode of 180 cows 
stolen from Turkana and 145 recovered on 20 October 1999 40  and also the 500 
goats/eep stolen from Samburu and all recovered in 2000.' The majority of the time 
however, it appers thaç jione are recovered (the tables do not show this). Newspapers 
reportØ the b raid by the Samburu that occurred on 21 April 2000 when 5000 heads 
36 JbiØ 
Traditionally, Samburu have served in the security since colonial times. However, traditionally they have 
always been very loyal to the government. 
38  The Samburu have always been well represented in the army. See for example Were and Ssennyonga 
(1 986 ; 78) Samburu Socio-Cultural Pl'otle. 
39 Daily Nation 21 April 2000:6 but alsq column 2 op cit. 
40 Baragoi Police Occurrence records, 20 October 1999. 
41 Baragoi Police Occurrence records 10 June, 2000 
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were stolen and 3000 recovered by security at Soitokovoiyo. 42 This might be under-
documenting of recoveries, (as it is not mentioned in the table) but good work by the 
police. Inadequate police capacity could account for both poor recovery from raids or 
under-documentation. 
Monitoring Recovery of Arms 
In 1996, 8 arms were seized from the bandits by police responding to a raid but the police 
killed over 32 people. There are no reports of any arms recovered at this time, which 
leads one to question what happened to the arms of those criminals gunned down by 
police? One would expect the police to have a procedure for dealing with weapons 
captured, as recovered arms cQuli be sold or kept by the individual police. The marginal 
nature of the area, and lack of police capacity influences this issue, which needs more 
work. 
Police Effectiveness 
One method of measuring police effectiveness is to examine statistics on cattle stolen, 
cattle recovered, number of arrests, and arms recovered. A rise in seizures of illegal 
small arms does not necessarily imply that there are increased numbers of these weapons 
available, but it may mean that the police are stepping up their attempts to uncover them 
and are improving their effectiveness. 
Newspapers have reported that the police do nothipg about this problem. For example the 
East African, 15 September 2003 43  stts: 
Few think police are capable of responding to a distress call; most say they do not 
think the police hotline '999' works any more and that the police are incapable of 
recovering stolen goods. 
42  East African Standard, 21 April 2000:5. "Baragoi massacre toll hits 30" col. 2. Also see East African 
Standard 21 April 2000:6. "nit the bandits hard" Editorial 
43 Care must be taken ui press reports in Kenya on which to base conclusions. The press is based in 
Nairobi, far away from where pastoralists live. Furthermore, the inaccessibility of the areas makes it 
impossible for journalists to go there. 
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However, the data make clear that there are some government attempts to keep records 
and recover stolen stock. 
Media Reporting 
During the raids in Baragoi in 1996, the local media reported an incident in December 
when more than 600 armed warriors from Turkana rustled over 10,000 head of cattle and 
killed more than 50 people in a single incident. In May 1999, bandits armed with AK-47 
and G3 rifles, sprang on a group of herd boys and their grazing cattle in Baragoi and 
made away with 200 cattle. 45 In April 2000, a gang of 500 armed bandits invaded 
Baragoi, and went away with 5,000 cattle, camels and donkeys. 30 people were killed. 46 
These figures differ somewhat from the Baragoi police data. The question raised here is 
where do they get their data? It is likely that the police data illustrates the problem more 
accurately. However the reporting of 3000 recoveries in April 2000 is likely to be true, 
because the media47 does not easily credit the police with good work. Therefore there are 
possible inaccuracies in the police data. 
44 See also Daily Nation 2 February 2004. "Government has failed to Protect the Turkana" 
Http://www.nationaudio.comlNewsfDailyNation/TodayfLetters/LettersO2O22004l  I .html. 
45  Emily Nation, 17 May, 1999:3. 
46  East African Standard, 21 April 2000. 
47  In Kotodo interviews from the ground by people that did not want to be named indicated that media have 
been bought by the army to be politically correct. More research needto be done on the issues of media 
reporters being bribed. 
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Impact on Various Divisions in Samburu District 
Figure 6.11: Frequency of Raids in Baragoi 
Location 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Baragoi 8 11 2 2 - 
Nchola 3 3 - 1 - 
Suyan 5 3 - - - 
Elberta 3 5 - 1 - 
Martie 7 8 1 3 - 
Ndoto 2 3 1 - - 
Latakweny - 3 1 - - 
Total 28 37 5 7 - 
Source; Baragol police station occurrence Book 1Y90-1V9J 
From the above, it is apparent that the most affected area was Baragoi, followed by 
Martie, Suyan, Nachola and Ndoto locations. When the researcher visited the field in 
1999, the situation was severe because the Turkana had invaded Samburu, and most of 
the Samburu had moved to Baragoi township creating more problems there. Most of the 
residents of Nchola and Marti had fled to Baragoi. (Nchola and Marti are mainly Turkana 
and Samburu areas.) The movement created other conflicts due to overcrowding in 
Baragoi and in other receiving areas. During the researcher's visit in September 2002, 
some places like Marti were too insecure to enter. 
Economic Losses 
Figure 6.12 lists the losses incurred by Samburu and Turkana between 1991 and 2000 in 
pounds sterling. 
Figure 6.12: Cost of Stock Lost from Samburu by Turkana and from Turkana to 
Samburu Raidets 1991-2000 
Types of 
animals 
£ Per unit Samburu total 
animals 
raided 
Total Value 
£ Pounds 
Turkana total 
anithals 
 rallied  
Total Value 
£ Po*Iñds 
Cattle 165 18,738 3,091,777 547 90,255 
Goats/sheep 33 28,826 951,258 7,125 235,125 
Camels 191 2,465 470,815 38 7,258 
Donkeys 127 404 51,308 15 1,905 
Total 50,433 4,565,151 7725 334,543 
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Total animals raided in Samburu by the Turkana between 199 1-2000 were 50,433, which 
amounted to £4,565,151 net gains. The livestock the Turkana lost to the Samburu in the 
same period totalled 7,725, which is £334,543 net gains, most raided between 1998-2000. 
The total amount lost by the two communities was nearly £4,899,694, which is equivalent 
to over 636,960,220 Kenya shillings. However, it should be noted that many of the herds 
were going to each other, although many would also end up in the hands of racketeers on 
the way to markets. The cost to each community seems not to have evened out over time, 
even with the attempts at revenge by the Samburu mainly since 1997 onwards. Clearly 
the impact is overwhelming; the significance of the loss of one animal to a pastoralist 
may be a matter of life and death. 
Human Loss 
The human loss from raids in Baragoi between 1991 and 2000 is illustrated below. 
Figure 6.13: People Injured and Killed in Cattle Rustling in Baragoi 
Year Injuries Deaths 
1991 0 0 
1992 0 0 
1993 0 0 
1994 0 1 
1995 0 1 
1996 33 230 
1997 23 68 
998 - 1 
999 19 19 
2000 1 22 
Total 76 342 
Source: Baragoi Police Occurrence books 1991-2000 
The table indicates that between 1990-2000, 342 people were killed and 76 injured in 
Baragoi. In the previous tables a total of 105 people from Sambuiii and Turkana were 
killed and 10 injured. However, other data available from police sources led to the above 
table, which probably reflects underreporting in the earlier dta48 . Interviews with local 
security people revealed that police were killed also, but this data only gives civilian 
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deaths. For example in the August 1999 shootout, six police officers were killed, while in 
the April 2000 raid five police officers were injured. 49 But these do not make up part of 
the figures obtained from the police records. 
These casualties were directly linked to the cattle raids, and they exemplif' the gravity of 
the effects of cattle rustling. From interviews with communities there is evidence of 
underreporting likely to be due to lack of police capacity and possible poor record 
keeping. The many dead and injured greatly impacts both the local community and the 
state itself. 
6.2.3 West Pokot 
In West Pokot, data was obtained from 1997 to 2000 using similar methodology as used 
in Baragoi. Colonial data was available for West Pokot. Just before independence in 
1956, 21 heads were stolen, in 1957 the number was 16, and in 1958, 27 heads were 
stolen.50  The increase of raids from 1956-1958 was attributed to the close proximity of 
the Pokot to Uganda where concealment of stolen property was easy. Farmers located on 
the borders continued to sell stolen stock to the local Nandi people (who are mixed 
farmers) without enquiring where the stock was going. The 1959 annual report noted that 
the most prevalent crime in West Pokot District was stock theft. In 1962, 62 herds were 
stolen, and the large number was blamed on the drought in 1961. Many livestock were 
stolen suggesting that the police were able to cope with the increase in crime, and arrests 
and convictions showed satisfactory figures. Many stolen livestock were recovered, 
suggesting that the colonial regime was to some extent effective in recovery of raided 
animals as compared to the post-colonial regime. 
The table below shows the number of cattle stolen from West Pokot in more recent years. 
The animals had an average market price of 10,000 to 20,000 Kenya shiljings. 
48  Interviews, names withheld Field notes 2002 and 2003. The officers noted that they have lost many 
officers in the field fighting bandits. 
49  See Daily Nation, 24 August, 1999, 'Bandits Kill Six Policemen.' See also East African Standard, 21 April 
2000. 
50  Kenya National Archive/District Commissioner/West Pokot 1/8/1957 Annual Report. 
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Figure 6.14: Number of Cattle Stolen Less Cattle Recovered: Monetary Total Value 
in £ sterling 
Year Herds rustled Total value 
1997 1040 171,600 
1998 2352 388,080 
1999 12,439 2,052,935 
2000 10293 1,698,345 
Total 26,124 4,310,960 
Source: Kapeugurla ['once Marion, 1JYI ano June hUUU 
There is a clear and progressive increase in the number of cattle stolen from 1997 to the 
year 1999, with figures remaining high in 2000. The above table shows that between 
1997 and June 2000, the District lost livestock to the value of over four million pounds 
sterling (Kshs.520 million). In 1999, the worst year for herds stolen but not for human 
deaths and injuries, over 12,000 cattle were lost whose approximate value was 2,052,935 
pounds sterling. Even 1997, the best year on record for the area, recorded a loss of more 
than 171,600 pounds sterling. These figures only suggest the overt economic impact, for 
most rustled cattle are never reported to the police, according to interviews. Elders noted 
that often by the time the police come all the way from Kapenguria, the raiders have 
gone. 
West Pokot is at the epicentre of the conflict with increasing frequency of violent 
interethnic confrontations. It experiences raids from all sides, Turkana from the north, 
Karamoja from the west and Marakwet from the east, and lies between Pokot and 
Kapachorwa districts in Uganda. The government security system in the area is simply 
inadequate for such a challenge, through lack of resource and motivation 51 . 
The conflict is manifested through raiding and revenge raids, which is largely a response 
to drought. It is organised along the lines of lineage/clan tribe by the process of fission 
and fusion. Increasingly, however, commercial raiding is also being organised along the 
same lines, which is making it difficult to differentiate between the two types of raids. 
One difference is that the former are not normally sold in the market and the community 
See for example Daily Nation 20 August 2004 "Clans war puts local elders in sharp focus." 
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is aware about them. Another difference is that during the drought periods, one can 
possibly assume the raids are customary. 
In the year 2000, there were more recoveries than in prior years, according to police 
records and interviews with security and community people. Interviews with one of the 
longest-serving District Commissioners in Pokot indicated that the efforts of security 
personnel to recover stolen cattle helped reduce losses in the year 2000.52  The reduction 
in Samburu was again attributed to beefing up security, which means with improved 
security, cattle raids can be minimised. 
Figure 6.15: West Pokot Human Losses 1997 to 2000 
Year Men Women Children Total 
1997 115 12 6 133 
1998 114 1 4 119 
1999 35 18 13 66 
2000 180 12 11 203 
Total 444 43 34 521 
Percent 85 8 7 100 
Source :Oceurrence police book: Kapenguria police station 
Figure 6:15 shows that a total of 521 people were reported killed by small arms fire 
related to cattle rustling from 1997 to 2000. Eighty-five percent were men, 8% women 
and 7% children. Under reporting is likely again because pastoral peoples consider it bad 
luck to retrieve their dead 53 . The highest number of such deaths (203) occurred in 2000. 
This happened in the last seven months of the year, probably due to an increase in cattle 
raids for livelihood. The year 2000 was a drought year such that the Pokot must either 
migrate in search of pasture or raid to restock. 
Women and children made up 15% of the deaths; they may be unaware of an impending 
raid and be caught in crossfire. When raiders strike, children and women get injured even 
from their own peoples' weapons in the darkness, for cattle raids usually take place at 
52  Interviews May 2001, A former District Commissioner, West Pokot. He noted that the reason for the 
recovery was that cross border peace initiatives between Uganda and Kenya were being encouraged by the 
District Commissioirs ofhe two cotntries. As he noted, "Pacifying the community occupied most of my 
time." 
51  Interview Chairman oticjo Local Council five, 22 November, 2003 
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night. Interviews and data, especially from Baragoi and Karamoja in the previous 
sections, indicate that male children are more vulnerable to intentional killing by raiders 
because they are viewed as future raiders. 54 
6.2.4 Conclusion on Police Data 
in conclusion, the police data demonstrate the great human and economic impact on the 
community from the use of firearms. However, the gravity of the problem is almost 
certainly underestimated due to underreporting by the community and police, and 
possibly by inadequate record keeping55 . 
From the human perspective, many lives have been lost due to the use of small arms in 
raids. The rates of small arms death and injury are related to the scale of the raid. Those 
most affected are males who are usually the perpetrators of the raids, in the 15-30 age 
range. Women are increasingly becoming the victims of violence in raids. 56 They are 
targets when they go collecting water and firewood, and are sometimes targeted because 
they are known to alert the entire community when they see the raids (by ululation). 
Traditionally women and children were captured and assimilated into the raiding 
community. 
From the economic perspective, people have suffered greatly. For example, the Samburu 
in the short term suffered imbalance in security and resource since the animals raided 
were worth millions of shillings. Moreover, as pastoralists they have no other 'ivelihood 
except their animals, so raids leave the survivors destitute. 57  However, revenge raids 
may prevent destitution as the 'losses' cancel out (example of Samburu and Turkana) 
though there may be considerable imbalance at any one time. The possibility of 
54  Field notes interviews from Alale and Karamoja, 200 1-2003. 
The problem with reporting should not be blamed on security as the remoteness and inaccessibility of the 
areas, coupled with lack of equipment (vehicles, fuel) hinders the security from doing their job. 
56  Fiec[notes interviews in Namalu, Rupa, Nabilatuku, Alale, Dol Do! 2001-2003, noted that women are 
not vulnerable than before. 
See for example the Human Development Indices (HDI) for Karamoja. 
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retribution raids does not depend only on resources of those victimised as others might 
support their revenge raid. 
Ocan (1992) found in fieldwork that out of 160 pastoralists interviewed in Karamoja, 47 
had lost all their cattle. One spin-off from the problem of diminishing cattle due to raids 
that are immediately sold afterwards is the creation of a pooi of young warriors with no 
employment who see raiding as a livelihood strategy. As noted in Chapter 3, traditionally 
a majority of the youths were occupied as herders, but currently they seek employment 
among businessmen, traders and administrators who originate from same communities, 58 
who are wealthy enough to own cattle. In Karamoja, some seek survival in rebel militias 
like the Lords Resistance Army 59. This is creating a two-tier society made up of haves 
and have-nots. The have-nots are a growing reservoir of unemployed, uneducated youth 
with no source of income except raiding, and who can be recruited by groups with 
sinister and even terrorist aspirations. For example, interviews in the field in January and 
November 2003, noted that the cattle racketeers in Karamoja struck a deal with the Lords 
Resistance Army. They get guns, and the LRA takes the animals. This is a new twist 
which is intensif'ing the proliferation and sales of arms and complicating the conflict in 
Karamoj a60 . 
Unlike some neighbouring countries, Kenya has not been at war, but the number of 
people killed in the five years in the three districts studied is enormous and cannot be 
viewed as resulting from just a minor conflict. Further, the figures do not include police 
officers killed in the area. For example, between 1998 and 2000 over 70 police were 
killed in gun related incidents in Kenya alone (Egesa and Mkutu, 2000:7). This situation 
poses a challenge to the Kenya Government. There is a need to strengthen security 
systems and to establish police bases to provide security. The case of West Pokot 
Hogg, David, interview, September 2002, found similar dynamics in Marsbit where he has done 
extensive research. 
59 See IRJN 19 MarcJ 2004; see also Kenya Times, 19 March 2004, where Ruto, the World Vision Director 
of Marakwet, Pokot and Turkana (MAPOTU) project notes that the hidden hands in pastoral conflicts are 
big-time merchants who profit. Their hot money has spurred desperate young men to the risky and often-
fatal warrior style combats. Their link to security and corruption makes it very difficult to know who they 
are. More research is essential in this area. 
60  Interviews Kotido and Moroto, January and November, 2003 
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suggests times when the communities are especially vulnerable to raiding. These times 
could be periods when the price of cattle is high or when the rains fail. Such trends are an 
early warning to the government when they should strengthen security. Police records 
could also serve as an early warning system to help government and other parties 
interested in controlling SALW and in relieving their impact. 
If nothing is done, cattle raids by one community lead to the other community acquiring 
arms to retaliate and to recover their animals. The result is a vicious circle of violence 
and increased weaponization of the communities, making conflict resolution increasingly 
difficult. 
6.3 Indirect Impacts 
After examining the direct impacts of SALW, this section examines the indirect impacts, 
which are harder to identify. Beyond deaths, injuries, and loss of livestock, there are 
problems such as the creation of 'no-go' buffer zones and interruption of economic 
activities, administration and development work. There is also massive displacement of 
people and the margins of tolerance within and between communities have considerably 
diminished. There is an increase in widow inheritance and breakdown of inter-tribal 
marriage patterns. This last section examines these issues looking particularly at the 
growing salience of cultural factors and changing gender roles. 
6.3.1 Inequitable Distribution of Livestock (Karamoja) 
The impact of drought and epidemics, which have intensified especially in much of 
Karamoja over the years, has been exacerbated by armed conflict, so that currently, the 
ratio of livestock per person has decreased from 6 to 2 61  . The current distribution of cattle 
61  Field interviews in Nakapiripirit, Amudat, Moroto, Kotido and Kanwat, Karamoja between December, 
2002- February 2003 and May and November, 2003 in which several respondents indicated th4t raids had 
intensified especially after the disarmament. See Recommendation of the Workshop on Security for the 
Communities of Karamoja. Organized by Pax Christi, Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Programme and Kotido 
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is so uneven that only a few people in the entire Karamoja region can still afford to keep 
a few cattle, let alone live off them 62 . 
In Rupa and Nabilatuk in Karamoja, many villagers claim to have lost their herds 
completely. With the changing nature of cattle raids, the animals are now sold by the 
raiders and cannot then be recovered. This affects the family, since there is now less milk 
available, which is a staple of the pastoralists' diet. In an interview, the Minister for 
Karamoja told the researcher that: 
A long time ago there was an almost even distribution of cows. Everybody had 
some cows before the tragedy of raids started. As time went by, the cows became 
unequally distributed. Those who had cows are now losing them. Some are 
growing old and have no sons to replenish the stock. Some societies, e.g. people 
of Labwor who have not acquired guns and do not have a fighting culture, have 
been greatly dispossessed, as is the case along the borders of Acholi, Teso, etc. 
Some people still have cows, but their riches cannot be compared to older people 
who had cows some time back. The cows have remained with those who have the 
means to keep them, the guns. 63 
In an interview the late Catholic priest, Father Novelli said, 
In Karamoja, one needs 5 to 6 head of cattle to satisfy his or her basic necessities. 
The present ratio .... makes the competition for animals extremely high. The 
possession of cattle is a matter of life and death.M 
He further noted that currently the distribution of cattle is so uneven that only a few can 
actually live off their cattle. Others, in order to live s must become clients of the rich. 
However it must be noted that there is not a clear divide between those who own guns 
Peace Initiative (KOPEIN), Held at Mount Moroto Hotel, Moroto, 20-21 November 2003. See also 
Workshop on Sustainable Disarmament, Peace and Development in Karamoja 22-23 November 2003. 
Organized by Pax Christi and Uganda Human Right Commission, held at Moroto Mount Hotel. See Daily 
Monitor, 25 November 2003, Insecurity worries Karamoja NOOs. 
htti://www.monitor.co.uglarchives/2003main/nov/news/1 I 25/news9.phi, See Peacemaker 2003 Issues 1 
and 7. 
62  Field notes Karamoja January-February, 2003, May 2003 and November 2003. 
63Lokeris, Peter, Minister of State for Karamoja. Interview, Kampala, 22 January 2003. 
64 Novelli, op cit. 
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and cattle and those who do not, but the systems which used to sustain the population, 
kinship obligation, collective ownership and security have broken down to some extent. 
6.3.2 Out-Migration and Internal Displacement in Uganda 
Armed conflict has interfered with traditional survival and coping mechanisms leading to 
an exodus of the Karimojong, into agricultural areas that they would not normally use. 
This has especially affected the Bokora who have moved to various places outside the 
region65 . The Iteso were amongst those who suffered as a consequence from Karimojong 
raids and were forced to change their settlement pattern for puiposes of security. The 
local councillor of Magoro sub-county, Iteso, Victor Odile, estimated that due to 
Karimojong raids 75% of the population of his area had fled in the short term to places 
like Kumi, Soroti, Serere, Pallisa, Busoga, Bunia, Magonoga, Bugerve, Makelama, 
Masindi and Kampala66 . 
According to Ocan's census in 1997 there were 37 camps and 54,891 internally displaced 
people in the sub-counties of Obangala, Kapelebyong, Acowa, Usuk, Ngariam, Katakwi 
and Magoro. It indicated that most of the people started coming in the early 1980s. At 
that time the Karimojong had been affected by a severe drought. Heavily armed with 
newly acquired weapons, they carried out the biggest raids in the history of the region. 
Other terrible raids occurred in 1995 and 2000. On 6 August 2001, a Katakwi district 
emergency meeting unanimously declared Katakwi 'a disaster-struck district67 due to 
refugee influx'. More recently UN World Food Programme figures have shown the total 
number of internally displaced people in the above sub-counties stood at 1.2 million. 68 
65  Field notes Karamoja January-February, 2003, May 2003 and November 2003. 
66  Chief Administrative Officer, Katakwi, Interview Katakwi 5 June, 2002 
67  In accordance with article 176, section 2 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda, and subsequently second 
schedule part 1, No. 2 of the 1997 Local Government Act. 
68  See IRIN, 29 September 2003, "More Than a Million Displaced People." Before the incursions of the 
Lords Resistance Army on 15 June 2003, the number of displaced is estimated to have been around 
800,000. Others estimate it at 700,000, most recent put the number at 1.4 million. See Monitor, 23 
December 2003. Monitor 22 March 2004 p:I/www.monitor.co.ugInews/news03223.php  See "The Council 
Declaration of Katakwi as a Disaster-Struck District," 13 August 2001. 
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During the researcher's field visit, a few miles north of Olilim, an Iteso woman named 
Malissa Oligna was rebuilding her house. Itesos are agriculturalist peoples. She told me 
her story: 
The Karimojong raided 12 cattle in 2000, around May, during the night. It was 
some Bokora from Kangole. My husband Alfred traced the footmarks to Napak 
and was killed there. No compensation was demanded and no revenge was 
undertaken. Last dry season, around February, they came and uprooted cassava 
and sweet potatoes at night. We were scared to go out of the but because they 
were armed. They took also chickens and goats and requested us to throw clothes 
out of the huts. We then went to the camp of Mulinga near Olilim and near the 
military detachment but decided to come back to plant cassava. We will sleep in 
the farm but in case of any threat, we will go back to the camp. 69 
In Baragoi (Kenya), interviews indicated that over 10,000 people were displaced between 
1996 and 1998. Interviews and observation in September 2002 showed that most 
displaced people had not returned to their homes. 
6.3.3 Impact of Small Arms on Women of Karamoja and Pokot 
In many African societies, widow inheritance is institutionalised. Amongst pastoralists, at 
the death of the owner of the herd, the eldest son will take over the responsibility of 
managing the whole herd.7° Another important aspect of rights acquisition at the death of 
a person is the fate of his widow(s). Interviews noted "A woman dos not marry an 
individual but a clan. The children and wife belong to the clan. So wlp the husband 
dies, she has to procreate with the brothers of the deceased family." 71  If they are still of 
chi'd bearing age, they will be inherited by a member of the group, noriplly by one of 
the brothers of the deceased, but it can be even by one of the sons of a younger co-wife. 
69  Cited in Gomes and Mkutu, 2004 a report done for Netherlands Development Organization and Pax 
Christi in Uganda. 
70  I.e. he will se cattle for his own marriage first, then, as soon as it is feasiblç, for each of his brothers if 
still unmarrie4 in strict order çf seniority. 
' Interview Eqison Achia, Moroto 2 October 2004. 
348 
(Novelli, 1999) Widow inheritance was a means of survival for women, not only 
economic, but also social and religious. 72 
Currently, there are many widows in North Rift pastoral communities due to the high 
death rate among the warriors from small arms conflict. Women interviewed said, "We 
are tired of being inherited by the brothers of our husbands." 73 Widows also complained 
that unlike the past, they are not being treated well. A former councillor of Karita, 
Uganda, Elizabeth Chepsok, noted, 
Often when the husband dies, the brother will inherit the woman. In some 
situations the women face mistreatment and abuse. They will not be taken care of 
the way the husband used to. 74 
Additionally, unconfirmed sources indicated a significant presence of HIV positive 
people in Moroto, so that widow inheritance could have disastrous effects. The issue 
clearly needs more research. 75 
Some women are married many times. In one of the peace meetings, a woman who had 
been inherited at least five times, came to the meeting crying and saying that the women 
were tired of sleeping with dying men. She said, "The women have lost the meaning of 
love because of all the battles, beautiful people dying, husbands, wives, girls, boys and 
children dying, and women being inherited without their wish." She noted that women 
have agreed to stop buying firearms, because these were the cause of death. (IBARIOAU 
Mbale Workshop, 2001) Women may acquire arms after the death of their husband, to 
give to their sons to protect the family. Women may also be convinced by their sons to 
buy arms for them, selling their own cows (contrary to some beliefs, women often own a 
small number of their own cows). 
72  Interviews with several informants in Karamoja, Pokot, and Samburu, 2001-2003. 
73  Focus group discussion, Male, 3 August, 2002. 
74 MkUtU 2003 op. cit. 
71  More research is urgently needed in lilY/AIDs and pastoral areas such as Karamoja. 
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Given the increasing use of guns, some women informed the researcher, "You are not 
assured if your son or husband will return alive when they go for raids." 76 The current 
ratio of men to women on the cross border area was said to be 75:100, It is true that 
warriors have been killed in raids, however this figure is highly disputed and difficult to 
prove as a result of poor record keeping. In 2003 Jie Karamoja lost nearly 60 warriors to 
raids.77  As a result of the deaths widows get new roles in managing homesteads and 
taking over the entire workload. As they said, "We work like donkeys."78 When the man 
is killed, the woman is left with managing the home and taking care of her own children 
and often other orphans of the conflict. 
When women are told that their sons or husbands have been killed in raids, the first thing 
some of the cross border women will request is the deceased's gun, since the gun can be 
used to protect the home and is also a convertible currency. 79 As noted by the Minister 
for Karamoja, in an interview, "With a gun, you can exchange with cattle, with a gun you 
can raid. 80" It was even alleged that widowed women buy guns for their sons, so their 
boys will get cows, and the security of the homestead will be assured. 
Karimojong and Pokot women have always spent very little time with their husbands. 
Warriors spend about two weeks every month in the bush, spying on the enemy to learn 
where the cattle are living. With increasing loss of lives of wrriors, and warriors 
travelling longer distances to raid, and the need for increased vigilance to protect against 
raids, the women become even more the managers of the home. families are rarely all 
together and young men grow up undisciplined and prone to join raids. Focus group 
discussions with women in Alale Pokot (cross border) revealed that the frequent raids 
have conditioned the Pokot women to believe that death is normal and the cow is the only 
76 Mkutu 2003 op. cit. 
77 Karamoja Strategic Planning Workshop, Moroto Hotel, 17-19 May 2002. and see IRIN 19 March 2003. 
78  Mkutu 2003 op. cit. 
79 Field notes, West Pokot and Kapoia 2002 and 2003 Interview with Hon. Lokeris, Peter, Minister for 
Karamoja. Jinja, Uganda, Noy,ber 11, 2001. Also Interview with Lokeris, Kampala, 22 January, 2003 
80  Interview Lokeris Peter Minister for Karamoja. Jinja, Uganda 11 June 2001. Also interview with Lokeris 
Kampala, 22 January 2003. Again in Mbale, 16 May 2003. 
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means of livelihood. The women argue that "it is better to die in war than die in the 
village with diseases since you are not honoured 81 ." 
Kellerman et al, 1992 argue that the risk of death increases substantially if arms are in the 
home. Small arms have changed relationships in the home making domestic violence 
more dangerous. When warriors get drunk, which is common, they shoot randomly. One 
woman told how they would come home and demand food. If they are not given food 
they just shoot. As argued by Odhiambo (2000:31) a woman faced with a rungu (stick) 
has a better chance of survival than a woman faced with the barrel of a gun. 
Another social effect of the raids is that intertribal marriage has decreased. For example 
Iteso and Karimojong used to intermarry. Due to increased cattle raids in the 1980s, the 
bride wealth of the Iteso dropped down from 60 head of cattle to 4 or 5. Bollig (2003) 
also noted the decline in cattle per capita in East Pokot of Kenya from 14:1(1 920s) to 
about 8:1 in 2003. However, the Karimojong still demand 60 head of cattle for a 
daughter. The result is a progressive decline in intermarriages till by 2000 they almost 
completely ceased. There has to be more to it than this since bride wealth varies over 
time and according to the parties involved. Clearly the issue needs more research. 
63.4 Abolition of the "Friendship System" 
Chapter 2 describes the establishment of relationships with other communities for barter 
andlor trade as a survival strategy by pastoralists, especially with regard to food 
production. Muhereza (1995: 95-96) notes that some Karimojong have established 
cordial relationships with their neighbours, which enables them to complement each 
other's needs, especially for food. Some men, upon returning to Karamoja after the rains, 
leave a few oxen with their friends in the hope that the gesture of goodwill will be 
reciprocated when they return in the dry season. In exchange, the friends would plant 
cassava and millet and share the harvest. These informal contracts were practised until 
recently in thp bordering sub-counties, especially in Kapelebyong and Magoro. However, 
81  Field notes, Alale West Pokot, Discussion with African Women Church Group, Alale August, 2002. 
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Iteso from Usuk (Ugandan Pokot) and Ngariam have become wary of the idea, saying, 
"We have to cultivate and feed them for the animals they stole." 82 This socio-economic 
relationship or "friendship system" has been shattered by violence associated with arms, 
although there is collaboration of other kinds. 
The proliferation of small arms has led to the breakdown of non-violent traditional ways 
of settling disputes in Karimoja (both violent and non-violent), such as use of fines or 
compensation payments. However in Kenya the system of compensation payments is still 
effective due to the presence of the elders, though this is not utilised by the state. 83 The 
chief administration officer for Katakwi, Nicolas Ocakaro, admitted that the local 
administration is now discouraging this practice because of previous manipulations. He 
said that the Karimojong steal animals from other Karamoja and hide them with their 
friends in Iteso, and then they steal the same cattle, and return as "friends" to demand the 
cattle that they had previously loaned. 84  On their side, the Karimojong pointed out the 
frequent confusion between raiders and friends. "In 2000, a Bokora came to harvest 
cassava in the garden of his friend and the Iteso local defence units shot at him." 85 
6.3.5 Interruption of Economic, Development and Administrative Activities in 
Karamoja (Uganda) and Samburu (Kenya) 
During my field research, I noted the creation of Awasia 'no-go' zones from Laikipia to 
Karamoja. The raiders create these buffer zones for their own security purposes. As noted 
by Achia, "These are lands dedicated to insecurity." 86 Several fertile areas here cannot be 
cultivated due to insecurity, especially the southern slope of Mt. Napak where Pian 
confront Bokora in Nabwal, and in Karamoja and the eastern part of Pokot country, 
especially in Loroo and Karita. 87 A large stretch of valuable land along the border, from 
82Field notes December, 2002-February, 2004 from Karamoja. 
83  Masinde et a! 2004; Mkutu 2001, 2003 op.cit. 
84  In 2000, Bokora raided Matheniko who sought refuge in Iteso. 
85  Ibid. 
86  Interview, Terrace Achia, Local Council 5 Moroto, Uganda 21 November 2003. 
87Ibid. Achia noted that ifjoint cothmtlhal grazing were encouraged as in the colonial period, it would 
increase cohesiveness and allow the Karamoja to rediscover their identity. It would also reduce the distance 
for cattle thieves and reduce the no go-zones. However, security would need to be provided by the state. 
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Magoro district to Adacal up to Kapelebyong and Obwin, ceased to be cultivated or used 
for grazing. The large tracts of 'no-go zones' are basically used as an early warning for 
defence against hostile raiders, which is an important precaution. In Samburu there was a 
stretch of deserted land starting from Mariti. 88 The commercialised stock raiders have 
also made 'no-go' zones that are off limits for grazing, further contributing to scarcity of 
food and to malnutrition in an area with only limited resources. This has been possible 
due to no policing of the areas by the states. Although it could be argued that insecurity 
has made it possible for the natural environment to regenerate in insecure areas, armed 
conflict has led to concentration of both human and livestock populations in relatively 
secure but overcrowded areas. Those areas are then subject to environmental degradation 
because of pressure on resources in fragile semi-arid ecosystems. 
A driver for the Karamoja Agro Pastoral Development project who was interviewed, has 
been a victim of road ambush on both the Namalu and Moroto roads. People drive at very 
high speeds to avoid ambush, for the high speed is thought to reduce the chances of the 
car being hit. The driver said, "I know my ambushers, and they are known locally. 
Several times they have met me and told me 'it's your speed that has saved you." 89 
Relations between the three tribal clans, the Matheniko, Bokora and Pian remain poor to 
this day, and violence continues to erupt periodically. Leaders of one clan cannot visit the 
areas of other clans without fear of attack. in June 2001, January and February 2003, and 
November 2003, I observed that the roads in Karamoja area were indeed unsafe. 
With the introduction of the disarmament programme in Karamoja, described in chapter 
7, the government instituted a deadline for the voluntary handing over of guns by 
warriors to the Uganda army. Up until the deadline 2002, Karamoja was relatively calm 
and peaceful and, as noted in chapter 7, some guns were handed over. Howçver since the 
88  Contrary to expectations, the new pattern of settlement of the Iteso into "camps" did not really affect 
district crop production. It might be due to the fact that the Iteso managed to continue cultivating their 
fields whiiebased in the camps. However, insecurity in Katakwi district impacted on land use. 
89 Interview, Karamoja Agro Project Development op cit 
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end of the deadline, there have been increasing incidents of road ambushes, lynching, and 
shootings. 
The insecurity has also threatened the administration. One of the worst is the story of 
Father Declan, a Catholic priest, his driver and the mission cook, who were shot at point 
blank range and killed by soldiers on the way back into Kotido. Interviews with various 
people in Kotido and Moroto claimed that Father Declan had witnessed something that 
the army did not like and it is likely that the shooting was related to this incident. His two 
murderers were executed publicly by a firing squad. 90  Since the disarmament process 
slowed in January 2003, security has deteriorated further in Karamoja. Moroto did not 
celebrate Labour Day because a World Vision official, Davis Chelangat, was killed the 
day before on the notorious Lorengwat 91 Nakapiripirit road, while on his way to 
Kapchorwa. 
Oxfam suspended their activities outside Kotido town from 2 November 2001 to 21 
November 2002, after one of their vehicles was shot at on the road from Kotido to 
Moroto. The road crosses the Dodoth-Jie battlefield. MSF-Swiss ambulances referring 
patients to Matany Hospital in Uganda have been ambushed, and patients are no longer 
referred to Matany but to Kitale (Kenya) and Mbale. 
In Samburu, Kenya, Oxfam suspended its services in 1999, due to road ambushes and 
small arms violence92 . In 2002, the Intermediate Technology Development Group 
suspended its services in Baragoi and moved to Maralal. 93 A highly publicized attack in 
Baragoi happened in April 2001, when four aid workers of a non-govermnental 
organization were ambushed and gunned down by bandits at Soitokokoyo about 10 
90 lnterviews with various people in Kotido, and Moroto , January and November 2003. 
91  Lying at the central police station in Moroto is the wreckage of the Nakapiripirit Resident District 
Commissioner's official vehicle, which was burnt by the warriors. He survived but the vehicle did not. 
92 See also the murder of another an Italian missionary. The Daily Monitor 5 April, 
2004hLtp://www.monitor.co.uginews/newsO4O5l  1 .php 
Observation and visit, Intermediate Technology Development Group office in Maralal; also interviews 
with Wayama, Maralal, 19 August, 2002. 
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kilometres from Baragoi town. 94 However, reliable sources on the ground said that one 
person gunned down in another incident on the Maralal Baragoi road was an arms trader. 
In conclusion, the impact of the current insecurity is most clearly manifested in the 
voluntary sector, upon which this community greatly depends. However it is also affecting 
government personnel including the Resident District Commissioner, in fact himself the 
head of the security for the District, Additionally it is threatening the tourism industry which 
might have otherwise been a viable alternative livelihood for those affected by the depletion 
of cattle in the region. 
6.3.6 Changing Patterns of Leadership in Pastoral Areas 
At the moment, the authority can be viewed as tripartite; (see figure below) 
Figure 6.16 Tripartite leadership 
State Authority (cent 
Warriors 
security, chiefs) 
Elders (this include diviners, kraal leaders etc) 
For the pastoralists, wisdom belongs to the aged and understanding to those who have 
lived many years. The pastoral areas in the North Rift are still very rural. In some of the 
places, the influence of national government has not been felt and the customary 
traditional governance institution is still dominant as discussed in Chapter 3. However the 
power of the elders is being eroded. 
Father Joseph, a Catholic priest in Dol Dol stated, 
Influence and ability of the elders to take issues has weakened. This is attributed 
to the double structure, (government system and traditional system). When it is a 
hot issue, it's pushed and not dealt with. Traditionally, the Masai had a strong 
94  http//www.nationaudio.comlnewslDailyNationlToday/FeaturesfFeature 1 .htl 
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egalitarian system. You behaved according to your stage in life. Something has 
slipped out of the hand, some roles have deteriorated. 95 
The elders in Dol Dol noted that "youth are now a problem, there is the problem of the 
gun which has challenged the power of the elders. 96 
Father Bosco of Amudat mission concurred, "In the past, the elder said, do not move, the 
youth could not move. But today, the youth will point the gun and the elder will keep 
silent."97 
This was attributed to modem development, which has brought the vices of theft, 
indiscipline, disobedience and murdering of parents by the young people. 
The elders in Alale told me that, 
Civilisation has spoilt everything. The problem is that young people do not listen 
any more. A long time ago the young men could not try and kill their father or 
mother. Currently, before you make a decision, they kill you with gun. The gun 
has retrogressed and destroyed our thinking. People with the guns do not want the 
elders to marry. 98 
Chief Alexander noted that: 
Elders sit and talk to the youth and negotiate peace. In the past the morans 
(warriors) would herd cows until they were between 25 and 30 years and they 
would be given a wife, but now the 15 and 16 year olds want wives and if they are 
not given, they use their guns to go and raid or torture the elders99 
In Namalu, Nakapiririt district, I learnt of a son who shot and murdered his father who 
had been reluctant to release his contribution to the bride wealth of his son. During the 
fieldwork the said young man had been reluctant for the researcher to take any pictures, 
his uncle then revealed the reason for his cautiousness. I learned also that he had been in 
95 Father Joseph Cit. Opt 
96  Focus groups discussion. Elders Dole Dole, September 3, 2002. 
97  Father Bosco Interview, Amduat, 19th  June, 2001 confirmed by Father Novelli,op. cit.; Philip Ichumer, 
Moses Mudo, and Hon Lokeris. Interviews, 2001-2003. 
98  Alale elders, Focus group interviews, Nauapong, 3 August 2002. The elders raised the issue of the young 
men not wanting them to marry more wives. While interviews in Karamoja and even Upe Pokot, the young 
people were forcing the parents to marry for them, if they refused, so parents were being killed. 
99 Chief Alexander of Kongolai, Interview, 31 May 2001. 
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the army, and deserted, likely taking with him his weapon. In most cases murder 
demands sacrifice of bulls to the elders for forgiveness. I learned that the elders had 
refused as it would allow other young people to follow suit in what was a growing 
problem 100 . 
This is collaborated by Ntende and Mworozi (2000:80) who observe that long ago elders 
were people with power and youths consulted them. But today, the young men and 
racketeers are controlling the power of elders with the guns. Possession of weapons and 
an army of warriors is now a major determinant of authority. Keter, a Karimojong 
businessman under the age of 35, who was killed leading a raid in Bokora, had 100-
armed warriors under his command.' ° ' The authors refer to it as the "gun factor." When 
the state presence is also weak, this allows the youth to increase their relative power 
through the barrel of the gun (jower of coercion).' °2 
Enduring Power Of Elders 
Scholars argue that elders have lost their power. However, though on the decline, the 
customary governance system still persists across North East Africa. 103  Pastoral society is 
still patrilineal. That is, people inherit property and status through their father's line and 
belong to their father's family community. The patrilineage with its senior men is still the 
social core of life and livelihoods. The elders play a significant role in sanctioning 
alliances and overall management of the community and resources. When warriors go to 
raid, they generally consult elders and elders negotiate peace with the raided through 
cleansing ceremonies and compensation making. 104  They can also invoke the power of 
god and curse the youths. 
100 Interview with KIS? Chairman, Namalu, June 2001 
101 Fie1dnots Jan and Nov 2003 
102 See Daily Nation 20 August 2004 op cit. 
103 Masin4e et$, 2004 Mkutu 200 iop. cit. 
op cit. 
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As noted by Rt. Rev. Kewasis, among the Pokot, "The youth and elders can never 
contradict. But the contradiction will come because now we have youths who act as 
thieves and go on their own accord to steal, but they are always punished".' °5 
Although the elders have lost power in the physical sense, due to the coercive means of 
violence by the youth, when it comes to certain essential issues in the community, the 
elders project themselves in a powerful way particularly where youth and the community 
still believe in the rituals and traditions of the community. 106 Modern public 
administration has not collaborated with the elders in their role, which could be valuable 
in peacemaking. 
It was the elders who gave permission for my visit and interview to cross sections of the 
communities and especially visit the manyattas/kraals. It is true to say that elders, in 
some areas and at some points in time have lost some of their authority. However some 
elders are using their legitimate power as a bargaining chip. Some seemed to know who 
is in possession of guns and in fact were partly in control of the arms. As argued in the 
workshop in Mbale, some of the raiders are the elders' sons 107 . It also indicated that due 
to their long suffering under youth with arms, they have managed to amass a lot of small 
arms slowly and regain control. Thus, there is a new problem in that some have been 
compromised by having significant economic interest in raids, verging on warlordism, 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
Decline in succession ceremonies 
Additionally in Karamoja, small arms have led to the breakdown and loss of ethnic 
identity. People now identify at the sub tribe level, 'we Pian', 'we Jie', etc., instead of 
'we Karimojong'. Due to this breakdown of the broader ethnic identity, customary 
governance is affected. For a succession ceremony to take place, all the Karamoja must 
unite and agree, but this unity has been broken so there has been no succession. Whilst in 
105 Right Rev. Kewasis op cit. 
106 See recent research from pastoral areas in Kenya Masinde et a!, 2004. 
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the field the researcher found that the current generation of senior elders in Karamoja is 
from the age-set of ngimoru (mountain). Several decades have passed without initiation 
ceremonies being held at which the senior elders pass on power to the junior elders from 
the age-set of nngitetei (gazelle). As a result, in most communities there are only a few 
senior elders living. 
6.4 Conclusion 
So what are the consequences of small arms proliferation? The aims of this chapter were 
to describe the social impact of SALW. But it must be borne in mind that these are by no 
means exhaustive findings. It is obvious that the spread of small arms and light weapons 
in the North Rift since the 1980s has negatively impacted the communities in many ways. 
Small arms injuries can be counted like the incidence of any disease, and from the figures 
above, it is clear that a health crisis is building, given the scale of the violence. 
Whilst the medical data does not consistently demonstrate an increase in small arms 
injuries in all areas, there are clearly some alarming statistics, especially in small clinics 
in Nakapiripirit and Matany, both in Karamoja, Uganda. For several reasons the statistics 
are likely to underestimate the problem of both injuries and deaths. There is a suggestion 
of disordered violence in and around homes caused by increased prevalence of weapons 
and alcohol. This warrants more research. 
The paucity of medical facilities is evident with these hospitals providing care for huge 
areas. Small arms injuries are a preventable drain on resources. The large number of 
small arms additionally dissuades medical intervention, as the area is so insecure. 
The police data show great human and economic impacts to the community from the use 
of small arms in raiding though the problem is underestimated due to underreporting by 
the community and police and possibly by inadequate record keeping. The rates of small 
arms death&and injury are related to the scale of the raids. Those most affected are males 
Workshop on "Challenges of Conflict and Small Arms Proliferation on Capacity Building for 
Development in Karamoja N.E. Uganda". Organized by SNVIPax Chrsti. Mt Elgon Hotel, Mbale, May, 
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who are usually the perpetrators of the raids in the age range of 15-30. From the 
economic view, the people have suffered greatly. The cost amounts to millions of Kenya 
shillings, although it is conceded that what is lost by one group is often gained by 
another. However, the most vulnerable or less armed groups will lose the most. An 
example is the Samburu mentioned earlier who from 1999-2000 were unarmed, and 
therefore lost their stock to the armed Turkana. Additionally, with commercialisation of 
cattle raiding the cattle leaves the community and the riches end up in just a few hands. 
Moreover, as pastoralists they have no other livelihood except their animals. A possible 
spin-off from the problem of inequitable distribution of cattle due to raids is the creation 
of a pool of young warriors who are idle and can become a menace. 
The armed conflict has interfered with the traditional survival coping mechanism causing 
a rise in internally displaced persons. It has also led to the creation of no-go zones, which 
have interfered with economic development and the contribution of NGOs. 
Widow inheritance is increasing among the pastoralists, as a result of the high death rate 
of warriors and this also creates an increase in dependent children. This has implications 
for the spread of HIV. More in-depth studies on widows and their survival strategies are 
needed. For women, gun violence is leading to new roles of managing homesteads and 
taking over entire workloads including security of the homes. But with the gun in the 
home, domestic violence is on the increase. 
Other traditional systems and values have been eroded with the use of guns including the 
increase in the authority of the youth vis a vis the elders. However, the elders still have 
legitimate power and this may be utilised by peacemakers. 
The true extent of suffering from the spread of small arms probably will never be known. 
What is certain is that the costs in impoverishment, wasted lives, orphaned children, 
widowed women, and shattered communities are potentially huge and dismal. An 
example of such a community is found in Katakwi where the Iteso are living in refugee 
camps in their own district, having been displaced by the Karimojong. Due to high 
1416th, 2003. 
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insecurity they cannot return to their homes, and they currently survive on food aid. 
Those still in their homes rarely keep cattle and when they do, they may be seen chained 
and padlocked in place. 
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Chapter 7 
State Interventions in Pastoral Conflict Zones in the North Rift 
7.1 Introduction 
In the last twenty years the governments of both Kenya and Uganda have made it a policy 
goal to end raiding and resolve conflict in the pastoral areas, and to address the problems 
of insecurity. However these measures have largely failed increasingly as the communities 
acquire arms for protection, thereby increasing their alienation from central govermnents. 
Attempts have been inconsistent, poorly coordinated and executed; too often taking a 
narrow definition of security that has focused on coercive disarmament without focusing 
sufficiently on the root causes of the pastoral conflict. In an interview with the chief 
administrative officer for Kotido on civil society "They have invested huge amounts of 
money in organizing peace meetings between warring groups, but they have just been fire 
fighting and not addressing the root cause" 
The result has been the intensification of insecurity, violence and tension, and the 
weaponization of pastoral communities. 
This chapter examines attempts to mitigate the conflicts noted in previous chapters. This 
section reviews related efforts by the Kenyan and Ugandan governments, firstly 
examining the evolution of government strategies for respthiding to violence involving 
pastoralists in relation to small arms, then examining other efforts which have ranged from 
amnesty2, the branding of cattle, and the disciplining of local government officers who 
condone insecurity in their respective areas, to specific weapons collection programmes. 
The main focus of this chapter is on the Karimojong in Uganda, and on the Pokot and 
Samburu in Kenya3 . 
Interview, Walter Irama, Chief Administrative Officer, Kotido District, Kotido, 2 February, 2003 
2  See Daily Nation 11 January, 2002 
www.nationaudio.comNews/Dailyl4ation/11020Q2/News/News I 6.htm I 
Regional organizations, the organiaoh Of Africh tJtIfr (OAU- now African Union) and the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Dçougit (IGAD) have atlehèd other minimal interventions. The failure of the 
Earl' arning System started by 3AD see Mkutu 2003 op cit. also see Muhereza 2003b 
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7.2 Evolution of Government Strategy for Addressing Armed Violence involving 
pastoralists 
The pastoral areas of east Africa were viewed as having little potential or economic value 
to the colonies and were confined in native reserves (Leys, 1925:125). The policies of 
postcolonial governments led to the further marginalization of the pastoral people. Nyaba 
and Otim, (2001) note that: 
There is no policy framework for the management of the pastoral conflict. At the 
state level, there is no policy for the transformation of the pastoralists' conflict. 
The main thrust has been attempts to resolve symptoms of conflicts or what may 
be called the indices of conflict4 . 
Colonial Period 
During colonial times the regime's policy in pastoral areas was to pacify the pastoralists. 
In some places disarmament was attempted. In Samburu, between 1928-1936, the colonial 
government experienced problems with the Samburu in relation to cattle raiding. In 1935, 
government attempted to disarm the Samburu of their spears. By February 1935, 1,800 
had been collected. In the end 5,000 spears were collected 5 and a ban on carrying spears 
was imposed. After 1936 cattle rustling continued but the colonial government made all 
attempts to ensure that law and order existed in Samburu. 
The most recent approaches to be examined in both states are disarmament, branding, 
amnesties and peace meetings in Kenya. Weapons collection is the most direct response to 
the problem of small arms proliferation. It confronts directly and simply both the fear and 
many of the problematic elements. It is seen as a relatively easy option for addressing 
conflict and insecurity. Disarmament and weapons control are increasinty a part of peace 
efforts (SAS 2003: 278). Since weapons create the problem, the solution is to get rid of 
them. Efforts in the 1980s were heavily dependent upon the use of force to disarm 
This includes drilling from water wells, and construction of dams, provisions of relief, drugs etc; also see 
Mugerwa 2001. 
KNA/DçIsmI3/3/politica1 records Baraza 1936-1951 Samburu a Problematic district "lawless" 1934-5) 
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pastoralists, but relatively few arms were seized. 
7.3 Government Polices And Responses In Kenya 
This section first examines Kenya's strategy to respond to the proliferation of small arms 
and light weapons. This strategy built on colonial patterns but with an 'Africanist' veneer, 
which is why colonial policies must also be explored. The first case of illicit firearms was 
reported in Turkana district in 1928. Demand was driven by the communities' need to 
defend themselves against Sudanese raiders targeting their animals. 
Small arms in Kenya are largely an outcome of the inability of the postcolonial state to 
extend its legitimate institutions of governance to marginalized areas. In West Pokot, the 
elders argued "the government has forgotten us, we only see it when it carries out security 
operations in the area" 6 . The elders noted part of Pokot district was seen as part of Uganda 
even long after independence. "Until 1971, we were administered from Uganda, hence the 
name "Kenya Mpya "(new Kenya)7. The elders and people interviewed felt that the Kenya 
government continued to ignore them and treat them as foreigners, while the Ugandan 
government had since given them up as Kenyans. The elders stated 'Only missionaries 
have brought development to the area." 8 Observation also confirmed that Alale does not 
have any secondary school, the primary schools in the area were all missionaries, though 
the Kenya government had seconded teachers to the schools. Missionaries ran all the water 
in Alale and even the functioning medical dispensaries. 
The absence of state presence has resulted in lack of trust and confidence in the public 
security apparatus in the pastoral regions. The result is the 'zones of insecurity' 9 noted in 
chapter 6. Over the years these regions have disproportionately borne the brunt of the 
state's draconian policies, witnessed in the Northern frontier district and Pokot-Turkana 
areas' 0 . For instance, following the outbreak of the shfta war of the 1960s   the government 
imposed a state of emergency on the northern frontier district, which lasted until 1992. In 
6  Elders interviews Alale, West Pokot, 3 August, 2002 
ibid. 
8  ibid. 
men go zones. 
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Kenya, in 1960, the preservation of public security ordinance was enacted. This was 
intended to give the postcolonial administration the powers to pre-empt subversive 
movements without proclaiming a state of emergency as was done in 1952 with the Mau 
Mau. Since then the province has continued to experience banditry, low-level insurgency 
and general insecurity. 
After independence Jomo Kenyatta, the first president, announced an amnesty to Mau 
Mau fighters, but there was no follow up on those who did not surrender their arms. 
However, in general small arms were not an issue until after 1980 11 in Kenya. 
Kenya has one of the most rigorous arms control laws in the Horn of Africa forbidding 
unauthorized civilian gun possession. 12 Yet these laws have not prohibited the spread of 
small arms throughout the pastoral areas, rural areas and urban towns. Pinkney (2001:95) 
notes "Kenya seems remarkable for the ease with which civilians obtain guns and for 
their willingness to use them, whether in robbing shops and banks in broad daylight..." 
While the government of Kenya has condemned armed raids and called for pastoralists to 
disarm, it seems unable to bring the situation under control' '. The predominant attitude of 
government toward the pastoralists has been "pacifying" them to maintain law and 
order.' 4 This was similar in Karamoja. However, in the 1970s the antistock police was 
created to deal with the insecurity. Home guards also increased to deal with the issue. 
However, since 1980 the problem has increased with the flows of small arms and no 
policy for control. To manage the challenges caused by the proliferation of small arms, 
Kenya has swerved between different methods, including use of force by security 
personnel' 5 and presidential amnesties 16 to persuade voluntary surrender of arms and 
10  See Dietz, 1987 
See for example Leenco Lata (1996:6) who notes "that use of modem arms appears to be minimal, 
however the worry in 1996 was more the sowing of distrust between communities than arms diffusion from 
the State to the society" http://plougshares.ca/contentlBUlLD%20PEACE/lata9.6.html . See also the Wagalla 
massacre in 1984 in which nearly 5,000 people were killed in Wajir in an operation by government. The 
only thing Ruto admitted on behalf of the Moi administration was that "security standards were flouted" 
during the operation. East African Standard 15 February, 2004, Wagalla Massacre: the sore that refuses to 
heal" 
12  See Laws of Kenya "The Firearms Act" (revised, 1982). For legislation on aims see Kizito and Mkutu, 
2004. 
13  See for example Daily Nation 23 May 2004 " Cattle raids hold sway in Turkana"- 
14  Interviews in 2002 with some of the District Commissioners in Kenya this policy still existed. 
' Opçratjpns in  Jokot noted in previous sections, see also Daily Nation 11 February, 2004 "Wagalla 
massacre to be probel" bttp://www.eastandard.net/headlines/newsi 102041 I .htm thousands of people were 
killed and maimed during the 10 February, 1984, botched operations to smoke out alleged bandits from 
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peace meeting strategies. These stratagems originate from the states' temporary conflict 
crisis management due to the amplification of conflict especially in pastoral areas and 
lately in urban areas. 17 In September 2003, the Minister for Internal Security was 
interviewed "Our borders are porous and difficult to interdict to be able to seal routes that 
are used by weapons smugglers. Increased border patrols are in place to check this, [as 
well as] enhanced intelligence-gathering and inter-country disarmament programmes." 8 
A long-term policy on how to deal with the armed flows and conflict situation does not 
exist. There are several contingents of security personal, including the army, the general 
service unit, the regular police, the anti-stock theft unit, the administration police, and the 
Kenya Police Reserve, that have been deployed in the rustling-prone areas. 19 I-low raiders 
can attack in the face of such considerable security forces is a puzzle that no government 
official, including the former head of state, has explained. The issue of illegal trade in 
ammunition has been relayed to the government, but not much has been done to address 
the issue. Initiatives20 have yielded little result 21 . 
An integrated, holistic effort has yet to be articulated at the national level. This section 
examines these attempts in Pokot and Baragoi in Samburu District, of Kenya. However in 
West Pokot and Samburu the government's attempts to collect weapons have achieved 
very little success. 
7.3.1 Efforts to Promote Disarmament between the Kenyan Pokot borders and 
Samburu. 
Small arms control policy has not been clear in Kenya, though the issue has always been 
Wajir. 
16  Daily Nation, 17 March "Kenya issues Amnesty on Small Arms'. 
17  See Mkutu and Sabala, 2002; Daily Nation 21 April, 2004 "Police reserves 'were a threat to security' 
' East African Standard, 1 September 2003 "Murungaru admits we are under-policed and that the force is ill-
equipped. http://www.eastandard.net/headlines/news01092003010.htm  
19  However, the menace continues, See for example Daily Nation 2 February 2004 "Government has failed 
to protect the Turkana" Http:II 
www.nationaudio.comfNews?DailyNationlTodaylLettersfLetters/0222004 11 .html. 
20 	civil society, including churches, NGOs and Community Based Organizations, have invested huge  The 
amounts of money in organizing peace meetings between warring groups. owever, they have just been 
firefighting and not addressing the root cause. 
21  The cries for disarmament are rampant everywhere See recent calls East African Standard 18 August 2004 
"State told to disarm home guards" http://www.eastandard.net/headlines/newsl8080413.htm  
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controlled in joint efforts between the army and the police. The Government of Kenya has 
attempted to disarm pastoralists on the Kenya-Uganda border several times since 1979. 
Dietz (1987) provides the background to operations in Pokot. By 1984, it was estimated 
that the Pokot had 3,000 arms. Insecurity and raids were on the increase. Raiding had 
spilled into Trans Nzoia (Kenya) and Sebei (Kapachorwa) district in Uganda. The Kenyan 
and Uganda authorities decided that the weapons on the border of Kenya and Uganda were 
a continuous threat to peace and security. In an interview with Brigadier E.T. Tonui, a 
former Chief of Operations based at the Department of Defence in an interview told me: 
"Helicopters were used and I led the operation." 22 Omara Olara, the current human rights 
commissioner in an interview said: "I was then serving in the Obote's government at the 
time and we used helicopters. 23" 
In 1984 the rains failed in Karamoja, and this led to death of cattle and increased raiding 
within Karamoja and between Karamoja, Kenya and Sudan. As a result, a joint military 
operation between Kenya and Uganda was undertaken in the affected areas. Dietz 
(1987:191) notes that: 
In February 1984, both armies launched a military action to force the people to 
surrender all their guns, including the ones given to home guards by Kenya 
government in 1980. The government recovered more than 300 firearms. To 
achieve this goal, many cattle were confiscated as 'hostages'. 
Local people told me that by using helicopters about 8,000 head of cattle were driven 
together in the main camp. Some of them were sold in Kitale, some were eaten by the 
military, but most of the animals died from lack of water, as it was a dry year 24 . People 
were also killed, among them an assistant chief. The Pokot did not fight back. A local 
politician informed me that "the operations were done by use of force, and it was done in 
an inhuman way".25 Security personnel were then used to collect the firearms that the 
Pokot had obtained illegally. The aim of the Kenya government was to retrieve weapons 
from young Pokot warriors, many of whom refused to co-operate. 26They did not give them 
22 Inteiew Brigadier E. K. Tonui, Chief of Operations of Kenya, Jinja, 12 November 2001. 
23lnterview Omara Olara, the Uganda Human Rights Commissioner, Moroto, 20 November 2003. 
24  Field notes Alale, August, 2002 
25  Source did not want to be named. Inhuman in that people were put in a hole so that they could state where arms 
were kept in the community. 
26  He admitted that helicopters were used and that he was part of the operation. Also confirmed in an interview 
with Omara Olara, the Uganda Human Rights Commissioner who was serving Obote's government at the time. 
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arms in nor fight the government for confiscation their animals. 
The local community viewed this operation negatively.27 On the other hand, the 
international community felt that the Kenyan government had violated international 
humanitarian law, which provides for the protection of non-combatants. For the local 
population, it brought a terrible loss of life and property. Many felt that the operation 
could have been more successful if it had been carried out differently. The local people 
told me: 
We would have co-operated and removed the guns and returned to the spears. It's 
easier to control spears. With spears you have to fight at a distance of 100 metres; 
it's ajavelin kind of fight where one throws the spear not more than 100 metres. 28 
Interviews revealed that the government managed to retrieve only 200 guns from the 
area.29For six years after the operation there was relative peace between the Pokot and 
their neighbours (Marakwet and Turkana) in Kenya (though not with the Karimojong of 
Uganda). A second attempt to disarm the Pokot took place in 1986. The police force and 
the General Service Unit were excluded from the operation, which was jointly launched by 
the Kenyan army in Karamoja in Northern Uganda and in Karapokot (West Pokot) in 
Kenya. The Karimojong had attacked the Teso. However, as Dietz (1987) notes, due to the 
problem in the North, the Ugandan army was withdrawn. The Kenyan army operated on 
both sides of the border. It started as a small operation to look for cattle raided from 
Turkana, but it turned into a major operation. This time, the Pokot fought back, they could 
not stand another loss as happened in 1984, but also they had acquired enough arms to hit 
back. The operation was stopped due to the intervention of the Provincial Commissioner 
for Rift Valley. The Pokot felt the military forces were being used to harm them rather 
than to retrieve firearms. As a result, very little was achieved. The third attempt to collect 
weapons was in 1998. However, that disarmament effort only produced one gun (Mkutu, 
2001: 6). 
Interview, Moroto, 20 November 2003. 
27  See The New Vision, 15 February 2002. httpil/www.newvision.co.ug/detail.php?story 32737 notes that the joint 
Kenya-Uganda disarmapent exercise flopped in 1984 when the soldiers involved in the programme 
indiscriminately killed several Karinojong and raided several head of cattle. 
28  Field notes from PoJpt, Karamoja and Samburu, May-June 2001, July-August, 2002, January -February 2003, 
November 2003; September- October 2014 
29  Source did not want to be i4entife4.  The sources differ with Dietz and either way the results were small. Also it 
should be noted that local officials in the countryside often do not (may not) keep as precise records as are 
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In March 2003, several members of Parliament addressed Pokot professionals at a meeting 
organized by the Pokot Moi University Students Association. The MP for Kachiliba, Mr. 
Honourable Pogishio, called on the Kenya government to disarm the Turkana and 
Marakwet to end cattle rustling. 30 The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) pledged itself 
to security for pastoralists, but when security action is taken, it must be immediate to be 
effective and that has not been the experience in northwestern Kenya, where cattle raids 
have escalated. Just as the Minister for Internal Security, Chris Murungaru, had scheduled 
a high-level peace meeting in the North Rift 31 , three people were killed and bandits raided 
the home of the MP for Kapenguria. The IviP appealed to the government of Kenya to 
intensify security in his constituency and the district. He noted, "This attack shows the 
magnitude of insecurity we have been talking about in West Pokot." 32 In another incident 
three people were killed in Lokichogio when bandits armed with AK47 rifles stood in the 
middle of the road and opened fire on a vehicle on 27 April, 2003. Reacting to demands 
by MPs to have the Pokot, Sebei, Turkana and Karimojong disarmed, the MP for 
Kapenguria, Mr. Moroto, said that operations would not achieve anything. 33 
The Samburu have been disarmed twice, in January and August 1997. The areas affected 
were mainly Baragoi and Nyiro divisions. The number of arms collected totalled 84, most 
being AK-47's. 34 The government's justification was that the Samburu had illegal arms, 
which they had been using for unlawful activities. As the number of cattle raids rose along 
with the number of people killed and injured, the government was under pressure to do 
something. They hoped that by disarming the Samburu, they would reduce cattle rustling 
in the area. 35 The arms taken from civilians by the government were returned to the 
Baragoi Police Station and later reissued to the Kenya Police Reserve as legal additional 
arms in the area.36 However, interviews indicated that the guns collected were obsolete 
and not functional. No automatic guns were gathered except for a few 303s, which are 
useless and fetch 'ittle money on the market. AK47s and G3s are seldom seen in the area. 
expected in Europe or Nofth America. 
Nation, 24 April 2003. 
31  Turkana, West Pokot and Marakwet 
32DaiIy Nation, 29 April 20O. "Three killed as minister plans tour of region" 
http.//www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNationI29042003fNews/NeWS29042003  I 9.html 
33 Daily Nation, 27 June 2003. 
i" Counselor Alose of Bendera Baragoi. Interview, 20 August 2002. 
35  Chief Security officer from Saniburu. Interview, Kenya Institute of Administration, Nairobi, 13 October 2000. 
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Counsellor Alose noted, "DisarmamentlAmnesty are not very successful; as soon as the 
government starts operations, the cries by politicians and community force government to 
abandon."37 
The second approach by the Kenya government has been amnesty for turning in illegal 
weapons. Amnesty is the least complex of arms collection programs. Following the 
signing of the Nairobi Declaration, former Kenyan president Moi announced an amnesty, 
Warning those trafficking in firearms to surrender all illegal firearms to the 
authorities within one Month."38 in 2001 and 2002 he ordered the residents of West Pokot, 
Marakwet and Baringo to hand over arms in exchange for amnesty. Pokot elders argued, 
"It was difficult for the Pokot to live without guns, while their neighbours, 
including the Karimojong of Uganda, were allowed to use guns like walking 
sticks39." 
The amnesty period expired with no arms being recovered 40. As a result, a public 
education campaign was launched to persuade the Pokot to surrender their weapons. Local 
leaders, in particular the chiefs, were used to educate their communities on the importance 
of giving up their arms. The government threatened to seize arms by force if co-operation 
was not forthcoming. In January 2002, the acting District Commissioner of West Pokot 
announced that the government was offering a further three-week amnesty period to West 
Pokot and Turkana residents to surrender all illicit arms, after which there would be a 
military crackdown41 . However, this crackdown appears not to have materialized 42 . The 
most recent operation to disarm the Pokot took place in January 2004. Again, no arms 
were recovered. 
The third strategy used by former President Moi was peace meetings with the pastoral 
communities. He hosted delegations from the affected areas to persuade them to stop 
36 FieId note interviews in Baragoi and Maralal March and August 2000 and August 2002. 
17  Ibid 
38 Daily Nation, 18 April 2001. "Moi offers one-month arms amnesty" See also Daily Nation 17 March 2000 
"Kenya Issues amnesty on small arms". 
39  Interviews Alale elders, Alale 3 August 2002. On 18 April President Moi gave a decree to all pastoralists in 
Kenya to surrender their arms. Se also Daily Nation, 17 March 2000, "Kenya Issues Athnesty on Small Arms." 
40  See for example Daily Nation 11 May 11 "Firearms amnesty ignored" 
' See Daily Nation 11 Januy 2002 "State issues three week amnesty for illegal arms" 
42  This was due to the election which brought the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government to 
power 
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raiding. He gave amnesty to all who would surrender their guns. Amnesty was not very 
successful because it was rarely followed with more forceful action. The government 
backed off when politicians and community leaders complained. If people were certain 
that arrests would follow the amnesty period, they would yield, but if they think the threats 
are empty (and history has supported that view) they will not comply. But also it seems 
that elders would mostly prefer police and the state out of their lives, but when their 
authority is flouted by warriors or commercial elements they may be keen to involve 
police or soldiers against their 'enemies' therefore it is not a clear cut situation as it is 
ambivalence on both sides. 
The policies of forceful disarmament, amnesty and peace meetings have failed, yet they 
continue to guide current national debates on the management of small arms. The use of 
force by the state widens animosity between pastoralists and the security or military 
forces, which in turn increases the vicious circles of violence and demand for arms. 
The Kenyan Government has sought in recent years (since 2001) to develop a more 
sophisticated framework for co-operation with pastoral communities in pursuit of 
disarmament. To this end, it established a National Steering Committee on Conflict 
Resolution, which is still in existence. The aims of the committee are as follows: 
To establish co-ordination, collaboration, and networking between government and 
civil society, with a view to strengthening and institutionalising effective national 
peace building and conflict resolution strategies and structures. 
Its responsibilities includes: creating a database on actual or potential sources of conflict; 
developing a national policy on conflict resolution with an emphasis on integrating peace-
building into development programmes; and organizing public consultation processes. The 
committee includes representatives from the Office of the President, from NGOs and 
religious organizations, and from the UN and donor agencies. An interim secretariat was 
created to serve the committee, which had the potential to lay a foundation for a more 
systematic and coherent approach to conflict management. The fact that it had the backing 
of the Office of the President meant that it could have played an effective role. To mark 
the third anniversary of the signing of the Nairobi Declaration on small arms, in March 
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2003, about 8 '00043  guns recovered from gangsters and cattle rustlers in various parts of 
Kenya were torched by the Kenyan Govemment. The Nairobi Declaration on Small arms 
was on March 15, 2000 Government delegates from the Horn of Africa and the Great 
Lakes region concluded a four-day conference addressing the problem of the proliferation 
of small arms and light weapons. The representatives of Burundi, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and 
Uganda signed the Nairobi Declaration, which attempts to tackle the problem. 45 
7.4 The Case of Northern Uganda 
This section considers past and more recent policy attempts to manage armed violence in 
Northern Uganda. The colonial administration had little impact on Karamoja until 1916 
when the first police stations were established. 46 The aspiration of the colonial government 
was to limit migration by limiting access to dry grazing areas, by the creation of ranches, 
and by fixing district and local borders to prevent migration. The policy was to settle the 
pastoralists, which alienated the Karimojong. The Administration of Justice (Karamoja) 
Act introduced permits for anyone entering the areas. Olara Otum noted the consequences: 
every time a government of the day made a deliberate attempt to alleviate the 
Karimojong problems the gun was not far off resulting in more conflict and the 
need for Karamoja to arm themselves. 47 
In the postcolonial 1960s and 1970s, lawlessness was seen as the principal bottleneck 
affecting the Karamoja region. The priority of colonial and postcolonial governments of 
Uganda was the establishment of law and order and respect for the state. 48 Just prior to 
independence, the Bataringaya security report of 1961 concluded that what was needed in 
Karamoja was a general showing of the flag in order to recover the lost prestige of 
u Daily Nation, 10 October, 2003 "8, 000 illicit firearms are destroyed in crackdown" 
However, given the soaring in armed crimes in Kenya one can only guess that many guns may still exist in 
civilian hands in Kenya. See Daily Nation 31 May, 2004 "High rate of crime causingjitters" 
http://www.nationaudio.comldailynation/nmgcontenetentry.asp?categirt_id398neWSidS8  
45  See http://www.ploughshares.caJCONTENTIBUILD%2OPEACEfNairobiDeClarOO.html. On the Nairobi 
Declaration. 
46  As noted in chapter 3 
' Olara Omara Kenya note address for the workshop on sustainable disarmament and development in Karamoja 
22-2 3 November 2003. 
48  The Bataringaya Security Report, 1961 observed that "we are not dealing with men and cowardly thieves who 
know that what they are doing is morally wrong and is not admired by society they live in, we are dealing with 
determined brave warriors who will stop at nothing to achieve their aim.., the only force that they respect is that 
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Government. The aim was to strike 'holy terror' among the people and show them that the 
Government has enough 'warriors' to combat their own and that they can reach any part of 
the District if and when need arises. 
Therefore, the policy undertaken to address security in Karamoja was a military strategy 49 
This colonial militaristic approach involving seizures of livestock seems to have continued 
into postcolonial Karamoja. Okudi (1992) describes the 1970s. 
The coercive arm of the state [the army and police] was taken to Karamoja to tame 
the pastoral society. In the process of exacting their dues, they acted with impunity 
and in disregard of the pastoral societies. 
Under Amin's regime, the Karimojong were forbidden from wearing their traditional dress 
of the skins and hides. The 1970s were times of continual raiding in Karamoja, and 
disarmament efforts were sometimes successful, which left Karimojong defenceless to 
external attack. In 1973 after refusing to obey an order to disarm, issued by the central 
government, over 300 people were killed (KWMP, 1997). During Amin's overthrow 
(1979), fleeing soldiers looted and killed Karimojong creating fear. 50 During Obote's first 
and second regime, he also used the militaristic approach and seizure of livestock. 
After coming to power in 1986, the National Revolution Movement (NRM) government 
supported the development of the vigilante system. The vigilante/warriors were allowed 
to keep their guns for self defence, for protection of the communities and to patrol the 
roads by foot. Detachments were established at "black spots", improving security to some 
extent. 5 ' The government also increased the presence of the army in Karamoja from one 
army barracks at Moroto to several barracks including the establishment of barracks at 
Abim and Iriri and setting up detachments in several areas. 52 Shortcomings in the strategy 
existed. The detachments became the targets of warriors looking for ammunition and 
arms. The UPDF army also became the target. The army decided to respond by use of 
excessive force to solve the problem, which could have been solved with negotiation and 
only superior to their own and the only authority, that which can defeat them." 
49  See for Amins times http://www.monitor.co.ug/specialincludes/ugprsd/aminlarticleS/ifldex.PhP  
50 See chapter 4. 
51  Observation and interviews in 2001 May and June. 
52  The Ministry of Karamqja Affairs was also created. 
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meditation53 . The army itself became the source of insecurity in the region by failing to 
link up properly with the local communities and acting on the basis of incorrect 
information provided by informers who were beneficiaries of past confusion. 54 
The result was loss of confidence in the UPDF by the communities. While the use of army 
and warriors provided an increased sense of security in the short term, in the long term it 
spiralled into a cycle of increased insecurity and violence. The increased violence led to 
crimes as it spread to Teso, Katakwi and Soroti areas. In brief, Uganda has attempted to 
deal with the pastoral crisis in the north through military force. 
On 21 November 2003, warriors attacked two army detachments near Moroto, and in the 
long fight, the UPDF lost many men. On 22 November, the Uganda government 
responded by sending gun ships and a major operation was expected. 55 The situation raises 
doubts about the Uganda government's policy and its capacity to provide security for 
property and humans to Karimojong. 
Branding 
The Uganda government has made substantial efforts to brand the pastoralists' animals. 
The programme started slowly in 1999 with sub-county brands, but there are problems. A 
Karimojong who steals Iteso cattle can say that he bought them in the market, as there is 
no efficient control mechanism. Interviews with cattle  traders indicate that the warriors 
sell the cattle outside the market. Moreover, if they are taken to a different county, control 
is not guaranteed because of corruption. So branding as a control mechanism is largely 
ineffective. 56  The local council fiv Chairman of Kotido, told me that, "The branding 
exercise got stalled for lack of money to py field workers." 57 
Disarmament. 
53  Field notes 2003 interviews with elders, MPs and even the warriors and women noted this. 
54  See A New Vision 23 May, 1989; See also Muhereza 1997b 
55 Researcher's observations, 19-23 November 2003, in Moroto, Uganda. 
56  FieldnotesfrQm cattle traders, Interview Namalu, 24 January, David Moni 2004 and alsQ Owalinga, John, 
Interview, Nabilatuku, 29 January, 2004 
57  Adome, Lokwii Callistiis. Interview, Moroto, 22 November 2003. 
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The main government response has been voluntary and forceful disarmament, and the 
creation of paramilitary institutions to achieve security and peace in Karamoja. 
Disarmament attempts in Karamoja have been the concern of both colonial and 
postcolonial administrations. The first attempt at disarming Karamoja was in 1962 in the 
widely publicized campaign named "mukuki"58 which flopped. Ocan (1992:16) revealed 
that extreme brutality was used in 1966 and 1968. In 1973-1979, Obote used repression, 
and the Karimojong became bitter and mistrustful of the Government. Between Amin's 
fall (1979) and Obote 11(1985) two further attempts were made to disarm the Karimojong. 
In 1983-84 when Obote returned to power he received help from the Kenyan military, 
including use of helicopters, and he again tried to disarm the Karimojong using force and 
brutality. In all these attempts, the Karimojong managed to defeat the army. 
President Yoweri Museveni tried to disarm the Karimojong in 1986. An attempt by his 
government to disarm Karamoja failed miserably even after many elderly Karimojong 
were captured and tortured. Concerning Museveni's attempt at disarmament, an 
eyewitness said: 
The soldiers gathered the old men and took them five kilometres away in order to 
find out where the Karamoja had hidden the arms. The elders told them that the 
arms were with the warriors, on the other side of the river. There are six thousand 
warriors with arms all of them waiting for you. The soldiers were beating old men 
with their hands tied behind their back, in an effort to find out where the arms were 
hidden. All they said was, the arms are with our sons. 59 
Some of the adults who were tied up had to have their arms amputated. Many died from 
the serious injuries inflicted on them by the soldiers. 6° 
In recent years there have been periodic offers of amnesty to tl9se who gave up their 
guns, but these initiatives have still been heavily based on coercion. As noted by the 
Uganda Human Rights Commission in a workshop in Moroto, "Force became the 
accepted method to settle the problem of Karamoja." 6 ' These efforts have also been 
58 Spears 
59 Field notes November 2003 
° ibid. 
61  Aliero, Ymara, Uganda Human Rights Commission, Speech opening the workshop on Sustainable Disarmament 
and Development Stakeholders Workshop, 22-23 November, 2003. Mt. Moroto Hotel, Karamoja, Uganda. 
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overwhelmingly unsuccessful; though one can argue that. Carrying guns in public, which 
earlier was widespread, has ceased, as observed in the field in November 2003. The use of 
force instead of solving the problem has further alienated the Karimojong from the 
government of Uganda. 
7.4.1 The Weapons Collection Exercise from 1999 to 2nd December 2001 
Insecurity and atrocities rising from cattle raids by armed warriors sparked an outcry 
among the neighbours of Karamoja. In response to the violence on 2 October 1999, 
President Museveni set up the Karamoja Parliamentary Group to investigate the situation 
in Karamoja and make recommendation for the reduction and control of firearms in the 
region. This was done between 18 and 29 October. Among the overall recommendations 
of the group was: 
A process of voluntary and participatory disarmament by the vigilantes to be 
preceded by a conscientization programme, supervised by independent observers. 
Individual gun owners were to be rewarded with a 'resettlement package' 
A re-organization of the security system with complete overhaul of the existing 
infrastructure in Karamoja, and that the UPDF be deployed at border crossing 
points to secure Karamoja against infiltration from Kenya and Sudan; 
The establishment of a more adequate judicial response to cattle raiding, and a 
Presidential Peace and Development Commission to coordinate peace and 
development in Karamoja; 
The disbanding of the concentrated kraal cluster system of settlement by replacing 
with a more dispersed mode of settlement as to prevent the organization of large-
scale raids; and finally the construction of dams to limit the migratory movement 
of cattle62 . 
In March 2000, a motion was tabled in parliament that later was incorporated in 
recommendations for security and disarmament in Karamoja. Parliament, in April 2000, 
resolved that the Karimojong were to be disarmed. In July 2000, a seven-month 
community-based initiative was announced which contained some innovative measures. 
62  Interview Honorable Lokeris Peter, Kampala January 2004. 
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In addition to offering amnesty to those who gave up their guns, the Ugandan government 
agreed to compensate them. By doing this, government acknowledged that guns are an 
important economic asset, as well as crucial for security. The initiative also sought to turn 
those who did surrender their guns into ambassadors for disarmament by using them in 
sensitisation activities63 . The authorities also tried to tackle the counter-productive 
activities of vigilante and Local Defence Units. It was decided to reduce the number of 
vigilantes on the Ugandan side of the border from the estimated 8,00064  to 146 in each 
sub-county and provide them with training. 65 This involved demobilizing 854 vigilantes in 
each sub-county from the previous complement of 1000. The remaining vigilantes were to 
be placed under much closer supervision by the UPDF. 66 These steps were accompanied 
by the most sustained efforts yet to close off the routes into Uganda used by small arms 
traders. The Uganda/Sudan and Uganda/Kenya borders were supposed to be sealed. 
Disarmament was delayed until December 2001, when phase 1 of the initiative began. 
The exercise was supposed to be in two phases. Phase one was a voluntary disarmament 
period from 2 December 2001, to 2 January 2002 (later extended to 14 February) 67 . The 
second phase, forceful disarmament followed from February 2002, to date. President 
Museveni himself went to Karamoja and spearheaded the sensitisation process before 
launching the programme. The incentives provided were ox-ploughs and one bag of maize 
flour for those that relinquished a gun. The mobilizers mainly the kraal leaders were 
supposed to be given iron sheets. Interviews with members of Parliament and other local 
leaders disagreed why about disarmament started when it did. They argued that Museveni 
was under pressure from the Teso and Acholi members of parliament to address the 
insecurity caused by the Karimojong. 68Being an election year, and being under pressure, 
he decided to go ahead and disarm, despite not being sure that disarmament would 
succeed. 
63  Field note Interviews Nakapiripirit, Moroto and Kotido districts June 20001, 2002 and 2003. 
64 Discussed in chapter 4 
65  Father Bosco, interview, Amudat, Uganda, 16 July, 2001 
66  Lokeris Peter op cit. 
67  And now being renewed afresh again see Monitor 9 July, 2004 "Kayanja heads to Karamoja 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/specialincludes/mplSupS/rWandagefllgefl4.PhP  
68  In the run up to the first Presidential elections under the movement system in 1996, the Karimojong warriors 
had wreaked so much mayhem in neighbouring districts that cattle rustling was to become a critical electoral issue 
among the opposition who wanted to discredit President Museveni. The President pledged in his manifesto to end 
cattle rustling by the Karimojong. 
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Museveni was under pressure to disarm the Karimojong but also, afraid that human rights 
organizations would complain. He included NGOs, human rights organization and faith 
based organizations to be involved in the disarmament in an attempt to improve civil/ 
military relations and restore the confidence of ordinary Karimojong. Also the Uganda 
government needed money from donors. The first step to disarmament was the formation 
of Civil Military Operation Centres (CMOCs), independent of the military and 
government which followed a workshop hosted by the Moroto NGO Forum (Riamiriam), 
the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) and Human Rights Development 
Programme (HRDP). It was attended by civil society organizations, religious and political 
leaders to discuss the way forward during the disarmament process. These CMOCs were 
information points and centres, established to assist the population displaced during the 
disarmament process. CMOCs had the following mandate: (a) to co-ordinate with district 
teams of civil society, local government and traditional leaders; (b) to assist anybody 
displaced by the disarmament; (c) to receive complaints against the military and take 
remedial actions including referral, and; (d) to gather information for all stakeholders 
including media (UHRC, 2002). The concept clearly emphasized human rights and 
required fresh mechanisms within which to operate. 
The CMOCs were intended to forestall situations that threatened human rights, and to 
build confidence in the disarmament process. They would provide legitimacy to the 
disarmament programme as an exercise to rid the region of danger. They would provide a 
basis for the continued involvement of the army and civil society in solving conflict on a 
common front. They would enhance transparency in issues of human rights, especially 
concerning the army's involvement. The final advantage was the link with ordinary 
citizens and the issues affecting them. The CMOCs were initially planned to function for 
the duration of disarmament (Ogwang, 2002: 1-2). However the spirit of the CMOCs 
changed when disarmament switched from voluntary to forceful methods, as everything 
was a promise and not a reality. Active members such as churches, donors (I-IRD-
Dandia!EU) found it impossible to continue their cooperation when the disarmament 
efforts changed to use force. 
According to interviews, in the initial stages of disarmament CMOCs had relative success. 
They created good relations between the public and the security and increased community 
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awareness regarding the illegality of carrying small arms. In June 2001, when I first 
visited Karamoja, carrying guns in public was common, but in February 2003 only a few 
warriors could be seen with guns, and in November, 2003, the carrying of guns in public 
was not common. Recovery of small arms was considered good as nearly 10,000 arms 
were recovered with no bloodshed during the voluntary phase of disarmament. Though it 
is not clear if the arms handed in were in working conditions. This was the first time in 
100 years that arms were handed in voluntarily, so this was an important achievement. 
This was attributed to the sensitisation work of the CMOCs whose mere creation was 
evidence that the highest officials in Uganda were aware of the problem of human rights 
abuses in the Karamoja region. 
Despite the achievement of the CMOCs, numerous challenges and constraints led to their 
failure. The former Resident District Commissioner for Nakapiripirit told me that they 
failed because of weak co-ordination at all levels between the Uganda Human Rights 
Commission, the office of the prime minister and local governments. "They are no longer 
functioning as of 2003.69  One senior government officer interviewed said, "CMOCs was 
only on paper. It was never practiced. The disarmament was being talked about in the 
offices, but the main stakeholder was the army."70 Women who were asked to comment on 
CMOCs said that the communities did not understand their importance. 71 
Problems with the CMOCs included inefficiency, a vague mandate, and lack of sufficient 
funding. The budget included operations, staff salaries and allowances, transport, centre 
activities, capital development. 72 The funding turned out to be insufficient. In 
Nakapiripirit the CMOCs received money from Lutheran World Federation already 
allocated to different activities. And a struggle developed by the various parties to control 
the funds, which undercut the smooth operation of the CMOCs, implying in general, that 
69  Lochap Peter Ken, Resident District Commissioner Nakapiripirit, Interview, Nakapiripirit, 26 Sunday, 2003. 
Also Honourable Lokawua, Michael. Interview Kampala. 17 May 2003. Also, Interview with a Member of 
Parliament who did not want to be named. Kampala, 18 May 2003 
70  It included the personnel of centres, and representatives of Lutheran World Federation and consultants. 
Recommendations of the workshop on security for the communities of Karamoja. Organized by Pax Christi, 
Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Programmed and Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPELN). Held at Mt. Moroto Hotel, 20-21 
November 2003. 
72  Each item was costed and a total of Uganda Shs. 111,622,000 per year was budgeted, of which capital 
items amounted to Uganda Shs. 5,950,000 arkiitl- kihd cottributions amounted to Shs. 8,760,000, leaving a 
recurrent cost of Shs. 43,912,000L The funding came from international donors, and was channelled to the 
Uganda Human Right Commission, which in turn channelled it through the Lutheran World Federation in 
Moroto. 
accountability was poor. However, the question remains: If the CMOCs had been better 
managed, and if the donors had diversified their support, would they have been effective? 
One is left to wonder, was the disarmament meant for the donors, Uganda central 
government, NGOs, faith based organizations or the community? 
A further problem was that seconded staff did not have terms of reference, and no 
procedures for their engagement were in place. Planners assumed that the military would 
share facilities, such as transport and offices, with civilians, which never worked. At the 
time of their conception, it was assumed that civil society would play a large role in 
running the centres. However, during the disarmament operation, civil society was not 
strong enough to provide the level of participation or capacity that was needed, and 
community based organizations could not handle the task due to lack of training. 73 Hence 
the UPDF ended up running the CMOCs. 
The CMOCs were not gender friendly; women felt most uncomfortable (Ogwang, 2002). 
No single CMOC had a woman representative, 74 yet they play a major role in the pastoral 
conflict and suffer most due to insecurity. This was unfortunate, for women played an 
effective role in convincing their male partners and sons to deposit guns at collection 
centres.75 Kuskus of Karamoja Agro Pastoral Development (KAPD) noted, "We had a lot 
of women complaining of violations of their rights." 76 Warriors, who are the arms users 
and perpetrators of crimes, were also excluded, especially in Nakapiripirit. 77 Furthermore, 
there were only 3 CMOCs located at district levels. No CMOC was located at the sub-
county levels where a majority of the community lives and arms exist; this adversely 
affected operations at community level. 
The relationship between CMOCs and local government started well but it later 
73 Field notes interviews January- February 2003, May and November 2003 also for details see Gomes and Mkutu, 
2004, Mkutu 2003. 
" Several different women confirmed this during researcher's visit to Moroto in November 2003. 
75 See for example ADOL, 2002:22 "The (women) expressed willingness to continue persuading their husbands 
and sons to voluntarily surrender the guns. They contended that wars have disrupted family life. The misuse of 
guns has created a large population of widows and orphans and emphasized that they would rather not be widows 
and have orphans as a result of the continuing armed conflict. While the (girls) continued to persuade their 
brothers and fiancées to surrender the guns. They argued they would not want to have absentee husbands or being 
widowed while young". 
76  Kuskus, Michael. Interview, Moroto, 30 January 2003. 
77 Interviews with warriors during researcher's visit 19-23 November 2003. They confirmed that they were not 
included. The elders and kraal leaders interviewed also confirmed this. 
380 
deteriorated. The local government leadership accused the CMOCs of running 
independently. 78 Coordination with the Resident District Commissioner was weak. In 
Kotido, people complained that the Resident District Commissioner was persistently 
unavailable, though during a workshop in Mbale he denied this was a problem 79 . 
The CMOCs mandate and responsibilities were not clearly spelt out. This led to a lack of 
proper training for personnel. Moreover, the relationship between the CMOCs and other 
institutions was not clearly defined. The responsibilities of UPDF were also said to be 
confusing, as the military took over the day-to-day running of the CMOCs, which 
undermined their civilian character especially in Nakapiripirit and Moroto. As funds dried 
up, all other civil society organizations disappeared, leaving the army to do the work. 
Another criticism of the CMOCs was the absence of liberty at the centres for granting 
victims of human rights abuses the privacy to speak freely. When these violations are of a 
sexual nature, such privacy is essential if the victim is to avoid re-traumatization. No 
procedure was put in place to monitor and evaluate the performance of the CMOCs, to 
enhance planning and to ensure that lessons were being learned. 
7.4.2 Voluntary8° Weapons Collection Phase 
The process of disarmament had two phases, the first voluntary and the second coercive. 
Meek (2000:168) notes "little research has been done on voluntary weapons collection as 
a means of reducing firearms... there is also little material available for research or 
evaluation." Weapons collections have a lot of controversy. This section examines their 
success in North Rift and some of the challenging issues. During the first phase of 
disarmament many arms were turned in. Figure 7.1 shows the number of small arms 
collected per county by June 2002. 
78  Achia, Terrance, LC5 Moroto. Interview, 30 January 2003. 
79  Workshop on The Challenges of Small arms, Capacity Building for Development in Karamoja. Organized by 
SNV/Pax Christi 15-17 May 2003,Mbale Uganda. 
80  Voluntary has been attempted in several countries, Albania, US, Australia, South Africa, El Salvador, by 
ti JJ army in Haiti and the United Nations in Eastern Slavonia. Most recently in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
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Figure 7.1 Arms Recovered 2 December 2001-15 February 2002 
Counties Jnits SMG 
Ak47 
SAR SLR G.3 LMG U2 gun She gun M4 NATO Pistol Home 
made 
RL' Total 
Labwor 67 WA 4/A WA 4/A WA 4/A 4/A 4/A WA WA /A 0 67 
lie 67 1026 170 0 182 2 8 4 49 6 2 /A 0 1516 
Dodoth 75 1614 191 12 186 5 9 4 31 17 0 4 1 2149 
Kotido 2640 1361 12 368 7 17 1 80 23 2 4 1 3519 
Matheniko 967 125 10 170 WA 10 2 28 9 2 4 0 1327 
Bokora 61 1337 110 70 47 1 20 3 14 0 4 3 1 1671 
Pian 820 112 60 49 WA 121 9 16 7 0 2 0 1096 
Chewii 608 103 50 1130 4/A 7 3 130 5 0 8 10 944 
Pokot 744 1140 42 82 WA 9 11 22 10 10 IT/A 0 1060 
Moroto 4,476 1590 232 478 1 67 36 110 31 6 17 2 6046 
Total 270 14232 11902 488 1792 16 168 76 380 108 116 42 5 9,640 
Source: 405 Infantry DDE healquarters. Also see Mkutu 2003:30-31 
In Kotido County 3,519 small arms were turned in, while in Moroto, which included the 
new district of Nakapiripirit, 6,046 small arms were voluntarily surrendered. The AK47 
was the most fashionable gun, followed by SAR and G3. During the voluntary 
disarmament 42 homemade arms were also turned in, which confirms that the community 
has the capacity to manufacture their own guns, as the pastoralists have local gun makers. 
Only the Be and Pokot did not hand in any home made guns, but that does not mean they 
do not possess the skills. It is worth noting that the Jie and Dodoth possessed the most 
sophisticated arms. These tribes are located closest to Sudan and have easy access to 
belligerents in the Sudanese civil war that are believed to supply weapons. 
Forceful Weapons Collection to Date 
In interview Honourable Lokawua Lotee 82 said, 
Today, if you ask the UPDF, they will tell you that the disarmament is still going 
on, both voluntary and forceful, but mostly forceful. According to us, it collapsed, 
and we need to resume. 83 
SI  Rocket launcher 
82  Lokawua is the Presidential Advisor on disarmament. 
Interview Honorable Lokawua, Michael. Kampala, 18 May 2003. Observation in the field in November 2003, 
382 
Figure 7.2 accounts for the arms that have been collected since forced disarmament began. 
Figure 7.2 Forceful Weapons Collection 15 February 2002 to April 2004 
Counties Units SMG SAR SLR G3 LMG U2
Gun 
S 
IGhUeN 
M4 NATO Pistol Homemade RL Total 
Labwor 67 N/A rA 9/A 9/A 4/A NJA 9/A 4/A 4/A 4/A 4/A 9/A 36 
lie 67 172 17 9/A 1 INA 9/A 9/A 2 3 4/A 9/A 9/A 195 
Dodoth 237 10 1 9 2 9/A 9/A 4 1 4/A 1 9/A 265 
Total 409 27 1 10 
Kotido  
2 9/A 9/A 6 4 4/A I 9/A 496 
,1atheniko 203 10 3 1 1/A 9/A 9/A 9/A 4/A 4/A 3 9/A 220 
7 193 8 1 4 9/A 9/A 9/A 9/A 4/A 4/A 2 9/A 208 
123 9 4 3 4/A 9/A 9/A I 1/A 4/A 1 9/A 144 F 182 3 8 2 9/A 9/A 9/A 3 2 4/A 3 9/A 203 72 3 1 - - - - - - - - 79 773 33 17 13 2 9 854 
Source: 405 Infantry DDE headquarters" Also see Mkutu 2003:30-31 
Compared to the voluntary weapons collection period, coercive weapons collection in the 
region yielded 854 weapons to date. 86 By comparison, not much has been achieved with 
forceful disarmament. In total, approximately 10,494 guns have so far been recovered 
from Karamoja. Again, though small, the 40 homemade guns collected is significant. The 
target for total guns removed from circulation was 40,000.87  Efforts at forcible 
disarmament continue at the time of writing. In January 2003, the UPDF stated that the 
number of weapons collected as of April 2004 was 10,494,88  or only about a fourth of the 
target. It is surprising that despite this number of arms being collected, overall misuse of 
guns is said to have increased 89  and now the state security personnel are victims 90. An 
issues that must be noted is that the disarmament meant to collect the arms that were 
and even September - October 2004 confirmed this to be true. 
84 Rocket launcher 
85  See Action for Development for Local Communities (ADOL). 
86  Some interviews indicated 1949 arms. 
87 UPDF, 'The Security Situation and Disarmament Programme in Karamoja Region' (briefing to participants at 
the National Strategic Planning Workshop for Karamoja, 24 January, 2003). Available at 
http://www.karimoja.org . 
ar UPDF. Op. cit 
See Olara Otum, Uganda Human Rights Commission, Keynote address for the workshop on Sustainable 
disarmament and Development in Karamoja, 22-23 November 2003, Moroto hotel. See Daily Monitor, 23 April 
2003. "K'jong raid Lira, hundreds displaced" 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/archives/2003main/apr/news/0420/news3.php . See Daily Monitor 25 November 
2003. "Insecurity worries Karamoja NGOs" 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/archives/2003main/nov/news/11 25/news9.php 
° See Olara 0mm, Uganda Human Rights Commission, Keynote address for the workshop on Sustainable 
disarmament and Development in Karamoja, 22-23 November 2003, Moroto hotel. See Daily Monitor, 23 April 
2003 "K'jong raid Lira, hundreds displaced". 
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already in the hands of pastoralists but the supply side was not addressed, for arms 
reduction to operate the supply side must be addressed. In addition, reliable sources 
indicated that the weapons that returned were the unwanted or non-operational guns, in 
order to get something back. Lastly most of the arms collected in Karamoja were not 
destroyed but some have been re-circulated back to the community. 
7.4.3 Challenges of Weapons Collection in Uganda and Kenya. 
The limited degree of disarmament failed to reduce violence and insecurity for several 
reasons. First was the northern security threat from the Lords Resistance Army. Just as the 
disarmament process started, the Lords Resistance Army hit, and the security forces were 
taken to the north to fight. Sacondly the pastoralists lost confidence in the ability of the 
government to protect them; law and order failed. As argued by Honourable Lokawua: 
A Karimojong is very intelligent. When Museveni came up with disarmament and 
said he'd protect the Karimojong if they gave in guns, the Karimojong gave him 
time. He came and in the first round most of the guns collected were archaic arms, 
those no longer useful, those that were not firing etc. The second lot was good. The 
people were still studying whether what he (Museveni) said would still happen. 
When they saw that the situation was not in their favour they started saying they'd 
better be patient with this because for them they don't come for raiding just at once 
e.g. 20 cows. They start with one then they see whether you'll follow and recover 
or not. When they take one today, tomorrow they'll come for two, the next day 
three and by the next month everything. So they were still at liberty because what 
was promised wasn't in place. The Local Defence Units they talked of were not in 
place. Because Local Defence Units were starving, there was no motivation for 
them; they were suffering in the same way the warrior does. So they didn't do 
anything. When the army especially chased the Bokora from the Katakwi side, 
they thought that the government would do as it had been saying. Everybody gave 
in guns. Some people had many guns, e.g. if you have three women, each with 
around six mature sons. It means all 6 of them have guns. So I pick one and take to 
Museveni and I'm given a certificate. How about the others that remain at home? 
Thus the surrendering was also not genuine. They were strategic in giving and they 
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wanted to test the government.9 ' 
During the Mbale workshop a participant noted that most disarmament in Karimojong has 
been half hearted. Instead of taking guns, the army has taken cattle. The Local Council 5 
chairman of Kotido noted, "Collection of guns was priority, leaving cattle rustling 
unabated."92 The situation is getting worse, with more raids."93 
The pastoralists are re-arming, especially the Pian. During interviews in the field, the 
owner of one of the largest kraals in Amudat said, 
The people of Lorengwat called on the Pokot to have peace with them. All their 
guns were taken during the time of peace disarmament, and they revenged by 
raiding Lorengwat, and the people of Lorengwat hit back. With this incident, the 
disarmament slowed as people started refusing to turn in their guns.94 
For the purpose of building confidence among the Plan, home guards that were considered 
vulnerable to attack from neighbouring ethnic groups were re-armed to protect them. This 
was done because of constant attacks of one clan by another without response from 
government forces would undermine the disarmament programme. 95 However, instead of 
using the guns for the purpose they were meant for, they turned them against the Bokora 
and Matheniko in the region, altering the balance of forces in favour of Pian 96. Interviews 
indicated local politicians encouraged this, in retaliation for what they went through before 
the re-arming of the home guard. For example, on December 29, 2002, Pokot clashed with 
Pian and murdered 10 people in Namalu sub County, of whom two were children. 97 
Therefore, one cannot pursue disarmament in isolation from the factors that prompt people 
to use guns. The lack of a mechanism to control the arms flows intensifies raids. 
91  Honorable Lokawua. Interview op. cit. 
92  Adome, Lowkii Callistus LC5 Chairperson Kotido, Interview, Moroto, 22 November 2003. 
93 Participant, "Breaking the Spiral of Violence: Building Local Capacity and Development in Karamoja, 
Uganda." Mbale, Uganda. 15-16 May, 2003. In November 2003, "Security for the people of Karamoja and its 
Neighbouring Districts: the Way Ahead," workshop organized by Pax Christi Netherlands, in partnership with 
Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Development and Kotido Peace Initiative. Mt Moroto Hotel, 20-21 November 2003. 
Observation indicated that the insecurity situation in Karainoja had worsened with the warriors openly attacking 
the army detachments. 
' Lowogonie, James, kraal leader. Interview, Amudat, 27 Januaiy 2003. 
95 The Pian, for example, would lose confidence in the ability of the UPDF to protect them 
96  In mid November, the army carried out a three-day operation against the Pian to crack down on warriors who 
killed 21 people and raided cattle in three separate incidents in Ngariam sub-country, Katakwi in September. See 
Etengu Nathan, 2003,"K'jong kill 26 rustlers" New Vision 1 December p. 9 
site visit in January 2003, investigator saw the graves of the children. The raid reportedly was a revenge 
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The incentives to disarm were inadequate and some were impractical. Initially people 
were optimistic about disarmament, some even expecting the incentives to transform their 
livelihood from dependence on cows to other sources of income. They were hopeful for a 
"Marshall Plan" by the Ugandan government to make up for years of marginalization. In 
interviews in June 2001, people in the affected communities talked about tractors 98 , micro-
enterprise projects, roads, electricity and security, to open up the area 99 . The Minister for 
Karamoja Affairs thought that the Karimojong should receive adequate compensation for 
the guns they would surrender during the voluntary disarmament program. The 
Karimojong consider the gun a currency that they can use to acquire other utilities as well 
as for guarding their wealth. The cry of the Karimojong is, "If you take them away, what 
shall we remain with? Give us entandikwa (money) so we can do arable farming and 
general commercial activities." 00 
The views of the minister coincide with opinions held by many of the Karimojong 
interviewed. Chepsok argued that they did not steal the guns; they bought them as an 
investment and to protect themselves, so it would be justified if they were compensated 
when the guns were surrendered.' ° ' Comments from elders, women and warriors, 
indicated that the people are tired of having the guns around, but many of them stated that 
guns are an investment. "We bought them using our cows." Though willing to hand them 
in, they were not willing to hand them in free. The lack of jobs to occupy youths who 
might voluntarily hand in their guns instead made them revert to raiding. Further, they 
claimed that security must be guaranteed by both states (Kenya and Uganda) before 
disarmament. As noted in a Daily Monitor; 
The Karimojong behavior can be attributed to the failure of successive national 
governments to protect them from the Toposa, the Turkana, the Pokot and to a 
certain extent inefficient NGOs.' 02 
The incentives given fell short of what was needed; many people sold the ploughs given 
raid. 
' In areas like Namalu. Napak, Iriri agriculture is possible. 
99 Mkutu 2003 op cit. 
100 Lokeris, Peter. Interview, Jinja, 12 November 2001. 
°' Chepsok, Christine, op. cit. 
102 Daily Monitor, Bullets, not guns are the problem in Karamoja, 20 February 2002. 
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them because those living on mountains, the plough was hopeless. Honourable Lokeris 
informed me; 
For the Pokot, it is sacrilege to tie a plough to an ox. They may have sold their 
ploughs. The Tepesi on the mountains may also have sold theirs because the 
mountain terrain doesn't allow the use of the plough. However, those who are 
selling are selling them within, e.g. from Pokot to Pian. 
They are not selling them to outsiders.' °3 
The giving of ploughs was also problematic as it reminded the pastoralists of past failed 
policies which focused on agriculture and attempts to settle them which the pastoralists 
resisted. Moreover, the ploughs were not equivalent in value to the guns surrendered, and 
the criteria for their distribution did not make clear who should receive them. 
As weapons collection proceeded, raiding intensified, commercial raiding increased, and 
efforts to stop the raiding failed.' °4 In May 2002, Karimojong fighters resisting 
disarmament reportedly killed 19 soldiers. The UPDF retaliated by setting fire to several 
Karimojong homesteads. At least 13 warriors were killed and the UPDF captured several 
weapons. A few days later, UPDF soldiers stripped and paraded over 50 Karimojong in 
Moroto town. The move followed the passing of a by-law prohibiting Karimojong men 
dressing in sukas.' °5 The by-law was justified on the grounds that warriors were hiding 
weapons under their sukas. The order was also intended to enforce moral sanity in the 
Karimojong whose men walk naked to this day.' 06 This in turn led a group of women from 
Rupa and Nadunget villages to protest in Moroto town, chanting songs critical of 
President Yoweri Museveni. 
On 3 January 2003, at the apex of the disarmament process, the Upe Pokot with the 
assistance from their cousins in Kenya raided a Pian settlement in Namalu. It was 
reported that they took 600 cows (my sources indicated 200) and killed two warriors and 
two shepherds.' °7 Apparently, it was a revenge raid undertaken after the Pian from 
Nabilatuk attacked Pokot /craals in Achirichori on 12 December 2002, and took 60 
103 Lokeris, Peter, Minister for Karamoja. Interview, 22 January 2003. 
104Hon. Adome, op. cit. 
105 Sheets of cloth wrapped around the body 
Vision, 14th May 2002. 
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cows.' 08 Three weeks later, on the evening of 6 January 2003, a group of UPDF, Local 
Defence Units (LDUs) and elders from Namalu moved to the village where the footprints 
were leading. On the way, a Pian diviner foresaw problems, and the elders did not 
continue. As the elders retreated, Pokot warriors ambushed the UPDF and the LDUs, and 
12 UPDF were shot dead. Eleven soldiers were injured, and eight taken to Amudat 
hospital. 109 These events amongst others show that weapons collection did not help 
transform the livelihood of the Karimojong but intensified inter-ethnic conflicts between 
neighbours and created a new dimension. 
Further, disarmament did not succeed because of the porous borders; the ethnic groups 
straddle the border and can move from one country to another when disarmament is taking 
place on one When the situation is bad in Kenya, they move to Uganda and vice 
versa. For example, there were many temporary displacements of Karimojong from Jie 
County and Pokot from Loroo and Karita. Some Dodoth were reported to have fled to 
Kenya with their livestock and arms to avoid disarmament. "These Pokot do not trust that 
the disarmament is for real; they think it is a trick from the government to take guns away 
from them and leave them at the mercy of their perennial Karimojong enemies." 111 "You 
cannot determine a Kenyan Pokot and Ugandan Pokot. When the situation is bad in 
Kenya, they move to Uganda and vice versa. This makes it impossible to manage 
them." 12. The result is insecurity and tensions in the receiving areas. 
A further problem was identified by Peterken, who noted: "Disarmament failed because it 
did not have a structure"." 3 Disarmament actually increased insecurity, according to 
interviews with Pokot elders, who said, "We gave Ugandans guns in exchange for peace 
and pasture."4The UPDF had increased its military on the border areas from 150 in 2001 
to 600 by 2 August 2002, especially at Karita. As a result, the Pokot noted that they could 
not access pasture because of the UPDF's presence. On the Kenya side there is not enough 
water and pasture. Grass and water is at Achirichori in Uganda. The elders argued, "We 
107 Visit site of raid and interviews with the bereaved, warriors and elders, Nanialu, Uganda 17 January 2003. 
108 Field notes from Amudat interviews January 2003 and interviews in Moroto November 2003. 
109 Field notes January, 2003 
'o See for example Kenya Times 19 March 2004. 
' New Vision, 18 December 2001; Daily Nation, 30 December 2001. 
112 Nyogesa, Joseph. Interview, Male, West Pokot, 2 August 2002. 
113 Interview, the foner Resident District Commissioner for Nakapiripirit, Moroto, 22 November 2003. op cit. 
114 Investigator's field notes, 2002. 
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have been lied to, and now we need more guns to protect ourselves." 115 One of the Pokot 
elders most wanted by the Uganda government said: 
UPDF crossed recently and we got together [fought them] and kicked them back. 
We are the security of the border. I am wanted in Uganda because of the recent 
fights in Uganda between the Uganda People Defence Force and Kenya Police 
Reservists. We hear they want to come and steal our cows. The Uganda Peoples 
Defence Force is beating common wanachi [citizens]," 6 who are not army, non-
combatants, fighting them with bombs. Our cows are in Uganda because of pasture 
and water. We need government to intervene for pasture so that the UPDF do not 
interfere. Our cows are in Uganda. Talk to the officers in Uganda. When my cows 
move into Uganda I do not want to fight with anyone." 7 
Interviews in Alale, West Pokot indicated that in the battle between the UPDF and Pokot, 
referred to above, the UPDF lost 28 men and arms to the Pokot" 8 . 
In conclusion recent weapons collection efforts in Uganda and Kenya are a source of 
spreading insecurity and tension as the armed pastoralists migrate from insecure areas to 
safe areas to avoid disarmament; thus insecurity spills to other areas. A half-hearted 
process of disarmament in one community while arming another community creates an 
arms demand and imbalance as the disarmed community looks for arms to avenge and 
protect itself. Most of the arms turned in are obsolete, not semi-automatic rifles or 
handguns. Uganda lacks a transparent disposal mechanism for relinquished small arms. 
There , is need for a system of arms disposal to assure the pastoralists that weapons 
collected will not return in the hands of enemies to terrorize them. Women are heavily 
involved in the conflict and greatly influence their husbands and children, but the weapons 
collection process seems to ignore them. Furthermore, measures seem to focus only on 
gun control, though the proliferation has already occurred, so this needs to be reversed ançl 
at the same time incoming supply quelled. For any weapons collection to succeed, 
enhanced security provision and political will by the central states (governance) is a key. 
115 Ibid. 
116 The LC5 Moroto Lokwii, op. cit, confirmed this. 
117 Mr. Armoit, elder. Interview, Naupongy, Alale, West Pokot, Kenya, 2 August 2002. 
118 Interviews, Alale, Kenya, August 2002 
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7.5 Co-operation Between the Two Governments 
One outcome of widespread insecurity in the Horn of Africa has been the growth of 
regional groupings to address the problem, though no formal sub-regional mechanism 
exists. The purpose of such groupings is to enhance human security through building 
strategies to the advantage of each of the member states and harmonizing security, foreign 
and trade policies at a regional level. In this regard Kenya and Uganda are members of the 
Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Co-operation 
(EAC) and Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD). The overlap of sub-
regional groupings makes it difficult for any one of them to formulate a coherent policy, 
though the most potentially significant is the East African Co-operation." 9 A key focus in 
these developments is the relaxation of restrictive border and customs controls. This 
change aims to increase legitimate mobility of goods and people, but the situation can be 
exploited for arms smuggling. 
Since 1997, both Kenya and Uganda have made attempts to develop a more co-ordinated 
approach to peace and security on their common border. In May 1997, they organized a 
joint peace meeting between the Turkana and Pokot from Kenya and the Upe Pokot and 
Karimojong from Uganda. Mr. Yusuf Haji, then the Provincial Commissioner of Rift 
Valley Province, headed the Kenyan delegation. Hon Peter Lokeris, the Minister of State 
for Karamoja, led the delegates from Uganda. There were three main outcomes from the 
meeting. Firstly, in order to improve security co-operation, it was agreed to increase 
border patrols and establish or reopen border posts. It was also agreed that there should be 
improved exchange of intelligence. Operational responsibility was given to the Provincial 
Police Officer (PPO) and the District Commissioners for Turkana and West Pokot on the 
Kenya side, and the Anti Stock Theft Unit, the UDPF and Resident District 
Commissioners of Moroto and Kotido districts on the Ugandan side. 
Secondly, various development programmes were identified as priorities, including the 
building of link roads, water development, development of human and animal health 
services, and access to basic education and telecommunication service. Lead responsibility 
119 Often countries are members of different overlapping regional groupings pursuing similar goals, which 
create competition for the meager resources available. 
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on the Kenyan side was assigned to the chairmen of the District Development Committees 
and District Education Boards who are the District Commissioners for Turkana and West 
Pokot. On the Ugandan side lead responsibility was given to the Chief Administrative 
Officers and to the Local Council 5 chairmen of Kotido and Moroto districts, working 
with the Permanent Secretary to the Minister of State for Karamoja. 
Thirdly, it was agreed that there should be regular follow-up meetings and monitoring.' 20 
Important as these agreements were, vital questions of governance, marginalization, the 
weakened authority of elders, and the broader relationship between security and 
development, were barely addressed. Despite agreement that there be regular high-level 
meetings to co-ordinate actions, relatively few have taken place. The Ministry of State for 
Karamoja has continued to liase with the Kenyan Government, and this has produced 
occasional positive results. In May 2002, with clashes intensifying between the UPDF and 
the Karimojong, the Kenyan Government agreed to disarm pastoralists crossing into 
Kenya from Karamoja region and return their weapons to the Ugandan authorities. This 
produced little in practice. There were also reports that Kenyan government officials had 
encouraged Upe (Ugandan) Pokot to flee over the border with their weapons in December 
2001.121 Most recently (in 2003) both the Resident District Commissioners (Uganda) and 
District Commissioners (Kenya) have met over raided cattle, and Kenya's Minister of 
Internal Security met with President Museveni of Uganda. Despite these attempts 
between Uganda and Kenya and the efforts to disarm the pastoralists, cattle rustling along 
the border persists, causing heavy human suffering. 
On April 12, 2003, Kenya's Pokot community reportedly attacked three villages in 
Kapachorwa district of eastern Uganda, killing over 30 people and torching 300 houses. 
They also stole cattle and left over 2,000 people homeless. Local leaders in Kapchorwa 
blamed the attack on the Uganda Government's decision to remove some 400 home 
guards to join the Uganda army, leaving the area vulnerable to attack. This caused the 
communities to demand arms for protection. However, Resident District Comrpjssioner 
Tezira noted that the attack was in revenge for a similar raid by the Sabiny from Uganda 
120"Kenya-Uganda Joint Peace Meeting between the Turkana, Pokot of Kenya, the Karimojong, Pokot and Their 
Immediate Neighbors of Uganda", Moroto, Uganda, My, 1997. 
121 IRIN, 10 Janu' 2002. 
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on the Pokot earlier in the month, in which they stole 200 heads of cattle. 122 The most 
recent peace attempt between Pokot of Kenya and Sebiny of Uganda at Chepchoina 
Primary School in Trans Nzoia on Monday 21s  April 2004. The meeting was chaired by 
the District Commissioner West Pokot 123 and Resident District commissioner of 
Kapchorwa,' 24 which among other things resolved that communication between security 
forces and administration be improved to assist recovery of rustled animals and arrest of 
suspects. It also agreed that security personnel be deployed in Kanyerus, Katikomor and 
Nkuyen areas, which were the areas targeted by rustlers. This illustrates once again the 
difficulties that have plagued efforts to establish effective co-operation between the two 
governments. 
Evidence from the field indicates that the pastoralists, who purchased their guns using 
their livestock, could not comprehend how ownership of these unlicensed weapons is a 
crime. Additionally, small arms are used for economic empowerment. Several people 
interviewed as well as legislators and other representatives of the area, felt that 
substitution was imperative small arms must be replaced with equally lucrative 
commodities. They also noted that since the area is insecure, security must be established 
before people surrender their guns. 125 Therefore the need for the two countries to address 
security as a development issue is essential. 
7.6 Protocols and Agreements. 
Political leaders in Kenya and Uganda have agreed on many declarations and protocols 
since 1998. The most recent is the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation 
of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of 
Africa. It was signed by ten countries in March 2000, and calls for states to strengthen 
national mechanisms to deal with the illicit arms problem.' 26 As of 2003 Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Rwanda, Sudan, DRC and Ethiopia have established national focal points.' 27 
122 IRIN, 14 April 2003. 
123 Kenya 
124 Uganda. 
125 Field note Interviews with MPs, elders, warriors and LC5, Moroto, Uganda 19-22 November, 2003 
126 See His Excellency Honorable Daniel T. Arap Moi President and Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces of 
the Republic of Kenya: On the official opening of the Great Lakes Region and the HQrn of Africa Conference on 
Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons 14 March, 2000. 
127 OperationaIition of the focal points has been an issue due to lack of resources andcapacity. 
392 
By adopting the Nairobi Declaration, the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa region has 
made important progress in articulating a collective framework for tackling the small arms 
issues. The declaration emphasizes a regional determination to imitate similar initiatives in 
Africa and elsewhere to evolve common strategies for dealing with problems of arms 
proliferation. 
The key strength of the Nairobi Declaration lies in its organizational principles that 
recognize that the prevalence of small arms is inextricably linked to civil conflicts, 
fragile state structures, economic deprivation, and social decay. This recognition 
has, in turn, compelled a search for strategies that span national, regional, and 
international domains. (Khadiagala, 2002) 
To reaffirm commitment to the Nairobi Declaration, ministers and representatives of the 
parties met in Nairobi on 7-8 August, 2002, for the first ministerial review conference on 
the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration. During the conference, they reviewed and 
approved operational guidelines and a working plan for 2002-2003 for the Nairobi 
secretariat. Among the priorities agreed was the urgent establishment of national focal 
points, or strategies for meeting the challenges of illicit small arms. At the regional level, 
the Nairobi Declaration proposes the creation of effective monitoring and control of 
transactions relating to small arms and strengthening sub-regional cooperation among 
security and intelligence forces to curb small arms trafficking. The meeting also agreed to 
the adoption of the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Committee (EAPCCO) on the Draft 
Regional Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. To meet these goals, it was also agreed to strengthen law enforcement agencies 
by developing common training curricula and proposals for joint cross-border operations. 
The Nairobi Declaration's ambitious blueprint nonetheless faces disconcerting 
impediments to implementation, given the weakness of the states in some areas and the 
different levels of development, resources, institutional capacity, legal traditions and 
expertise. As former President Moi of Kenya not4 in his speech to the March 2000 
conference, 
The governmflts in the region had the inability to successfully police their borders 
and the clandestine nature of the trade in small arms, it would be difficult for any 
33-. 
one state on its own to curb the flow of illicit arms with any reasonable measure of 
success. 128 
Lack of resources, and the resulting impracticality of some of the priorities hinder 
implementation of the document. The declaration is unclear on how to accomplish its 
goals. Implicit in the declaration is the assumption that its priorities be in staged so as to 
resolve the multiple political problems that impede economic development. It is worth 
noting that the Nairobi Declaration recognizes the essential links between human security 
and economic prosperity, and the regional obligation for comprehensive development 
measures to stem small arms proliferation (Khadiagala, 2002). Consequently, most of the 
provisions that underpin the Nairobi Declaration emphasize the resolution of ongoing 
conflicts and establishment of national regulatory frameworks to reduce small arms flows. 
The absence of development strategies in the Nairobi Declaration stems fundamentally 
from the fact that these concerns are better articulated in the existing regional economic 
institutions. The problem with the Nairobi Declaration lies in its failure to specify how the 
priorities can be incorporated into the mandates of the Inter-governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), and the East African Cooperation (EAC). Most importantly, 
implementation of the core strategies ultimately depends on national efforts envisaged 
under the framework of National Focal Points. In this respect, the Nairobi Declaration is, 
but an initial step. The principles of the Declaration would immensely benefit by being 
integrated into the mandates of either the Inter-governmental Authority on Development 
and the East African Community, thereby providing a solid institutional anchor, but in its 
current form, it does not possess any impact. 129 
Bilateral mechanisms that would serve as essential building blocks for a strong regional 
arms control regime are missing in the Nairobi Declaration (Khadiagala, 2002). In the 
absence of National Focal Points to ability to develop policy and institutional content to 
125 Honorable Daniel Arap Moi "The official opening of the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa 
conference on Proliferation of small arms and light weapons. 14 March 2000. See also Daily Nation 8 March 2004 
"Kibaki announces plans to increase police officers" Http://www.kentimes.comlnwsstory/news4.html . The 
President poind out that the current ratio of police coared to the total population was overwhelming and far 
below the recommended UN standard of 1:450. The current Kenya police ratio stood at 1:1,150. 
129 would be very near to impossible for the Nairobi Secretariat to be in corporate into the two bodies as they 
only represent East Africa and the Horn of Africa and not Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda and 
Burundi. 
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regional aspirations, the Nairobi Declaration will remain merely a set of declaratory 
principles. So far, the Nairobi Declaration has not been fruitful; most of the declarations 
were good but not practical. However, the Nairobi Declaration was a vital milestone, 
which followed four days of talk on small arms, and it led to the establishment of the 
Nairobi Secretariat in Kenya. 
Some bilateral mechanisms exist to respond to the problem of SALW, such as border 
security commissions. The Intergovernmental Agency for Development is one example. In 
1996, it was revitalized to broaden its mandate from simply addressing the problems of 
drought and development to addressing conflict management. In this line, the Conflict 
Early Warning and Response Mechanism was established at its summit in early 2002. 
Among other things, its vision aims to give civil society organizations an important role in 
addressing conflicts in the Intergovernmental Agency Development (IGAD) countries. 
The fact that countries in the region hold memberships in overlapping regional groupings 
raises concerns whether the mechanism and structures replacing individual country 
controls will facilitate or escalate the illicit flow of small arms across national borders. 
As with the Nairobi Declaration, however, little progress has been achieved. Major 
problems facing the various initiatives include lack of communication, collaboration, 
coordination and cooperation. They also fail to include the main victims, the pastoralist 
communities. Both South Sudan and Somalia are at war and major sources of arms, to 
pastoral areas, which makes the regional groupings fail before they start. These countries 
are among the main sources of arms, but are not part of the Secretariat. Another issue is 
the vague and unsure relations between civil societies, national governments and the 
Secretariat. Tensions seem to exist between the groups and the Secretariat, which makes it 
very unstable, needing the support of all civil society.' 3° 
7.7 Conclusion 
Neither Kenya nor Uganda has a stated policy strategy to deal with small arms 
proliferation. Though Kenya has one of the most rigorous arms control laws in sub 
Saharan Africa, the laws have not prevented the proliferation of arms. A policy on small 
'° The tensions clearly came out in the IRG/APFO Conference in 2002 held in Mombasa. 
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arms control has not been clear in Kenya. Stemming the spread of small arms in Northeast 
Africa must start with the premise that government protection, the establishment of police 
posts and patrol bases in pastoral areas, the replacement of informal voluntary security 
sector which are currently the official security at the community level, must take place. 
The absence of these steps remains the main impediment. 
Providing sustainable security is imperative in any weapons collection programme 
because the culture of self-protection and preservation that is endemic in pastoralist 
communities grew out of the government's marginalization of the pastoralists and the 
coercive militaristic operations by the two states against the people. 
The response used by the two states is not holistic and integrated, one that tackles the 
multiple causes of the conflict and offers practical alternatives; instead the states have 
merely tried to get rid of the guns. The methods have focused on proliferation of weapons 
yet the proliferation has already happened, which creates another problem of not just 
addressing proliferation but also reversing and controlling incoming arms. It does not 
address the security of property; issues of livelihood, governance etc. Further, the main 
goal should not be to end gun dependency and violence but to bring about social and 
economic transformation, which is likely to alter attitudes. 
Both states pursue policies of arming civilians, which is a short-term solution to the 
problem of small arms proliferation, and which ultimately leads to intensified insecurity, 
tension, and diffusion of more arms into society. As a policy, disarmament leads to 
heightened tensions and insecurity as people are forced to move where there is greater 
security, and they bring insecurity to those areas to which they move. Collecting weapons 
in an insecure area does not in itself therefore create peace and security. If badly handled, 
it exacerbates the security situation and leads to an arms demand, which is unlikely to 
result in reduction of arms and violence. 
Since the disarmament programme slowed, there has been an escalation of insecurity, 
especially in Karamoja and the border area of Kenya and Uganda. Cattle raids, roçl 
ambushes and unexplained murders are now common. The pastoralists haye ls 
confl4çpce in tlic se's ability tp protect them, and law and orjr has totally collapsed. 
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Planning of any future disarmament effort needs to incorporate the community i.e. 
community based organization, women and even faith based organizations and all its 
leaders who will be affected by the operation. Disarmament needs to incorporate 
provisions for "giving something back" to the communities as well as individuals who 
surrender weapons. Compensation is essential since many guns are an investment in 
family security. 
Disarmament needs to be carried out in co-operation with the local people and should go 
hand in hand with public awareness-raising programmes. The role of women as agents for 
peace needs to be fully recognized and women should be employed in developing, 
building, supporting and implementing disarmament initiatives. Finally, the programme 
must include regional collaboration in order to succeed. 
The policy of disarmament in both Pokot and Karamoja is defective, as it does not take a 
regional approach to disarmament. The programme has been inconsistent, and at times 
brutally coercive, without commitment to see the programme through to success. 
Imbalances have resulted, and the disarmed ethnic groups have become targets. While the 
Kenya government worked to disarm the Pokot and the Samburu, the neighbouring 
Turkana, Karimojong, Toposa, Dongiro and Merrille still kept their firearms. This is one 
reason why the disarmament efforts failed. For disarmament efforts to succeed, the entire 
border region must collaborate. It is necessary that the disarmament process go on 
simultaneously so that no one group can threaten others not yet disarmed. So far, most 
Karamoja leaders have expressed fear that disarmament will leave their people vulnerable 
to attacks from their neighbours, a sentiment shared by other pastoral communities.' 31 
Therefore Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia must collaborate. 
histead, the root cause of conflicts must be tackled. Disarmament will require reintegration 
of the demobilized warriors and their provision with sustainable livelihood, along with a 
system of tracking them to ensure they do not return to raiding and banditry. This lack of 
alternatives means that disarmed young men grvitate to the racketeers who need private 
13t See Recommendations of the Workshop on Security for the Communities of Karamoja. Organized by Pax 
Christi, Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Programme and Kotido Peace Initiative, Held at Mount Moroto Hotel, Moroto 
20-21 November 2003. See Workshop Report on Sustainable Disarmament and Development in Karainoja, held in 
Mount Moroto Hotel on 2 1-22 November, 2003 
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militias for illegal activities and who can provide pay or some other economic benefit.' 32 
In Uganda, current measures to reduce the number of vigilantes could simply play into the 
hands of the racketeers. Some disarmed young men may even find their way into the 
Lords Resistance Army' 33 and terrorist groups. 
There is an urgent need to create sustained day-to-day cross-border co-operation. Such 
collaboration should address more than just security issues as traditionally conceived. It is 
crucial that co-operative efforts tackle the root causes of conflict, especially the endemic 
competition over scarce resources and the wider lack of development in the peripheral 
areas. 
Evidence shows that communities invest in small arms partly for self-protection from 
raiders and from violent government forces. Karimojong note that the governments of 
both Kenya and Uganda believe in using force against them,' 34 and this creates more 
mistrust in the disarmed people. 
The Kenyan and Ugandan governments also need to co-operate with the governments of 
Sudan and Ethiopia, whose territory has been used as routes for the illicit livestock and 
small arms trade. A regionally co-coordinated disarmament initiative is vital if the arms 
that are picked up in one part of the region are not simply to be displaced to other areas. 
Such co-ordination should also embrace community-based initiatives, which are currently 
lacking. If all communities are not disarmed simultaneously, those that have been 
disarmed will inevitably be vulnerable to attack, as the ongoing disarmament in Karamoja 
has proved. 
To address these issues effectively, institutional mechanisms for co-operation and 
dialogue are required. The traffic in small arms in the region destabilizes everyone and 
needs international agreements linked to regional and local initiatives all pulling in the 
same direction. Until now, day-to-day efforts at co-operation have depended heavily on 
committed local officials, who have too often been transferred just as they were beginning 
132 Kenya Times 19 March 2004. 
133 This is happened to many of the 36,000 soldiers demobilized from the UPDF during the 1992-1995. 
134 Field notes, January-February, 2003, and confirmed with interviews, November 2003, including with 
Aliero Omara, UHCR Commissioner, Moroto, 21 November 2003. 
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to make a difference. 
The Nairobi Declaration was noble but does not include issues like militia concerns, 
which is a growth industry in the region. Weak governance, which is a major obstacle in 
the path to sustainable security in east and northeast Africa, is not addressed. 
The modern state need not ignore the rich contributions of the customary governance can 
offer. It is clear that pastoralists do benefit from government operating in good faith and 
service. If the overall goal of arms management is peace, security and economic 
participation of pastoralists, the strategies used should reflect this goal. 
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Home guards and chiefs in Dol Dol Laikipia, The guards are well dressed and visible as security, and have a 
car. This is what the government with private cooperation can do, August 2002 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
Chapters 3-7 have built a comprehensive understanding of factors in violent conflict in 
pastoral regions. The impacts of the conflicts and attempts at management have also been 
analysed in detail. Chapter 8 reviews conclusions from chapters 3-5 and their inter-
relationships and the conclusions from chapters 6-7. It then returns to the major 
hypothesis and the big questions and good practices, and ends by providing areas for 
further research. 
8.1 Customary Pastoral Conflict 
Chapter 3 explained how pastoralism is the main viable form of livelihood amidst the 
fragile ecology of the areas they occupy. Over the years, pastoral peoples have evolved 
an intimate relationship with their environment, with coping strategies that place a high 
value upon cattle. One of their coping mechanisms is raiding, which has been an integral 
part of pastoral life for centuries. The harsh environment meant that parties would raid 
their neighbours in order to redistribute cattle. Survival issues are intertwined with other 
cultural practices, as cattle are not only a means of security but also a sign of status, and a 
means of alliances and marriage agreements, which also contribute to stability within 
communities. 
Chapter 3 also looked at the social structures of pastoral societies, with regard to their 
influence on raiding. Traditionally elders and diviners instigated raids, and young men 
were the main raiders. But the elders also sorted disputes when they escalated and were 
policy makers and resource managers. Women played their part in encouraging young 
men to raid. Thus raiding was a community affair and raided cattle were retained in the 
community as wealth. 
In the last century there have been many changes in the traditional conflicts. The first of 
these began with the colonial administration that created borders, limiting the vital 
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mobility of pastoralists. They marginalized pastoral areas and encouraged 
sedentarisation, as it was easier to administer. Fertile pastoral lands were alienated as 
ranches and private farms. Thus competition for scarce resources became even worse. 
The colonial and post-colonial administration has been insensitive to the customary 
governance system. Therefore there is a social breakdown as the power of the elders is 
eroded, although in many places it is still stronger than the modem public administration. 
Young people are now more likely to raid of their own accord. Additionally, with the 
depletion of cattle in the region, the disenchanted youth have lost their traditional 
livelihoods and are more inclined to banditry and violent crime. The requirement for 
bride wealth is a further pressure on young men to go raiding, and in many areas the bride 
price has escalated. 
The customary conflict has escalated at regional, district and community levels, 
potentiated by the injection of the new technology of small arms as opposed to spears and 
arrows in the past. The traditional unity among pastoralists has been replaced by raiding, 
in which many lives have been lost. There have been violent conflicts at district level, 
and pastoralists have invaded settled areas, displacing other communities. There is also 
escalation of the conflicts into Sudan and Ethiopia, and arguably in the other direction 
too. 
Chapter 3 left us with some new and sinister developments in cattle raiding, again 
potentiated by the new technology of small arms. Cattle raiding itself has changed from 
being a means of survival to a commercial enterprise. The commercial raids are believed 
to be motivated by racketeers, many of whom may be well respected businessmen who 
now control the warriors and the arms trade in pastoral areas. As a result the cattle in the 
regiçn have been depleted and the conflicts intensified further. 
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8.2 Governance 
Marginahzation 
The range of policies pursued by colonial and successive post-colonial governments has 
led to the marginalization of pastoralists in the Horn. Colonial government policies which 
sought to alter, rather than build upon, the pastoral production system have been 
continued. The failure to appreciate the logic of pastoralism means that security and 
development are defined on the basis of erroneous assumptions. 
Pastoralists have little representation in political life or in high-level civil service jobs. 
They are never included in the participation of initiatives, projects or programmes that 
affect them. They have the greatest difficulty to be heard and involved. Due to their 
physical and social isolation, and migration, there are limited government services 
available to them. They also have limited access to formal education and exposure to 
modern ways of doing things, in comparison to agriculturalists. 
Karamoja region in Uganda is the lowest in terms of literacy. Only 12% are able to read 
and write as compared to national average of 60%. Only 6% of women can read and 
write'. Access to education is hindered by several factors; local customs and gender 
inequality, hostility to change, nomadic lifestyle; and insufficient attention by the two 
governments to alternative models of schooling. Additionally the small arms problem has 
further served to increase pastoral mobility and reduce access to school. Many schools 
have closed in pastoral areas, due to insecurity. 
In ecoiwrnic terms, pastoralists inhabit the periphery of the periphery. Most investment is 
channçlled to those areas perceived as having more potential or importance in national 
development. Pastoralists remain isolated because of limited economic integration with 
their national economies. 
'See Karamoja Strategic Planning Workshop, 2002 
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Infrastructure, which is the government's role, is also markedly limited. The North Rift 
districts have some of the poorest transport services in the region. Road transport is 
erratic. The self perpetuating problems of bad roads, irregular means of transport and fuel 
shortages severely curtail the movement of the majority of the pastoralists for whom most 
journeys, no matter how long and arduous, have to be made by foot. This constrains the 
attempts of security to contain the cattle raids. 
Attempts at Development by the States 
Approaches in the 1990s assumed that policies linking privatisation, land registration and 
titling with the provision of credit would lead to the take-off of pastoral development. 
The assumption was that ranching based individual control of land and resources would 
lead to more efficient production. These assumptions are flawed, deriving as they do 
from the belief that indigenous tenure systems impede productivity and development for 
some 'if productivity and development is defined as maximising profit'. The policies take 
no cognisance of the native population's indigenous knowledge and understanding of the 
local environment, and their solutions to practical problems of herd and security 
management. 
Management of Conflict 
Chapter 4 noted the way in which colonial and post-colonial governments managed cattle 
raiding conflict. Though heavy handed, colonial systems were seen as quite efficient and 
effectiye in minimizing raids. One important policy was that of tracking raided cattle and 
recovering them to their owners. The community was involved in recovery and 
community policing, which was seen as positive. Laws were created, such that 
individtals, and in some areas, communities were fined for stealing cattle. The failing of 
this system was the lack of discrimination between the innocent and the guilty, which 
reduced support for the administration among the community. Additionlly the 
community resented the "stealing" of their own animals to satisfy the demands of the 
military and the administration, leaving them depleted and encouraging them to raid for 
more. Lastly, the justice system in pastoral areas did not keep pace with the policing, 
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which again reduced confidence in the administration as a whole, since guilty individuals 
did not receive timely punishment and remained as troublemakers in society. 
Post-colonial policies were expected to be more "people friendly"; however, they altered 
very little. For the Karimojong, who had always resented state interference, there evolved 
a confrontational relationship with the state. This led the state, beginning with Amin and 
followed up by Obote, to decide on a militaristic approach, which has been largely 
unsuccessful in managing conflict within the region. There may have been some 
opportunities for peaceful negotiation and dialogue with the customary governance 
institutions, which remain powerful in Karamoja, but these have been inadequately 
pursued. It must be said however, that Museveni has attempted this to some extent. Once 
again, the state, in the form of the military, has been seen to take for themselves 
Karamoja cattle, leading to more resentment and confrontation. 
The legacy of the British, upon leaving Kenya, was peace for many years. The efficient 
systems remained in place, keeping a lid on cattle raiding for a time. However there is 
evidence that the provincial administration, which was supposed to act in the interests of 
the communities, remained oppressive and corrupt, as was the central government. 
Additionally the areas were marginalized further and policing was under-resourced, such 
that stock theft recovery began to fail, and raiding to escalate. There was lack of 
consistency and fairness amongst many but not all provincial administrators, and well-
connected individuals were implicated in cattle raids. It must be noted however that 
provincial administrators cannot be blamed entirely for the misdeeds of central 
government. 
Paramilitary Institjitions 
The increase in insecurity among pastoralists has made the states support the 
development of vigilant groups and local defence units. These groups have been armed 
by the states. Some of the arms being given to these autonomous groups end up being 
used for criminal purposes. Instead of providing human security, it fosters anarchy. The 
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rise of semi-autonomous security forces is at the centre of bad governance and the 
inability of the state to fulfil their responsibilities to pastoral communities. By using 
vigilantes, states abdicate their role of protecting life and property. Though the states 
have formed the paramilitary institutions, the legality of the paramilitary institutions is 
questionable. Even in Kenya where the home guards are embedded in the constitution, 
they are not treated with justice, and are not paid, which leads to their involvement in 
raids. 
They also lack clear command structures, which are not defined and there is a lack of 
communication between them and the state, which readily arms them. The lack of policy 
to regulate the paramilitary forces creates problems of coordination and control, which 
compound the current security predicament in North Rift. 
Elders in Uganda permitted their sons to join the LDUs in order to protect communities. 
Now LDUs live in barracks and fight the LRA while the place they are needed is the 
kraals. Due to the corruption in the military and the inability to pay their salaries they are 
now deserting. Those who desert leave with arms, ammunition and military expertise 
leading to more proliferation of illegal arms in the community, and training of fellow 
warriors to fight the UPDF. 
Apart from the vigilantes the emergence of and development of militia by the state is a 
worry. The development of militias by the Uganda government is a breeding ground for 
future warlords, which is already problematic in Karamoja. 2 Therefore, while the 
acquisition of arms and the creation of vigilante and paramilitary security structures 
provide an incrçased sense of 'security' to the pastoral communities in the short term and 
saves the exchequer, in the long term, it feeds a cycle of insecurity and violence, 
militariss the region and escalates the proliferation of arms and pastoral conflict in the 
North Rift. Arming civilians to fight rebels turns civilians into rebel targets and increases 
violence in the communities. They may also heighten inter-ethnic tensions. 
2  Again as noted earlier the term "warlord" is contested but for more details see Muhereza, 1997, Ocan, 
1992, Mkutu, 200-3 
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8.3 Small arms Dynamics 
Colonial history, Cold War politics, and poor governance have all been identified as 
factors causing or inflaming conflicts in the region. Throughout the colonial period, arms 
were brought into the region in vast quantities in order to protect the colonial regime and 
their interests. Later, during the Cold War era from the end of WWII to the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991s,   arms were used as a key instrument of diplomacy on the Horn 
of Africa. Arms sales in essence became a substitute for the traditional means of securing 
influence through alliances and deploying forces to protect "like-minded" nations. 
However, arms delivered during this period not only served the ideological struggle for 
supremacy, but they also enhanced regional hostilities and increased internal instabilities 
within Horn nations. 
Weapons brought in during this period have become difficult to account for and very 
challenging to control. Numerous countries in the region have experienced tensions and 
wars. It is a fact that, except for Kenya and Dj ibouti, all of the countries in the region 
have had leaders who assumed power through the barrel of a gun. These wars reached 
climaxes with the overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam by Meles Zenawi (1991) in 
Ethiopia, the defeat of General Tito Okello's military regime by Museveni in Uganda 
(1985), the toppling of Siad Barre by clan based factions in Somalia (1991), and the 
ousting of Sudan's elected government of Sadiq el Mahdi by General El Bashir's forces 
(1989). The recent wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Sudan, Somalia and Northern 
Uganda remain unsettled to date. All these conflicts have led to the arms flowing into 
pastoral areas where state security is absent or minimal. 
Regions in conflict are not the only source of arms to pastoralists. Arming by the state is 
mentioned in the above section on paramilitaries, and there are also flows of arms via 
corrupt military officials. There are official traders and racketeers selling arms in the 
region, a risky business, but with great financial return. Finally, a major source is 
acquisition by killing other warriors or the military. 
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On a local level pastoral communities are arming themselves for several reasons. 
The need to protect themselves and their animals against being plundered by 
hostile groups or other armed pastoral communities. The state police that are 
supposed to provide security are not often visible. If visible they are frequently 
corrupt or lacking basics such as fuel, equipment and adequate vehicles. 
Arms are used forcefully to steal stock from other pastoral communities. This has 
always been the case, which is why pastoralists were armed and organised with 
spears. 
Arms are now in demand to protect pastoralists against state security forces who 
misuse their power. In Karamoja, most police stations and barracks are in 
appalling conditions; thus police often resort to corruption to improve their lot by 
raiding pastoralists animals and selling them. 
Small arms and ammunition have now become a convertible currency to barter for 
animals and food. 
Most of the areas affected with conflict in the northeast Africa lie on the periphery of the 
Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia borders. These are mainly pastoral areas 
that get little state attention unless there is an insecurity problem For the last 120 years, in 
the absence of state security, people living in these regions have been taking care of their 
own security. During the Mbale Workshop held between 15-16 May 2002 on small arms 
it was noted by a participant that there are only five police officers in Moroto. 3 Most 
police stations are located many kilometres away from the kraals (homesteads). Access 
to the areas by administrators and security is difficult: hence the weakness in local 
administration and lack of law and order. Local Defence Units and homeguards have 
failed to effectively take on the role of the police in ensuring law and order. 
The affqrdability of the small arms and ammunition has increased the flow of arms. 
Prices have dropped from as many as 60 to 150 heads of cattle per gun in the mid 1970s 
to the current two heads of cattle per gun. The closer the proximity to the soulte, the 
This seems an exaggeration; in reality one hardly sees any police, even in urban areas such as Moroto 
municipality, Kotido town, and other upcoming trading centres like Namalu, Amudat and Nakapiripirit. 
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cheaper the arms. Ammunition in pastoral areas is now a convertible currency frequently 
used to buy the local brew mainly sold by women. The prices of ammunition have 
increased from 200 Uganda shillings in 2001 at the sources to the highs of 1000 Ugandan 
shillings in remote areas in October 2004. The increases in ammunition can be attributed 
to firstly, the failed disarmament, which started in December 2001 and ended in 2003 and 
the most recent re-launch in September 2004 by President Museveni, and secondly, to the 
increase in raids and tension in the last year in the region. 
8.4 Small Arms, Governance and Pastoral Conflict: Inter-relationships 
This section seeks to link together some of the factors summarised above, providing 
analysis of relationships between pastoralist conflict, governance issues and small arms. 
It is the issue of governance, which seems so often to influence the other two issues, 
though it must be said that good governance is certainly made more difficult by the 
existence of so much violence in the area. Governance 4 refers to the method of producing 
order, justice and peaceful management of relations in dealing with the complex 
problems encountered in a rapidly changing nation. 5 In chapter 4 governance questions 
emerged which were central to any hope of reducing numbers of small arms. The 
diagram below shows some important cause and effect relationships in the complex 
problems of the North Rift. The relationships are summarised and then certain 
governance issues examined further. 
promise was that Kenya would henceforth enjoy a culture of good governance and economic revival. 
Poverty would be eradicated. Jobs would be created for tens of thousands. The totally dilapidated 
infrastructure would be rehabilitated. Restoration of law and order and observance of human rights 
practices would be prioritized and security saw the old party being voted out. See Kenya Times 11 April 
2004 http://www.kentimes.com/l1apriO4/nwsstory/opinion1.html  
See for example 
http://www.irinnews.orglreport.asp ?ReportlD=39849&SelectRegion=East Africa&SelectCountry=KENY 
A. The report by United Nations Development Program/University of Nairobi identified lack of "effective, 
participatory and good governance" as one of the major causes of underdevelopment in Kenya. 
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Figure 8.1 Cause and Effect Relationships 
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The relationships above can be summarized as follows. Firstly, pastoralist communal 
conflicts are fuelled by competition for scarce resources and also cultural factors, 
exacerbated by a long history of history of economic and political marginalization by 
colonial and post-colonial governments. There is a demand for arms for protection and 
also for revenge against other raiding communities, such that raiding has been 
exacerbated to become a lethal business. Additionally there is a failure of government to 
provide adequate security such that the pastoralists take the law into their own hands. The 
gun is now viewed as necessity for livelihood in ensuring access to resources and human 
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the government, armed and given certificates to operate, but that they lacked equipment. 
The donors decided to provide a vehicle (a Jeep, able to run in the difficult terrain), and 
also bought the Kenya Police Reservists uniforms, boots, Motorola radios and batteries 
and even managed to arrange for a small salary. The donors gave funds for sponsorship to 
the community members willing to go for further studies. During the interview with the 
home guards in Dol Dol, they informed me that they have now decided to request another 
vehicle and binoculars to assist in security. 28 The ranchers employ rangers who have 
guns, and who, together with the Kenya Police Reservists and the Europeans that own the 
ranches, work in cooperation to repel cattle raiding. Attacks from Samburu and Isiolo 
have drastically reduced. 
The home guards are doing a good job because they have not been compromised to go 
raiding, since their welfare is well catered for. They are using their arms not for 
individual benefit but to protect the community. On the side of the Kenya government, 
the police have a radio connection with the home guards, but the government also 
provides daily monitoring and check-up for the issued guns and ammunition. The result 
of good governance and the cooperation of security with donors and local community is 
that pastoral conflict and cattle raids have been reduced. 
8.7.2 Good Administration 
Recovery of Cattle 
Chapter 5 noted the increase by cattle raids in Samburu as Samburu acquired arms from 
1996 onwards. 29 After years of the Baragoi community being terrorized, a District 
Officer Hussein Noor was appointed. Being of pastoralist origin and comprehending the 
value pastoralists place on cattle, he realized the importance of providing good retrievI 
of cattle in reducing revenge raids. He ensured that all the Kenya Police Reservists were 
well supervised; they were not allowed to move with their arms from one location to 
another. He told me, 
28  Currently a Chief in Do! Do!. Interview 3 September, 2002. 
29  In the interview with the community, the great loss in 1996 was attributed to the fact that the Samburu 
were not armed but had inferior traditional weapons like arrows and spears. 
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When there is a raid, I ensure that I go with the home guards. Being pastoralist 
myself I understand the pain one goes through when their cattle is raided. The 
high return rate of raided cattle has convinced the Samburu that their cattle will be 
returned.30 
In the case of both Samburu and Laikipia where governance was good, the small arms 
conflict has been minimized, given that the communities are sure the authorities will 
respond so that someone will follow and get their stock back. This prevents revenge 
raids, which escalate violence. However the frequent transfer of administrators from one 
area to another does not encourage this kind of tailor made governance. 
Disarmament 
Wajir in Kenya gives us another good example of administrative success, this time in 
disarmament31 . As noted in chapter 5, it is a major route of arms feeding the Kenya arms 
triangle. Interviews with local administrators from the areas indicated that mobilization 
of the community depended on effective provincial governance and its capacity. 
Interviews with state officials who served the region noted that "Wajir succeeded because 
of the Provincial Commissioner and local leader's ability to create trust with the 
community contributed to peaceful weapons collection." 32 The provincial administration 
convinced people of the negative impact of small arms, but also enforced local security. 
They assured the community they were safe without guns. 33 Sadly, despite the successful 
arms collection in Wajir, without Kenya patrolling the 1500-mile long Somalia border, 
arms will still continue to flood into Kenya. 
The above successes were possible because of good governance by the administrators on 
the ground, investment in the security sector (facilities and salaries) by both government 
° District officer Baragoi, Interview, Baragoi August 2002. 
31  See http://institutions.africadatabase.org/datalil2886.html  
32  District officer who served the area, interview, Kenya Institute of Administration, August, 2002 
13  District officers who served Wajir, interviews, Kenya Institute of administration, August 2002. 
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and the local NGOs, which ensured cattle raided were returned, hence no need for 
revenge, and lastly involvement of the local people and their elders. 
8.8 Conclusion. 
The study is guided by the following hypotheses about the pastoralism, governance and 
the proliferation of small arms in the North Rift. The first hypothesis suggests that cattle 
raiding is carried out both for subsistence and commercial purposes. Both of these play a 
role in the demand for arms. Secondly, security and governance does not act in the 
interest of pastoralists, raising the question "whose security?" The last hypothesis is that 
diffusion of small arms and light weapons leads to a localised arms race. It increases 
violence and creates a black market and networks of criminal activity in which violence 
is the norm. This in turn affects and undermines governance, development and the 
pastoralist way of life. 
The Role of Cattle Raiding and the Demand for Arms 
With unreliable rainfall in the pastoral areas, and the population continuing to increase 
pastoralists are forced to compete, like animals subjected to forces of natural selection. It 
is the responsibility of the state to manage scarce resources including wood, fuel, pasture 
and water, and ensure equitable distribution. However, reversing the history of 
marginalization and exclusion is a challenge for the states. 
As noted in an interview with Juma John a Senior Deputy Secretary with extensive 
experience as an administrator with the office of the Ministry of Home Affairs in Kenya: 
Small arms are just a subset of the conflict. Among the root causes is the 
competition for resources, resource distribution, resource utilization and sharing 
the scarce resources. Small arms are intertwined with development and decision 
making by governance, which exacerbates the conflict. 34 
34  Juma John, interview, Office of the President, Nairobi, Kenya 22 September 2003. John is a former 
District officer who has served most pastoral areas in Kenya. He was also the Chairman of the National 
Steering Committee on conflict in Kenya. 
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There is also competition between the pastoralists, the state and the private investors for 
the exploitationlconservation of the natural resources35 . 
The communities' perception of cattle and their dependency on the same for livelihood 
and income is a major root of the pastoral conflict. Cattle are also seen as a status symbol 
and playing a key cultural role as dowry and the creation of alliances essential for 
survival. These mechanisms remain intact today, owing to the harsh environment from 
which the pastoralists scratch a living. Small arms have become a necessary part of these 
traditions. 
The transformation of cattle raiding into a commercial and entrepreneurial activity has 
increased the intensity of raiding and is leading to major changes in economic, social and 
political structures in the pastoral areas in Northeast Africa. It is creating a black market 
for commercial cattle trading that straddles the localities, urban areas and the wider 
region. The new technology of small arms as opposed to the traditional spears has 
become essential to successful commercial cattle raiding. 
Pastoralists are therefore accumulating arms for cattle rustling protection and revenge 
raids, but also now arms are a convertible currency. A gun enables one to work as 
militia or a vjgilante, and is a prerequisite for joining in the cattle raids. Moreover it 
allows access to illegal incomes from road ambushes or other crimes. The change 
brought by small arms in the traditional raiding complicates any conflict resoluton 
mechanisms by the states in that they have also to address the problem of racketeers who 
are now entrenched and are benefiting from the conflicts. The situation is made more 
multifaceted with the involvement of government officials in the commercial benefits. 
The solution to managing the conflict then rests in bringing in policies to develop these 
areas through the provision of alternative livelihoods, e.g. bee keeping, gum Arabic 
harvesting, tourism, mining of marble, gold or ruby and others. Economic activities need 
to be suited to the environment and to the culture and lifestyle of the pastoralists, without 
Interviews between 12 September to 12 October 2004 indicate that the UpelPian Wildlife reserve has 
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demanding of them too much change. However, without security, sustainable 
development will be untenable. But without development, security too will prove elusive. 
So they must go hand in hand. 
It is vital to develop pastoral areas to ease the internal and external pressures especially 
during drought periods. The states could do this by allowing mobility but also stopping 
the alienation of pastoral lands. 
Security and Governance in Pastoral Areas 
The clock cannot be turned back to the customary style of raiding; therefore the state 
must do everything possible to stop raiding. It is only after the broader problems of 
governance are addressed that small arms can be managed. Any other mitigation 
mechanism will just be short term. The state is the purveyor of the policies that define 
resource management, security, development, what is morally acceptable, and forms of 
competition and co-operation. It is clear that the Kenya and Uganda are dealing with 
similar problems from different directions but the issue of governance must be tackled 
before small arms can be controlled. 
The governments of Kenya and Uganda often dismiss pastoral conflict as nothing more 
than a misguided tradition and this has been used to justify government inaction. This is 
another way of marginalizing pastoralists as people who are "difficult and backward". 
Unequal distribution of resources is another aspect of marginalization, which acts as a 
trigger to conflict and hence small arms proliferation. The negative impact of conflict on 
the socio-economic condition of a community results in further exclusion, as they are 
denied access to goods and services; hence the situation is compounded. 
Lack of security by the states is an important cause of pastoralists changing from using 
traditional weapons to small arms, with which they must protect themselves and their 
cattle, and also provide for themselves by raiding and ambushing. Provision of human 
already been given to investors from Libya by the Uganda government. 
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and property security from attacks from neighbours and also control of small arms is 
essential. 
As it relates to the North Rift, violence is no longer the monopoly of the state, as the 
concept would make us believe. On one hand the state has the duty to protect its citizens 
and provides security against the arbitrary violence of others; for this purpose it needs a 
monopoly of violence or a way to deter the violence. However the state has abdicated its 
role and allowed the warriors to terrorize citizens. This has allowed others to gain access 
to arms or the means of violence. This then has established the links between the sale of 
small arms and light weapons, governance and conflict, which is becoming a major 
security dilemma for the entire Horn of Africa. 
Unless the mitigation of conflict and insecurity is approached from the regional level or 
addresses the different levels, little impact will result. It is the regional aspect of the 
conflict that introduces the global aspect of the conflict. It is also the regional dimension 
that supplies and feeds the different communities competing for arms. Collaboration will 
be essential among the different peace building organizations at the different levels. The 
vastness of the borders, the Kenya-Uganda, Kenya-Ethiopia, Kenya-Sudan and Uganda-
Sudan borders, implies that mammoth amounts of resources are needed to police the 
borders, which the states cannot afford. The Uganda-Sudan border is complicated by the 
current civil war in Southern Sudan. 
The routes of small arms flows are very complex and states will need to undesthnd the 
dynamics for effective control. One cannot tell the difference between herders and arms 
traders. The nature of the problem calls for the use of local informants to assist better 
understanding of the patterns and root causes of armed conflict. Similarly for the two 
states to keep ahead of rustlers, they will need to identify how they operate and the tactics 
used. They must remember that the community is the eyes and ears of the security forces 
and unless their cooperation is sought, attempts at managing the small arms and rustling 
could prove elusive36 . 
36  This will need real time intelligence, human intelligence, and technical equipment by the police. 
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In the early 20th  Century, in order for the British colonial government to address the 
problem of arms and ivory trade in Southern Sudan they first addressed the issue of 
ammunition. 37 Current attempts to address proliferation have only addressed the issue of 
guns. The cost of guns in Uganda has come down, averaging 1-2 cows near to the source 
and between 3-5 in the interior. On the other hand over the period May 2001 to Nov 
2003, the cost of a bullet has increased from nearly USh200 to USh500 at the source, a 
rise of 150% in Uganda. In the interior it has multiplied from USh200 to USh 1000, an 
increase of 400%. In Kenya the increases are even greater. Ammunition control could be 
a short-term mechanism to tackle the problem of small arms proliferation. This calls for 
more research on sources of ammunition in the region. 
Another important move is reforming or strengthening institutions of legal systems and 
regulation (which cannot be addressed without proper central governance) and 
introducing development considerations into weapons collection and destruction 
programmes. At the African Union meeting on the prevention and combating of terrorism 
in Africa held in Algeria from 11-14 October, 2002 a plan of action called for measures 
such as: strengthening border controls and combating the illegal imports, export and 
stockpiling of small arms, ammunition and explosives. The United Nations Office in 
Nairobi is working on conferences as a component of its campaign for sub-regional 
awareness, and working with sub-regional police chiefs' organizations (EAPCCO) on 
small arms. The United Nations at Nairobi in conjunction with EAPCCO is also 
developing a training manual and curriculum for law enforcement officers in the region. 38 
Other approaches have been through pushing for reform in the security. All these issues 
fall in the broad area of governance. 
37  Discussion with Douglas Johnson, Oxford, 31 January 2004. Douglas served as the Assistant director for 
the National Archive in Juba Sudan. See his work on imperial Ethiopia in Southern Sudan- trader, arms, 
attempts at control, the complexity of arms control in a govern less area etc in the early 20th  century 
2002:219-245 
38  See http://www.smallarmsnet.org/docs/saafl I .pdf 
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The two states must now broaden security beyond just state and territory to include 
individual and property security. As declared by J. Stuart Mill, security is "the most vital 
of all interests' and that 'security of person and property are the first needs of society" 
(Acton, 1972) enhancing the capability and opportunities of the community to improve 
their own social and economic conditions. Security is ultimately achieved by state 
governance, which has the power to implement the policies. 
Good governance stops the racketeers (mafia etc) and power brokers accessing arms and 
the influx of small arms from countries in conflicts. Borders need to be better guarded, 
intelligence needs to be collected on the ground and communicated efficiently. In order 
for this to happen, the security sector should be transparent and accountable. This of 
course necessitates proper remuneration of those citizens that provide security. 
The absence of a legal framework for security and arming of vigilantes or civilians adds 
to the problem of SALW races in pastoral areas. A key issue in management of security 
is governance that will ensure that licit arms do not diffuse into illicit hands, as is the case 
now. There is an acknowledgement that the vigilante/paramilitary/militia are a reality of 
policing in pastoral areas. Their existence is dependent on the social, economic and 
political situation that led to their creation (bad governance). The worrying possibility is 
that if not checked they can metamorphosise into rebel groups, or encourage the 
proliferation of other similar social groupings, which increase small arms and violence. 
With good governance a paramilitary should not exist. Security could be achieved 
through community policing, which does not imply communities providing security or 
creation of police, but good relationship/co-operation between police and local people 
and leaders. When policing becomes more effective to provide human and property 
security, this would mean the role of LDU/KPR would be outlived. The Uganda and 
Kenya governments may argue that it is too expensive and difficult to have police in 
pastoral areas, due to mobility of the people and with cross border movements. Therere 
home guards may be decided on. If this is chosen as a long-term solution, they shouki be 
trained, paid and equipped by the governments. They could become a mobile police unit, 
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which moves with pastoralists. However, they should have a code of conduct. They 
should also have powers of arrest, but hand the criminals to relevant authorities. Again, 
these will require good governance and in the case of LDUs a legal framework in the 
constitution is essential, which again only the central governance and parliament can 
perform. 
There is lack of confidence in the security, creating mistrust, misunderstanding and 
hatred. Reform is priority, to ensure a peaceful and secure environment and to improve 
standards of training and professionalism in crime investigation and in dealing with 
pastoralists and other communities. A better equipped and more professional law 
enforcement agency could, to a certain degree, reduce the demand for small arms 
provided that this agency is impartial and can provide security for all. However, 
governance as a whole is the key to the security sector reform. The consequences of 
doing one without the other can be seen in the problems arising from disarmament. Both 
security and development are embedded in governance. 
Addressing the problem of small arms merely in the context of security reform, 
disarmament, and legal reform is limited and short sighted. SALW must be addressed 
with understanding of the multi-factorial nature of the problem. Supply and demand form 
a key component noted in the work that must be addressed. At every level, numerous 
players operate. Brokers, insurgents, criminals, racketeers government officials, youth, 
women, elders or organized groups. The study shows how due to unemployment the 
youth will be used and that unless something is done to put the youth into active 
employment, small arms will continue to proliferate. The inability of the Kenya and 
Ugandan economy to integrate the young generations in pastoral areas into the labour 
market, as they reach the age of normal entry, will continue to provide a teeming boost to 
illegal and criminal economic circuits and an unlimited reserve army for intra-state armed 
conflicts that are now a feature in the pastoral areas. 
It is vital also that governors (district commissioners, resident commissioners and 
security) understand the eccentricity of pastoralists who have resisted military approaches 
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in the past and are ready to do it again. Disarmament is essential for sustainable peace but 
the important questions this study raises are, how are the community engaged in it, what 
are the incentives, and for who is it taking place, the NGOs, the donors, the government 
or the community? 
Effective and efficient governance at the central and local level ensures valuable polices 
are formulated, and implemented, and that pastoral communities participate in decisions 
that affect their destiny especially as relates to development and security. The study 
shows that there is a problem with the way in which individuals and groups are included. 
Genuine participation is less about the particular structures of governance and more about 
how people feel the system works for them and how much they can change. Closely 
related to this are a number of other factors and efforts to address gross disparities in the 
distribution of wealth in the society are key. Good governance understands the need to 
progressively remodel its institutions to be more in tune with the traditions, beliefs and 
structures of its component societies. 39 
This is the duty of those in governance. However, this cannot solely be blamed on the 
current governments as some of the people, namely the Karimojong themselves have a 
historical confrontation relationship with the states, referring to them as anyang which 
means "the enemy". Two parallel governance systems have emerged, the modern public 
administration and the customary governance system. If harmonised, these systems could 
provide a valuable mechanism for peace building, peace making and arms control. 
The Downward Spiral 
One of the main emphases of this analysis has been to recognize the multifaceted ilature 
of the conflict and players. The research found that it is local resource-based conflict due 
to lack of water and pasture, but it has national, regional, international and global 
linkages. Small arms are not the root but symptoms of a wider problem. However, arms 
39  See East African Standard 20 June 2004 "Ours is a government of mass deception" 
http://www.eastandard.netlintelligence/inte120060403.htm  Development in Kenya. Any evaluation of 
performance and governance shows clearly how governance can deter development in all sectors. 
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have become entwined in the conflict making the conflict more lethal due to the high 
power of the arms and their easy availability and use. 'Governance' is heavily implicated 
in potentiating and failing to curb small arms proliferation in pastoral areas. 
The major symptoms of the small arms problem are: 
The breakdown of law and order with the emergence of racketeers 
(commercial enterprise) 
The declining power of traditional governance 
Injuries and misuse of arms with no-go zones and road ambushes 
Increased cattle raids and declining numbers of cattle. 
It is a tragic untold story, that these communities have suffered so much loss of lives, 
livelihood, identity and dignity. The acceptance of crime and large-scale death as a 
normal part of life, the training of a 12-year-old boy to carry a gun and shoot, without 
understanding the value of life is appalling. The stealing and mismanagement of a wealth 
of resources, including human resources, who could enrich the local populations, is a 
tradition that should be reversed. The resulting insecurity has already spread across 
borders within the Horn of Africa, and may further destabilize the region unless action is 
taken. 
Both the Uganda and Kenya regimes have failed to live up to this expected standard 
resulting in loss of lives and property, and great psychological trauma for the affected. 
This is "actionable state negligence." though the states cannot be held wholly to blame, 
and some of the difficulties they face have been mentioned. 
Good governance requires the rule of law, legitimate leadership, transparency and 
responsiveness. Democratic governments implicitly guarantee law and order and the 
proper functioning of government institutions. The inability to implement law and order 
is the main problem of insecurity but on the other hand, the state's weakness is due in 
part to the breakdown of law and order. However, experience shows that institutional 
instruments work better under good governance and democracy, since democracy is 
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responsive to the needs of all the people including minorities. Policies of exclusion from 
government are one cause of the downward spiral. When groups are pushed out of the 
governance process, they seek to literally fight their way back into fecognition. 
Governments must be challenged to be inclusive, transparent and fully participatory. 
The supreme method to mitigate pastoral conflict and small arms in the long term is to 
develop the institutions of governance that give people confidence that their differences 
can be resolved through peaceful means, a representative legislative process, a legal 
system that delivers justice without marginalization of any tribe, local government that is 
responsive to its citizens, and the honest and efficient delivery of social services. 
8.9 Future Research 
A number of areas have been identified as warranting future research. One area of further 
research is emerging issues of racketeers and their relationship with politicians, traders 
and warriors and small arms. The involvement of racketeers brings in to focus the issue 
of arms funding and the networks of arms trade across the regional borders. 
The research found that gender is a major issue in the pastoral conflict and small arms. 
Though the majority of the people being killed are male, women are also greatly 
impacted direcily, by violence, and indirectly, by changes in their work and family lives 
as a result of the conflict. Women are deeply involved in the ammunition sales as a 
survival strategy, and themselves are custodians of the arms in the home. A study that 
that focuses directly on the relationship between pastoralism, gender and small arms is 
essential to understand their role and how the conflict is affecting them. The phenomena 
of involvement of women could be due to survival wartime strategies but more 
investigation is needed and could yield some valuable insights into the main role gender 
plays in conflict and peacemaking in pastoral areas. 
Another area for further research is the pastoral warriors and small arms. The áge'st 
system which warriors come under, functions as the agent of military and political action. 
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Age structure has fascinated many anthropologists due to their regulation and structures. 
It is only by understanding the organizations, the functions and sources of arms to these 
groups that one can develop policy on managing small arms. The age-set and specifically 
warriors provide a systematic framework for generating communal identities from enmity 
and belligerence. Also the role of diviners and elders in conflict and peacemaking 
deserves fuller understanding, given that the informal governance system remains strong. 
Lastly, a dilemma about the commercialised cattle rustling is that it does not interrupt the 
cattle markets. This is because of its links with the political leadership, implying a well 
co-coordinated network of transitional business crime given its high profit margin. 
Individuals, particularly political leaders remain key in the efforts to stem the small arms 
problem. They must provide favourable environment for the implementation, 
enforcement of domestic laws and measures to stop the arms problem. However, no study 
has examined the role of governance in the flows of arms. 
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security in the absence of good state control of raiding. The power afforded by arms has 
allowed some to amass cattle and weapons and so cash in on the conflict. 
The main supply of arms in the pastoral regions is from the spill over from the countries 
undergoing civil wars in the Horn and Great Lakes. 6 There are countries in the Horn 
supporting insurgencies in other countries in the region. Pastoralist areas do not 
manufacture any arms, such that the arms that proliferate are a consequence partly of the 
inabilities of the regional governments to address their supply and demand, taking a 
regional view. On the supply side it is difficult to control the activities of neighbouring 
countries but there is also a distinct lack of resources put into policing the area and 
properly patrolling the borders at national levels. 
Attempts to control insecurity in the region by providing paramilitaries have been poorly 
resourced and managed and have often led to further arming of the region, with 
subsequent anarchy for some and organised crime for others. Any prospect for good 
governance, observance of human rights, law and order and economic development are 
then undermined due to the existing insecurity. Clearly some do not have an interest in 
pursuing peace. 
The combination of small arms, poor governance and pastoral conflict results in trans-
national criminal networks in the entire Northeast and Horn of Africa region, forcing the 
states to divert the little available resources to security, instead of using the money for 
development. The final result is mistrust, hatred and impoverishment of the communities. 
Further Discussion with Reference to Governance 
From the above analysis it can be seen that governance is a key mechanism for 
addressing inequity, marginalized communities, cultural factors in conflicts, security, 
arms demand and supply and issues of alternative viable livelihoods. Kenya's special 
envoy to the Somalia peace process recently highligited: 
6  Southern Sudan, Somalia and Northern Uganda, Ethiopia and even Democratic Republic of Congo. 
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Bad governance due to flawed constitutions that deny majority of citizens 
political space is the main cause of many conflicts that have plagued many 
African countries since attaining their independence in the 1 950s   and 60s. 7 
A Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Labour in Kenya also echoed the same words 
for Kenya: "lack of good governance is the main cause of problems ... Corruption, 
inefficient management of public resources, reluctance and failure to involve the poor in 
the development process has contributed to the sorry state." 8 
Recently at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference in Nairobi, 
conflicts on the African continent were blamed on bad governance and power-hungry 
leaders. Conflicts are sparked by irresponsible and provocative utterances by politicians 
and their opponents. 9 This is also directly linked to corruption and lack of transparency in 
military in the case of Uganda soldiers and in the Kenya Police Reservists, characterized 
by the theft of weapons and bullets, which are then sold to cattle raiding groups.' ° 
For a long time, the customary Council of Elders in pastoral areas served both the 
political functions of public administration as well as the judicial functions of a court of 
law, adjudicating, sanctioning, and enforcing the sanctions. In many circumstances, it still 
operates effectively. The modern legal system has not been yet fully implemented and 
integrated in pastoral areas, whilst modern public administration does not recognize the 
customary traditional governance system. This weakness in governance has intensified 
1  Kenya Times, 18 February 2004 "Bad governance to blame for conflicts plaguing Africa". 
http://www.kentimes.com/nwsstory/other3.html. 
See Kenya Times 5 March 2004. A permanent secretary explains the cause of economic decay 
http://www.kentimes.com/nwsstory/others4.html . See also East African Standard 24 March 2004. The 
chairman of the just ended constitutional review for Kenya gives a brief background of the 40 years in 
dismantling of freedoms and democracy following independence; the establishment of one party rule; 
enactment of draconian laws like preventive detention and the intimidation of those who dared to criticize 
the government; the emergence of a highly personalized system of rule, with heavy reliance on patronage, 
corruption and plunder of the State, the decline of the rule of law, the transformation of the police from 
being protectors of the people to becoming their oppressors; the subordination of the Judiciary to the 
Executive; marginalization of social groups and communities; and the suffering of extreme poverty. 
Daily Nation, 8, August, 2003 :6 "Commonwealth MPs discuss wars" 
10  See for example in Kenya Daily Nation, 23 July 2003. "Police pay rise not enough" Noted that cases 
have been reported of police officers operating lethal gangs or renting out guns and communication gadgets 
to criminals. 
412 
conflict. Pastoralists have common wet and dry season communal grazing areas, where 
access is 'free' for all. Scarcity of resources has always necessitated negotiations with 
other ethnic groups. With customary institutions not being recognized by the states a 
potential peacemaking and peace building mechanism is being neglected. 
Neither police nor the army are even able to arrest criminals. When they do, armed 
warriors often overpower them. 1 ' For example on 23 August 2004 warriors mobilised 
against the Kaabong police station, breaking into the cells, freeing all the prisoners and 
destroying all files. They took charge of the entire police station, looted the guns and 
paraded through the town where they lynched one LDU commander and killed him. They 
then went to the UPDF barracks and wanted to attack it. They took charge of town. All 
the people in the town ran and gathered in hospitals for three days without food. They 
looted the town until the government sent helicopter gun ships to intervene.' 2 
The lack of policing in the area is illustrated again by an incident observed during the 
field trip on the way to attend a peace meeting held at Karita (Uganda) in May 2001, 
between the Karamoja, Sebei and Pokot warriors. The lorry carried 60-armed 
Karimojong warriors past the Kachiliba police station (Kenya) without being stopped by 
the security. It entered Kenya, and then exited into Karita in Uganda. After the peace 
meeting, the armed warriors took the same route back to Karamoja in Uganda, without 
security or any of the local governors from either side of the states stopping them.' 3 If 
animals and people can cross the border at will it is not impossible to smuggle anything 
across the border. 
The fact that in most cases the raiders plan, prepare elaborately for the raids, mobilise 
themselves, attack and take away stolen cattle without security counter is a further 
indicator of the reduction of the power of the states or a crack in the intelligence system. 
Field observation 23 November 2003. 
12  Interview Mark, KOPEIN, Moroto, 1 October 2004. Also interview with Hon. Michael Lotee Lokawua 
the Special Presidential Advisor Moroto, 29 September 2004. He noted that taramoja have no mercy for 
the army 
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Injustice creates tension and hence conflicts demand for arms by the communities.' 4 One 
of the Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace elders argued; 
Crime is committed and the criminals are identified, even arrested and handed 
over to the authorities, they are kept in the cells for a short period, and then they 
are released. When they return to the communities, they seek revenge against 
those who reported them to the authorities. So, in the end, we all know that it 
serves no useful purpose to report a crime or a criminal; and we keep quiet even 
when we see crimes being committed. Otherwise we solve the problems 
ourselves; and that only leads to more killing' 5 . 
Field interviews revealed cases where a rustler was caught, but because he was connected 
to a powerful politician, businessman or chief, the police would let him go. In such a case 
the actual legitimacy of the state may be in question) 6 
Although judiciary and police are in place in the case of Kenya and in Karamoja, lack of 
enforcement, border posts, police posts, and lack of political will, with favouritism of 
certain groups and harsh treatment of others are major problems. Lack of information on 
what is really going on, and a general lack of respect for law by the pastoral communities, 
render them ineffective. 
When the state responds to insecurity through the police, they inflict punishment as much 
as protection. This situation is central to communities' demand for arms. The result has 
been continued increased cattle rustling. The failure of governance has produced inter-
ethnic confrontations in the form of cattle rustling, and the loss of much life and property. 
' Ibid. 
14 Respondents alleged bribery and corruption of local leaders; it is quite difficult to confirm such allegations. 
15 Interview, author did not want to be named, Namalu, 27 January, 2003 
16  A motion calling for an amendment the law to make cattle rustling an offence punishable by life 
imprisonment was shot down in Parliament in Kenya recently. See Daily Nation 10 June, 2004 'Lts No to 
stock theft motion" Hon. Peter Munya claimed that rustling had graduated from a small time activity to big 
business, sponsored by prominent people in the society. 
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Marginalization on a background of scarcity, lack of security, and influx of arms 
exacerbating raiding has served to impoverish the region and diminishing cattle. Thus 
warriors lose their herding livelihoods and have to search for alternative employment in 
order to survive; in some areas crooks and entrepreneurs in others the racketeers are the 
only employment agencies' 7 in the areas. Thus the only gainful employment for the 
youth is security for racketeers, businessmen and traders or joining militias groups. 
The racketeers in Northeast Africa though still emerging, have helped to contribute to 
further state weakness since the funds needed for development are channelled to security. 
The power of racketeering must be addressed in any peace or conflict management 
attempts. The patronage and networks built by racketeers must be dismantled to create 
peace and sustainable development. Additionally any initiative in the areas must address 
rewards that such people offer the warriors, traders, politicians that they are linked to. 
There is a major potential for the development of warlords like the LRA if the 
racketeering is not addressed. 
8.5 Impacts of the Small Arms Conflict 
The spread of small arms and light weapons in the North Rift since the 1980s   has 
negatively impacted the communities in many ways. Small arms injuries can be counted 
like the incidence of any disease, and it is clear that a health crisis is intensifying given 
the scale of the violence. There are clearly some alarming statistics, especially in small 
clinics in Nakapiripirit and Matany, both in Karamoja, Uganda. The rates of small arms 
deaths and injury are related to the scale of the raids. Those most affected are males who 
are usually the perpetrators of the raids in the age range of 15-30, though there are 
worrying records of injuries to children, some of whom are likely to be young boys 
learning to raid. For several reasons the statistics are likely to underestimate the problem 
of both injuries and deaths. Small arms injuries are a preventable drain on resources. The 
17  In the New Vision, 28 January 2002, President Museveni noted that most of the recruits into the ADF 
rebels were young people who did not have skills to secure jobs. (Wasike, Alfred, Museveni defends 
Gaddafi ties, New Vision, 28/01/02 http: allafrica.com/stories/200201280513.html . The high number of 
young people without employment skill makes easy recruitment for abuse. 
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large number of small arms additionally dissuades medical intervention, as the area is so 
insecure. 
The police data show great human and economic impacts to the community from the use 
of small arms in raiding though the problem is underestimated due to underreporting by 
the community and police and possibly by inadequate record keeping. From the 
economic view, the people have suffered greatly. The cost is enormous although it is 
conceded that what is lost by one group is often gained by another. However the most 
vulnerable or less armed groups will lose the most, and with commercialisation of cattle 
raiding there is diminishing cattle and the concentration of wealth in a few hands. A 
possible by-product from the quandary of inequitable distribution of cattle due to raids is 
the formation of a pool of young warriors who are idle and can become a menace. 
With the high rate of mortality of warriors, there is an increase in dependent children and 
more widows. For women, gun violence is leading to new roles of managing homesteads 
and taking over entire workloads including security of the homes. But with the gun in the 
home, domestic violence could increase. Other traditional systems and values have been 
eroded with the use of guns including the increase in the authority of the youth vis a vis 
the elders. However, the elders still have legitimate power and this may be utilised by 
peacemakers. 
The armed conflict has interfered with the traditional survival coping mechanism causing 
a rise in internally displaced persons. It has also led to the creation of no-go zones, which 
have interfered with economic development, the potentially lucrative tourism industry 
and the contribution of NOOs. The data presented in chapter six reinforced the evidence 
that the cost of the small arms conflict in impoverishment, wasted lives, orphaned 
children, widowed women, and shattered communities are potentially huge and dismal. 
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8.6 State Armament and Disarmament 
There are two major interrelated sources of insecurity in pastoral areas in the North Rift. 
Firstly there is the insecurity due to regional conflicts in the Horn. This leads to 
lawlessness and spilling over of arms to civilians forcing the pastoralists to arm for self-
protection. Secondly there is the insecurity due to underdevelopment and marginalization 
of the areas. The commercialization of cattle raids, and the arming of communities by the 
states intensify these insecurities. It then tries to control the weapons but uses coercive 
force, which results in increased demand for arms through different sources. 
Chapters 4 discussed the state weaponization of communities in order to control armed 
cattle raiding conflict, whilst chapter 7 showed how disarmament was used for the same 
purpose, though at the same time armament took place. The following section gives some 
examples of the complexity of this picture of arms management. 
The Uganda government is recruiting Karimojong warriors to fight the Lord's 
Resistance Army in eastern Uganda. This could reverse the work being done to 
limit the gun culture in the region. 
In response to increasing violence against the Mukogodo Masai by armed groups 
from Isiolo, Turkana and others, the government of Kenya took a decision to arm 
home guards for the protection of the communities. The same strategy was used 
for the Samburu, who having no access to weapons had found themselves victims 
to the armed raids from Turkana. Similarly, in Karathoja, Uganda, the escalation 
and intensification of road ambushes and insecurity stw the birth of vigilante 
groups supported by the state. And in January 2003, the kàrañija Plan were re-
armed as home guards were given 650 guns by the state. This was for the purpose 
of 'confidence building' since they were vulnerable to attacks from neighbouring 
ethnic groups.' 8 
' Interviews in Namalu, Uganda January-February, 2003 and also 21 November, 2003 
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The states are therefore primary contributors to small arms proliferation in the 
region. The state's need and use of arms and the existence and efficacy of 
institutions and procedures for regulating their distribution to civilians deserve 
attention. 
Legal control is now an issue contributing to further small arms proliferation. 
According to the law of Kenya, the only person allowed to issue guns is the Chief 
Licensing Officer, so that for District Commissioners to issue arms to home 
guards is actually illegal. Yet the District Commissioners do issue arms to the 
home guards. 
Arming one clan or community against another by the state creates imbalance and 
triggers the race for arms as deterrence by the other communities. 19 
There is an increase in sophisticated weapons in the region, and, particularly in 
Uganda, a level of specialization and differentiation in the ownership of guns has 
developed. A class of weapons and owners has also developed which tends to 
concentrate most weapons in the hands of a group of chief warriors, racketeers 
and 1&aal leaders. 
The truth is that there are small arms linkages from the state's armouries to groups 
within the states and also from neighbouring states. For Kenya, the habit of 
issuing arms to groups is very recent. And again Kenya is very different from 
Uganda and the other states in the region, because it is only in Kenya where 
armed rebellion by at least one group does not exist, though the communal cattle 
rustling in pastoral areas is rampant. 
There have been three approaches to curbing the proliferatiQn of small arms and light 
weapons. Firstly, those directed to establishing legislation that would control the supply 
' As in the case of Pian noted above, when armed they decided to retaliate over what they went through 
before being re-armed. 
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of weapons. Secondly, those that focus on the reason for demand and lastly, those aimed 
at disarmament or weapons already in circulation. Weapons collection should be the 
desirable goal for the two states. However, without first providing human security (not 
just from other raiding communities, but also from the state security agents who raid 
pastoral animals and sell them) and economic development and livelihood, eradication of 
the small arms trade through weapons collection or disarmament will not succeed. As 
noted by Masinde et al 2004:98, 
The disarmament of pastoralists is a pressing policy question for the governments 
in the Greater Horn of Africa region. A broader approach to conflict management 
based on understanding the forces behind the emerging gun culture in pastoral 
areas should be considered. 
The proliferation of arms is likely to persist and to undermine the gains of disarmament, 
as confiscated weapons are replaced with new arms from conflict zones in the Horn of 
Africa and Great Lakes. Moreover as shown in chapter 7, it is noted that the people have 
the knowledge and skills of making home made guns. Therefore even if the AK47 is 
taken away, without providing security and reasons for armaments, the people will make 
guns. Chapter 7 showed that weapons collection is undermined by the fact that borders 
with Southern Sudan, Somalia and the Great Lakes region are not fully under government 
control, but also by corruption in the security themselves. Additionally disarmament on 
one border creates insecurity and tension on the opposite side, as the people not disarmed 
attack those who have surrendered their arms. It does not make sense to disarm one 
community while leaving its hostile neighbour, sometimes from across the border, fully 
armed. Disarmament also creates displacement as people flee to secure areas. 
Additionally, security operations and disarmament fail because the political arm of 
governance puts obstacles in the way. 2° For the case of Kenya with the most rigorous 
arms control legislation in the region, but with weak governance and enforcement, 
control is impossible. Attempts to continue reducing small arms by mercenary designs 
20  See Daily Nation 18 June 2004.Kenya Times 18 June 2004 Attempts at flushing out OLF rebels from 
Ethiopia. 
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(see Chapter 7), through amnesty or cash purchase will continue to be ineffectual if there 
is continuing re-arming by the states of some sectors of the community. 
On September 21, 2004 President Museveni decided to revive the failed disarmament in 
Uganda noted in chapter 7. He noted that the "disarmament was suspended to attend to 
the LRA problem, but given that the LRA banditry has now been totally defeated, 
attention is to be refocused on the disarmament programme in the region." 2 ' The 
disarmament programme starts on 1st November 2004 with peaceful means and 
forceful starts on 1st December 2004 as per a military programme supposed to be 
completed by 28 February 200522.  However, interviews on the ground noted that the 
reasons for the re-launch are political. Firstly, local papers confirmed the alienation of the 
Upe Pokot wildlife reserve discussed in early chapters was truly alienated to the Libyan 
government who are demanding security before investing. Secondly, President Museveni 
has decided to run for the 2006 election (his third term) and the population of Karamoja 
is only one million compared to 5 million people those from the neighbouring regions 
whom those from Karamoja have been raiding23 . In order to get these votes, he must be 
seen to be doing something about the Karamoja and the guns. The majority of the leaders 
interviewed are not prepared to talk due to the painful experience of the disarmament as 
seen in chapter 7, as poor methods were applied by the UPDF, no security was 
guaranteed to life and property, though the majority of the Karamoja would want the gun 
to go. 
In summary, firstly, the governments cannot expect the pastoralists to hand over their 
arms when their security is not assured. Secondly, without addressing the issue of 
alternative livelihood there is just a continual demand for more arms, to acquire and 
protect cattle. Thirdly, weapons collection requires a regional approach given the nature 
of the small arms diffusion in pastoral and border areas in the Horn re&ion.  Disarmament 
results in increased arms demand among the different ethnic groups and makes the arms 
21  Interview Hon Michael Lotee Lokawua the Special Presidential Advisor to the disarmament in 
Karamoja, Moroto, 29 September 2004 
22  ibidi Email communication 27 November 2004 
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trade business very lucrative. It brings lack of confidence and ill feeling towards the state, 
rather than peace. 
8.7 Good Governance as a Solution. 
Though it seems that pastoral conflict and small arms are out of control in North Rift, 
best practice found in the field indicates that good governance in security and 
administration is the key to managing pastoral conflict and small arms proliferation. 
8.7.1 Good Security 
Evidence from Dol Dol Laikipia indicates that good governance in both security sector 
and local administration has reduced and curtailed home guards being privy to raids. The 
senior chief of Dol Dol insisted that home guards (KPRs) are working with the 
community. 
Two communities, Seku and Ilngwesi decided to get together and have a joint security 
system. The two locations each decided to contribute five Kenya Police Reservists. With 
the help of some NGOs organization; Laikipia Wildlife Forum (LWF)24, Borana and 
Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 25 and in collaboration with the local Member of 
Parliament ,26  chief, and other leaders they developed a joint security network. They 
selected one individual as a commandant and one assistant. 27 A proposal was put to 
different funding agencies, arguing that they were members of the community, trained by 
23  Interviews with several MIPS, and local leaders in the fields who did not want to be quoted, Moroto and 
Kotido September-October, 2004 
24  It brings together all the different interest groups who are involved in wildlife, including ranchers, 
pastoralists from group ranches, representatives from small farming communities, the government and 
Kenya wildlife services. See at LWF http://www.laikipia.org/laikipia-foruni.htm  
25  The Borana and Tassia lodge are ecotourism projects managed by Masai themselves-
seehttp://www.laikipia.org/hotel borana.htm 
26  Francis Ole Kaparo the Member of Parliament for Laikipia West has been the National speaker for three 
terms. Even former opposition leaders held him in high esteem while he was in the Kenya National African 
Union, which lost the elecon in 2602 after 39 years. He used his governance skills to steer Kenya through 
the ethnic clashes npppo earlier, the budget fiascos of 1997 and in 1998 and also the invasion of ranches by 
pastoralists in 2000-2001. 
27  The commandant has 8 years of experience working for the Kenya Navy and is currently a Chief 
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Appendix 1: Workshops and Conferences Attended 2001-2004 
• Towards a Coherence EU Conflict Prevention Policy in the Horn of Africa. 
Enhancing EU Capacity to foster peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. 7th9th 
March Ethiopia- EU Conference- Addis Ababa 
• Small arms demand reduction and human security towards a people centred 
Approach to small arms. Toronto March 14-17, 2001 
• Small arms trafficking in the border regions of Sudan, Uganda and Kenya: 
determining the issues and setting the strategies, held in Jinja, Uganda 9-13, 
November, 2001 
• Improving law enforcement and operational capacity to tackle the proliferation 
of small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of 
Africa, 28-29 June 2001, Nile Hotel, Kampala. Uganda 
• The International Resource Group/IRG Regional Conference on Good 
Governance and the Rule of Law in the Horn of Africa, 11-13 September 
2002, Leopard Hotel, Mombasa. Kenya. 
• Security meeting organized by Moroto Resident District Commissioner for 
NGOs and local administration, Moroto 31 January 2003. 
• Breaking the circle of violence: the Challenges of Small arms, Capacity 
Building and Development in Karamoja. Mbale, Uganda, 14-16 May 2003. 
• Workshop on "challenges of Conflict and Small arms proliferation on capacity 
building for development in Karamoja, N.E. Uganda" Mt. Elgon Hotel, Mbale, 
Uganda 14-16 May 2003. Organized by SNV-Uganda and Paxi Christi 
Netherlands. 
• ACACIA- Conference University of Cologne, Konigswinter- Germany 1-3 
October 2003. 
• Security for the people of Karamoja and its neighbouring Districts: the way 
forward. Workshop organized by Pax Christi Netherlands, in Partnership with 
Karamoja Agro- Pastoral Development Programmed and Kotido Peace 
Initiative, Mount Moroto Hotel, Moroto, 20-2 1 November 2003. 
• Sustainable Disarmament and Development in Karamoja Stakeholders 
Workshop Organized by Uganda Human Rights Commission and Paxi Christi 
Netherlands, Mount Moroto Hotel. 22-23 November, 2003 
• Controlling the demand for small arms: The search for strategies in the Horn 
of Africa an din the Balkans This Hotel, Scheveingen, Organized by Paxi-
Christi Netherlands. 
The Hague, 8-9 December 2003. Pastoralism, conflict and small arms in the North 
East Africa: The Challenges of Insecurity and Attempts at management (the 2001-
2003 disarmament) in Karamoja, Uganda. A seminar done at St Atoney's college 
Oxford University, 31 January 2004. 
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Appendix 2: General Question Guide for all Respondents 
Goal 
Understand the problem 
Get useable data-facts on the trans-border dynamics of arms movement, costs, 
impacts 
Assess the nature of governance in the areas? Is there governance in terms of 
institutions of law and order- police, judiciary courts etc 
Security questions explored. 
Has insecurity increased in the area? 
What security problems do the communities in the study areas experience? 
What in your opinion is the cause of the insecurity? 
What do you consider to the be major security risk in Karamoja, Pokot, 
Baragoi 	and Do! Do! 
How has the problem of insecurity presented itse!f? 
In what ways has the security affected the people? 
What activities are most affected? 
What is being done to address the insecurity by the government, the 
community, religious organizations and others. 
What are the tiers of security in the areas? 
Disarmament 
How many times has the government tried to collect arms from the 
community? 
Why did the government decide to collect the arm? 
Was any gun-buying back problem initiated, if so how did it work? 
Has the government been successful in disarmament if not why 
What happened with the guns collected? 
What organizations are involved in peace in the area? 
7 What are these organizations doing? 
8. How long have they been involved? 
SALW, Demand, Costs, Sources etc 
Why are pastoralists demanding arms? 
Trans-boundary pattern of arms movements? 
Trans-boundary dynamics of interactions. 
What security problems do the people find? 
What are the costs of arms and ammunition, border areas and interior? 
Cross border nature of the small arms conflict 
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Customary Traditional Governance and Dispute Management System. 
1. Customary traditional governance institution system is visible? 
2. Are they intact or have arms affected them? 
3. What is their role in the small arms dynamics? 
Governance 
Is there Government on the ground and are service provide by the states? 
What is the nature of roads? 
3 Does the area have state security, what type of security exists, militia, 
vigilante, and army? 
5. How long do the local governors District commissioner/Resident District? 
Commissioner's stay? 
6 What is the relationship between the local council, the DC/RDC with the 
community? 
7 Are the institutions for justice on the ground i.e. courts, police if not why and 
how is justice ensured? 
Response by the state 
Policies of the States 
Attempts at the management of insecurity. 
4. Challenges of Management. 
5. Cooperation 
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Appendix 3: Questionnaires to Administrative and Senior Officers in Kenya 
Last District 	 Last Division. 
Last Name-----------------------------First Name 	Sex 
If border town name it................... 
Designation............... 
How long did you serve in the district......................... 
Name the nature of conflicts in the District according to the highest to the least 
Is there an increase in the conflict or intensity, if so, explain 
What security problems do people in your district experience? 
When did this problem start to cause concern (period)............................. 
Why are Kenyans, especially pastoralists' suddenly demanding arms? 
Has a chairman of security committees we have been arming home guards or 
KPR, what is the advantage and disadvantages of home guards? 
How can the problem of small arms and cattle rustling be turned into 
opportunities? 
How has the problem of small arms and cattle rustling affected the division, 
district you come from (it is a problem)......... 
If you worked on the border towns, what is the nature of the border? 
a. 	Security wise......b. Customs officers........................... 
C. 	Immigration.........d. Other........................... 
Does the border make a difference? If not explain.., explain.................. 
Is trafficking on the borders regular, occasional or is the supply of small arms 
becoming organized, why do you say so................. 
In Samburu and Pokot disarmament has been done was it voluntary?, what 
were the incentives given to the local people....... 
Why has Pokot been target for small arms disarmament? 
Has the disarmament programs been successful? If not why? How should be 
done to succeed? 
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What can be done to address the problem of small arms in Kenya 
What initiatives are being undertaken in your last division to address the small 
arms problem? 
What concrete results have these initiatives yielded .... ............ 
In your last station do have any knowledge of the existence of weapons caches 
(which).......... 
What are the routes of arms into Kenya? 
If you were to draw a rough map of the routes weapons take into Kenya, what 
would be the start off points, transit areas and arrival points............... 
The pastoralists are currently the most militarised groups in peacetime Kenya, 
what is the implication to the security of Kenya? 
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Appendix 4: Glossary of Vernacular Terminology 
Ajore 	 Revenge raid 
Akicul Half marriage 
Akiriket 	 Traditional council of initiated elders (juniors and seniors) 
Akoko Small theft 
Alokita 	 A group of women united for the purpose of communicating 
messages to the community through songs, poems, dances and 
speeches 
Alomar 	 :Group of cattle camps (kraals) 
Ameto: :Customary punishment by the elders 
Areom 	 Big scale livestock raid 
Asapan Initiation 
Ekeduara 	 Dreamer who predicts successful raids in Kotido 
Ekuron Insecurity 
Ekicule 	 Full marriage 
Emuron/Ngimurok 
	
Seer in Turkana and Karimojong 
Laibon 	 Seer in Samburu and Laikipia Masai 
Karachuna Young herdsman/warrior/raider in Karamoja 
Lokit 
	 East Coast fever 
Lopi't Anaplasmosis 
Ngidigidai............... 16-25 warriors in Pokot 
Moran 
	 Warriors in Masai 
Chinkororo 
	
Vigilante in Kisii- Masai border 
Amachuma Vigilante in Kisii 
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